HOW FOGGY BOTTOM LOST ITS SPIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000100350002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 9, 1967
• Content Type: NSPR

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JAN 91967.
Sanitized - Approved For Release
CPYRGHT FOIAb3b
1t1SP. OP TiTP. CIA
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m.m
? - --- k-uviu l us. gaining or preserving- our in-
.: ?, . Mr. Simpson has occupied many foreign' posts for the U.Si dependence we have resorted to espionage and much that
%, . State Department and has been a t'
v
t
l
b
r
e a
some to
a
. t.
or affairs. goes with it, including?the bribery of foreign officials. We
He was associated wit/r the development of the' United Nations.
have not lik
d
i
I
e
,
t.
t has always been repugnant to us. But
Charter, has served as Labor A tachf iii Brussels, as First Sccre- :' we, like everyone else, have had to yield to the dictates of
!ary in Athens and Mexico City as Deputy Pririci
a! Offic
,
p
er
necessity.
at tlrc Consulate General in Bombay, and as Consul General
-African affairs to the Department of Labor?and was Director +' It was our good fortune for many years to have'
Of ii, Office of Countr
Pr
s i
h
y
ogram
n t
an department. He .little or no need of espionage in our overseas diplomacy.
returned to the State Department,' resigned in 1962 but 're- W
by Houghton Mifflin in Mardi. to our credit that we did so. However, our moral co
e
.;turned as a consrtltmrt in 1965. it against the Indians at home, for. this was a
. ? ' ,,,~?~_ _~ __-___ - -
t o ;~
.Intelligence* Agency are of the most critical sort. mternattonal politics, and World War I'found us at
They,' ,: a considerable disadvantage.
influence thw tlon~ern,a,a.. ac .:_?_---_ __ _
kuG lacls.aoout our changing position as we moved
The relations of the State Department with the Central ?''t '
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00001 R00010035OOt012 ea
- -- ??-?,--s - unv uuCUrgence. it ment and State arranged to support a group of skilled. !
was not intended by the National Security Act to- monopo- - cryptographers with Yardley at its head. Although he knew
lize these functions, nor has it attempted to : do so. ?It'
not a word of the language, Yardley was able to crack'
specializes in collecting information by surreptitious means, the Japanese code during preparations for the 1922 Wash. -acting as a clearinghouse for all intelligence, and assist- ington Disarmament Conference. The United States Gov
ing the other members of the intelligence community (pri- ernment therefore knew precisely what the ? various fall-
marily State, Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission and , back positions of the Japanese delegation were to be, and
'the FBI) with some of their special,=assignments.- bargained accordingly. The diplomatic advantage of such
Governments-our' own included->)tuve from time im- 'feats was immeasurable, for-we had little preparation- to?
memorial engaged in spying. Wherevct,we?have been faced ? ' buttress our ambition to exercise, some influence in -post.
success ? ment offering a generous reward to Mexico for remain-
. are, and what the results of their success or failure may be. ing neutral in World War I.
The stn
d
`?'; :cal
philosophy; what their objectives and chances of ar ley deciphered a long message of the German Govern.
e
in terms of background, governments. The value of histwork became apparent when
psychological make-up and oliti-
g authorized to organize MI-8, the Intelligence Corps' first
the Cuban Government, we have information. Intelligence, unit, to invent new military codes and crack those of other
on the other hand, tells us who he and his associates ar
u a with discouragement by,, no means ended, he was eventually
a handful of guerrillas- and begun hostile operations a ainst- :.-
c
ryptographte unit for breaking codes and devising safe ones.
"Intelligence" is. simply evaluated information. If we The War Department took Yardley on, and, while his I
know that a man has landed on the toast of e, b
rs a c ear of the war Department with a proposal to develop a
statement-as long as one knows what intelligence is ' ?
- - - ---- --- -?-- >yy.+p??aw umxulurauVU of his. point. across to the diplomats, however, and, finally .''
such intelligence within the Government, using where ap- discouraged, approached the military intelligence division
propriate -existing agencies and facilities" This 1 '
? a
pp to rmself to breaking all the department's codes with-
relate and evaluate intelligence relating to fee natinnnl
ecurtiy Act of 1942,,;: governments. To test the soundness of his suspicions he
which established the CIA, provides that the agency "cor- ? '
1' d h'
genous, he began to,suspect that the department's code
leadership we try to exercise in world affairs. .'~ system was unsafe against the intelligence activities of other
Section 102 (d) of the National S
l:.
MAVJSII ? ora an : - in 1913 when Herbert 0. Yardley joined the State Depart-
political principles which we claim to stand for at home meat as a young code clerk. Imaginative, questioning, in-
and abroad. They are thus crucial to all phases of the*
punctions made it hard even for seasoned dinhmats 'to