BALANCE SHEET OF THE PERMANENT CRISIS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Publication Date: January 1, 1963
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

enough to hold together a multinational, multiracial conglomeration of peoples, with
the continuing aim of imposing Communist totalitarianism on the world. Since earth-
bound deterrence has prevented general war, it is possible that predominance in space
may in the end become a decisive issue in the bipolar dispute. To meet the totalitarian-
ideological challenge of Communist power, we must shed long-held policy concepts
and throw an intellectual switch from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, in prepa-
ration for the twenty-first. These are some of the vital entries in the .. .
espite differences between Moscow and Peking, the Red bloc's coalescence is strong
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BALANCE SHEET
of the
PERMANENT CRISIS
Dire s,
tear Institute of Slno-Soviet to ie
The George Washington University
By Dr. _Kur lpndon
STAT
An excerpt from The Permanent Crisis (Walker and
COMOd i) , e"w orC f ' y Dr. Kurt
London. Copyright 1962 by Kurt London, reprinted
with permission.
THERE are times in the lives of men and nations
when it becomes imperative to pause, take stock,
discard the obsolete, and start anew. The middle
decades of our century were such a time. The prob-
lems to be solved came into focus, and the changes
affecting the relations among nations clearly emerged.
The outlook for the second half of the century be-
came more penetrable.
Revolutions usually are directed against petrified
traditions, views, and attitudes. The trouble is that
they tend to become iconoclastic and destroy the good
with the bad instead of replacing the old with the
new. Recognition of this probability and adjustment
to changing conditions can prevent violent upheavals
while vigorously stimulating evolutionary actions. We
do not need revolution to prevent entrenchment in a
figurative Maginot Line of traditionalist concepts of
foreign affairs.
In the preceding chapters, an attempt was made to
call attention to the hazards of archaic thinking under
the unprecedented conditions of contemporary world
politics. Conventional subject matter was purposely
retained as a point of departure since it is better to
chart a new course from a known position than from
parts unknown. But the revolutionizing developments
in the nature and technique of international relations
are anything but conventional. It should therefore be
useful to recapitulate the most important factors which
have led to a change of substance and an eclipse of
traditional principles in international relations.
Broadly speaking, these factors are ideology and
technology.
The sharp division of the world into two irrecon-
cilable camps, with weak neutralist countries desper-
ately trying to remain uncommitted, is basically the
result of an ideological schism. It renders obsolete
both the traditional outlook on world politics and the
employment of traditional diplomacy except between
nations of the free world.
Communist ideology has reshaped the bloc coun-
tries' thought and life. In striving for totality and in-
tegralism, it has developed different and unconven-
tional approaches to international relations and for-
eign policy. It seeks to hasten what even the West has
recognized as "the decline of the nation state."1 With
revolutionary aggressiveness it has forced the ideo-
logically ill-prepared West into a defensive position.
On the strength of doctrinal cohesion, the "world
social system" or "Commonwealth of Socialist Coun-
tries"2 came into being, commanding a large part of
the world's natural resources and manpower.
There is no precedent in history for a universalist
secular religion which, armed with modern means of
communication, can reach all peoples of the world
over the heads of their governments, Nor is there any
precedent for a worldwide system of parties which
overtly or covertly carries on Communist business
against their own nations' interests. Were it not for
totalitarian ideology and organization, first Fascist
and then Communist, the free world would not now
face permanent crisis.
If power per se were sought and contested, differ-
ences could reach eventual settlement as they have so
1. The Mid-century Challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy, Special Studies
Project I, The Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Doubleday & Co. Inc., New
York, 1959, p. 487.
2. See London, "The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations," in Orbis Vol.
III, No. 4, 1960, and E. R. Goodman, The Soviet Design /or a World
State, Columbia University Press, 1960, passim. Cf. also Z. Brzezinski,
The Soviet Bloc, Harvard University Press, 1960, passim.
STAT
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drive harder. We approach the end of our conven-
tional r e. We are losing. Or suppose we are holding,
or even' ning, when the Soviets introduce tactical
nuclear wea ns. What do we do? How many options
are open to us. ow flexible are we?
