SCIENTIFIC MANPOWER RESOURCES OF THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000200430063-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 63
• Publication Date: March 29, 1956
• Content Type: SPEECH

Approved For Release 2001/08/20: CIA-RDP
Scientific-Man er Resources of the USSR
before Counc o ore gn e a ons, New YO R,, Ma 29, 1956,
by , Central Intelligence Agency
As you all know, the scientific-technical manpower shortage is
a matter of real concern in this country. Perusal of "rant ad"
pages from any Sunday New York Titres serves to emphasise, if indeed
en.phasis is needed, the extent t.o which American industry is crying
or engineers and physicists. United States industries, long expe-
rienced in competitive free enterprise, now are directing much of
this competitive skill toward 1uri: engineers and scientists to
ti,.eir companies. The race is one For future business achievements
w'il go to the firms which are successful in recruiting competent
ectin.i cal manpower now.
The race is on not only among Urut.r"i States companies, however,
but between nations. The United States and the Soviet Union are
each trying to outstrip the other in producing large numbers of
scientists and technicians. In the Soviet Union impetus is given
tier program from highest ,rovernmetit authorities. Out of the 67
members of the USSR Council of Ministers, 39 have had a scientific
or technical education. Significantly, 9 of the 13 First Deputy
ana neputy Chairmen have technical Uackgrounda. These men know the
importance of technical training and are in a position to give
assistance when and where it is needed.
Today the United States and the Soviet Union each has a
scientific-technical manpower force of about 1.2 million. In
re:{e.dren and teac.uint; the Soviet Union has a force only about 2/3ds
that of the United States 175,000 vs-265,000). In research alone,
tt,e.y have only about r+elf tie numuer we have (120,000 va about 210,000).
Fut.aach year, though we turn out 10% more college graduates than they,
they graduate many more in science and engineering than we do. For
example, in 1955, 5J% of Soviet full-tine students graduated in
scientific-technical fields as compared to only about 25% in the
United States. In engineering alone, the Soviet Union graduated
twice as many as did the United States.
;:hart 1, Graduates per Year in All Scientific Fields, shows the
steady increase in both countries in numbers of graduates in all science
fields from 1930 to 1960. In 1930 both countries were almost equal, each
graduating about 36,000 science students. The 1933 drop to 19,000 is
the Soviet curve resulted from a lengthening of courses. The rise is
1935 (in the Soviet curve) reflects the expanded enrollments is 1930/32.
Both,the United States and Soviet curves show wartime losses from about
19L2/l3 to 1945. Soviet losses were greater than ours. They dropped to'
about 22,000 in 19L5 compared to about 39,000 in the United States.
Rapid post-war increases are shown for both countries. We climbed
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fr.;+er aid farti.er end reached a pehk of about 131n,,000 science
graduates In 1950,largely under the 14GI Bi11",, and then started
de ~lit,.r Th-y .Imbed less spectacularly, but note that the Soviet
r,urve _ i not. go ntu a decline. That curve is still rising. In June
11,1, 5eviet science raduatea outnumbered ours by about 36,000, it is
estimated that in 1960 the Soviet Union will graduate about 1559000
science students compared to about 1269000 in the United States.
Chart. 2, Graduates per year in Physical Sciences and Ugineering,
shows a comparison of American and Soviet graduates in the physical
sciences and engineering only for the period 1930 to 1960. During
the early 1930's, the United States graduated more engineers and
physical scientists than did the Soviet Union. In 1935 and 1910,
as a result of planned expanded enrol cents in 1930 to 193?, the
Soviets graduated more than did the United States. Wartime losses
are shown. Again,, the Soviets dropped lower than did the United States.
Post-war expansions are obvious. Note that in 1950 we graduated a].oat
twice as many in the physical sciences and engineering as they did,
But by 1953 a reverse trend was developing and in June 19511 the Soviets
graduated 57% more than we dids about 65,000 in the USSR compared to
about 389000 in the United States, It is estimated that the Soviets
will graduate 90,000 in the physical sciences and engineering in 1960
compared to about 65?000 in the United States,
If these trends continue,, it to apparent that soon the Soviets
will have a decided advantage in numbers of scientific-technical
personnel. Continued expansion of their manpower reservoir is assured
by the Soviet educational system. Because the educational system is a
key factor in this race, I should like to point up some of its more
important features, First of all,, the system is designed mainly to
train scientists, technicians, and skilled labor for the nation's
e;.onory. Even elementary schools stress science. There are no
eiective.s; therefore every Soviet student has taken 5 years of physics,
r years o~ '>iologr, L, years of chemistry, 10 years of mathematics? and
a year of astronomy by the time be finishes high school. Compared with
American high school graduates, less than 10% of whom have taken as
much as a year of physics and chemistry,, and. even fewer any advanced
mathematics the Soviet high school. graduate has a much better science
foundation. An evaluation of Soviet high school textbooks for physics
courses shown that the books'. coverage is not so up-to-date as that
presented in United States high school texts, but the range of materials
presented is broader.
