(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000200200017-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2000
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: May 1, 1961
• Content Type: OPEN

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CPYRGHT
if the democracies are to surmount
the perplexities of sustaining morale
in a limited war situation.
The most promising clue is con-
tained in another paradox; views of
the past and the present must coexist
and become synthesized. The crux of
the educational principle is that it
must be easy to grasp and credible
once it is grasped.
I suggest provisionally the follow-
ing scheme. Limited war must con-
tinue to be seen as a war of national
survival. But patience must be exer-
cised and immediate goals probably
must be modest. The breaking off of
a war on apparently unfavorable
terms must not be regarded as an ir-
remediable catastrophe; neither must
a limited victory be heralded as the
harbinger of inevitable triumph. Sta-
bility must become a word with heroic
connotations. If threats of escalation
are launched by the enemy, the pub-
lic must be trained to recognize that
this same violence could be launched
? This judgment is based on the premise that
no future limited war directly involving the United
States could possibly resemble Korea with its gen-
eral lack of civilian anxiety. In an age of ICBM's,
a crash air alert and maximum strategic readiness
would characterize continental defense prepara-
tions in a limited war. 'In such circumstances an
enemy would be far better advised to launch a
massive strategic strike in time of dEtente and
without warning.
at any Moment and that, the hazard 17
no greater than in time of peace-less
great, in fact.*
Finally, the public must accept the
notion that if limited war comes, it
is probably only through a series of
such conflicts, pursued with vigor and
the skill of adaptation, that we have
any real hope of holding the adver-
sary at bay long enough for some
c h a n g e in his philosophy to take
place without intervening nuclear
catastrophe. This latter sequence is
unpredictable and it is folly to grasp
at straws in the wind, as many emi-
nent Soviet observers do from time to
time, but this probably remains our
only clear salvation from the world's
present predicament.
These injunctions a r e , perhaps,
self-evident to many readers. But
have they become a cornerstone of
public education in military matters?
Can the man in the street repeat them
and, in time of war, would he react as
if he believed them? It will not be
time enough in the stress of battle to
make these points and have their logic
prevail. The man in the line cannot
stop firing to go to school for the
causes of the war and the justification
of the means by which it is being
fought. But there is time-now.
Since this country was founded, each generation of Americans has been
summoned to give testimony to its national loyalty. The graves of young
Americans who answered the call to service surround the globe.
Now the trumpet summons us again-not as a call to bear arms, though
arms we need-not as a call to battle, though embattled we are-but a call
to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle year in and year out,`rejoic-
ing in hope, patient in tribulation'-a struggle against the common enemies
of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself.
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 MILITARY REVIEW MAY 1, 196
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CPYRGHT
NOT only is intelligence vital in
diplomacy, but it is absolutely essen-
tial in defense, for you must know the
composition of the enemy forces, the
weapons they will use, the direction
of the attack, and their intentions in
order to enable our own defense struc-
ture to be properly constructed and
properly alerted.
What are we doing to meet the chal-
lenges that threaten the very exist-
ence of our way of life? This is not
an easy question to answer, particu-
larly in public. If we say too much
Py~`' much we know, or how we
}1? ,for what we are doing, we are
tial ingredients of information such
as we are seeking from them. On the
other hand, it is of great importance
that the American public have confi-
dence in the work of their intelligence
organization, for this is our first line
\of defense.
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FOIAb3b
In order to approach
this subject, let me descr
tion of our intelligence
since World War II. '
World War II with va
gence services operating
ington-the Army, the N
Department, and other;
little in the way of a c
ization. The result was
instances not all of the
was ever compiled or as
alyzed in one place, nor
presented to the Presic
policymakers in the govt
President Roosevelt w.
concerned about the aua'.
This article is a cc
kof a speech presented
Michigan, in Novembe
,Kirkpatrick is the Ins;
`.eral of the United
tral Intelligence Aget
CIA-RDP75-00001 R
n answer to
be the evolu-
organization
re went into
rious in.telli-
out of Wash-
ivy, the State
;-with very
-ntral organ-
that in many
information
sessed or an-
was one view
ent and the
rnment.
,s so seriously
ity of his in-
ndensation
in Detroit,
r 1960. Mr.
ector Gen-
tates Cen-
;cy.
OHO OGO?0017-6
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App
formation that in 1940 he called on
a New York lawyer, William J. Dono-
van, whom he asked to make two trips
-one to the Mediterranean and Bal-
kan area and one to England. The
President particularly wanted to know
whether the British would stand and
fight, and he was also interested in all
of the various elements that were ac-
tive in the Mediterranean and the
Balkans.
Donovan came back with basically
three major i t e m s of information.
First, the British would stand and
fight; they would hold out until aid
could come. Second, he warned that
the Germans were undoubtedly going
to move into North Africa. Third, he
urged the President to create an or-
ganization to combine all the infor-
mation and intelligence activities of
the Federal government.
