RIOTS CAN BE THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP75-00001R000300490057-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
November 17, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 20, 1998
Sequence Number:
57
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 25, 1964
Content Type:
NSPR
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP75-00001R000300490057-0.pdf | 107.71 KB |
Body:
AEG 2 5 1964
CPYRGH~, ~ ~~,~Q'~',~ ,~
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 :CIA-R
LOUISVILL., KY.
TIMES
e. 174,689'
Fron} Edi4~ Oebor
Pag? Pig Pa
~!~jHETHER the rioters in South
T~/ Vietnam are expressing the will
of the majority of people of
South ,Vietnarsi, we have'no idea. No
one, we suppose, could do more than
guess about it, for ~ the people of
that country never .have been con-
sulted by the governments which have
imposed themselves on them.
Perhaps these rioters are nothing
more than a dissident minority. On
the other hand, perhaps ,they are
the 10 percent of the iceberg that
shows above the surface and under
them is a vast but voiceless majority.
Whatever-the truth, one aspect of
these riots must be disturbing to all
Americans. It is the fact .that, as
pane wire service said, "The riots
generally had ,anti-American over-
tones. In Saigon,. one student speaker
shouted, `Let this be a warning to
the United States. Do not interfere
in South Vietnam's domestic prob-
lems.' "
Is this man speaking only for a
small group or for, the majority of
Vietnomese7 Is the American Ares-
ence in South Vietnam resented by
the people? Would the majority there
rather switch allegiance to a neutral-
'st or even .Communist government
than continue the war? Z'Vithout some
sort of plebiscite, the .answers to
hose questions cannot be much' more
han guesszvorh.
Throe American .administrations-
hase of Presidents. Eisenhower,
ennedy, and Johnson-have ad-
anced the proposition that we are
'n South Vietnam to help the people
f that country defend themselves
gainst Communist aggression. But
vhat if this proposition is based on
false premise? As we have asI.ed
efore, what if the South Vietnamese
on't want to be defended? It is
e that the various Vietnamese gov-
rnmen~ts keep asking for more and
ore American -aid, but these recur.
ring riots suggest that what the gov- does not appear to be in sight, the
ernment wants and what the people guerrillas (badly outnumbered, fre- ~
want sire not necessarily the same. quently armed with American weap- ~
A people which is not given the, ons captured from the South Viet-~
opportunity to express itself in an namese army, and operating in what
orderly process not infrequently ex- is theoretically hostile territory) are
presses itself in a disorderly manner, - more successful than they have been
as in these riots. ~ in a long time, and the political situa-
In Washington, the government has tion obviously is delicate.
released, even thqugh reluctantly, a The riots in South Vietnam and '
report bearing on this question. It the success of the Viet Cong make
was, prepared by Willard Matthias, us wonder-and not for the first time ~
a member of the Central..Litelligence --about what 'the people of South ~
Agency's Board of National Estimates: Vietnam really would~like. -
Administration sources made it public_~
only ai'ter learning that it was to
be published by a newspaper.
In the report Matthias broke sharp-;
Iy with all the optimism that until?
very recently had been sounded in
.Saigon and Washington, ,and the, gov-;
ernment made clear his opiiuons were
his owsi and not those of ,the .gov-~
ernment.. lie wrote:
"The. guerrilla war in South Viet-~
nom is in its fifth year and no end ~
appears in sight. The Viet Cong, ~in~
the soi~i.h, dependent largely u~~on`~
their own resources but under the';;
'direction and control of the Com-^
munist regime ip the north, are press-
ing their offensive more vigorously
than ever... ~ There remains serious !.
doubt that victory can be won, and
the situation rernains very fragile ..."
About the most that Matthias could
foresee was "a prolonged stalemate."
This, of course, runs counter to
virtually everything such men as De-
fense Secretary McNamara, Ambassa-;.
dor Lodge, and President Johnson
have -been saying. And the words
of one obscure C.T.A. man may not'
weigh much when balanced against
those of such high officials. ,
At the same time, his words seem.
to draw a more accurate picture of
what is going on in South Vietnam
than those of his more illustrious'`
fellow officials.-.The end of the war ;
Approved .~'or ReLease, 20'00/08/26 EIA-RDP75 00~001~bQ03;0b490b5~-0
FOIAb3b