WHICH WAY BACK?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000300430005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 9, 1966
• Content Type: NSPR

CPYRGHT
litt.e no infuellee with peasants
ors to badly exposed to intinlida-
i{11:,, tee COliatrysieee 1S recognised to
.aiCr the permanent control cf the
eteong. day and night. But nearly all
rest is in fact no more than " secure by
_,,v ?i;'n is obviously a very relative
. SCe',itlty. Tile goveranunt in Saigon
one else can hold their country for
themselves at Lillis late hour the
rr;ll to tight their way back. in the
is vl'i;,_t11or the South Vietnamese
r,ot want to be communist can
ton back from London in 1940.
t,c Segos government's position
:nit of General de Gaulle when he
i toihili secure. Almost all are town
tat can reasonably be classed as
5' t, must of South Vietnam seems to
ae;y lost. Cinly five million people
one ct1cll y. tills do not appear so
Mat do the Vietnamese want?
No one can say with authority An " the
0ut1 Vietnamese " want. The only general
lections hold since the French left in 1954
were those under Diem, which were rigged.
It can safely be assumed that most South
Vietnamese want to be free of foreign
interference (fierce resistance to it is a
constant in their history) and also that most
4 them would appreciate hence. Should
the United States withdraw, and exchange
the prospect of an indefinitely protracted,
horrible war for the chance of seeing a
united communist Vietnam under Hanoi
detach itself sooner or later from Peking's
1aflue nee and strike an independent Titoist
,inc ? It is a case that is easier to argue in
Fir rope or America than on the ground in
Vietnam.
The lack of serious anti-American feeling
in Saigon. is a constant surprise to visitors,
considering how the American presence
sprawls, often unattractively, across the
whole heart of the town. A survey of the
knov,'n attitudes of . the factions that
dominate South Vietnam gives the following
resuit: tine I1 million Catholics, many of
whom left glee north to escape Hanoi's rule
in 1954, are implacably opposed to the
communists ar'd leant the Americans to Help
fight them ; so do the I 'l., million followers
if t:,e hoc 11-1z o sect, whose determination
:?il11Gi1 Cao Dai also want to run
is :he whole country outside the towns;
Ac Cambodian border the most secure
FOIAb3b,.
27
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:ca I-lao rather than free South
.. te) has made OR home provinces
often enoul;,l of ilcgotiauc ns and pc, co
attract the iaoe, of dangerous noutralats.
But no-one is sure what their leaders really
want (their leaders give every sign of not
having th"ght ON Was 1MOtlgn OCm-
selves). Who t they say they leant is to lead
~, hmovement slrGiic,
a broadly'b.sc1popular g
visages. 'lacy DeeseV'e, apparently, that a
general election would allow them to
establish a gavernnlent that would provide
a road to pe ce, eceause it would eventually
become strong enough to cegotiate with the
Vietcong of eet:ci terms. They say this
might be in .... _ e ett s' ti:,^.e. In the mean-'
tulle, they y want the Americans to
stay and ll , n~n f ght the ware
Of aSSeSS,;_, opinion to those
who bclicv cc V i:.conk have quite
simply war and that the
peasants :ces;,.rily regard the
Americar< ),;'rn as the number
simple in ty. The SysLCm e1ic and r'uth-
less way in o bich the Vietcong have used
There are at least three American views
iii Saigon of now to escanc, In one, military
power, escalta;on and deterrence pre-
dominate, giving the hope of a more or less
quick solution. Some Ail'.r rican officials in
Saigon, whit; they have been left with no
illusions about Marshal Ky's political
qualities and acceptability to the Vietnamese
people, foci that this is not the time co
encourage the necessar'lly slow and messy
process of creating representative govern-
Mont illstitlitioiiS. Unfortunately, helping
Marshal Ky to stay in power from month
to month could paean helping him to frus-
trate indefinitely the process of political
developtlacllt, The government is working
seriously on the preparations for the
elections, but Marshal Ky's frequent
declarations about how long the means to
retain power do not improve the atmo-
spllcre. A serious Buddhist boycott of the
elections would be a disaster.
Of course, the Americans do not control
the Saigon government-as has been
demonstrated all too often since 1954.
Presumably, no government could survive
it they withdrew their support ; but the
Diem epoch showed just how hard it is to
exercise this kind of negative power in posi-
is well documented, and every day the
evidence that the tcrroris: a goes en : dis-
Mien, (Florally, the American tactical 'comb-
ing alined at Vietcong units is hardly cent-
parable with AV terrorism.
The fact idiai. the American me sence
appears to have rile appruvm of the pccpls
they are Iry'illg 10 help does 110t, i owever,
mean that there is a united South Viet-
namese will to but the Vietcong, or to do
anything else, The Buddhists and the
Catholics distrust each other intensely ; the
southern Buddhists distrust the northerners,
whom they suspect of wanting to set up an
autonomous, neutralist state in central
to go their own way. It seems clear ... ,.
if the Americans left, South Vietnam would
not have the political substance to survive
for a month. There are signs of ilhhp:GvC-
nlent in the past year, but again not e;letgt
for optimism. This means that the Am.a'i
cans may be left holding, the baby
CPYRGHT
taking at most a moderating role , m,
meanwhile to set about budding
Vietnam ex iiovo, largely with American
means and with limited reference to S I_on.
The alternative political strategy c fct s-
in;; South Vietnam on the rock of ti:e My
native organising principle that has emerged
there-religion-has apparently been set
aside for the time being. even though ni;iriy
people in Saigon still think it clew the best,
if not, indeed, the only, chance of s; ccess.
Instead, the word that is being handed dcvn
from Ambassador Lodge's oibcc, and the:
emanates by implication from Gcceral
i.ailsdale's private nation-building ope: -
tlon, is that a new " pragmatic " breed:. 0'i
politicians must be summoned forth Cron-,
Vietnam's womb. Pragmatic, being iater-
prcted, means " more like us ": inch ui' ;o,
instead of feeling Buddhist or 1-eca 1 ao or
Catholic, will think of themselves as South
Vietnamese, and work wholeheartedly
the common good rather than for priv'ate
or family advancement. There are such
men in Vietnam, but not many yet.
The Lansdale
operation
live ways. On the other haled, they arc General Lansdale, who carnet:
lnis
involved directly in the administration of in south-cast Asian history 15 yetis rife
the country, and leave a capacity to run a building up lMagsaysay as a a:ltic.i;.:l Ic'met
number of things Themselves with little to defeat the lrrtkS in the Phi invites, a
reference to Saigon. So a clear view of now on his second tour of duty in
what they are after would help. The i1am, having been asked personally by Mr
evidence in South Vietnam does Suggest Cabot Lodge to conic and help. .-
ona i;lairs free from Vietcong
i ll country's rent fining 8 million
ate claimed as Buddhists by the
n);ar,zcs (as the monks are called), who ca-
ill)' C0:11mand _their reap ct, although ISoine SCi'iGus Confusion. _ _ _ _ _ rounded by his special aura Gf secrecy, i.
d'aiinallt religious principle, Most Of~thcsc appears to be to allow the Vietnamese the South Vietnamese minister for re'.'C
nconlc live in 1110 Vjcll:4;11! t)L?lra S niirii of I Inulitical nower. olav-the stru ale betw'ecil tlonarv develCg',nlent, who is Lien,;: