THE BAY OF PIGS REVISITED FORMER CIA AIDE TELLS WHAT HE'D DO DIFFERENTLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000100250041-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 16, 1999
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: July 20, 1965
• Content Type: NSPR

Sanitized - Approved For Releas , t
CPYRGHT
JUL 2 0 1965
THE BAY OF PIGS REVISITED
HS)
A F.0 rM C e
Aide
The Evcl,lnRr&t ., Nen Dauer C~
rd e li, ile re
4 F
'FOIAb3b
' "?" "'?" 6 9t two omit 61~i11j=-(-~q LZ'RLSS
would have to be made up of ,
Now an etif th Theittihihc
xecuve oe caon wc acom a
CPYI GHlBy ERR KELLY Planes available on the opcu United Aircraft Corp., which' nied the award-most often
star staff writer market. Because of the distance has its headquarters here,' given to agents who have
hey would have to fly-1,200. Bissell sat calml in his bright. distinguished themselves in
onn.-If he h d; riles-this meant that no
it to (lo over again, the ch f white-paneled office toying with sec , e t operations-praises:
''architect of the i
n the Pi sft htcr planes could be used to a tiny rubber tire as he talked' Bissell for 20 years of govern.
13ay of
invasion says `he 'might ha ep ovide air cover for the B-26 ' of the tense days of, late 1960 ment service and for "blending
the United States r co,,n- lzc
e.b tubers and the men on the and early 1961; theory and practice in a manner
Cuban governmentin=csile a fl,g ound. Although he'has been given a unparalleled in the intelligence
,openly provide it with ?
tuna y I now believe it is better not., large share' of the blame for the- profession."
and "volunteer" fighting o
mn t try to organize an operation Bay 'of Pigs -fiasco,- he talked' Bissell described the citation
In an interview here yeste - o this kind' ff it has to be done dispassionately . and without wryly as "fairly formal and
day, Richard M. Bissell J ,o a scale or in a manner such . apparent bitterness. deliberately not revealing."
who was in charge of planni tl at the U.S. really, plausibly He made one mildly critical
'the invasion for the Centr, 1 c Knot occupy essentially a reference to another high-level Denies Lack of Restraint
Intelligence Agency, valid ever pi ssive role," Bissell said,
one
that off the the record. details, Bissell's recollections of
chances of keeping the U.S. rot 2 py plane and played a minor "I agree with what (Secretary; the events leading up to the
secret. r e in, the CIA-backed over- of State Dean) Rusk always. Cuba Invasion and the debacle
"The hope existed ? that- i . th ?ow of the government of I said, that there was. enough) itself coincide closely with a
could be plausibly disclaims G atemala in 1954, is convinced blame to go around so there; number of reports that have
was no ar
th t the U S
b
ui
` ab
th
ill h
t h
g
ng
y
w
ou
ave to inter j
e US got
owld b
..vernmen. W v e in.. the affairs of other - to shpts it,". areayeen published. But he
Bissell said,
'thought we could plausibly stat :,,;,~?~,;,,;.,:,..?;, differs sharply with some
;that this was an independen c itries with some frequency, ' Kennedy Remained "Warni" interpretations of those events.
operation, in the future. Those who accuse the CIA of
"But it became obvious to all . 'There 'is a succession of After the invasion had failed, operating irresponsibly and
that what was being done in places around the world where,i lie added, the relationship outside the normal restraints of
Cuba could not have been done it will seem essential and wise; between him and President government irritate him partic-
b p, fo the U.S. John Kennedy remained a ul"Aft
y an unaided exile group, . government to use. ?
i;I3isscli said. warm one.
its power to avoid an even tr l ydarh of chafing under
The operation, planned during w se outcome," Bissell said. "I Bissell He was c recallealled. "d. "Healways;was" " control and the need St te anoan]-
I the latter clays of the Eisenhow- all not one who wants the circle
, Hate everything with State and
i a ttr (lays
and the earlof such instances widened-God encouraging and friendly." Defense, I find this particularly
days no the tion dy the earl forbid-but, ..such cases will, Bissell resigned from the CIA, galling," he said. "If what they
days ofinvolved Ke the laadminis- of are where he was deputy director- say were true, it would oil
g o ` This is a 'distasteful form of! Plans, in February 19 course be highly improper, butt
a small U.& -trained tone, The new director, John C. Mc- ?
