THE BATTLE STREET FORUM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000200190010-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 1999
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: July 12, 1967
• Content Type: TRANS

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4,435 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W.. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016. 244-3540
FOIAb3b
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM The Brattle Street Forum STATIONWGBH TV
FULL
CPYRGHT
July 12, 1967
PROFESSOR BEERS: "Tonight we're talking about the CIA. And Mr. Lindsay
and I were just discussing these recent revelations earlier this year about the channeling
of money from CIA through various foundations to organizations -- political -- like
the National Student Association or Encounter magazine, some trade union organization.
This, as you know, has caused a tremendous disturbance in professional circles and
elsewhere -- trade union circles, liberal circles, newspapers.
"How do you -- how do you explain this -- how did it ever get started? How
did the CIA ever get started in the business of giving money to an organization like the
National Student Association?"
FRANK LINDSAY: "I think one has to go back to the -- the times immediately
after World War II when CIA was organized. It was a time in which the Soviet Union was
exerting very powerful force to try to capture and control public organizations -- mass
organizations -- whether labor unions or political parties -- throughout the free world.
And it was time too that there had been a takeover in Czechoslovakia. There was concern
-- major concern was in the United States as to where all this might lead. And a short run,
an immediate crisis developed in which a few able Americans suddenly found themselves
completely outnumbered and without the resources that they needed and such resources that
they did have from their own sources were completely inadequate and it began in those
days and under those circumstances of crisis, where CIA provided on an emergency basis,
amounts of money to supplement from their own inadequate sources of funds,
BEERS: "Well, this Is certainly true of the students, I mean, the NSA belonged
to a thing called the International Union of Students, I think was the name wasn't it? And
this I think was more or less Communist controlled. Then they set up another organization.
And then they also would at times go to some of the Communist organized festivals elsewhere."
2l 1967
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LYMAN KIRKPATRICKi "World Federation of Democratic Youth and -- the
World Federation of Trade Unions were all Communist front organizations which in the
early '50's practically had the field to themselves because there wasn't any money and there
weren't cohesive and dynamic organizations in the West that could oppose them."
BEERS: "Well, why'd this have to be done secretly? I mean this -- of
course, today this is the thing that's the nub of the objections."
KIRKPATRICK: 'Well, I think you have to recreate the atmosphere of the
50's in which, if you remember in our domestic politics, we had one party which
was trying to make the Communists the scapegoats for all foreign policy failures. And the
attitude of where would you put the money and who would be allowed to do it. It would have
become, I think, a fairly major national debate as to who you subsidized and who you
didn' t. The very fact that during the revelations of this past year that we had the
extreme right accusing the CIA of subsidizing socialist type organizations...."
BEERS: "That's true."
KIRKPATRICK: "And the liberals accusing CIA of subsidizing right type organ-
izations. Seems to me CIA must have been fairly close to right because both sides were
accusing them of being wrong."
LINDSAY: "There was a point at which McCarthy proposed to investigate
the CIA for Communist infiltration."
KIRKPATRICK: "In fact, during the notorious Army-McCarthy hearings I just
retuumed to the Agency at that point from an unanticipated leave and became the McCarthy
case officer to Mr. Dulles, who was Director. And during the McCarthy hearings the Senator
would periodically stand up and say that the most serious problem we have is the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Communists that have Infiltrated this. Every time he did It,
Mr. Dulles would write him and say, Senator, I heard your allegations on television
yesterday, and would you kindly submit me the evidence that you have. Which of course
was never received."
BEERS: "But see the -- the -- it does, as we now know, it has these bad
results, and this was potentially there all the time. I mean, it was dishonest. I mean,
you know, here's the American Student Union, organization, and if it -- if it, you know, one
of the central things certainly was It was independent, that was the whole difference supp-
osedly, between the American organization and the -- and the Communist one. And yet
it comes out that they are equally -- well, not equally dependent, but also dependent.
I think this is the -- the danger in the thing. Wasn't that considered?"
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KIRKPATRICK: 'Well, yes, of course it was considered, too. But I think in
order to put it into proper perspective -- and Frank Lindsay, of course, was directly conc-
erned with some of these aspects from his work in the government -- was that it was a strict
subsidy as for as CIA was concerned. I think even the student organizations have brought this
out that they weren't told specifically what to do or how to do it. They were given money to
do a general job. And they were not agents in the sense of the word of controlled agents
doing that -- that particular aspect.
"It was a subsidy. It was money coming to them which couldn't come from
foundations or couldn't come in an open grant from Congress, but cou Id be made available
In this particular direction."
BEERS: 'Was it that -- really that muci,of a no strings attached grant?"
LINDSAY: "Yes, certainly it's my impression that that was the case at the outset.
And I have reason to believe that it hasn't been generally true that essentially the purposes
for which these funds were used were perfectly acceptable. Activities that there was,
as Lyman Kirkpatrick says, a high degree of independence. The only real weaknesses, as
you point out -- it was the source was hidden. And that sooner or later I suspect It was
found to come out with the damage that has occurred. And I -- to me, I think the weakness
have been that what started off to be an emergency,,.."
BEERS: "Yes."
LINDSAY: "A short term, because there was no other source of funds, became
the easy solution on a continuing basis, both for the government and for private society,
which I think has to -- the w9ole of the American society has to take responsibility in the
sense that there were neither private funds adequate to do these important jobs -- and per-
fectly acceptable open jobs -- there were inadequate private funds, and the government
could not find an overt acceptable way to do what otherwise is perfectly acceptable."
BEERS: 'Well, what -- what about the point of the 'no strings' because I think
that has been questioned. Now, you -- you've been in OSS and CIA 23 years, no recently
the Executive Director -- it's been said that -- that the CIA would then ask these officials of
the NSA who were in on the know to give them reports on foreign student leaders and so on,
which, I can imagine, this would be useful. In this sense it was.not exactly 'no strings
attacked, ' was it?"