After completing high school,, the better students enter a higher
educational institution, Honor students are admitted without takimm
entrance examinations, but all others must pass stiff comprehensive
exams in Russian language and literature, mathematics, physics,
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chemistry, and one foreign language. All entrance examinations
are oral, except Ruastan which is written and mathematics which
is both written and oral. Future Soviet engineers and scientists
are trained at or* of 3 types of higher educational institutions:
(a) Engineering and technical colleges offer 4-5 year
courses in specialised fields such as machine
building, coA9truction, and agricultural nschaa--
sation. These colleges prepare engineers and
specialists for particular industries.
(b) Polytechnic institutes offer 4-6 year courses in
broader engineering fields such as civil,
electrical, and metallurgical engineering.
Students graduate as production engineers and enter
the .co.
naq(c) Universities offer 5-51 year courses in fundamental
sciences. Graduates enter research or teaching-
the better graduates are directed to research.
Almost half a million students enter these Soviet colleges each
year. They spend, as indicated, l-6 years in a rigorous course of
study. Discipline is strict. Attendance at lecture and laboratory
sessions is compulsory. As nary as 10 comprehensive examinations are
given each year. Those who fail are weeded out. Those who do well
are rewarded by increased stipends.
While in college students spend as mach as 90% of their time ea
technical subjects. The next four charts show translations of
curriculum requirements listing subjects of instruction and the number
of hours allotted for lectures, laboratory work, and practical study
for each subject. The first two charts (3 and 3a) show the 1955
curriculum prescribed for physics majors at Kharkov State University*
Chart 3 lists the scientific subjects studied and the mniber of hours
spent on each subject. Students spend 3#556 hours out of a total of
11,290 hours over a 41 year period studying scientific. subject.. Chart
3a lists curriculum requirements in non-scientific subjects. Only 72s
hours are spent on non-scientific su 3 ct.. The pie diagram shows
graphically that 83% of the student's time is. spent on scientifie-
technical subjects.
Charts 4 and ia, prescribe the curriculum for mechanical engi-
neering students majoring in %&chi= CMutruction, Netal 04ttisg
Machine Tools, and Tools" at Bauman Higher Technical School in Resew.
(Bar an, incidentally, is the best technical school is the eowrtry.
It is superior to any technical school in the U.K. and compares
favorably-with MIT in this country. One of the impressive fasts
-3-
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about Haman is that all of its engineering students take physics
courses trhich correspond in level to those taken by physics majors
in this country and which are rarely takes by engineering students
here. Every Bauman graduate has a training in physics corresponding
to a stiff physics undergraduate aiagr in the United States.) Chart
4 lists scientific subjects. Out of a total of 4,848 hours spent oa
instruction, laboratory work, and practical study 4,322 are devoted
to scientific subjects. ? Chart ba shun the noarecientific subjects
prescribed. Only 526 hours are spent on non-scientific subjects. The
pis diagram shows that 89% of the Bauman, student's time is devoted
to scientific-technical subjects. For purposes of comparison, at
MIT the curriculum prescribed for mechanical engineering students
specialising in materials and material processing-includes 2,895
hours of instruction and laboratory work. 2,265 hours or 78% of the
student's time is spent on scientific subjects.
Quality of training in the Soviet Union in general compares
favorably with that in the United States. As canpetities for entramse
to universities and colleges is very keen, standards are kept high.
University faculties are organised so that each dspartmest is quite
small and teaching often can be dons through informal contact between
students and staff. For example, the overall ratio of students to
teachers in Soviet colleges was 10.5 to 1 in 1950 compared to about
14 to 1 in the United States. The Soviet ratio was ?p to 12.6 to 1
in 19511. The ratio varies from school to school, of course, and the
Soviets don't always compare so favorably. For example, at Bataan
the student-teacher ratio is 11.1 to 1 compared to 5.8 to 1 at MIT
and about 2.7 to 1 at CalTsch. A weakness of the Soviet system is
that training is highly specialised and college graduates therefore
often have competence only in narrow specialty fields. Such narrrs
specialisation tends to create a narrowness of outlook and may well
reduce the Soviet scientist's chances of producing original scientific
research. Furthermore, emphasis throughout schooling is on acquiring
knowledge rather than understanding. Many U.S. experts feel that such
"spoonfeedinge will also inevitably limit im4speadant inquiry and
originality.
As the scientific profession in the Soviet Union is a highly
honored and well paid one, the majority of Soviet students wish to
prepare themselves for a scientific career. What institute a student
attends and what course of study he purses is largely a matter of
state selection. Instead of depending upon individual preference or
public appeal to influence the high school graduate's choice of a
'major*, the Soviets use several effective methods to funnel students
into disciplines in accordance with the needs of the Stater
(1) They use, of course, propaganda appeals, mach as we do,
stressing monetary and prestige factors, and in addition point out
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