We can negoti v, with the terms highly unlikely
to be in our favor.
Or we can escalate i ediately from conventional
war to an exchange of IC' s, to the highest level of
conflict, to the kind of war here we already have
told ourselves that there are n . winners.
Clearly we cannot confine our quest for flexibility
to the low-intensity end of the con ect spectrum. Fur-
ther, we must build in flexibility fro the top down,
not from the bottom up. Unless we ar willing to pay
the price of being able to cope with ever . conceivable
Soviet challenge in exact kind, we must e priority
to the potential challenges which most eriously
Flexible Response and Western Europd
For a dozen years or more the sword and shiel
concept of NATO has contained the vastly superi
conventional forces of the Soviet Union and her
Europe satellites. The shield has been made u of
NATO's ground forces and tactical air forces, fined
with both conventional and nuclear weapons :- here
was never a question of attempting to contain major
Soviet assault, even a conventional one, wit conven-
tional weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons frould be
employed. The sword behind the shield s SAC, to-
gether with other strategic forces and ? the direct
command of the Supreme Allied mmander in
Europe.
Today the argument over conven
weapons may prove to be the ree
founders. We are insisting that
capability is grossly inadequate
result in nuclear war being fore
peans, who have lived in t
equanimity all these years,
apprehensive about the e
fear of using tactical n
war in their back yard
that conventional w
shift in this dire
desire to keep a
derives in lar
viability of
our scuttli
But if We
tionally .arm
onal vs. nuclear
on which NATO
TO's conventional
nd that this could
upon us. The Euro-
Soviet shadow with
becoming increasingly
nt and nature of future
alf. They worry about our
ear weapons because they
ger of a major conventional
he Europeans know firsthand
is no consummation devoutly
ey tend to view any US policy
ion as ;motivated primarily by a
art from his doubts about the future
ommitments. And British anger over
her V-bombers by our virtual abandon-
bolt missile is part of the same package.
ern Europe finds the thought of conven-
d defenses distasteful, our own strategy
is finding it more and more attractive. Undersecretary
of State George W. Ball, speaking before the NATO
Parliamentarians' Conference in Paris last November,
said:
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"There is no reason why the NATO countries cannot
maintain in the NATO area conr}ventional forces that
are at least equal to those in Ed-stern Europe."
Mr. McNamara has also.,,~:indicated his belief that
the NATO countries ca increase their conventional
defensive capabilities. e NATO nations will agree,
but only reluctantly nd under heavy pressure from
the US.
We have not ublicly renounced the first use of
tactical nuclea (weapons in the defense of Western
Europe, nor there any likelihood that we will do
so soon or en ever. But the doctrine of nuclear stale-
mate, coupled with the theories of automatic escala-
tion an s exible response, indicate that we are trying
hard , remove these weapons from any battlefield
of t future, even if this means risking large-scale
s far as Western Europe is concerned, the danger
twofold-first, that the doctrinal conflict will irre-
parably damage the Alliance, and second, that the
Soviets will be encouraged to take new risks in the
NATO area that could not have been justified when
they were faced with the sword and shield concept.
More Options or Less?
No thoughtful person can quarrel with the idea of
s king as many alternatives as possible between sur-
e er or holocaust. The real question is whether or
not c current trends in strategy and force composi-
tion ?e really narrowing, rather than widening, the
numbe of options that will be available as time
goes on
Consu ing fear of nuclear weapons and nuclear war
can depri .: us of the main strategic advantage we
possess to It would reduce risks for the Soviet
planners by oncentrating future conflict in the con-
ventional area where the strategic advantage is clearly
theirs. In addi n, they know they can always pause
for negotiations the going gets too rough.
Far more worn ome, however, are the dangers in-
herent in unilater acceptance of the strategic-stale-
mate concept. Ind d, the very fact that we accept
a stalemate in itself eaks the stalemate in a psycho-
logical sense. A sing technological breakthrough-
with space offering a almost unlimited range of
possibilities-could shatt " the stalemate suddenly and
irrevocably, permitting n her time nor opportunity
to "fall back and re-grope."