KIRKPATRICK: "Well, I think here on the reports, I -- I -- I watched and
listened and read all of the discussion of this in the last year, and I think as far as the reports
are concerned it was mainly directed toward, Is this a useful direction in which to put our
money? When you say 'no strings'...."
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BEERS: "Yes."
KIRKPATRICK: "1 don't mean literally in the sense that here's a bushel
sket full of greenbacks, and, go out and have a gay time with them. No. The -- the
m ney was directed toward the purpose of encouraging student organizations that were
aligned with the west and anti-Communists of assisting (?) student leaders that were
m tivated in this particular direction. And obviously you'd want to know whether the
m ney was going in the right direction.
"But the implication that this was espionage or spying, I think is just totally
w ng. I think this is the same as any corporation would ask, as to whether its advertising
m ney, or its promotion money was going in the right direction.
"I can speak fairly frankly on this because my last several years In the
Agency as Controller, I had an obligation in about four different directions, to the
Bureau of the Budget, to the Congress of the United States, and more remotely, of course,
the taxpayer, to see that the dollar was well spent. And I was constantly questioning,
a e we accomplishing with the dollar what we want?"
BEERS: "A good point. It's pretty hard to give them money without there bein
some kind of strings."
KIRKPATRICK: "You have to ask, and Dr. Beer, the thing, of course, there
that I think that people seem to look on CIA as the source of limitless funds. It has
odest -- it has a modest budget basically as far as our government's concerned. And by
ntrast with the opposite numbers in the Communist world, it's minute by comparison.
When you look at the fact that in 1957 in the Youth Festival at Moscow, it's conservative)
estimated they spent $100,000,000 for that one youth festival."
BEERS: "A hundred -- the Russians spent a hundred million dollars on one....
KIRKPATRICK: "The -Russians spent a hundred million dollars on one youth
stival. Which is more, I think, than the total subsidy of the National Student Associatio
nd was, over the entire period. "
BEERS: "Many, many times more, yes.
"But how about Mr. Lindsay's question, supposing we understand how this began
an emergency situations, why does it go on?"
KIRKPATRICK: "Well, I think the answer to that, quite frankly, is It went
4
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on because perhaps there weren't any other ways that were usually visible, for one.
Secondly, obviously the recipients weren't fighting against receiving the money.
When the money is coming and coming on a regular basis, that's quite important.
One of the -- the arguments against government subside always is the -- the one year app-
ropriation, or the two year, at most, appropriation, they don't have any sssurance for
the future. I think the President's got something in mind on the aid program in this
regar right now.
"And even the people that were handling the -- the youth organizations from
wiiiwin the government felt the some way about it.
"Sure, I think that. in -- in 20-20 hindsight, one can say, well we ought to
have stopped this in the early '60's." J1
BEERS: "Was it that hard to see ? I mean, you think of it now, I mean,
there's the intrinsic Fact of the dishonesty in some cases. And then, secondly, the fact
that it tends to be self defeating when it comes out. And, you know, pretty hard to
keep things secret in the American government."
KIRKPATRICK: 'Well, I wonder there whether the rejoinder wouldn't
be that occasionally we're --we're just too afraid of -- of using techniques that are
almost the only techniques available in these fields. And I -- I -- I seriously question
as to how this present proposal for an open foundation is going to progress when Congress
starts to nit-pick at the appropriation."
LINDSAY: "I don't know, I think I disagree a little bit. I think I tend to
agree with you that -- that serious damage has been done, not only to the organizations
which were involved, in terms of how they were regarded, but also, as you mentioned
earlier, to others who may go abroad, and it's the easiest thing in the world now to charge
anybody with this background, and make it stick, as 'oh, he's-another CIA agent'. So
1 think there is --a price has been paid for this...."
BEERS: "You see, I'm a political scientist. I have colleagues who go into
other countries, you know, South America, Europe, elsewhere, Africa -- and they want
to go with clean hands, and say, I'm here, just as independent scholar. But the fact that
some way or another foundations have financed this kind of thing, and It's been kept
secret, would make it difficult In many instances, for these people -- in this sense I mean
self defeating."
KIRKPATRICK: "Oh, I don't think there's any question about the damage
that was done. But I think in looking at why the damage was done, that it's not quite
fair to simply say because the CIA didn't cut It off, and say, didn't do it otherwise. I
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think part of the damage was done simply in -- in what became almost a orgy of self
recrimination and widening the credibility gap until it became the Grand Canyon."
BEERS: "How about the -- the -- the other -- the controls within the
governmental structure -- this is related to this -- if people in the CIA didn't think, or
didn't feel they could make this cut, what about the Congress and the policy makers
in the Executive Branch ?"
LINDSAY: "Well, I .... "
BEERS: "This in a way is their responsibility."
LINDSAY: "Go back on one point herd. The assumption is as I have under-
stood it recently, and Lyman can correct me, that there were efforts from time to time to
reduce these activities, and to find other open publicly knowledgeable sources and that ---
that the control, if you want to call it that, that existed, was --was strongly in favor
of continuing these activities by CIA."
BEERS: "In other words...."
KIRKPATRICK: "That's absolutely right, Frank, over the years, of course,
there've been strong elements in the government -- the Bureau of the Budget is a very
strong and rather silent element in the government which is constantly putting pressure
on the Executive agencies that cut down federal expenditures -- particularly if they can be
converted to private subsidies from non-government sources. And over the years there
is a great deal of pressure onrthis -- particularly on the people that were working in this
field, to cut back. But it almost invariably ended up at a fairly high level session in the
White House at which the decision was made, well, we can't either find the funds, or if
they were found they wereon a very limited basis -- and some were -- so we must continue
to do it because it'll be too bad to lose what we've...."
