(Classified)A(Classified)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000300110004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

B,2
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PACIFICATION
.'A CONCEPT OF PACIFICATION
25X1A9a
by
entral Intelligence Agency
THE PROBLEM
1. The totality of Viet Cong insurgency in South Viet-Nam con-
siats of two distinct but interrelated problems:
a) The Viet Cong military apparatus, which now constitutes
a well-equipped, growing, and experienced army, and is no longer
a collection of partisans. These so-called main force units now
augmented by at least seven PAVN regiments are supported by an
extensive and much more numerous paramilitary structure. The
fighters in this structure are, from time to time, gathered as
military units and committed to combat in concert with main
force elements, or committed to military actions quite on
their own. Let us call this entire military grouping the Viet
Gong military arm.
b.) The second part of the insurgency consists of those
,Viet Gong activists, terrorists, sympathizers, and collabora
tors who constitute the ever-widening and strangling web of
subversion that moves out through the countryside, district
by district, village by village, and household by household.
The extent to which this subversive permeation of the popula-
tion is successful constitutes the extent to which and the rate
at which the population is being lost to the enemy. In this
grouping one must include the part-time VC paramilitary
fighter, when he is not gathered for an operation but is at
rest and pursuing an apparently harmless and normal life in
the body of the non-VC population..
Z. These two arms of the Viet Gong movement, described above,
constitute our enemy. It is their destruction or neutralization which com-
prise Our immediate purpose in being in this country, in support of the
South Vietnamese themselves. These two problems are sufficiently dif-
ferent as to require radically different methods and styles of attack. They
have, however, been viewed and approached as a military challenge which
would be met by a military response, with minor and peripheral support by
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civilian authorities and agencies. Certainly, we on the American side have
not distinguished '.-,etween these two problems, and have concentrated our
efforts on dealing with it militarily by the constant enlargement of the
RVNAF1 as an establishment directed from the national level. At the same
time, much less attention has been devoted to the significance of the civil
effort at the provincial and district level, where the popular pacification
war is being fought.
3. In order to overcome the Viet Cong and to achieve our objec-
tive, this late in the game, four separate but interrelated efforts are essen-
tial. It is necessary that we be successful in all four. Failure in any one'
will endanger each of the other three, and probably bring all of our efforts
to failure. These four efforts are:
a) The progressive curtailment and elimination of signif-
icant infiltration of men or materiel into SVN from areas external
to it.
b) The imposition by the RVNAF, aided by Allied Forces,
of its will on the Viet Cong military formations and structures as
they exist in each province. With the battlefield of SVN at least
t
ure
practically isolated, the objective must be to destroy, cap
or disperse the Viet Cong military arm.
c) The identification, subsequent harassment and ultimate
neutralization of the VC political and covert apparatus that con-
stitutes the essentially non-military structure by which the Viet
Cong movement controls, coerces, and exploits the populations
it dominates, and through which it carries out its subversive
tasks amongst population groupings yet to be engulfed by the
VC.
d) A continuing and ever -expanding GVN provincial
effort beginning at the household and family level, extending
up through the village and district. The objective here,
working from the household unit upwards, classically is to
`?arm" those households and villages, by means of civic
action and reasonable protection at the family level, and
thus to equip them to resist or deflect VC blandishment
and encroachment, to the limit of their ability to resist.
In speaking of "the people" in this way, one must visualize
them as existing in rural groupings ranging ,from a few score
to several hundred. One must also envisage the goal as being
the creation and sustaining, among these small groupings, of
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a collective attitude which is hostile to the VC - or if it is
responsive, it is so only under VC duress. In brief the target
here is the involvement of the population itself, beginning with
.its smallest components, in the overall commitment against
the Viet Cong. This favorable environment, friendly to the
GVN and poisonous to the VC can be achieved by the proper
mixture of 'low level civic action, basic armed security, and
gradually strengthening mutual confidence between GVN action
teams and the families amongst whom they circulate and live.
This is one of the lessons we have learned from the develop-
ment of the People's Action Teaml program.
4. There are several points that should be noted with regard to
the four efforts mentioned in the preceding paragraph:
a) Sub-paras a. and d. above have been given the least
attention to date. Given further inattention, additional effort
on sub-paras b. and c. may become irrelevant.
b) It should be noted that sub-paras a. and d. are in
themselves means to an end, with the end being b. and c.
