OPTIONS IN VIET-NAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000100280031-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 1999
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: March 3, 1964
• Content Type: NSPR

WASHINGTON POST AND
TI:V ES - Approved FoV#elelJ
j ..f ~ 14 1. ~ 1
Opfionr.s int. Viet-Nain
t.ion in the crt
Appointment of William P. Bundy to the post of stront positions virtually invnhicral~le; for guerrilla'
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Af- operations against the Viet Cong based on the use
fairs puts another well informed and able man in -of small and mobile forces. This prescribed strat
charge of our relatiqns with a part of the world ;cgy has not been fully applied. Direction has re-E
that is filled with problems. mained divided. The Mekong.-delta has. not been
Foremost among these problems, at the moment, !made the primary objective. The strategic hamlet
the problem of South Viet-Nam. Secretary;, program has been distorted beyond recognition,,
Th
ti-Vi
C
d
e an
tt
ong operations often have looke
Bundy will find, as did his predecessor, Secretary
Ifilsman that this crisi w11 contin t 1 f "more like the offspring of the Staff and Command.'
s tie o c amor
,
o School at Leavenworth than the progeny of Fort
attention. The appointment of a specialist for the Bragg. where irregular combat tactics are taught.
country may help, but it is hardly likely to totally' What is most unpalatable about this strategy is
relieve the regional chief in the Department of the'the time element. It is a strategy that Is open
first-ranking headache of this part of the world. ~ ended. No. one can say that it will succeed in two
This appointment, together with the new reportlyears, five years, 10 years or 15 years. It may'
of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, pro- take longer than that. If ' it is to have a chance"
vides the appropriate occasion for a re-examina-' of succeeding, the Administration must have the
tion of United States policy. It is to be hoped that courage to say just this, the fortitude to admit
this re-study will-be undertaken with an eye solely that the time that will be required cannot be calcu- x
to the things we ought to do, The Administration gated, the resolution to announce that however long,
cannot escape its responsibility by dismissing diffi- ;it tales, this country is prepared to stay the job,
Through to the finish.
cult courses of action, because they would be u`n- , rr ;.
popular. It is in the fortunate political position of
having all the assurance that a democratic gov-
ernment could have that the country will support
s;
or
n
er
ve
t
a strategy for the Secretary of Defense to say, as
lie said last October that "the major part of the
Ignited States military task can be completed by
whatever policy the Administration says Is neces- t lie end of 1965." It is unwise even to voice the
sary. The people will back up any course, how- 'hope" that this can be done, as he did in his
ever unpalatable, if they are persuaded by their 't.cstimony before the House Armed Services Com-.'
leadership that difficult decisions must be made in:mittec last January.
he national interest. To those who ask how long we must stay in"
If anything is clear .about South Viet-Nam, it' South Viet-Nam the only honest answer must be'
F clear that any policy available to the United that'we will stay as long as it is necessary to pre
fates will be unpalatable. In a popularity con-;serve the independence of the country (just as we
est there is not much to recommend any of ourare prepared to stay in Europe as long as neces
ptions. To carry the war to North Viet-Nam, by sary.) When it becomes clear that this is what we~
it or other operations, would risk escalation intol intend, it is conceivable that a better alternative
vorld conflict and hazard reconciliation ? between, may mature. There is no reason why an alterna
lie Soviet .Union and China. To undertake a mas-; tive acceptable to us should develop as long as we'
ive reinforcement of American forces might traiis-,' exhibit an impatience to wait for it. 'It will not.
orm a disagreeable small war into another Korea. emerge from a posture of weakness and irresolu-,
o neutralize South Viet-Nam alone would be to Lion. Those who contemplate aggression against,
ndanger all of Southeast Asia. To obtain the neu-' South Viet-Nam are not going to confer neutrality,
ralization of all Southeast Asia (while operating or independence upon it or its neighbors while they
rom a position of weakness) seems diplomatically United States is poised for departure.
mpossible. It is to be' hoped that when the Administra-
The. option that still looks the least dangerous' Lion has completed its new study of this crisis, it
s the one we have' tried to pick up all along: the; will say firmly and explain clearly' what It intends'
upport of the government of South, Viet-Nam until to do, When It does, it will have the support of a.
iet Cong operations are contained and dimin-, mature public that is prepared for disagreeable
shed. There' was, at one time a near-consensus; tasks once it is made plain that they' are required;
mong Americans on how this should be done. The l by'the : interests of this Nation. and pf the free'
ced in the thcatcr was for centralized direction of!world.
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Sanitized - Approved For.Release CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100280031-3