BEERS: "How do you feel about this, Bil I ? You've been working in the
Harvard Defense Seminar in Subjects related to this."
UNIDENTIFIED MANN' "Well, on the -- the NSA crisis or incident, it's ironic
in a way, because the government had just about pulled out, as I understand it from some of
the NSA officers, they had felt that the strings, which I agree, didn't exist at the
beginning, except general guidelines and reports to -- to know where the money was going
-- that the strings had become a little stronger, little tighter and --and they didn't like
it. And I think even some of the people involved on the government side were uneasy,
and the students decided to look for private financing. And they were -- they were getting
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most of their money in the last year from private sources. And as I understand it, from
the president, in '64 or five, he had managed to get legitimate private support for just
about all of it. And they had only...."
BEERS: "The president of NSA?"
MAN: "Yes. I believe they only had something like a $10,000 lease on
-- on their offices, that was left from CIA money. And they wanted to get out but they
wanted to do it quitely, because they knew the damage that might be done. And they
almost succeeded. And it was unintentional, and really no one who had been sworn to
secrecy, who intentionally gave it away."
BEERS: "How about this point of -- of control ? I mean, here's a pretty big
and vital agency of the government, and it certainly isn't subject to as much public reve-
lation of its operations than most other agencies are."
MAN: "I think...."
BEERS: 'What do you think about these controls?"
MAN: "I think there probably are more controls than are generally known.
And in part I think one of the problems has been CIA public relations, and a reluctance
on their part, and a reluctance on the part of the Congressional committees which exercise
the control to acknowledge the control. For'example, they don't publish a list of the
members of the committees -- there are found Congressional committees."
BEERS: "How many?"
MAN: "Four."
BEERS: "Regularly established."
MAN: "Regularly established. And the one in the Senate is under the chair-
manship of Senator Richard Russell -- one of the most powerful members of the Senate;
knowledgeable; chairman of the Armed Services Committee. The committees with the
Congressional control is -- is actually quite stringent, and in the July 1966 debates over
whether the control should be enlarged, Senator Russell said that he didn't know of any
agency which had its budget looked over more carefully than the CIA. And Senator Stenn
said that he didn't know of any chairman of any subcommittee that took such an interest
as -- as Senator Russel I .
"Now, I know they were in the middle of a debate, but...."
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MAN: "These are men who've been around. And I think there is great control
there, plus control from the Bureau of the Budget. And of course, within the White House,
and within the agencies themselves."
BEERS: "Does the Bureau of the Budget have a budget review -- an examination
of the same type that it has for other agencies, for the CIA?"
MAN: "It -- it's not of exactly the same type but it's smaller In part because
of.thesecurity problems. But they get quite knowledgeable people, and often people
who have been in CIA, and as someone put it, who know where the money's hidden."
BEERS: "Yes."
MAN: "So they're -- they're quite knowledgeable."
BEERS: 'Well, now for instance, I mean, you know, if it was an agriculture
committee, I mean, the members of the agriculture committee would know not only what
the budget was but they wo-ild know the general course of policy if Freeman wa s going
to change price supports, they'd know. But i mean, was -- was it Russell who said
he didn't know about the Bay of Pigs. "
MAN: "He said he didn't know about the Bay of Pigs, but Senator Cannon
made a speech to the effect that they knew and had very carefully scrutinized the
development of the U-2 and had appropriated the money every year. And since -- since
Russell's statement about the tay of Pigs, I believe that his committee has been more
carefully informed than it was in the past.
"And one of the effects -- one of the few advantageous results of a book called
'The Invisible Government' -- which is highly misleading, in most respects, and did a great
deal of damage -- but one of the few useful effects of the book was to make those responsi-
ble for oversight well aware of their oversight responsibilities."
BEERS: "In the Congress?"
MAN: "In the Congress and in -- in the Executive Branch, in the -- in the
White House and I believe those who were charged with oversight responsibility take it
even more serious than they did before."
BEERS: "Yes."
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MAN: "The so-called 5412, or special group has some responsibilites."
BEERS: "The whole -- the group within the Executive...."
MAN: "That's one of the groups within the Executive Branch. And one of
the members of that group explained that -- last year that their oversight was for more
detailed and stringent than it'd ever been before."
BEERS: "How about looking at this In a little more in perspective, because
the CIA, after all, has done a few other things besides subsidize the National Student
Association.
"What are the general --what are the general functions of the organization?
You've looked at it from the broad perspective of government service."
LINDSAY: "I think this is an important question here and -- and this part-
icular issue may get little out of -- our of focus, in the sense that -- that there are man
other functions which take a great deal of money, and that certainly my impression, that
the political activity function we've been discussing in terms of funds, is a very tiny pa
of the total. Certainly the traditional intelligence functions are a major part. And I th nk
there are some changes that are going on here that are very interesting. That -- that I
and less Information is coming from the traditional, the classical, human spy." 7
BEERS: "The James Bond."
LINDSAY: "T(je J ames Bond. I think that in one sense for more very im rtant
intelligence is coming from technical means. And certainly the U-2 is one of the
acknowledged devices here. And obviously to develop an aircraft of those capabilities
was a very expensive operation indeed.
"I think increasingly a great deal of very useful information is simply coming
from very painstaking economic, political analysis. Largely derived of -- based on
information derived from over sources."
BEERS: "What do you mean, magazines?"
LINDSAY: "Magazines, newspapers, radio broadcasts, and all sorts of --
perf ectly open information, reports, economic reports that are issued by other governme is
themselves form a basis...."
BEERS: "What are you trying to find out there? What kinds of things?"