5. The accomplishment of sub-paras a. and b. of para 3 are
essentially military matters and clearly must be controlled and directed by
the American and Vietnamese military leadership, each in its own sphere,
and each subject to larger factors of a political nature. On the other hand,
sub-paras c. and d. of para 3 have pretty much proved themselves to be
the kind of problem with which a formal military establishment is ill-equipped
to grapple. On the contrary, they constitute targets which are essentially
civilian in composition and which are local in character, indigenous to the
individual province, the individual district, or even at smaller sub-divisions
of the population.
6. If one accepts this view of the insurgency as comprising two
parts; and that these two parts produce four tasks or essential programs,
then it becomes possible to think seriously and constructively about how to
assign responsibilities, priorities, and resources available to the over-all
task.- It also becomes logical to view the first part of insurgency as one.in
which the GVN military component is dominant, with the civilian ministries
in support. The VC main force units comprise an army in the field which
must be brought clown by an equivalent or greater force: the RVNAF and its
allies. Equally, regarding the second part, it becomes logical to view the
Ministries of Interior and Rural Construction (now called Revolutionary
Development) as the dominant GVN agencies at the Saigon end, with the
1These are sometimes referred to as Political Action Teams.
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other echelons of the government being in support. Practically, the role of
these ministries is in itself less important than that which is even more es-
sential: vastly to strengthen the authority and the capability of the province
chief to work on sub-paras c. and d. of para 3.
WHAT TO DO ABOUT PACIFICATION
8. Briefly stated, we must agree that our pacification objective
is the simply-stated goal of causing the small family units which make up
the rural population, to become responsive to and receptive toward the
lowest echelons of local authorities with whom they are frequently in contact.
9. We must recognize that the knitting together of the population
and of the government must begin at this very lowest level; by the group of
families and households that make up the villages, hamlets, and the country-
side in general, to the' local elders and the district officials and functionaries,
who constitute local authority. Contact with such local authorities, certainly
at the district level, may well be the only form of officialdom that the local
residents will ever be aware of. As such, it is equitable to the GVN in
Saigon, about which the ordinary rural dweller knows little and cares less.
10. National and provincial institutions of popular representation
.must indeed be brought into being, but these' accomplishments will be endur-
ing only to the degree that the linking of the rural population to his own visible'
local authorities has been brought about. In saying this, 'it is well. understood
that this objective has been voiced before. It has never been achieved, how-
ever, because the actions necessary to its accomplishment were never in
fact performed.
11. One of the hard won lessons of 1964 and 1965, in the civic
and politics{ action field, has been that repeated and constantly-applied low
level civic action, of immediate and personal significance and value to the
families concerned, rather quickly creates an atmosphere of friendliness
and acceptance of the local authorities performing the actions, by the
families being helped. This atmosphere established and maintained,
information (intelligence) harmful to the Viet Cong and essential to GVN
programs and efforts, is volunteered in an ever increasing amount. Then,
as forceful action is taken against the Viet Cong locally on the basis of
such intelligenceo rural confidence in local authorities begins to develop,
especially as the rural population continues to benefit from civic action of
immediate value and impact. It is unfortunately necessary to emphasize
that this civic action. must in fact be done,. and not simply planned and dis-
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12. This cycle of good works leading to intelligence, thence to
action beneficial to the rural households, is the cycle which, as continued,
does indeed draw segments of the rural population closer to their local
authorities. Our experience with People's Action Teams over the past year
and a half seems to prove rather conclusively that this cycle of three ele-
ments is the only working device so far identified that indeed does accomp-
lish this essential goal. The varying conditions in the different provinces
and districts, and even within districts, require considerable latitude and
flexibility in applying this doctrine. It is, however, exactly this require-
ment of flexibility that dictates an approach to the problem from the very
lowest level upwards, rather than from the Saigon level downwards.
13. For a rural population, which has traditionally experienced
callous indifference at best and more frequently thorough exploitation by its
officialdom, to find this same echelon of local authorities itself taking the
lead in civic action in its most basic and wanted forms - it is this experience
that prepares the ground for the growth of rural response and friendliness
toward their local authorities. Given this, the next phase is characterized
by the volunteering of intelligence against the Viet Cong in their midst or
passing through their locality. It must be recognized that if the people
will give intelligence against the VC to local authorities, other forms of
cooperation will come as well. Once this watershed of morale. and spirit
is crossed, the Viet Cong fish begins to swim in a hostile sea. This., of
-,course, is the beginning of rural security. This also marks the beginning
of the rural development which will make it possible for the bulk of the
population of South Viet-Nam, once the major military actions have come
to a close, to control and suppress the problems of subversion and terror
which will.without doubt continue for the next decade or longer.