OSS and DWI
President Roosevelt asked him to
see Attorney General Jackson, Secre-
tary of War Stimson, and Secretary
of the Navy Knox. These three gentle-
men rapidly agreed with Donovan that
an organization should be created to
combine intelligence information and
the unorthodox warfare elements of
the government. Their recommenda-
tions resulted in the creation of what
was first known as the Coordinator of
Information Office. This organization
was short-lived because it combined
domestic information, news, and prop-
aganda, as well as intelligence.
In 1942 it was split into two organ-
izations, the Office of Strategic Serv-
ices under Donovan, and the Office of
War Information.
In the. course of World War II, the
Office of Strategic Services, working
with Army and Navy Intelligence and
our Allies, particularly the British and
the French, mounted a fairly major
clandestine effort against the enemies.
This included dropping agents be-
hind enemy lines, dropping guerrilla
leaders into v a r i o u s countries-
France, Norway, Italy, Burma, and
Thailand-and, equally important, or-
ganizing for the first time an over-all
research organization to prepare the
encyclopedias of information required
to conduct diplomacy or military oper-
ations in any area of the world. These
provided such vital facts as beach gra-
dients and composition, and the depth
of the waters in ports and harbors.
They a Is o provided information on
utilities, political structure, internal
security services, and the police.
It has been generally agreed that
the Office of Strategic Services made
a significant contribution to the war
effort and left certain heritages for
peacetime. Perhaps the most impor-
tant of these was the fact that General
Donovan, General John Magruder, and
others in the organization were look-
ing forward to peacetime and recog-
nized the need, in fact the necessity,
for a peacetime intelligence service.
As ;early as 1942 a paper was prepared
outlining a possible structure for a
peacetime service, and in 1944 Dono-
van again circulated in Washington
a proposal for a national central in-
telligence organization.
This proposal was not acted upon
during wartime, and when demobiliza-
tion came, the Office of Strategic Serv-
ices was disbanded on 18 September
1945. Fortunately, certain cadres were
retained from this organization, one
under the Secretary of the Army, and
another, a large research organization,
was transferred to the Department of
State where it still exists as a major
element in their research staff.
In the fall of 1945 Ferdinand Eber-
stadt, another New York lawyer, was
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 CPYRGHT
ppro a or a ease 2000105105 ~1- 15-00001 RQU020021JUM-5
S INTELLIGENCE
preparing the so-called "Unification
Act" which included a proposal for a
Central Intelligence Agency. But Pres-
ident Truman w i s h e d to act more
quickly, and in J a n u a r y 1946 he
created a Central Intelligence Group
to be staffed by representatives of the
services, p 1 us a permanent civilian
cadre to coordinate the intelligence ef-
fort of the government.
National Security Act and CIA
Finally, in July 1947 the National
Security Act was passed which created
in one fell swoop the Department of
Defense, the National Security Coun-
cil, the Joint C h i e f s of Staff, the
United States Air Force, and the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA). This
act embodied many of the principles
which Donovan had put forth in his
paper. These are quite important for
a modern-day understanding of how
our intelligence works.
First, he felt very strongly that
there should be one voice of intelli-
gence in the Federal government; a
man to whom the President and the
National Security Council could look
for a statement on what was going on
or what the threat was to the country.
Second, Donovan recognized that de-
partmental responsibility should be
preserved and maintained so that each
of t h e departmental organizations
could collect and process that intelli-
gence essential to its work. For ex-
ample, the Army should collect and
process intelligence on the ground
forces of the world.
Another important provision was
that this new organization would have
no domestic responsibilities; internal
security should be exclusively the pre-
rogative of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; and the new intelli-
ence organizations should look en-
,rely outside the United States.
Finally, this organization would co-
ordinate the over-all wok of the in-
telligence agencies of the government,
and the director would eport to the
National Security C o u ri c i 1 and the
President.
US Intelligence Board
Since the passage of this act some
13 years ago, our intelligence organi-
zation has evolved, become much more
closely coordinated, and we think has
become more efficient. Under the Di-
rector of Central Intelli ence, it op-
erates through a United States Intel-
ligence Board on which he directors
of all of the intelligenceservices either
sit or are represented. his board is
not only the board of directors of the
intelligence services, it is also the final
substantive authority, passing on to
the President those vit I documents
c a 11 e d "National Intel igence Esti-
mates," perhaps the most important
documents created in th intelligence
mechanisms of our gov rnment.
The National Intelligence Estimates
illustrate very well the d gree of inte-
gration that we now hav . A national
estimate is a statement of what, is go-
ing to happen in any country, in any
area, in any given situation, and as far
as possible into the futu e. We: natu-
rally would like to project these esti-
mates as far in the future as possible,
but the required information is not al-
ways available. Often there are cur-
rent-day situations on which we do
not have all of the intelligence that we
would like. These estimates are put
together under a Board of National
Estimates, which operate in the CIA,
but as a service of commoi concern.
Each of the responsible ldepartments
prepares the original draft on that
section which comes under its purview.
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Thus the Department of State would
draft the section on the political, eco-
nomic, or sociological development in
a country or an area or a situation,
while the A r m y would deal with
ground forces, the Air Force with the
air forces, the Navy with the naval
forces, and the Department of De-
fense under the direction of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff with the guided mis-
sile threat.