Optimism is running high a: er the Soviet backdown
in Cuba, and the temptation into read more into that
episode than is justified. One ~~fi:n make a case that
the very attempt to emplace oulanking missiles on
the island stemmed from the Sovietbelief that, if their
bluff were called, they had little to lose but face-a
small risk in terms of the prospective benefits had the
move gone undetected. And the strategic posture
which made possible our positive reaction in Cuba is
undergoing a radical change. Postulate a future Cuba
-perhaps in space, perhaps in Iran-under the strategic
philosophy discussed herewith, and one comes up with
quite a different set of answers.-END
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en in the past. But a deeply ingrained concept,
_
a philosophy of life, a quasi-religious political con-
viction cannot be compromised: It is an indivisible
entity. Therefore no sound foreign policy can be de-
vised by the West unless it recognizes the monu-
mental impact of ideology upon world politics in gen-
eral and upon relations between the bipolar groups
in particular.
Although the Communist bloc can no longer be re-
garded as monolithic, its coalescence is strong enough
to hold together a multinational, multiracial conglom-
eration of European and Asiatic peoples despite in-
evitable frictions and "nonantagonistic contraditions."
The combined power of this camp is held by leaders
impregnated with the principles of Marxism-Len-
inism. For them, genuine peace is possible only when
"imperialist" countries no longer exist. They permit
oily ad hoc agreements under the label of "peaceful
coexistence." This is clearly indicated by Soviet termi-
nology: Lenin, who is said to have originated the prin-
ciple of "coexistence," called it "breathing spell,"
and other bloc leaders use the term modus vivendi
interchangeably with coexistence.
The bloc's speedy attainment of socio-economic
goals which would create the "material-technical basis
for the transition to communism"-the present state
being no more than "socialism"-presupposes such
accommodation. This is not peace in the definitive
Western sense, but merely an extended truce during
which the "socialist forces" expect to achieve the
necessary strength to reach and overtake the level of
capitalism. Moreover, the Communists claim that the
deterministic philosophy of dialectical and historical
materialism proves "scientifically" that all other sys-
tems of human society are doomed. In view of the
dialectical combination of the increase in Communist
power and the expected decline of capitalism, the
men in Moscow and Peking believe time to be on
their side. Their POLITPROP is formulated accord-
ingly.
Major technological breakthroughs have occurred
in several fields of science: the communication sys-
tem, transportation, the means of weapon delivery
(missiles), and the utilization of atomic energy. From
the point of view of world politics, these develop-
ments are interdependent. The most momentous of
them all is the progress in atomic energy.
Provided the bipolar sides can maintain approxi-
mate equality of the nuclear and weapons systems,
the resulting stalemate will be so firmly entrenched as
to render general war useless as a means of foreign
policy. Naturally, misunderstandings or miscalcula-
tions concerning the balance of the deterrent could
conceivably lead to a holocaust, and there is need to
maintain a high level of preparedness even beyond
nuclear weapons. The Communist bloc's strong desire
for an extended period of peaceful development and
the West's caution against provocation appear to pre-
clude major wars. However, the Sino-Soviet compro-
mise formula in the Moscow Statement of December
1960, reiterated at the Twenty-second CPSU Con-
gress, excepted "just" wars of "national liberation
in the "national democracies," i.e., countries striving
for "liberation" from colonial and semicolonial domi-
AIR FORCE Magazine ? January 1963
In these cases the bloc will attempt to
nation
.
political and economic vacuums ostensibly without the
use of its own forces (witness Laos, Cuba, Vietnam).
But it almost certainly will stop at the brink of war.
As a result of this historically unique situation, com-
munication systems enable communism to maintain
worldwide control of and influence over its parties.
They relay messages and directives everywhere at, a
time when new and underdeveloped countries are ris-
ing and their vast uneducated masses are awakening.