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LINDSAY: "Well, obviously the -- the -- the most immediate and the
most important things are related to -- to defense capabilities and advances in
defense capabilities of countries such as the Soviet Union and China. And here
the government is trying to find out as best it can to make an accurate evaluation of
how far along defense systems are, or new missile systems, or the -- the present ABM
system. And this can have tremendous impact on the United States, on its defense
policy, on hand it can -- can save us from over-racting to a threat that is not in fact
as great as many have been believed -- such as the missile gap, or believed missile
gap."
BEERS: "What about the missile gap? Now, this is an intelligence
question, and you had some connection with this on the Gather (?) Committee, although
that isn't strictly CIA, I guess. Now that -- woulI you tell us about that. That was
a tough one to figure out. Wasn't it?"
LINDSAY: "Yes, and I'm -- I'm not sure that I'm really as qualified as -- as
Lyman, to discuss this, other than I think that -- that that particularly time, the Gather
Committee Report, that the information -- there were some major gaps in information which
later were closed by technical means, which tended to -- to give a more complete picture
than was available previously."
gap."
BEERS: "For a while we thought there was a missile gap, and then...."
LINDSAY: "Yes."
BEERS: "...a year or so later we found there wasn't much of a missile
KIRKPATRICK: 'Well, let's put it this way. Basically speaking the
responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency is to keep our policy makersfully informe
of what's going on in the world so that they can make the correct policy.
"And it seems to me the best way to graphically illustrate this is simply to
look at your defense budget. The Defense Department right now is putting together the
budget for fiscal year 1969, which has to be approved by Congress, the session starting nee
January, hopefully to be passed by June 30th, so that they can have the money to
spend on weapons which would then go to the drawing boards and would take two years on
the drawing boards, and maybe another three years getting through serial production.
So if you start in July 1968, by July 1973, the first of your new aircraft or new guns,
or new tanks, whatever they are, are coming off the production line.
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"The role of intelligence in this is to say what weapons must be needed in
1 73, to oppose what other major forces in the world you might be fighting. And if intell
i ence is wrong you can end up with the wrong weapons for the wrong war. So that it's
v tal and essential that you not just simply say, well, look, we saw the parade in
scow the other day of the seven new aircraft, because they're basically obsolete the
d 3y they fly, because of the new types coming on behind them. What the Defense
epartment must know is what the Russians have got now going off their drawing boards
that will be coming in the mid-70's. And Mr. McNamara obviously wants to know
this from intelligence. So intelligence is constantly having to project forward this.
And, as Frank has mentioned, it's -- it's coming from all sorts of sourccs, technical
b ing a very -- there's been sort of a scientific explosion in intelligence collection
i : modem times. Having well surpassed the human agent, who's still important, because
e en technicians can't gertnside the Kremlin -- yo,s want to get the minutes of those
stings -- to sit in with the Politburo."
BEERS: "Have you succeeded in getting the minutes of the meetings?"
KIRKPATRICK: 'Well, I think -- I think our record has been fairly
ad from that point of view. Colonel Penkovskiy was widely advertised, and I
d n't think the Russians still know how much he passed over."
BEERS: "Was he a member of their KGB?"
KIRKPATRICK: "He was in the -- the scientific committee, he was a regular
officer of the scientific committee in charge-of foreign liaison. But he had the
highest clearances and had access to a great deal of material. He wasn't -- no, he
w sn't strictly -- to answer your question, he was not KGB."
BEERS: "Still, that's ...."
KIRKPATRICK: "Security."
BEERS: "Close enough to tell you what you wanted to know."
KIRKPATRICK: 'Well, the fact he had access to it. I might just say here that
is good illustration of what people with this James Bond syndrome we have now seem
to think that intelligence is always this fellow In the fast car with beautiful girls who
c whip into a room and reach into the safe and bring all the top secrets."
BEERS: "Well, that helps your recruits of people for the organization, doesn't
It-
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KIRKPATRICK: 'Well, it does in a way but occasionally they're looking
for more glamor than hard work, and it's usually the latter."
BEERS: "Some of the wrong people."
KIRKPATRICK: "Some of the wrong people perhaps, because what you're
really looking for are the hard facts. Your spies that can produce the top secret documents
are very few and far between, so the real heroes of the intelligence war are the analysts sitting
In.Washington putting little bits and pieces together and coming up with a -- a prototype
of what you're looking for. That -- that's what the intelligence agency is doing. But
I think with all of the furor over the National Student Association and with the -- the
James Bond stories and the Bay of Pigs, and the U-2, and items like that, the people
overlook the fact that what intelligence really is is t~ a putting together of this vast
amount of material by good scholarly type of people who want to concentrate on finding
out the facts. "
BEERS: "You mean you have economists, engineers, and...."
KIRKPATRICK: "If I could just take another minute."
BEERS: "Sure, go ahead."
KIRKPATRICK: "The -- my favorite anecdote about the Cuban missile crisis,
which I think is one of the most remarkable of modern times, of the inter relationship
of intelligence and policy, was the development of what Mr. McNamara and his post
mortum television broadcast celled, I believe, the cratologists. And the cratologists were
the economists in the intelligence system, both in the Pentagon and State and CIA who looked
at all of these hundreds and hundreds of pictures of Russian ships carrying material to Cuba
with crates on the desks -- decks -- and trying to analyze what was in those crates, and
finally, simply by virtue of having looked at hundreds and hundreds of pictures of crates,
they started to put together the medium bombers and the missiles that the crates were car-
rying and the facts bore out the fact that they had succeeded in deducing...."
BEERS: 'Where it began from that hypothesis -- it was on the crates...."
KIRKPATRICK: "Exactly."
BEERS: "...that made you look for the things on land."