14. This well-motivated performance by local authorities can
be brought about by encouragement, example, and moral. indoctrination.
The techniques and devices used to train government cadre to this level of
selflessness and helpfulness are known. They have been successfully em- .
ployed over the last year and a half in the. PAT program.
15. Once this bond begins to show itself in a locality, and the
local security situation (at least in terms of Viet Cong main force units)
becomes tolerable, all of the other and more formal forms of government
involvement and assistance can come into play - the more formal and
complex forms of medical care, educational facilities, farmers' coopera-
tives, union activities, teachers' associations, and the like. The original
form of low level civic action should not stop, however, but should be con-
tinued even during this build-up period, until it is well established that the
more formalized institutions of rurai.help are indeed building the foot
bridge as well as the highway bridge, and are indeed teaching remotely-
located childfen how to -count as well as those able to come to the school.
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0
16. Given a growing bond of understanding and responsiveness
by a rural population to its local authorities, one moves into a phase when
meaningful choices of local representation to a higher local assembly can be
made. Thus, the ascending spiral of some acceptable or reasonable form of
representative government can begin. Possibly this spiral may reach the
national level at about the time a constitution might be agreed upon and a
national representative body needed - let us s'ay in three to seven years.
17. It is felt that the doctrine set forth above is both appropriate
and necessary to the present need. The general doctrine must be applied
from the bottom up and in all provinces, or at least in as many provinces as
can be staffed now, with high priority given to staffing all provinces as rapidly
as proper training can be accomplished.
18. To apply this general doctrine to the rural areas of Viet-
Nam will require immediate attention to two matters. One: the matter of
manpower native to the province and district concerned. It would seem
inevitable and that at an early date, provision be made for this kind of effort
to get its essential and proper share of the manpower resources in the coun-
tryside. Two: the role and authority of the province chief (and-his sub-
ordinate district chiefs) need clarification concerning and possibly even
their separation from the military line of command. Regardless of the fact
that the province chief is most often a military officer, he should be fully
responsible for implementation of the doctrine presented above, given the
manpower and other resources necessary to its accomplishment, and. made
responsible to thePrime Minister or his immediate delegee for this accom-
plishment. There are ample means of coordinating his activities with
purely military activities going on,in his province and district.
.and lasting only if it develops its own echelon of Vietnamese leadership, as
opposed to American leadership.
ing, we should avoid any appearance of assuming the leadership of this
pacification effort. The growth and spread of this activity will be effective
While doing what is essential in terms of initiating, supporting and monitor-
19. In implementing the doctrine presented in this paper, we
must always strive to advance the truly Vietnamese character of this effort.
CONCLUSION
tion which is inclined to support its local authorities, and local authorities
which work in the interest of serving and protecting the people - only this
20. We must bear in mind that the basic object here is to attach
.the rural population to its local authorities, and to inculcate the trait 'of
their being mutually responsive, one to the other. Long after our joint
military effort has dispersed or neutralized the Viet Cong military arm,
Communist subversion, terror and coercion will continue. Only a popula-
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kind of rural environment will be able to contain or suppress such subver-
sion. If this bond between people and local authority. is not brought into
being, the purely 'military effort, with all of its attendant losses, will have
been a failure. Thus, the Vietnamese must be brought increasingly to take
the lead and responsibility in this pacification effort, as rapidly as can be
done without jeopardizing the effectiveness of this growing effort.
21. For only too long have we played'with widely differing con-
cepts of pacification, both on the American and Vietnamese sides. The
doctrine presented in this paper is simple, derived from the needs and
problems of the rural population, and effective. Its successful implementa-
tion will make possible the development of a peaceful and orderly country-'
side. It does pot conflict with military prerogatives or tasks; rather does
it supplement them. We should accept it as the basis for rural construc-
tion, and urge the GVN to adopt it as well.
