CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000100170001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 22, 1962
• Content Type: TRANS

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000100170001-5
November 22, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 15797
sianization is also promoted in kindergar-
tens and mixed school. with parallel classes
in Russian and Latvian where children are
encouraged to befriend each other in the
Russian tongue.
However, asserts the author, Latvian re-
sistance to Moscow's pressure for Russifica-
tion is equally strong, the young generation
not excluded. In institutions of higher edu-
cation Latvian students still hold a majority
of 64.4?I , despite favorite treatment be-
stowed by the regime on Russians. Dr. Kal-
nins concludes that the next two decades
(provided Soviet Russian domination will
last that long) will show whether the Lat-
vian people will be able to maintain their
slim majority on their ancient native soil.
However, regardless of what the future holds
in store, no mass conver.ion of the Latvian
nation to Soviet Russian belief will ever
occur, as long as a breath of national spirit
prevails. The Red Muscovites of today will
hardly succeed where their equally reaction-
ary Czarist predecessors failed: namely, to
bend the Subjected nations of Holy Russia
under the reign of one ruler, one creed. and
one people.
Mr. Speaker, as I have indicated to the
Members, I will continue to emphasize
the cause of Latvia and other victims of
communism, since the foreign policy of
the United States remains dedicated to
legitimate self-determination of peoples.
We will not give legal sanction to Soviet
colonial rule of Latvia and its neighbor
states of Lithuania and Estonia.
THE STATE DEPARTMENT-SOME
ABUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Mr. ASHBROOK (at the request of
Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama) was granted
permission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include extra-
neous matter.)
Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, in his
recently published book, "Memoirs, 1925-
1950," George F. Kerman, whose creden-
tials in the academic, the foreign affairs,
and the liberal community can hardly be
questioned and whose present view to-
ward the U.S.S.R. hews to the "mellow-
ing" line, refers to the purge in mid-
1937 in which the realistic "hardliners"
in the State Department's Russian divi-
sion were shunted aside by pro-Soviet
replacements:
For here, if ever, was a point at which
there was indeed the smell of Soviet influ-
ence, or strongly pro-Soviet influences some-
where in the higher reaches of the
government.
In view of the nature of the following
remarks this illustration is not meant to
infer that the same conditions obtain at
State today, but merely serves to indicate
that cliques and coteries are nothing new
in that Department. However, consider-
ing the revelations of the past month or
so concerning the Runge and the Philby-
Burgess-Maclean spy cases, lax security
practices in an agency as sensitive as
State warrant review and corrective ac-
tion. Because some of the outrageous
abuses that have been perpetrated at
State over the last few years have not
received adequate attention or publicity,
I think it is advisable to comment on the
situation and offer possible recommenda-
tions. The unparalleled successes of So-
viet espionage over the years should have
resulted in a highly refined security sys-
tem at State, but recent experiences in-
dicate that coverups of security viola-
tions and purges of qualified security
personnel have provided a possible fer-
tile field for Communist penetration. A
brief review of the Philby-Burgess-Mac-
lean case will provide a background
against which cur own security problems
at State should be evaluated.
PHILBY, BURGESS, AND MACLEAN
The vital need for unbreathable secur-
ity procedures has been pointed up dur-
ing the past two decades by many cases
of defections, disappearances, suicides,
arrests, scandals and the like, but no-
where, not even in the phenomenal
Richard Sorge case, have there been situ-
ations to rival those of Harold (Kim)
Philby, Guy Burgess, and Don Maclean.
These three men managed to accumu-
late well over 50 years of communism and
aim their spying efforts at the heart of
both British and American security. All
three were members of the British For-
eign Service and all three managed to
defect to the Soviet Union, the land of
their allegiance.
Donald D. Maclean first entered the
British Foreign Service in 1935, shortly
after he left Trinity College, Cambridge,
where he had a "distinguished academic
record." He was stationed in Cairo. Guy
F. Burgess entered the Foreign Service
as a temporary employee in 1947. His re-
cord at Trinity College was described as
"brilliant."
For years the damage done by these
men has been either hushed or mini-
mized and their backgrounds said to be
clear of Communist leanings, at least in
the eyes of the security office responsible
for their activities.
To the Communists, however, they
were picked up early, doubtless well in-
doctrinated, and used to their fullest
extent. While British security did not
know of the Communist sympathies of
Burgess and Maclean, the Communists
latched on to them at Cambridge.
Vladimir M. Petrov, a Soviet MVD
agent in Australia who defected to the
west on April 3, 1954, clarified the back-
grounds and activities of the two spies
in these excerpted statements of sworn
testimony :
Burgess and Maclean were long term
agents who had each been independently re-
cruited to work for Soviet intelligence in
their student days at Cambridge University.
Their flight was planned and directed from
Moscow.
(During a period in London after the War)
Burgess was bringing out brief cases full of
Foreign Office documents, which were photo-
graphed in the Soviet Embassy and quickly
returned to him.
Petrov stated that he received this in-
formation directly from an assistant in
the Embassy, Filipp Kislitsyn, who was
involved with receiving the stolen docu-
ments. In fact, Kislitsyn was an MVD
cipher clerk in the Soviet Embassy in
London and, Petrov stated:
Kislitsyn used to encipher the more urgent
information and cable it to Moscow; the rest
he prepared for despatch by courier in the
diplomatic bag.
This same Kislitsyn was later recalled
to Moscow and trained to handle a spe-
cial one-man section of the top-secret
archives.
Petrov continues:
This section was devoted solely to the great
quantity of material supplied by Maclean
and Burgess. Much of it had not even been
translated or distributed to the Ministries
concerned, but Kislitsyn used to show par-
ticular files and documents to high-ranking
officials who visited his section for the pur-
pose.