KIRKPATRICK: "Exactly. And the economists and the -- the photo inter-
preters and the other analysts that were studying these pictures taken together with alI of
he other information that they had together were able to start and analyze the -- what
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was in the crates. I've often thought that as a result of this the Russians have probably had
to develop an anti-cratologist department to build crates with new wrinkles in them to
confuse the photo interpreters."
BEERS: 'Well, how about the -- how about the -- the spotting of the missiles
on the ground? Now, of course, at the time, they were -- they were -- there was one
Senator who said, well, they've got some missiles. Wasn't this the case?"
KIRKPATRICK:
"Senator Keating."
BEERS: "Yes."
KIRKPATRICK:
"Senator Keating." 01
BEERS: "And then...."
KIRKPATRICK: 'Well, they did have missiles...."
BEERS: "...the Administration said, well, no we haven't any reason to
think so. And others were really going -- deductively saying, no, the Russians wouldn't
do anything that foolish. I mean, these are the...."
KIRKPATRICK: 'Well, this is the case of everybody being a little bit right.
The -- the arms buildup into Cuba started now very long after the Bay of Pigs, and I
think there is a cause and effect relationship here, I think that when the Russians saw the
-- the Cubans failed at the Ba of Pigs, and the United States didn't support them, I think
this may have -- I didn't see the Khrushchev show last night -- by the time the All Star
Game was over, why I'd had it for the day. But I think that Khrushchev probably felt,
well, the Americans didn't back the Cubans up, so I can put missiles in there with
impunity. And intelligence did become increasingly concerned at the number of arms
shipments going into Cuba. And John McCone, who was then the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, was especially concerned. As you know, he was a shipbuilder, and
an engineer, and had been the chairman of theAtomic Energy Commission. And he
kep saying, they must be taking them in for some reason, even if we don't have the --
have the hard evidence. So, in the summer of 1962, Mr. McCone kept going to the
President and Secretaries McNamara and Rusk and Attorney General Kennedy, and McGeorge
Bundy and alerting them to these arms ships and to the fact that we had spotted the surface
to air missile sites, and what were they there to protect? Were they simply an anti-invasion
-- or are they there for something more serious.
"Then when September came this 24 -- 5412 Committee special group that
Bill Harris mentioned, met and discussed it and recommended to the President that he
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authorized increased U-2 flights over -- now, September, of course, is the hurricane month
in the Caribbean and the weather is -- is very poor for aerial reconnaissance. It's
been well written up I think...."
BEERS: "Yes."
KIRKPATRICK:, "...,by all of them. But the fact is that they didn't really
get the first pictures of the missiles...."
BEERS: "That really showed them on the ground, yes."
KIRKPATRICK: ".,..until about 72 hours after they started to build the
sites. The thing that I think that was most surprisingpbout...."
BEERS: 'Well, that's pretty good, three days later, or....
KIRKPATRICK: "I think it's quite remarkable. The thing that was surprising
and I think the major surprise there, was the speed with which the Russians could build
these sites. Of course the material was flowing in, and of course it was coming off the
ships. But all of the reports that Senator Keating was getting, and others, were coming
from Cuban refugees. And as Frank well knows from his experience in military intelligence
in Yugoslavia when untrained observers see something on the road it can suddenly go
from a jeep to a tank in very quick order, and from one type of missile to another type
in very quick order.
.The -- my last cpmment is simply to say thatafter the action we studied all
f the reports that were produced, and out of some thousands that came in, there were about
00 ground reports from ground observers on missiles, of which 19 were accurate."
BEERS: "Of 200, 19 were accurate?"
KIRKPATRICK: "Nineteen were accurate. If I remember, something in
chat nature. But, sure they were seeing things being carted down the road."
BEERS: 'Well, this raises a general -- excuse me."
LINDSAY: "I was just going to say, I think this -- the missile crisis
Ilustrates anotherpoint, and particularly the value of technical intelligence in photographs,
n that here was objective evidence to the world that could be shown at the United Nations
If Russians actions, which was for more convincing, I think, than if It had been a written ,
eport derived from aCIA agent on the ground, which -- it could be e
uall
correct but?
q
y
- but the picture was for more convincing."
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15
BEERS: "Yes.
"And this kind of technology Is improving all -presumably all the time."
LINDSAY "Presumably."
BEERS: 'What about the thing we read about occasionally'-- this manned
orbital laboratory ?"
LINDSAY: "1 don't know."
BEERS: "The President has spoken about it."
01
LINDSAY: "He announced this I belie
ve about a ~ year ago, that a so-called
mole' was to be built as a military experimental vehicle and I don't believe there've been
any other reports that I have seen. "
MAN: "There are a few in the press that suggest that the project's going
along and that it should be launched by next year and I think the -- the unmanned space
satellite efforts have shown how valuable...."
BEERS: "We've already got a satellite whizzing around up there that take
these very fine grain pictures."
MAN: "Even in World War II we had fine photo reconnaissance. And it
was Colonel Wright in DIA tl pt spotted this trapezoidal pattern."
BEERS: 'What's DIA?"
MAN: "The Defense Intelligence Agency. That's the one that was set up in
1961, centralizing most of the military intelligence function."
BEERS: "What was it he spotted?"
MAN: "He spotted a trapezoidal pattern on a photo reconnaissance picture
which was all too familiar because it was very much like the ones that we'd spotted for
years being built over the Soviet Union. And it looks as if the same part of the Soviet
Defense Department which was responsible for building missiles at home, was given
responsibility for building them In Cuba, and they did them in the some configuration.
nd that led to a follow-on U-2 flight which gave us the first hard evidence over San Chris-
beI (?) -- this is the Cuban missile crisis."
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BEERS: "Cuban missile crisis."