The Communist posture makes it difficult for the
free world to accept its protestations of peaceful in-
tentions at face value. The study of Communist clas-
sics and the experience of Soviet behavior since 1917
and that of Red China since 1950 make it inadvisable
to give credence to soothing bloc statements directed
toward the West. It has always been a primary maxim
of Communist tactical doctrine that all means are
permissible to achieve a strategic objective, except
where too much risk is involved. If one believes at all
in the influence of doctrine upon the behavior and ap-
proaches of Communist governments, one cannot pos-
sibly take for granted their assurances.
Consequently, the West is compelled to keep up its
deterrent power. It is hard to envisage nuclear dis-
armament so long as it might leave the West in a
weaker position with regard to conventional arma-
ment and manpower. In any event, the missile race is
bound to continue, whether under military or scien-
tific auspices. Considering the Communists' tremen-
dous concentration of scientific and economic devel-
opment under the umbrella of the nuclear stalemate,
the West has little choice but to do the same and do
it even better.
Part of the technological factor is the beginning of
space exploration which adds a new dimension to
already existing problems. The conquests of space for
all practical purposes began in the late fifties. For
reasons of deterrence-military, political, and propa-
gandistic-the "competitive coexistence" of the two
camps must extend beyond terrestrial bounds. Since it
is by no means established that problems of defense
can be separated from the purposes of scientific en-
deavor, predominance in space may in the end become
a decisive issue in the bipolar dispute. The thought
cannot be dismissed that the conquest of space may
change geopolitics into cosmopolitics and that the
Mackinder aphorism "who rules the heartland, rules
the world" will have to be paraphrased into "who con-
quers space, rules the earth."
Between 1957 and 1962, spectacular Soviet successes
in space exploration outstripped the United States'
more pedestrian progress, at least in terms of world
propaganda, but since then the United States has
shown impressive advances. The Kremlin knows that
it is still ahead and will make every effort to remain
so, but must realize that America may well catch up
with Soviet achievements and perhaps surpass them.
In this connection Lenin's remarks to the British
author, H. G. Wells, in 1920 are significant:
"I, too, understand that all human conceptions are
on the scale of our planet. They are based on the as-
sumption that technical potentials, when developed to
(Continued on following page)
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BALANCE SHEET OF THE PERMANENT CRISIS CONrl ED
`
'
the full, will not go beyond
terrestrial limits.
If we
arrive at establishing interplanetary communications
we must revise all our philosophical, social, and moral
conceptions. In that case the technical potentials, hav-
ing become unlimited, will impose upon us the end
of violence as a means and method of progress."3
This should augur well for the space age. How=
ever, we have not yet progressed that far and if we
had, there is no certainty that Moscow and Peking
would agree with Lenin. Thus for reasons of self-
preservation we must assume that the initial struggle
for space (observation posts on artificial satellites and
the moon) will scarcely be affected by Lenin's words.
Since the Communists recognize international law
only when it serves their designs, the value of a world-
wide agreement on the "neutrality" of space (similar
to that of certain polar regions), even if actually
signed, would be questionable. For the time being,
competition for the conquest of space, closely asso-
ciated as it is with the development of missiles, will
continue to play a considerable role in the political,
military, and propaganda posture of the opposing
camps.
How can the democracies cope with this novel situ-
ation? Can they master it without altering the very
substance of their beliefs? Is it possible to maintain a
status quo indefinitely?
The answers to these vital questions can be neither
positive nor negative. They are too complex, too de-
pendent upon a multitude of premises to be simple.
But the overriding fact is that a status quo is an illu-
sion and can only be a passing phase. New develop-
ments lead to new conditions which generate sudden
or imperceptible changes. It is human nature to seek
security, but it is human tragedy that such security,
seemingly found, slips away.
In politics and international affairs, this expresses
itself in never-ending sequences of undulation, com-
parable with the ebb and flow of the sea. The need of
the individual to "adjust" himself to changing environ-
ments is paralleled by the state. If the individual fails,
he is likely to suffer severe damage and so is the state.
