OUR TWO POLICIES ON TWO CHINAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000400490004-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 20, 1963
• Content Type: NSPR

11 HO D
Approved For ReleasjQ 2003/12/02 : CI
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~ur Two Policies .
:
On Two Chinas. Vi
By Marquis Chiidp
AS THE pressure' of the Commut1 is '
in Laos Increases 'a familiar' tliadow
once again darken%~the eastern horizon.
Because United ' Siteg_ policy i ignore!
Red China does not mean that it' will
conveniently fold up, nor does it mean
that the increasing thrust of Chinese
imperalism will not, be felt throughout
all of Asia.
If there are two Chinas-Formosa and
Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist
mainland-there are' also two China'
policies within the Government here.
Powerful forces in the Pentagon and the
Central Intelligence Agency have not,
abandoned the view that American in-
terests in the Far East can. never be
t +* 4
safeguarded short of a direct coniron? Leashed, Kirk because" IIt" 'Mtt~'~'
one-third the size of Cuba with nearly retiring chief of na
twice the population--as a theoretical some this seemed
alternative to the Red .dictatorship. view If the tank nt,
the mainLLi l but he has signed an eth with t for.' or Ie
United Stites. Official policy set by the Portugal.
President Is opposed to any. Invasion. ors
attempt jrould, under present Cirpum+ +U nr a' aam~rat, post. Ii~m
stances, ' e suicidal. has taken Oe Formosa post. 12v"10
? ( NATO naval forces ad the
WH, , POINTS this up are rprurrins irl..r w.b he .s......sa .....a _a. 1._A
f
r! # e act that a high civilian offs. ? Uttie imagination-Is required 1o "e
cis; -,1 se Pentagon went to Formosa ,;,the consequences W an, attempt by
spe udly to tell the Gimo, short for Chiang to land perhaps a division( nthe
Gt ra)L'simo, that his invasion plans China coast some time' this' ktttnmer'i
er Jd not be realized without massive when weather conditions are nloet'fa-
Y/ited States support which would. not. vorable. This would be in the belief that
forthcoming, a troubling doubt . the invasion would set flame to'riride? f
a
o
in tf di ect conflict with China. And ar re.
final recommendations are passed Wit.
de 1
- ----- -- ~^-- -?w uayavaualaaa; aaiclll. vii gala i-C&LUVWu;'4R?~
means, tvertheless to make the try. He, went to the CIA as one of the'124rbem*:+
has h1 trong support in the past from ? bers'1of the Board of National Eitl4** te,-
the 1,' ftsgon-CIA faction that bellevds which does the final U
1? bK
o cou uLO.,vajICla,, -sail auC WLLLWR41$L
`fhe question, in short, is: Who's in, - ctatorship. ah4
1l" c11irge here? The degree to which CIA It was on that same assumption the
i
i
n recent years shaped policyt to fiasco of the Bay of Pigs invasigK was
to by the acts of CIA operatives with unhappily based.
ttost?unlimited, unvouchered . funds With disaster looming
Chiang would
,
'. independents on-the-scene authority send up a cry for American help. And
(1l-t mrlght, made himself 'an advocate breach between Russia and ChU* gnd.
IL. .Ta._ V_w.-_J.. ._.l _ -___ . . .. .
V. ormosa cannot be measured. For , touch off a chain reaction so far-rt~ch-
'~ m~rly fhn... vnewa Kanln..1.... In 1119ZA iw.. .._ _a-_ --- - . ..
/lctld say six-Asian capital; the CIA help would be to invite the cis fo1'
ctdef has exerted the real authority a4 the China lobby and the Rep n I
a%tinst the American ambasador duly ' opposition that the Democrats the I
accredited to the country. only party that lost China twice.
The degree of direction from the CIA But to go to Chiang's rescne would
i F
p ` % 'a to Moscow.4maF l A Foos[ 0Tj?a -R jig P7 III
with instructions to keep Chiang old recurring dilemma of Chino.