ARE OUR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES DOCTORED?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000200180048-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: August 5, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN

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ARE. OUR INTELLIGENCE ESTI- - National Intelligence Estimates which evolve' almost certainly considered the contribution
DOCTORED? ? in this manner are used by the President.. which Cuban bases might make to the So-
MATES the National Security Council, and the De- viet strategic posture, and in that connec-
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, Col- partment of State and the Defense Depart- tion, the feasibility and utility of delivering
umnist Edith Kermit Roosevelt, writing ment as, a basis for policy, nuclear delivery systems to Cuba. Therefore,
in the July 19 Philadelphia; Sunday Bul- VITAL TO SURVIVAL this possibility must be examined carefully,
even though it would run counter to Soviet
betin, has painted a graphic picture of Understandably, our topmost Government poltcy."
the workings of our intelligence appa- officials are so involved is routine bureau- WEAKNESS OF SYSTEM
ratus and raised a serious question as to cratic affairs that they rely more and more IInderstandabl when the handed
the philosophical slanting of the Intel- on these estimates to determine their own y. they are
attitudes, approval or disapproval of the such a line from higher ups, most intelli-
natio a nal reports upon which much of our most crucial issues of national and interns- gence men will choose not to credit the
natio policy is based. tional life, matters literally of our personal "tales" by Cuban exiles or bestir themselves
Miss Roosevelt quotes the very excel- and collective survival and extinction. : to find photographs supporting hard intelli-
lent and comprehensive interim report Yet, often these estimates are drawn up genes facts.
on Cuba, drafted last year by the sub- according to preconceived theories or con- Another weakness in the system is that
.committee headed by my friend from clusions. Instead of reflecting hard Intel- many times members of the USIB do not
Mississippi, Senator STENNIS: ligence facts, many of our national Intel- agree on certain points in the national in-
ligence estimates reflect preconceived policies telligence estimates or even reject an "esti- ,
Faulty evaluation and the predisposition. or justification for policies already imple- mate" outright. This is known to have
of the intelligence community to the philo- .' mented. happened when the question of U.S. resump-
sophical conviction that it could be incom- The tipoff that this is in fact the case tion of nuclear testing was at issue. The
patiblo with Soviet policy to introduce is seen in the interim report on the Cuban estimate paper, in the view of the' Joint
strategic missiles into Cuba, resulted in in- military buildup, put out by the Prepared- Chiefs of Staff, "overplays the negative reac-
telligence judgments and evaluations which ness Investigating Subcommittee of the tion of world opinion on the resumption of
later proved to be erroneous. Senate Armed Services Committee. nuclear testing" by the United States. The
I believe related questions raised by In its "summary of major findings," the Chiefs urged that "The 'estimate' should be
Miss Roosevelt deserve the attention of report stated that: "Faulty evaluation and rejected for policy use because it is one sided,
the predisposition of the intelligence com- misleading, and in large measure irrelevant."
the public, and I ask that her column be munity to the philosophical conviction that Nevertheless, the estimate was implo-
printed at this point in the RECORD. It would be incompatible with Soviet policy mented into policy. at that time. Obviously,
There being no objection, the column I to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba re- this could happen again and at a time when
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, sulted in intelligence judgments and evalua- a Soviet breakthrough in weaponry could
+4,,.,- ,,hlnh rotor nrnved to be erroneous." Acatrnv mil inns nf-American lives.
"DOCTORED"?-PISILOSOPIIICAL CONVICTIONS How do such philosophical convictions get Such a system is used to neutralize or
INJECTED INTO CUBAN REPORT injected into the determination of national change -a policy to conform with the think-
(By Edith Kermit Roosevelt) intelligence estimates? ing of certain elements, such as Sherman
IiINCTON ~A government process which Estimates are usually based upon requests Kent?who heads the Board of National Esti-
WAS
. or schedules furnished by the State Depart- mates.' Kent is known in the intelligence
is practically unknown government
to all citizens w the ment. The word "schedules" in this context community as "a watchdog for the State
system used to produce national intelligence does not refer to anything so crude as a rail- . Department." He was formerly head of the
estimates. road or time schedule. It Is a capsule de- State Department's Office of Research and
Estimates do not refer to budgetary matters scription of an assignment. .Intelligence which engages in clandestine
but are supposed to be fully rounded ap- These "schedules'; are actually a few activities. He also served as Chief of the Eu-
praisal of a situation, recommendations and ; paragraphs containing virtual instructions rope-Africa Division of the Office of Strategic
possibilities. These estimates occupy a de- to the intelligence agencies that determine Services (OSS) during World War II. Kent's
cisive position in formulating new policies in advance what they are supposed to find. file reveals that as far back as his OSS days
or in justifying policies about to be implo- For example, let us take the following typi- (1941-45) the validity of his intelligence re-
mented. cal State Department schedule setting the ports was questioned.
Indeed, a special group calling itself the direction on the Cuban military buildup. Nowadays, an official is not likely to do any-
Board,of National Estimates exists within the' "The establishment on Cuban soil of So- thing so obvious as "doctoring" reports. He
Central Intelligence. Agency specifically to viet nuclear striking forces which could be just sees to it that unwanted intelligence
compile and write national intelligence ca- used against the United States would be simply is not gathered, or if it is, that It is
timates. These estimates ultimately are con- _ incompatible with Soviet policy as we Ignored.
curred in by the U.B. Intelligence Board presently estimate It. It would indicate a The perfect formula for diversion and
'(USIB) which operates within the National far greater willingness to increase the level paralysis of national policy-the formula ac-
-Security Council structure. . of risk in United States-Soviet relations than tually set up by. Alger Hiss-is exemplified
All other intelligence gathering agencies, the U.S.S.R. has displayed thus far, and.~in the national intelligence estimates eys-
including the Defense Intelligence Agency, would have important policy implications in , tem. In Asia and Latin. America, we are
the a Mi t1PFtr f fflfts 0&IM08FM 'M-RDP75-00001 R000'200109b g it. "successes-"