Neither the individual nor the state must necessarily
sacrifice basic beliefs in order to modify their ap-
plication to everyday life or practical politics. Ac-
cordingly, when the individual is confronted by a
situation that threatens the very core of his existence,
he first takes measures to safeguard it and then de-
vises counteraction to guarantee his survival under
the most favorable conditions. It is probable that in
so doing he may be required to sacrifice some sectors
of his status quo, but, in time, he can discover new
sectors which compensate for them. It is the same
with the state: its status quo can never be taken for
granted, Stagnation would be the alternative and his-
tory proves that stagnation means decline.
More concretely, it would seem that the changing
nature of world affairs has revealed the impossibility
3. The Christian Science Monitor, Boston, September 15, 1959, quoting
Paris Presse.
of traditional states maintaining their status quo. A
study of the facts which have led to this situation and
an evaluation of their effects on foreign policy and
international relations must inevitably demonstrate
that:
? It is urgent to shed long-held concepts of policy
and diplomacy and to develop new ones befitting the
requirements of the changing global environment;
? It is necessary to reconsider not only the think-
ing but also the organization and coordination of the
machinery for policy-making and implementation;`
? It is essential to enhance and reorient the educa-
tion of present and future generations so as to en-
able citizens of the democracies to understand the
problems confronting their governments.5
Meanwhile the democracies face the almost impos-
sible task of marshaling their national strength and re-
sources in peacetime, when most people's sense of
urgency is not so strong as it is in war or imminent
military conflict, when the will to survive generates
unity and willingness to sacrifice. During a cold war
or "peaceful coexistence"-there is little difference be-
tween the two terms-the need for sacrifice is not so
obvious. Thus the problem of defending against to-
talitarianism raises the question of how a decentral-
ized parliamentary administration can face a central-
ized dictatorship without itself becoming dictatorial
or totalitarian. Can the democracies adopt emergency
measures when no war clouds gather on the horizon?
Can they redirect and plan economy without explain-
ing to the people the long-term seriousness of their
situation? Can they maintain indefinitely a strong mili-
tary establishment and tax the citizens heavily for its
cost? Everything depends upon the national leaders'
view of the nature and extent of the danger and upon
the success or failure of the people to realize that it is
better to sacrifice some of their blessings now than all
of them later.
Opinions differ as to the nature of the threat. Even
if the theses of this book be discounted, we can dis-
regard the naive, if not foolish, attitude of individuals
who want peace at any price. Yet there are persons of
considerable sophistication who are inclined to believe
that if the USSR achieved economic power equal to
that of the USA, this would engender satiation and
relaxation, softening and finally eroding the Commu-
nist threat. More widespread is the view that interna-
tional communism is on the decline because it is a
monolith no longer, because there exist serious dis-
agreements on policies and methods between Moscow
and Peking, and because the denigration of Stalin has
brought about a trend toward growing "independence"
of bloc nations as well as Communist parties outside
the orbit.
4. Cf. "Organizing for National Security," An Interim Staff Memoran-
dum, Senate Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on
National Policy Machinery, Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, Washington,
D.C., December 4, 1959, and "Organizing for Survival," in Foreign Af-
fairs, New York, April 1960, by the same author.
5. Cf. Admiral II. Rickovcr, Education and Freedom, Dutton & Co.,
New York, 1959, passim.
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'NCE SHEET OF THE PERMANENT CRISIS
Some of the most respected pundits of foreign affairs
have proclaimed that, with the growing prosperity of
Western Europe and the hope for eventual unification
on the basis of the Common Market, the Soviet bloc
will be faced not only with the might of the United
States but with the new power of the "second force,"
United Western Europe, proving that capitalism is
gaining momentum while socialist economy is in
trouble. The pundits conclude from this that commu-
nism will lose its hold not only outside but also inside
the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. They further point to
the Khrushchevite reformist movement, deducing that
the Marxist-Leninist secular religion is incapable of
maintaining its sway. Their yardstick appears to be of
Stalinist making, and they regard as a sign of decay
the fact that terrorist absolutism has given way to
greater variety in implementing the doctrine. They
ignore the fact that Khrushchev's long-advocated amal-
gamation of Communist theory and practice has be-
come more of a reality than ever before, resulting in
a tactical pragmatism which should strengthen rather
than weaken the position of both the party and the
country. In fact, there is a general tendency to assume
that, with Stalin. gone, the cohesion of the movement
has become looser and that, as a result, an erosion of
communism is inevitable.