ATTACHMENT: The PAT Program: Theory and Practice
1. Although differing local situations cause some variations in
the specific content of People's Action Team actions, broadly speaking they
all carry out three interrelated activities which experience has proved are
essential to.the success of the program. These activities may be described
as:
a. Work. This means civic action at its lowest pos-
sible level and by this is meant basic and rudimentary medical.
help to an ill member of a family, help in repairing an en-
closure for animals, repairing a path, cleaning a well, cutting
a child'b hair, teaching a child to count - the list is endless.
b. Information (Intelligence). From the kind of work
described above grows confidence and a gradual willingness
to provide information, as well as to believe information
coming from local authorities.
c. Action. It has been learned that from good work at
the family level comes the confidence which brings with it
intelligence about the Viet Cong in the area, and on the basis'.-,
this intelligence, armed action can be taken against Viet
Cong so identified or compromised. It has been learned if
those who perform the work, mentioned above, are in
sufficient numbers and aggressively armed, that they them-
selves can in many cases carry out the action by themselves,
thus further indreasing the confidence of the local population
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in them, and further inspiring them to help. Where the
intelligence so produced leads to a prospect of action beyond
the capability of the workers themselves, referral to the
district level can bring appropriate military units to bear
upon the tactical opportunity.
2. Furthermore, it has been learned that there are four addi-
tional factors which must be constantly respected, if the above "Unity of
Three" is to be successful. These factors are:
conduct are observed and are in fact carried out, it has been found that
these activists becon- as one with the population whom they serve and
among whom they live. Where this condition has been created, objective
evidence reveals that the Viet Cong find such areas dangerous to enter.
greater importance the protection of the people among whom they work and
live, and on whose behalf they on occasion fight. When these principles of
they operate.
a. The work done for the small segment of rural
population must be of immediate and continuing help and
value to the families and households concerned, and be
repetitive if necessary.
b. The work must be done essentially by the same
group of activists, who must be native to the district in which
c. The work done by this repetitive group of activists
must be, generally speaking, among the same segment of
population, i. e. , in the same district, or even in a certain
portion of a district.
d. This work must be done by the same' people among
the same people, all the time and without end.
3. Where these factors are observed, and the "Unity of Three"
employed, the activists indeed win the confidence, affection, and of even
4. In addition to the "Unity of Three," and the four factors also
listed above, there are certain other characteristics which have been found
to have been greatly contributory,. probably necessary, to the success of
the program. These are:
a. The thoroughness and intimacy of the political and
motivational training given to these activists must be main-
tained and in no''way diluted. Provision must be made for
,refresher courses of a political and motivational character
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 every three to four months. While a good portion of this
training can be given in a centralized' to cation, for purposes
of efficiency and uniformity, final indoctrination and train-
ing should be given on the ground in the district in which the
team will work.
a. A willingness to provide to local authorities
be, characterized by such examples as the following, which are each in
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b. The activists must either be native to the district
in which they will work, or long associated with it, at home
in it, and generally speaking,. accepted by the residents of
the district.
special civilian partisans whose work is to help the people
amongst whom they live.
be so viewed by the population amongst whom they work.
They should view themselves, and in turn be viewed, as
c. In spite of the armament and fighting capability of
these teams of activists, they are not to consider themselves
as military units, in the conventional sense, nor are they to
these same people.
self. They should sleep in places provided by the population
they move among, and should purchase their meals from
place to which a conventional military unit habitually re-
turns. The base of these activist units is the district it-
serves as their headquarters or base, nor any other such
.d. In keeping .with previous sub-paragraph c., these
partisan units should not have a barracks or compound which
e. These units, as they observe the "Unity of Three,
must constantly move from point to point within their as-
signed district, depending on the work to be done, the
intelligence received, and the action indicated.
.5. The objective of the PAT program is of course to bring in-
to being a local popular 'attitude which is hostile to the Viet Cong presence,.
and which resists its encroachment. The attainment of this objective will
orators, or the movement of Viet Cong functionaries or
information concerning Viet Cong sympathizers, collab-
armed units
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b. A willingness to protect (by hiding, dissimula-
tion, or warning) local authorities or those working in their
behalf from Viet Cong raiding parties, terrorists groups,
or other forms of Viet Cong harassment.
? c. To avoid where possible paying taxes, providing
food, or otherwise assisting the Viet Cong, or where
avoidance proves too dangerous to the family or the
immediate communityp to report such action promptly
to local authorities.
d. To evade serving or supporting Viet Cong main
force units by flight or hiding, and' promptly reporting to
local authorities.
e. Normal cooperation with local authorities in low
level and local civic action or self-help activities of benefit
to the immediate groups of households or the population of
the immediate area.
