THE CIA'S SECRET VIETNAM STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000200180045-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: August 23, 1964
• Content Type: NSPR

SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE
Approved For Release 2001/0$p(@t1TQPe3P - p0001R000
CPYRGHT
Matthias observed in a s, views on negotiating a settle-
An o;iicial of the Central Intelligence gcuey cc..'et. and that it was of a
has suggested the possibility of "some Lied 'of tisc:ursive nature.
negotiated settlement" of the hostilities in South VV.ien it was made availa-
Vietnam. e to the press it had a cov-
According to the proposal, which was made r sheet signed by Sherman
public but not endorsed by Administration Kent, chairman of,the Board. . ..... ,
sources, the negotiated settlement would be based of National Estimates, stat- ing their offensive more vig-
upon neutralization of the area. ing that the paper had "gen- orously than ever.
Willard Matthias, a member of the CIA's oral board approval, though "The political mistakes of
Board of National Estimates, one of the highest no attempt has been made to the Diem regime ..inhibited
units, in the ageney, was author of the su gestioi reach general agreement on the effective prosecution of
in a 50-page working paper dated Junc S. every point of it." the war, which -. is really
did not reflect Official Unit c
States policy. It was ma ? A colleague of Matthias de-
I available apparently only scribed the paper as a "think
cause a copy was said pie c e," typical of many
have been obtained by 1.1 which are d i s t rib u t e d
Chicago Tribune, which i' throughout the various agen-
dicated it . planned to, pr ; cies of government.
excerpts. Q u a l i f i e d sources said,
'STALEMATE' however, that while Matthias'
paper that there was "s: r -. ment did not reflect the mu-
ous doubt that victory can 1 e vial U. S. position, they were
won" and indicated that, t widely held in government
best, "a prolonged st 1. - and were the subject of re-
mate" might be achieved; current official discussions.
more of a political contest
than a military, operation,
and led to the regime's de-
struction.
it was felt that the views
a single official sug :esting'~ .
a possible negotiation.' alight
be incorrectly consti'aecl as
the Administration's. policy.
Administration souiv.;es said.
it was then decided -to make
the paper public to demon
trite both that it was not a"
Working papers of offi.c A s In his paper e n t i t l e d
of the Central Intellit. a 1 e ':Trends in the World Situ-
Agency are almost n x ation," Matthias wrote:
made public. It was bellte ,
however, that when Ada i 1 _ - "The g u e r r i l l a war in
istration leaders learned 111 't; South Vietnam is in its fifth
a copy had fallen into Me year, and no end appears in
hands of a newspaper }',sight. The Vit, Cong in the
feared some political: i 't` South, dependent largely
.might be- made of it. upon their own resources but
under the direction ancVcon-
trol' of the Communist re-
gime in-thu North, are press-
"The counter-guerrilla ef-
fort continues to flounder,
partly because of the inher-
ent difficulty of the problem
and partly. because Diem's
successors have not:.yet dem-
onstrated the leadership and
inspiration necessary.:
"There remains ' serious
doubt that victory.: can be
won, and the situation re-
mains very fragile.. If large-
scale U.S: support -continues
and if further political dete-
rioration within South Vict-
n.zm is. prevented, at least a
prolonged stalemate` -can be
FOIAb3b
"There is also a chance
that political evolution within
the country and develop-
ments upon the world seen
could lead to some kind 0
negotiated settlement base
upon neutralization "
AppromedlEor_P,e!ease-20Q1./Q8/Q1_:CW-RDP7.5-00001R00020oa80045-8