These analyses semi convincing to Westerners be-
cause they are conceived by Western minds. It would
be desirable to review the issues more objectively, i.e.,
to apply Communist thinking as well. On that basis,
let us look briefly at the two principal problems con-
noting what is often regarded as the beginning of a
Communist decline.
First, the Sino-Soviet dispute. There is enough evi-
dence for students of Communist affairs to conclude
that a controversy of considerable proportion has de-
veloped between Moscow and Peking. It began in
earnest after the Twentieth CPSU Congress in which
Khrushchev initiated his campaign to denigrate Stalin
and triggered what. the Italian Communist Party chief,
Palmiro Togliatti, called "polycentrism." Ever since,
the arguments have had their ups and downs; they
were centered not so much on power prevalence as
on methodology. Peking did not agree with Moscow
on the desirability of "peaceful coexistence" and dis-
armament nor on the Soviet interpretation of the nu-
clear stalemate nor on the possibility of conquering
"imperialism" without arms, merely through economic
and technical "competition." Peking agreed with the
concept of "national liberation wars" but did not like
the reluctance of Moscow to implement this doctrine.
One may add, parenthetically, that the personal dis-
like between Khrushchev and Mao played an im-
portant role in the controversy.
Second, during the years following the Twentieth
CPSU Congress, there has developed, slowly but in-
exorably, a decentralized system of communism. At
that Congress, Khrushchev, after having denounced
Stalinist brutality, proclaimed that each socialist coun-
try should develop along its own "road to socialism."
The reception of this thesis was mixed; the inveterate
Stalinists (e.g., East Germany's Ulbricht, Czechoslo-
vakia's Novotny, France's Duclos, and, of course, Mao
Tse-tung) questioned the wisdom of this decision;
others like Togliatti accepted it with alacrity. As time
went by, the concept of polycentric communism
gained, and a gradual transition from monolithism to
polycentrism took place, particularly in Europe. No
such acceptance was forthcoming from Peking, whose
two Asian neighbors, North Vietnam and North Korea,
cautiously shared Mao's views. Thus the question
arose as to whether an integral movement such as com-
munism can continue to exist after having discarded
centralized control.
Red China would answer in the negative, as would
many free-world observers. The Eastern European
Soviet Bloc would answer in the affirmative, believing
that the experience and power of the USSR will find-
or has found-the answer to this question. Khrush-
chev is a wholehearted believer in the secular religion
and wants to prepare for the "transition to commu-
nism." He has made it clear repeatedly that such a
transition is impossible under Stalinist duress and that,
to speak in terms of experimental psychology, people
must be motivated by "positive reinforcement" or, as
the layman would say, by incentives-both ideological
and material.
This, once again, leads us to the Chinese dilemma:
Mao wants central leadership by Moscow on the one
hand and is passionately striving to strengthen his
sovereignty on the other hand. Albania. shares these
feelings. Both Communist states want to be in a posi-
tion to veto. decisions made in Communist summit
meetings, while the Soviets prefer majority rule, well
aware that the majority is at their disposition. But,
although Mao cannot accept the Soviet rationale, he
cannot break away from the Soviet bloc, as did Al-
bania, without dealing a deadly blow to Red China
and the international movement. The Chinese Com-
munists may be stubborn and beset by a superiority
complex, but they are also shrewd and realistic; they
would permit a break only in extremis.