MAN: "And that's even with -- with U-2's
A
d
h
.
n
wit
satellites, unmann
satellites, presents some difficulties, and manned ones will, too, but there's a great deal
more flexibility. And it's just one of. -- it's -- aside from satellites, it's the use of
computers and automatic data processing -- cutting the cost and making more accessible
information you want at the time you want it, and fitting together pieces of data which
just by humans looking for them we'd never get together."
BEERS: 'What about the -- what about the general political effects of diff ent
types of survei I lan? 1 1 '
c
e mean, et s say satellite survel lance compared with, you know,
ground -- agents on the ground. I mean, do these have -- do you figure these have
different effects on -- on tension between the two power blocs ?"
MAN: "Yes, this is -- this is one of the most hopeful signs, really, that
the new technology is much less intrusive and it's usually less visible, less embarrassing to
the country that's being reported upon. And this may present some opportunities for
cutting back -- not eliminating, certainly, but cutting back the priority which has been
given in the past to -- to agents -- politically disturbing groups."
KIRKPATRICK: "This -- this I think is quite true, in fact, I think when
Khrushchev was still in power he -- he commented that th
h
ey were p
otographing the
United States on a fairly consistent basis with their Cosmos satellites, and that they assumed
The United States was doin
th
h
g
e same to t
em. And -- and I think It's prbably within
the realm of science that sooner or later there can be constant observation of all points of
the earth simultaneously, as vie have the weather satellites now. From what the weather is
I can't see that they're doing much good. At least we've got them. But on the other hand
your -- your satellites will give you the visual observations but the human agent can never
be, eliminated until people can read men's minds because the decisions that men make."
BEERS: "How much weight do you put on this whole question of intention
versus capability?"
KIRKPATRICK: 'Well, I think capabilities are not too difficult to discern.
1 think that generally speaking in my studies and observations of intelligence, that we
do fairly well on capabilities. I remember after the Battle of the Bulge -- the Arden (?)
offensive in 1944 in Europe -- I was on General Bradley's staff at the time and we did a
study afterwards -- after the war was over -- and we figured out that between the Germans
and ourselves we had about 85 to 90 percent accuracy on each other's order of battle before
the battle started.
"But it's -- the decision that Hitler made in September or November to launch
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that attack -- and I gather he was on a sick bed at the time, and said we're going to have
a big counter-offensive, and threw everything he had into it, and nobody knew the
intention because it was by word of mouth. They passed it on down to the -- first to the
Army group commanders, and then the Army commanders, and then the corps and division
commanders at the very last minute so that to discover that intention unless one of them
was your agent was almost...."
BEERS: "I think to read Hitler's mind would be a little difficult. Not very
pleasant, either, but --what about the general question, Bill, you've studied this, I think,
of the effectiveness or how do you evaluate the CIA as an intelligence: agency? I mean,
afterall, we imagine this as something fairly new for the United States."
: "I think, probably in comparison to other countries it is relative( y new.
We haven't had these foreign engager'hents for as long a time as Great Britain of France,
or Russia for that matter."
BEERS: "Do you think we've done a good job?"
MAN: "On balance, yes. But I think it's helpful to distinguish different
branches, different functions. We didn't really get into the game until 1941 with the
Office of the Coordinator of Information -- Colonel Donovan -- and then OSS in '42
picked up most of its techniques from the British, really.
"And I -- I don't know -- Frank, you were in it -- but I'd say that OSS
eventually came to function quite well. Then after the war many of the best people left.
A lot of the good people staygd but there wasn't that priority. And in the late '40's I think
we were running a pretty weak show and -- but by say 1950, and especially in 1953, when
Mr. Dulles took over --Allen Dulles."
BEERS: "Yes."
MAN: "The CIA started really moving. And it's been a very effective organ-
ization since then."
BEERS: 'Well, now, this question here about intelligence and the more
dramatic sort of thing -- the political operations -- the subverting of governments -- or,
more particularly, the -- the -- things of this kind. It's -- it's the latter, which I suppose
attract the most attention. I mean, well, did we or did we not overthrow Mossadegn in
Iran in 1953? Apparently we did. Or Guatemala -- coup in Guatemala, and so on. Of
course, the things we hear about there normally are the -- are the failures. Do you think
there have been very many successes in that real cloak and dagger sort of field ?"
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MAN: "1 suppose that there -- that there have been dedicated people,
professionals, and they don't talk about their successes. Sometimes they do, and it's one
of my criticisms of CIA's public relations policies, which -- that from about 1945 Colonel
Donovan was so interested in a centralized intelligence organization and public understanding
of the need for it, he started leaking someof the better stories of OSS. And this continued
in the late '40's -- there was an article or two. And then in 1954, after Mr. Dulles
came in, one of the few things I criticize him for was having supported a flamboyant public
relations policy. And I'd say that since about 1961 there's been a cutback on -- on
this policy."
BEERS: "What kind of -- how would this, I mean -- you mean...."
MAN: "Less leaks to magazines."
BEEERS:
"I see, yes."
MAN: "But -- much less of that. And since Mr. Helms came in I know that
they're quite conscious of the problem and have done as good a job as they can to keep
down the level of noise. But there -- there are two problems -- one is just that they
have this tradition behind them and a gulf now with parts of the press, so that some reporters
lust won't cooperate and won't be discreet As this -- this latest NSA business shows.
And there's another problem, which is that the Espionage Act of 19T7 really doesn't
prohibit an intelligence official when he retires from telling all. It's -- it's -- it might
but the court -- the Supreme Court has not so interpreted it. And it -- it would be quite
difficult. And one of the things we might usefully have would be a modification of --
of this Espionage Act -- but I$don't think we'll get it now."
BEERS: "One (?) act so that it...."
