KENNEDY VIEW ON CUBA AIRED PRESIDENT WAS SKEPTICAL OF INVASION, SCHLESINGER SAYS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000100250042-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 16, 1999
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: July 19, 1965
• Content Type: NSPR

BALTIMORE SUN
Sanitized - Approv J~1LFgr8I~lg~ase : CI
CPYRGHT UU
CPYRGHT
KENNEDY VIEWS Machinery Motion
Rut Schlesinger r said the initial
lo-ahead set In motion diplomatic
President Was Skeptibal 0
Invasion, Schlesinger Says
New York, July 18',W-The at
President 'John K }ggnnedy we
skeptical about the; g'dvisability
the 1961 Cuban iniision right u
to tha moment,lle.gave the fin
o?aliead; Arthu f' M. Schlesinge
Jr., historian and -former pro
idential adviser, said today,
Schlesinger made the stateme
in the second of a series of e
erpts from his forthcoming' boo
"A, - Thousands Days: John
ennedy in the White House.
The excerpts are being publishe
by Life Magazine. .
Mr. Kennedy first heard abo
the Cuban invasion plans from A
ten Dulles, Central Intelligent
gancy director, twelve days all -
er the presidential election, Schl
singer said.
? Plan'Far Advanced
At that time, the plan alread
vas far advanced and Mr. Kenn
y gave dimctions for it to. pr
kept some Government. experts
from giving sound advice on the
ill-fated projcct to Mr. Kennedy.
weeks that followed the briefing;
Incoming administrations wanted Deeply,Disturbcd
to make fundamental decisions,", Part of the determination tot
the historian' added, "and most!eep the scheme alive, Schles
)mgcr said; sprang from the em
mntters confinucd to move Alont;b
r
t
f
lli
.i
f
1
ar
assmen
n
ca
ng
t o
f
existing tracks. !Even if (he'.Cuhih hriaarie were.-
DuiL?s, . Schlesinger said.wnslsuccessfully disbanded, il% meml
not able jo provide the President- hers- would dispcr'se; disappointed!
elect. with any good, analytic nd?. And' lrhsentful, all over, Lati '
vice because he was so,personaily. America,
involved in the plan. Confronted by ibis argnmcnl
And,, lie indicated, some whh the President gave his okay.- to
might have given sound advice . the invasion with the stipilatIon
such as Ilobert Amory, Jr., ,that there be "no ?Lfnit.ed Slated
deputy director of the CIA for military intervention," a atipuln
intelligence-were not Informed tion t.o which no one involved
of the operation. made any objection, the historian
"Idiotic Effect" . reported. ;.;
"The need-in-know standard, 'When ? the mission began to
i.e.. that no one should be told ~faller....Srhle Anger. added, some
about the peoject unless it he- people,:-argued that the Unite
came . operationally necessary, f States' should commit forces' sav=
cad, with the understanding th
6 60--t AIA .-t -2 ing much of the expertise of Gov.
I ant to the operation.
'"He then, authorized tl
ernntent at a time when' every
alert newspaper man knew some.,
t.ing' was afoot,"" Schlesinger
he invasion would occur, ' S
anger wrote, "but h3 . de
arefully and categorically, tha
he expedition must be laid on f
way which would make it poss
lc for him to 611 it off as late a
4 hours before D-day."
Schlesinger said that on Marc
8, 1961, he asked' Mr. Kenned
Oat he thought of the invasion
'I think about it as little as possi
le," he said the Pnzsident re
lied. .
The historian added,' "In hi
udgmcnt, the critical point--th
eak part of the case for goin
head-lay in the theory that th
andings would touch off a mas
nsurrection against the regim
of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.
ho President, it seemed to me
as growing steadily more skept
al as his hard questioning ex
sed one problem after?.anoth
the,Pla!!t'w, -staww .';d
. Sanitized - Approv
14e also said that Mr. Kennedy,
was Dever sh9wn a memoranduni
strongly opposing the plan written
by .Chester Bowleg, then . Under.
Secretary of State.
Schlesinger` said Mr. Kenned'y'
was forced to rely on advisers'
with whom he was not familiar,
particularly the "entrenched"
military and intelligence person-
nel whohwere unanimous in their
approval of the proposed Bay of
Pigs amphibious attack plan:. ';
'Nothing More Depressing'
"Dulles and Richard M. Bissell,
.1r., also of the CIA, accepted pro-
gressive modifications (in the
plan) so long as the expedition 'in
some form, remained; ppeerhaps
they ugconsclously'suppoded that
once the" operation began to un?
fold, t would not be permitted
' bihint had been moi P.. drj~rts-
sing. ..than to watch a collection
of officials prepare to sacrifice
Schlesinger reported Mr. Ken,
ncdy as remarking, "if someone
comes in to tell me this 'or that
about the minimum wage bill,
will not hesitating on overruling
people hate some secret skill not,
ing United States prestige Would
suffer If the rebellion died. -f
.The President was'. deeply dia?'
turbedtby fth4. failure. SchlesI~tge,