It would be dangerous for the West to expect such
a break. There is always a possibility that it might
happen, but the likelihood is remote. Arguments will
continue for a long time; this dialectical dispute is one
of the many that have beset the Communist move-
ment without upsetting it. Admittedly, the controversy
is serious, but both Moscow and Peking must realize
that a split in governmental relations would entail far
more serious consequences. However, should such a
split occur, Marxism-Leninism as a secular religion
might break into two camps even as the medieval
church broke into eastern and western branches.
Christianity has not perished as a result; communism
probably will not either. Instead of one center, we
would be faced by two, and the notion of some
dreamers that we could then unite with one (the
Soviet) to battle the other only testifies to their com-
plete misunderstanding of the nature and objectives
of communism.
Apart from the Sino-Soviet problem, can we expect
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'the movement to continue, once it has become a
loosely organized "commonwealth of socialist coun-
tries"? We can and we should. We must expect change
in the Communist camp just as elsewhere; stagnation,
as pointed out earlier, means decay, as the Commu-
nists are well aware. Indeed, one might say that
Khrushchev has done much to prevent such a stagna-
tion which had set in under Stalin. Before the latter's
death, the party had become a mere instrument in his
hands and was on the verge of losing its character and
initiative. One of the first actions Khrushchev under-
took was the revival of the party as a power, and in
that respect he was a better Leninist than Stalin.
Khrushchev, however, went further. He launched what
one might call a reformist trend, seeking to adjust the
Soviet party and society to new conditions which
Stalin had failed to recognize. In a sense, Khrushchev
has initiated a renaissance not only of his own party
but of the movement, and the opposition he found
must be attributed to the reluctance of Communist
chieftains throughout the world to accept the fact that
Stalin was dead not only as a man but as an era. The
aspects of totalitarianism had not changed but per-
suasion and "socialist legality" were to replace ter-
ror. A "New Soviet Man" was to be developed, a
superman of sorts, who expected only what he needed,
not what he deserved. Socialism was to proceed
toward communism, not only on a "material-technical
basis," but also on the assumption that people were
ready to submit voluntarily to the laws of the Com-
munist Moses so as to enter the "promised land." This
is not a short-range undertaking, and it is doubtful
whether Khrushchev, like Moses, will at least be able
to see the land.
The West has good reason to be skeptical of these
Communist dreams but it cannot afford to dismiss
them altogether. More specifically, it would be fool-
hardy to claim that such a goal can never be achieved
because Marxism-Leninism is not a secular religion
but only a convenient phraseology for political manip-
ulation. There still is a Communist bloc, not in the
sense of a monolith, but as an ideological entity and
a symbol of the ultimate objective which no Com-
munist regime has foresworn.
Changes are occurring in the "socialist camp." They
may be for better or for worse but they indicate move-
ment. For the West and the rest of the free world, the
flexibility and increasing sophistication of Khrush-
chevism, plus the emergence of an extremely aggres-
sive Red China do not presage happy times. What is
to be done?
Individuals and countries must roll with the
punches. They must either go forward or decline. If
the democracies insist on their status quo, time and
fate will by-pass them. To obtain the New, they must
relinquish the Old. In the lives of men nothing is per-
manent; the only immutable is change itself. It fol-
lows that in order not to lose such vital ingredients
of democracy as the freedom and dignity of the indi-
vidual, lesser privileges can and should be sacrificed.
For example, the maintenance of a strong national
AIR FORCE Magazine ? January 1963
economy need not necessarily be built upon the foun-
dations of luxury and hedonism. The preservation of
peacetime budgeting under conditions of nuclear stale-
mate is not necessarily the safest approach to national
security. The liberty of the individual to do as he
pleases must be subjected to and limited by communal
and national responsibilities without abridging his
freedom of expression, The self-interest of one nation
has to be restricted by the requirements of allied or
like-minded states and such restriction may be even
tighter if the nation commands a leading position. The
business of a country, be it political, economic, social,
or technical, can no longer be conducted with hap-
hazard laissez-faire individualism; it must be planned
to meet the totalitarian threat.
