EFFECT OF WARNINGS TO PEKING STUDIED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000300280007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 2, 1964
• Content Type: NSPR

WASHINGTON POST
AND TIMES HERALD
J U L 2 1964
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA
FOIAb3b
O
~YR
Lorton Mintz
aff Reporter
If that is the case, according
o one view, the Communists
ill be constrained to avoid
ny action that they believe'
o,xild bring about an atomics
ttack.
But another reaction among
he experts is alarm-a fear
at Peking, erroneously ex-!
ecting an all-out attack in'
ny event, will attempt new
ffensives. These, the fear 'is,.
uld broaden the conflict the;
dministration is presumablyi
in to contain.
our top U.S. experts on
Asian affairs fear that a ward
no one wants could result;
from a : misreading by Com-
munist China of statements
made, recently by the Admin.
istration'.
As they see it, President
Johnson and his :associates
!essentially have been trying to'convey an
simple message:'
The United States will ndt tol-'
crate new Communist aggres-,'
But they also 'feel that if.
this is the message, it has been'
'spoken obscurely. Obscurity,
ger of misinterpretation among
the. American public,.in;other
countries and, most omntously,
in Peking. i
(fri an attempt to clarify the
?Administration position, See-
j?etary of State Dean Rusk
said yesterday that. the first
objective of U.S. policy is to
l e x p 1 o i t the possibility of
achieving peace in Southeast
Asia without extending the'
fighting.) .
The experts unanimously!
are confident that there has
sheen no threat of nuclear ward
in the Administration policy'
(statements. But they do 'not)
foreclose the possibility that)
this is the threat mistakenly)
CPYRGHT
olinson, Rusk Try to Make
J.S. Determination Clear.
ona possibilities were, versity School of Advanced in-.I
)iced by the Asian special- ternational Studies
ts. , gave their,
One was that the Adminis-
ation's warnings were not
tended to be`. understood,
d that such deliberate ob-
urity can be fruitful, as was
e case with the Quemoy-
atsu crises. The thought here
that a warning of dire con
uences, even if murky, has
an effectively conveyed..
Yet another possibility cited
the experts was that the
mmunists will consider the
ministration's statements an
ctionyear bluff, one which
.1 leave the United States
mately confronted with a
)ice between a great loss of
.stige or a great loss of life.
he experts, all associated
i
g
on.
th the Johns 'Hopkins Uni? Chairman of the ? discussion]
CPYRGHT
Coatinuec
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00001.R000300280007-8
views to reporters Monday atI
the School's Washington Cen-
ter of Forcien Policy Re-
search. One ground rule was
that no view he attributed to
a particular individual.
The panelists were:
Roger Hilsman, former As.
sistant Secretary of State for
Far Eastern Affairs; Harold
C. Hinton, a staff member of
the Institute for Defense
Analyses; William C. John-
stone Jr., professor of Asian
studies, and Paul M. A. Line-
barger, a professor of Asiatic
politics who for six years was
private secretary to the legal
adviser of Nationalist China
in Nanking and Washin
t