MAN: "So that an official who retires is really under that act. And one reason
I don't think we'll get it is because of these recent disclosures. And it's not just the intelli-
gence disclosures but the problems with Defense Department public relations -- this so-
called credibility gap and news management. And until there's greater public confidence in
-- in intelligence, it will be difficult to get some of these legal devices which will help."
BEERS: "How -- you can't ask newspapermen to be discreet, you know --
well, discreet, but not very discreet -- that's not his job. Anybody who's ever had a
newspaper reporter for a friend has found out that -- that he must remember the man's pro-
fessional purpose, which is to make things public...."
MAN: "Right."
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NMI ...sooner or a er -- ~ usually sooner. But then how can you expect
this -- you can't ask this of newspapermen."
MAN: 'Wei I, there are some -- some of the most knowledgeable really
are discrett just in what they'll publish. No one would expect them to avoid basic public
policy issues -- issues which the public has a right to know about, think about, and discuss,
and influence decisions on."
BEERS:
"Yes. "
MAN: "But in terms of technicalities and details, many are discreet. And
aside -- I am not suggesting a law, in fact, the First Amendment would make many laws
directly encroaching upon the rights of newsmen un-Constitutional -- but laws which pro-
hibit intelligence officials from disclosing information upon their retirement might be
beneficial. And I -- I understand that there are some draft bills which are kicking about...
but I don't think that the time is yet right -- not yet...."
BEERS: "Do you think these disclosures about the CIA harm -- that is, do
you think attention has been -- or that operations have been moved away from the CIA
toward other elements in the -- in the so-called intelligence community operations?"
KIRKPATRICK: "No. I wouldn't...."
BEERS: 'Well, I mean activities...."
KIRKPATRICK: "No, I don't think so at all."
BEERS: "I mean like the National Security Agency which I know nothing
about, but apparently that's at least as important as the CIA. Is that true?"
KIRKPATRICK: 'Well, as far as its importance is concerned, I think that it's
a very important agency. It deals with communications security and cryptographic matters
,
which is obviously very important and has always been the -- the -- it dates back from
smoke signals, literally -- trying to intercept each other's communications, and goes through
the eta when one of our Secretaries of State abolished the black chamber with the classic
comment that gentlemen don't read each other's mail."
BEERS: 'What was the black chamber?"
KIRKPATRICK: "For breaking diplomatic codes."
BEERS: "Oh, I see, yes."
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KIRKPATRICK: "Other people's diplomatic codes. And he said, gentlemen
don't read each other's mail, so he abolished it. I guess we've now come to the con-
clusion that there aren't very many gentlemen in the world, or something. But we know
that the Soviets have a tremendous crypto-analytic agenc
and it'
y
s a very important
aspect of intelligence, but increasingly difficult as communications become more sophisticateli
"But back to your. basic question...."
BEERS: "Yes."
KIRKPATRICK: ' ",..,have operations moved away from the CIA because of
the revelations? My answer to that would be no, because there's nobody else in the
government equipped to undertake these -- these oppr ations. This is not to say there can't
be -- the Pentagon certainly has personnel that could be trained in this area. But here
again I would emphasize that the CIA and the military work exceedingly closely together.
The Defense Intelligence Agency was created as -- as an organization to develop for
Defense what CIA was doing for the Federal Government. They work closely together
in places like Vietnam. But revelations of any intelligence nature are always damaging
when they talk about operations...."
BEERS: "Yes."
KIRKPATRICK: ",..or agents, or accomplishments. Now, I don't quite
agree with Bill Harris that there's a possibility in this country of having an Official Secrets
Act, I just don't see it. I just don't think it would ever be passed. I think it's -- it's
so contrary to our official --tp our whole national structure, that we wouldn't have it. And
the press is always going to write about intelligence operations when they discover them,
so the...."
LINDSAY: "That's right. And I think there's another part of that, too, is that
operations have to be conceived and carried out in the atmosphere in the American -- in
the American society, and atmosphere, and fully recognizing that there are effective people
in the press and that If operations can't be designed to survive, if they are so visible, and
if that visibility then -- if there is a severe penalty for having become visible, another
way ought to be found of doing it."
BEERS: "Are we a little less -- a little less discreet, -- I mean, let's say
that the British, I mean, now, when Commander Crabbe apparently went out and put on his
skindiving suit, swam around under those Russian cruisers and something happened to him you never heard anthing more about it. Well, very little about it in Britain. Do you
think there's a difference there?"
LINDSAY: "I suspect that you perhaps know more than I do...."
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KIRKPATRICK: "They have an Official Secrets Act."
BEERS: "Yes."
KIRKPATRICK: "And a D Notice. And when the D Notice is out the press
is not -- is -- prints anything about it at its own jeopardy. And they've had several cases
in recent years of people tried and given sentences for revealing information that they learned
officially.
"I -- I think that you're getting into a very important aspect which I hope
we can touch on before we conclude. And that is, what does the American perople want
in the way of an intelligence or anization? I -- my personal feeling Is that there's almost
a -- a very sizeable percentage of our people that feel that intelligence is a necessary
evil, that we've got to get intelligence, and we've got to learn what's going on in the
world because there are evil forces in the world that are perhaps conspiring against us.
Having said that, I think that when you move into the second phase, which is the action
phase -- that is, taking action to support policy, public support dimishes to a degree. On
the other hand, I -- it would be my opinion -- I'm simply throwing this out more to evoke
an argument or a discussion, that there are considerable numbers of people in this country
who feel as Mr. Rusk has indicated in testimony before Congress, that the back alley fighting
is necessary in the world today -- that we can't simply move out of the streets of the world
ideological battle and leave it solely to the possession of the others."