cqu]ppcd force of exiles on the intervention, but we have been; Cone, he explained wanted to` it would be more fun.
south coast of Cuba on April 17, int rvening in the affairs of reoranize the agency and this' He said the restraints im-
tl9R1. It ended in disaster on the co ntries all over the world for' would have involved s littin posed on the CIA are a matter of!
afternoon of_lpril 19- when the ye i's. The Marshall Plan was Bissell's duties between two public record in the case of the
. ably the -most massivc'r ay of Pigs.
invaders ran out of ammunition for i l interve mo since World people. Bissell said McCune: ?~
and supplies. it was the Iicnne a IL asked. him to stay and he be No one can deny that it'was l W.,
idy adnunistratiowa worst hour: lieved McCune was sincere in s disaster and that a lot of= s As it trnra out, the effort to "301110 people argue that such; this request, but he, felt the; People were wbong. But a
say it
on. cover up U.S. involvement was'r int(
l iing,law and orders can be decided to resigns wise one and was irresponsible is false on the
a limit on the operation _andb ni too," he declared, change record.
serious 1 y diminished .the ?T e question of propriety or, after h saresignati 1, tB s months' Kennedy Made Decisions on, chances of success-but '(lid not i propriety comes ?down ' toj . a call and was asked to come to From the moment
by when he
,succeed in hiding the fact of the tl s: 'Is it ever justifiable to' the White House. Currious about was first briefed by Bissell and
U.S. role-Tiffs; ea said, in er~ shed against a lawfully the unusual summons, he called Dulles at Palm Beach, Fla.,
? Early in the planning, foLt
government. . I : ' McGeorge Bundy, who told him shortly after his election until a
;example, it was decided thank there are bound to be' he was to receive the National Pitiful handful of survivors were
as ns w
hen it Is. ?__-- . .
d
awar
was not an-went Kennedy was kept fully
nounced,? but did get Into the informed and made the key
papers..: , . (decisions. niscau 9si i
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In a philosophic mood, Bissell; Lack of Bonibs 1Johnson, Star reporter and
said there is always a conflict, "If we had been able to dum !,author of the book "The Bay of
between the "operational"five times the tonnage of bomb. Pigs," that they were Jed to
people-usually the CIA or. believe they would get Ameri
on Castro 's airfields, we won]
Defense, who want every ad can air cover for the invasion.
!vantage they can get to do their have ? had a damned goo "We were told absolutely
assigned task and those who chance," he said.
Schlesinger, who now blames clearly before this-and the
have consider broader gov Cubans were told as clearly as
ernment policy-usually the himself for not being morgwe could express it cl them
State De artment. vigorous in his opposition to th .
P whole plan-for failing to "blowjthat they would not have active
It is the President who has U. S. intervention," Bissell said.
make the decisions. This the whistle on this whole non, The political leaders amongi
one of the most difficult a is sense"-writes that he doesn't eue of the most difficult tasks of the Cuban exiles complained
feel the second air strike woulclb' 1 th t fl were left out!
Be
tt
x me
nv on
t a zed?-
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V_ an aAe _a
warn more than once that there few ancient- planes could cause, Government could be estab-
would be a very difficult prob-ihe added. lished on Cuban soil and call for
lem with this armed, highly, "Viewed as' a military opera-. help.
motivated unit in case thejtion, the invasion could have Bissell says there Was no such
operation were canceled. We failed for a number of reasons," plan. Schlesinger doesn't dis-:
had no final plan of what would Bissell said. "It did in fact fail cuss this.
become of it. because of lack of control of the Bissell foresaw two possibili
"They (the exiles) were the air. ties for a successful outcome of:
most powerful military force "The invading force was the invasion.
between Mexico and Panama completely dependent on air In the first, a succcssfull
and it is entirely possible that support not just to keep the beachhead would have permit-,
they might have tried to seize a', supply lines open and prevent 1l ted strategic bombing of mili-:
.base in Nicaragua, Honduras or air attacks against the ground; tary targets up and down the
!Guatemala. There is not the forces, but also as the equiv- island, leading to the dis-
slightest doubt that they could,alent of artillery or heavy, integration of the Castro gov-
have defeated any Guatemalan',armor." 1ernment.
force. 1.