The Board of Estimates would then
go over the individual contributions
very carefully-sometimes very heat-
edly-and arrive at a common view.
Any one of the intelligence services
has the right of dissent from the view
which will be expressed as that of the
Director of Central Intelligence. Thus
if any service disagrees with the in-
terpretation of the facts-for they are
all dealing with the same facts-it can
go on record before the senior policy-
makers of the government with their
own interpretation.
A Single Voice
This system, which I have watched
very closely since the war, has resulted
in a high degree of unanimity among
the intelligence services, yet has main-
tained the important right of dissent.
In World War II intelligence officers
often offered many possibilities to the
military commanders of what the eZl-
emy might do. These m i g h t range
from a massive counteroffensive, a po-
sition defense, unorthodox warfare, to
surrender.
Faced with this broad spectrum of
possibilities, obviously the military
commander is often placed in the po-
sition of deciding himself what the
enemy is going to do. This truly is a
responsibility of his intelligence offi-
cer. Today, intelligence is speaking to
the policymakers with one voice, or
use.
We should recognize that the intelli-
gence effort of the United States is
a massive effort. The flow of informa-
tion into Washington is of tremen-
dous proportions. We have information
coming in from the press, the radio,
travelers abroad, t h e official repre-
sentatives of other governments as
transmitted by the Foreign Service
of the US, the service attaches, and
the intelligence organizations.
Part of the major responsibility of
our intelligence organization is to sift
and filter this material, to remove the
significant, to add the highly classi-
fied or sensitive material which we
have obtained through a variety of
means, and to present to the policy-
makers in concise and readable form
that which they think the situation to
be, and what they think is going to
happen.
USSR and US Intelligence
The security aspects of intelligence
in the world today are of a very high
order. The Communists are extremely
sensitive about intelligence efforts and
ascribe to our work all types of activ-
ities, some of which are very flatter-
ing in their proportions. The Commu-
nists tell their people very little; con-
sequently, they make it more difficult
for us to find out what is happening.
Further, in the last two years we
have noted a very distinct Communist
campaign directed particularly at
United States intelligence efforts, and
at Western intelligence efforts in gen-
eral. Through their very adept and
facile use of fabrication, planted doc-
uments, and other devices, they have
tried to discredit our work, our direc-
tor, the work of various other services.
While this is flattering, it is also
dangerous. During Khrushchev's visit
t? fhc United States. he made several
May 1961 21
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 Ap
comments about American intelligence
efforts, indicating or implying that he
read some of our messages, that he
received some of our documents, and
that some agents were being paid by
both sides. A skillful propaganda war-
rior, Mr. Khrushchev, but his efforts
to sow discord and distrust of US in-
telligence in this country failed.
The importance of our work today
must not be underestimated. If we
achieve our principal objective of keep-
ing United States poficymakers better
informed at all times than those of
any other country in the world, peace
is possible. For if our diplomats are
better armed with facts when they sit
at the conference table, they have the
tools for successful negotiation.
As I mentioned earlier, intelligence
is absolutely essential to national de-
fense. Incorrect or inaccurate intelli-
gence, or erroneous estimates of the
future direction of those powers whit
are hostile to this country, could lead
us to arming for the wrong war, in
the wrong place, at the wrong time.
Consequently, it is essential that we
get up-to-date and vita information
on what the Communist powers are
doing and are planning to do.
No intelligence officer, if he is worth
his salt, is ever satisfied with the
amount of information or the accu-
racy or the validity of the information
that he has at any tim . He is con-
stantly striving to get m re and more
information, and to assemble those vi-
tal ingredients which we call "'hard
facts." While today I could not say
that we have all the hard facts we
need, I think that we have reasonable,
assurance that we can anticipate any
hostile activities directed at this coun-
try. Our objective is to have absolute
assurance.
In a question period which followed the presentation on whlich the pre-
ceding article is based, Mr. Kirkpatrick made the following observations.-
Editor. i
QUESTION: Do the other nations
of the Free World have organizations
similar to the CIA with which you
cooperate?
ANSWER: Yes. All governments
are organized a little differently for in-
telligence and national security. There
are no two exactly alike in the world.
We cooperate closely with some of our
colleagues in the NATO powers and
in other powers in the Far East. This
is a very important aspect of our work.
QUESTION: What are the specifi-
cations for the men who are selected
for the staff of the CIA, and where are
they obtained?
ANSWER: We have a recruiting
program in colleges and universities,
research organizations and founda-
tions, and business. We are constantly
on the lookout for professionals with a
wide variety of interests and of expe-
rience to come to work or us.. Each
year we bring in junior officers to be
trained to make a lifetim career with
us.
Intelligence is work in which there
is no substitute for experience. It is
difficult to have what might be called
on-the-job training in this work. Yet
our junior officers must be taken out
under the wing of experienced officers.
It is an exacting and a dedicated pro-
fession. The type of person we are
looking for is somebody of high in-
telligence with a wide variety of in-
terests, a great amount Of emotional
stability, and the ability to stand up
1lndar ctr.-
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