MAN: "But I don't. Also just a personal view, which is, that although I
would not advocate removing ourselves from the back alley fight, that we should also reco-
gnize that there has been some kind of a thaw in the Cold War -- not that the Cold War's
over -- but that it -- it leads to -- to a need to revamp and to take another look and to
see whether we might not be able to pull out of some operations, not all of them, very
selectively. But see what we might not now do morally. And I think that, for example,
vix a vix eastern Europe, there's a possibility for much better relations. And many of the
operations which made a great deal of sense in the late 4015 and early 50's may not be so...
Bill...."
BEERS: (one or two words lost in confusion of voices)..,, "Operations here,
MAN: "...political action -- so-called black propaganda -- unacknowledged
radio stations and the like."
BEERS: "This is different from -- just -- although it's connected to the sheer
Intelligence gathering."
MAN: "It's part of the intelligence mission. It's not part of the information
collecting mission ...."
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BEERS: "Right."
MAN: ",...but it's related. And we may have to take a look and just be
sure that these intelligence activities doesn't get in the way of a rapprochement. And
having done that, we'll still probably find that we want to continue in many important areas.
And in fact, now that the thermo-nuclear stalemate makes it difficult to engage in the higher
levels of violence there's going to be more pressure to engage in some of these less violent
activities. So it may mean we have to increase some of these covert activites in some
parts of the world and in some areas."
BEERS: "How about this question -- this really is related to this classic debate
you were speaking of, Frank, of whether you should have operations connected with
information gathering. Isn't that a way of putting it,?"
LINDSAY: "Yes, I think so. I think this has been an argument that has
raged for years and years. There are those who argue that the intelligence functions should
be completely separated from any -- any covert political action or para-military operation.
There are those who argue on the other side that the only possible way is to have them to-
gether.. Neither solution is -- is wholly satisfactory. The argument of course made for
separation is that you have an independent intelligence operation as a -- as a check and
that the danger believed that -- that if the same people run it they will collect intelligence
and evaluate intelligence to support their -- their operation."
BEERS: 'Wasn't this said about the Bay of Pigs, that -- that the CIA at the
same time was organizing the people to go In, at the same time was assessing the chances of
success . "
LINDSAY: "On the other hand, the British tried in World War II having these
two activities separate, and they felt, as a result of World War II experience that they
were better together. And one of the reasons is that it's generally believed that if you are
operating against the intelligence forces of another nation if these are divided, you have
a much easier job and a better job of getting after them and penetrating -- the counter
espionage."
KIRKPATRICK: "And there's the -- the competition for agents, I mean, people
just think agents grow on trees. They're very difficult to come by and that -- you can
go out in Hong Kong or Berlin, or centers like that and probably get many agents, but they
won't be very useful because they will be selling their wares. What you need are
the people that can covertly do the job.
"So that there's competition between your two types of effort -- your intelli-
gence gathering, and your action.
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23
BEERS: "How about the Russians -- how do they do this? Is their
organization like ours?"
KIRKPATRICK: 'Well, the Russians have a dual intelligence setup. They
have their general staff -- the Department of the General Staff -- the so-called GRU, is
their military intelligence. But the key foreign intelligence agency is the State Security
Committee -- the KGB as It is now -- it's gone through a whole series of names (speaks
in Russian) NKVD, and so on. They generally combine everything in that. They
have the Disinformation Bureau, which picks on our security agencies as one of Its favorite
targets. Their effort Is adverse propoganda -- black propoganda -- to tear them down.
And they have -- they even'. have an assassination squad. But their action is all built
Into their intelligence collection system which also is state security. They have -- they
are the supreme authorities over all state security. And it's sufficiently important that
the central committee itself approves of the nominations for their intelligence chiefs...."
BEERS: "You say they have a bigger organization, I mean, we -- I suppose,
altogether, according to this article, the whole intelligence community gets -spends
something like three billion dollars a year. That sound roughly right?"
CIA. "
MAN: "About the right general figures."
BEERS: "Not CIA, but all...."
MAN: "The actual amount is highly classified. But...."
BEERS: "Yes.'
MAN: "....just quickly I,U like to mention that since we've concentrated on
BEERS: "Yes."
MAN: "That the United States intelligence board, UCID (?) includes the
National Security Agency, the FBI, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Atomic
Energy Commission,...."
LINDSAY: "The State Department."
MAN: ",,.and the State Department, INR, which does a great deal of work."
BEERS: "Well, we've got a minute to go. Would you like to say anything
In conclusion about what you think any changes that ought to be made in the way the CIA
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24
operates, or in its public relations, its relations to Congress, or the public, as it is in
a bit of a trouble now. Have you any Ideas on this'. Frank, you'd like to offer?"
LINDSAY: "I think the only thing that I would say -- and I'm sure
people are seriously considering this -- is for those political activities which are perfectly
acceptable -- let's try to find as a society a way of supporting these publicly in ways
that cause no embarrassment or discredit to our organizations here and abroad."
BEERS: "And'how about more -- could there be more discussion of the CIA,
do you think it would help?"
KIRKPATRICK: "1 think the Congress can help here. I'd like to see the
Congress take a greater interest in CIA and if -- if npthing more than issue an annual report
that they reviewed the work, and that they find it satisfactory or that they've indicated
places it can be improved. I think this would help public understanding."
BEERS: "Thanks very much. We're winding up our discussion of the CIA.
And I want to conclude by mentioning our -- our program for next week."
ANNOUNCER: "Tonight you have heard Brattle Street Forum, presented
in cooperation with Harvard University Summer School, with Samuel Beer, Professor of Law
at Harvard as moderator. The guests were Franklin Lindsay, president of (tech (?) T TCk
Corporation, Lyman Kirkpatrick, Professor of Political Science, Brown University, and
William Harris, Research Associate, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University."
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