When Bissell learned that' Impasse, Then Elections
,Kennedy had canceled the,
Concurs With Schlesinger second air strike on the advice? In the second, an impasse'
Now, with the advantages of'of Rusk, he and Gen. Charles B. would have been reached in
hindsight, Bissell is inclined toiCahell, deputy director of the which the exiles would not have'
agree with Schlesinger that the !CIA, went to Rusk and urged been able to extend their power,
CIA people were so involved him to ask the President to but Castro would not have been.
with the plan that they accepted' change his decision. Rusk I dble to push them off the island.
"progressive modifications of! talked to the President and This might have led to a nego-
I i tiated cease-fire and free elec-:;
the plan so long as the ex edi-:asked if Bissell or Cabell want. 1'
ate
?
tion in,some form remained.?' led to talk to him. They declined 11 tions.
"We can be criticized for, "We felt that Rusk's position "I never
get into the operation'
allowing away towould would prevail with the Presi- ~,I except possibly in the event of a
go on this chipping dentf" he said. "I regret now
go le without insisting ationthe that.we didn't talk to him, but I1!stalemate to enforce a cease-'I
whole plan or on cancellation," , fEre, Bissell said.
Bissell said, changed don E his think mindwe.~~ would have t In his new job, it is Bissell's
.
Because we were so involved task to find new roles for United
in seeing it go ahead, we did notE Later Call In Vain - Aircraft in non-defense lines.
insist on as great freedom o[y Later that night-Sunday Looking out through the
action as we needed." Venetian blinds at the park-like'
April 16, hours before the start
Bissell still feels that the entrance to the plant, he re-
decision to cancel the second of the invasion-Cabell awak- marked:
'scheduled air strike by thelencd the President and pro- "I think any one who has
!Cuban B-26 bombers because of posed a more limited form of been down there in Washington;
a rising. tide of criticism from air strike, Bissell said, but his right in the thick of things;
'other countries might have plea was again unsuccessful. misses it when he leaves."
made a critical difference in the.' IMany of the Cubans who took.
part in the invasion told Haynes.
f t i
f
'
y
er y a
any Pl esndent. fi
"I am not about to be-I am have done much further dan~-of the planning. Bissell agrees
not prepared to be-eriticel... of_ age to U,S.? prestige. But he that this was true:
the President's decisions." doesn't agree with Bissell that it "It was unfortunate that they
might have turned the tide and couldn't , have been given a
"No Final Plan" made possible the overthrow of greater role," he said. "But the
Under instructions from the Castro. politicai leaders were hideously
President, the invasion wasi Underestimated Planes !insecure. Almost anything said
planned in such a way that it to them was immediately
d be called uc up until 2t Failure to destroy Castro'slcirculated in the rumor-ridden
could b the actual off operation. tiny, antiquated air force on the' community, in Miami. . We
ground left him with air superi-I n e e d e d surprise-and we
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., ority over the invasion beaches. couldn't . take chances with
historian and a, top-level adviser And while his planes did not do rumors."
'to Kennedy',; writes in the cur-Imuch harm to the' men on the
Two Plans
rent issue, of Life magazine ground, Bissell said, they blew
that he "believes .Bissell and pup a vitally important supply, According to one of what
Dulles, "perhaps . . . ' uncons- ship and denied the invaders Schlesinger refers to as the
ciously supposed that once the the help they needed from their= "mythologies" of the Bay of
operation began to unfold, it own planes. Even the Joint Pigs, the United States was
would not be permitted to fail.", Chiefs of Staff underestimatedlPrepared for massive mterven-
Bisell recalled' "We did the "catash?o hie" d I tion as soon as a provisional
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aoc'~s.-: fio'~.o,3et~~Aa:~eoffi.G 6~.J~.a.~uniw:.A~mR~.YaT.uf ~i.w:u?~uam.a..aWSaww.waa~ua~iiK,w~.+~+:^zc..:...+.fN,.,JC.eW., rvG,k.?a,d?:~a... -Yaidir'.
In this April, 1962, picture, just made public, Richard M. Ilissell Jr. receives the
National Security Medal from President Kennedy. In background, from left to
fight, are his son, Winthaop, and his wife and daughter, both named Ann.,, r .>,
0
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