These may seem to be unpopular suggestions, yet
they propose remedies against democratic calcifica-
tion and demonstrate the need for new departures
toward vigorous policies. In the last analysis, the stale-
mate affecting East-West relations is not only of a
technological nature; it is one in which the rejuvena-
tion of policies and actions share equal importance.
The revolutionary convulsions of the globe have led
to a rapid deterioration of traditional relations among
nations. In the new world emerging, the West must
match the youthful vigor of Communist brains and
brawn. It has the resources to do so, but must de-
velop an awareness of the nature of the threat it faces
and channel its countermeasures to meet the core of
the danger rather than its periphery. Most of all, it
must throw an intellectual switch from the nineteenth
to the twentieth century and prepare for the twenty-
first. Once this is accomplished, the bipolar stalemate
will no longer put the West in a purely defensive posi-
tion. Knowing more of our adversaries than we do
now, we would be better prepared to counter their
moves or anticipate them. Perhaps, once this is ap-
preciated on the other side of the Curtains, an ac-
commodation might be obtained that is more than
temporary. We cannot expect a "kingdom of heaven on
earth," imperfect as we are. But we can hope for a
long-range evolution which would eliminate futility
and restore sanity. Admittedly, this hope is vague, yet
it points to the only possible solution of the perma-
nent crisis which disorients relations among nations
and perpetuates that political no-man's land in which
we dare not make war and cannot achieve peace.-
END
Dr. London is Professor of International Affairs and Direc-
toi"] ,nrn stitute of Sino-Soviet Studies at The George
Washington University, Washington, D. C. He has written
extensively on Soviet affairs and world politics, and his
books include The Seven Soviet Arts, Backgrounds of Con-
flict, and How Foreign Policy Is Made. He has taught at
City College, New York, at Brooklyn College, and at the
University of Denver, and for a number of years heserved
with US government agencies, including the impartments
o State and Defense. Dr. London iscurrently editing a
si~mpo %um on tie nonaligned Afro-Asian states in a divided
world.
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Dr. Edward Teller, left, received the
1962 Enrico Fermi Award from Presi-
dent Kennedy at a White House cere-
mony on December 3 in recognition
of his contributions to nuclear sci-
ence. Mrs. Teller, center, was on hand.
WE CANIs. TON BACK
NUCLEAR CLOCK
t address to editors of nite
In a recen
Press International in San Francisco,.~Q ~fI '
US
a
P?----
famed physicist and
honored with the coveted
ntl
y
wer rece
nuclear po Enrico Fermi Award for contributions to'''hemical
and nuclear physics, warned that in fur dan-
gerous times .. .
? To rely in the nuclear age on cventional
weapons is akin to having depen d on the
bow and arrow after the advent firearms.
? The clock of history cannot be fumed back.
Additional nations are bound to ac uire nuclear
knowledge and weapons. Hence a must face
the fact that power for peace and!war unavoid-
'
to
ably rests on the use of the a
? Although the nuclear ageis fraught with
danger, it is filled with Opp. tunity too, and
eventually a supranatiopal uthority must be
created to guarantee adv nce in a peaceful
world.
By Dr. Edward Teller
HE development of the hydrogen bomb was pre-
ceded by a discussion of fateful importance. In
it was argued that our destructive
ssion
di
scu
this
, per was great enough and that nothing more was
that if we
nee` d. It was stated, with some emphasis,
refrai d from developing a thermonuclear device, a
hydroge bomb, the Russians would also refrain. Presi-
dent Tru n decided that we should go ahead. We
did. And o collective efforts were successful. Less
than a year a er the explosion of the first hydrogen
bomb by the ited States the Russians announced
an explosion of at they termed a hydrogen bomb.
I do not know preci ly what they exploded, but there
were definite indicate s that the Soviets were quite
close to developing so ething similar to what we had
successfully accomplishe Over the intervening years
e national de-
th d ed as aenecessary componentnin our be
fense.
fense.
I mention these old facts for a particular reason.
Progress in nuclear explosives has been rapid. Prog-
ress in the discussion has been nonexistent. We are
AIR FORCE Magazine ? January 1963
38
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