6. The above enumeration is by no means all-inclusive. It
must be borne in mind that the condition and the abilities of the local popula-
tion to lend themselves to this objective may vary widely from province to
province, and even within individual districts. This variance will be in-
a. The presence and strength of Viet Cong main force
units in or near the populated area in question.
b. The degree of control or domination over the local
population already exercised by the Viet Cong governing
apparatus.
c. Purely local factors such as ethnic homogeneity,.
religious affiliation, local occupation, and availability of
police at district level.
d. The degree to which there is a latent receptivity
in favor of local authority, to' the disadvantage of the
Viet Cong.
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7. It can be readily seen that once the villages begin'to inform
on the Viet Gong, once they begin to protect, those working against the Viet
Cong, and once they begin to resist Viet Cong demands, the first and critical
round in the pacification struggle has been won, and the area in question is
ready for "takeoff" with respect to the infusion of larger. doses of economic
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aid in the form of schools, local developmental projects, etc. Until this
essential first round is won, we believe that it is economically"waitefu ,..".
pfoliC c~ l ,y and ' 'ir'able;?and administratively chaotic to deluge small peasant
communities with the overly ambitious developmental projects which unhap-
pily have in the past far too often constituted the primary ingredient of joint
U:`'. 7Vietnamgse pacification efforts.
8. As it now functions, the PAT program is managed locally by
the province chief, with staff assistance covering three types of support:
a. Intelligence. It is this staff's reponsibility to ensure
that all reports provided to a district chief by teams within his
district are funneled into the province intelligence center, for
the benefit of all pacification operations within the province
(with due respect to the protection of source identifications and
agent names). In turn, this person has the obligation of provid-_
ing to the district chief such additional intelligence as may be
available and needed by a district chief in supervising or.direct-
ing the "ACTION" aspects of the teams' activities within the .
district.
b. Civic action and government information. This staff
has the responsibility of reviewing those civic actions found
desirable by the partisan teams in the districts, but beyond
their own capability to implement, and thereafter seeking ways
and means, at the province level, of responding to the need so
identified, or in otherwise giving evidence and concrete form
of GVN interest in and concern for the welfare of the popula-
tion at the lowest level. It is normally at this point that such
civic action meshes into province civic action capabilities and
plans, either on the part of the PATs themselves or in con-
junction with USOM.
c. Team support. This staff has the responsibility of
seeing to it that the PATs themselves receive, promptly and
fully, all necessary support. This includes:
(1) Maintenance at both district and province
headquarters of adequate ammunition stocks, re-
placement weapons,, replacement clothing and such
-accountrements.
(2) Prompt and unvarying provision of cash to
district chiefs for, dependable salary payments to'
team members,
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(3) Immediate payment to district chiefs of death
and funeral benefits for immediate passing on to
families of those killed in action.
(4) Maintenance of contact with the families of
partisan team members, in order to be aware.of
personal problems, sicknesses, or other matters
wherein the activist's family should receive some
help or attention, so as to maintain the activist's
morale and confidence that the local authorities are
taking an active interest in. himself and his family.
9. As the PAT program expands, it is very likely that the need
will become apparent for similar support staffs to be established at the
district level.$,
Richard Critchfield, "Assignment: Saigon,
The Washington Star, December 1965)'
As he settles into his job as Machiavelli-behind-the-prince to
34-year-old Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, /Major General Edward/
Lansdald becomes America's first full-fledged career revolutionary. At
his disposal are plenty of dollars, a vast intelligence network, and nearly
150, 000 American combat troops.
Lansdale's personal approach to his job is, probably best re-
vealed in a story he has told colleagues around the American mission. He
feels the United States relationship towards South Viet-Nam, a great
sovereign power helping a minor sovereign power, should be approached
like a man trying to help his neighbor garden. If he just stands there and
carps "that's no way to plant azaleas" his neighbor will hate his guts as a
know-it-all.
Worsen he can come rushing to his neighbor's aid with a lot of
gadgets that tear up the neighbor's flower bed. The third and Lansdale way
is to be the "really friendly guy" who comes over, spade in hand, to work
alongside the ieighbor and invite him home', for a-cold beer when it gets too
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