This testimony reveals the vast
amount of information which the in-
formers passed on. The next question is,
of course, What information was involved
and what damage did it do?
The cost of the security breaches
through which Burgess and Maclean
moved is indicated not only by their posi-
tions in the respective senior and junior
service corps, but by their connections
with another British traitor, Harold
Philby.
"Kim" Philby's exploits over 30 years
as a Soviet agent can be compared only
with the celebrated Japan-based spy.
Richard Sorge. Philby came to Washing-
ton as temporary first secretary a few
months before Burgess, an old friend-
all three were acquainted from Cam-
bridge. From this vantage point he be-
came the third man in the defection
plot. Philby, too, had been thoroughly
immersed in communism during his
Cambridge days, and like the other two,
it took. After leaving Cambridge he took
years fashioning an elaborate coverup of
his leanings toward communism which
included pro-Nazi associations and jour-
nalistic service in Franco's Spain. He
was so successful that Franco gave him
a state decoration which he was known
to display.
Philby managed to gain access to Brit-
ish security-the lifetime task given
him by the Communists-in the summer
of 1941 and was assigned to head up
counterespionage in the Iberian section.
Philby later became the link between
British Secret Intelligence Service and
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
It was in this position that Philby had
access to a secret report from MI5-the
counterespionage section-naming Mac-
lean as the principal suspect in a 2-
year-old security leak investigation. The
logical chain then had Philby relating
the secret information to Burgess and
Burgess passing it on to Maclean.
Philby was asked to resign from the
British Foreign Service in July of 1951
and the "third man" case, according to
Prime Minister MacMillan some time
later, was both denied and closed.
Thirteen years later Philby defected to
the Soviet Union from his post as jour-
nalist in the Middle East with the Eco-
nomist and the Observer, a position
taken after the reported separation men-
tioned above. But it was at the time of
the defection, and now generally be-
lieved as common knowledge, that Phil-
by had still maintained working con-
nections with British security and had
never been taken off the payroll. This
would extend his stint as a traitor to a
full 30 years: 1933 to 1963, many of them
in the Foreign Service.
I will make a more complete presenta-
tion of the backgrounds and associations
of Philby, Burgess, and Maclean at a
later date. At this point it is more im-
portant to examine the effects which lax,
FOIAbSgni
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE November 22, 1967
or nonexistent, security had upon the
history of the world.
There is little doubt that these men
not only passed on to their Communist
superiors a great quantity of information
but information of great value. The full
nature and impact of secret documents
revealed to the Soviets will never be
known even though hushed investiga-
tions still ferret out facets of the trai-
tor's work. Nevertheless, it should be
emphasized that their actions ultimately
involved not only Britain but the United
States and directly or indirectly many
American citizens.
MAC ARTHUR AND KOREA
To the average American citizen con-
cerned with the problems of everyday
life, the subject of espionage is as far
removed from his area of responsibilities
las putting a man on the moon. To be
sure, the CIA, the FBI, and other gov-
ernmental agencies are directly con-
cerned with problems of this nature, but
in the long run John Doe can be severe-
ly affected by weak security procedures.
The case of Gen. Douglas MacArthur and
the Korean war is an excellent case in
point.
It will be remembered that some
months after the North Koreans had in-
vaded South Korea in June 1950, the
U.N. forces under MacArthur smashed
the advance of the Communists with the
brilliant Inchon maneuver. The invaders
were chased back to the Yalu River in
disarray and the end of the conflict was
clearly in sight. Then the buildup of Chi-
nese Communist troops north of the Yalu
brought up the question of bombing the
Yalu bridges if the Chinese Reds entered
the fray. As history has recorded, Mac-
Arthur was denied by Washington the
permission to bomb the Yalu bridges and
the Chinese communication lines in Man-
churia in case of necessity. General Mac-
Arthur in his book "Reminiscences"
states on page 370:
For the first time in military history, a
commander has been denied the use of his
military power to safeguard the lives of his
soldiers and safety of his army. To me it
clearly foreshadows a future tragic situation
in the Far East and leaves me with a sense of
inexpressible shock. It will cost the lives of
thousands of American soldiers and place in
jeopardy the entire army. By some means
the enemy commander must have known of
this decision to protect his lines of communi-
cation into North Korea, or he never would
have dared to cross those bridges in force.
Again on page 374 MacArthur referred
to the apparent leak in intelligence:
That there was some leak in intelligence
was evident to everyone. Walker continually
complained to me that his operations were
known to the enemy in advance through
sources in Washington. I will always believe
that if the United States had issued a warn-
ing to the effect that any entry of the Chi-
nese Communists in force into Korea would
be considered as an act of international war
against the United States, that the Korean
War would have terminated with our advance
north. I feel that the Reds would have stayed
on their side of the Yalu. Instead, informa-
tion must have been relayed to them, assur-
ing that the Yalu bridges would continue to
enjoy sanctuary and that their bases would
be left intact. They knew they could swarm
down across the Yalu River without having
to worry about bombers hitting their Man-
churian supply lines.
On page 375 MacArthur quotes Chi-
nese Communist Gen. Lin Piao as later
stating in an official Chinese leaflet:
I would never have made the attack and
risked my men and military reputation if I
had not been assured that Washington would
restrain General MacArthur from taking ade-
quate retaliatory measures against my lines
of supply and communication.
With recent disclosures in the British
press there can remain little doubt as to
who was responsible for the intelligence
leak in Washington which so benefited
the Chinese Reds. Philby arrived in
Washington as British liaison to the FBI
and CIA and in November 1950, Maclean
came to Washington as head of the For-
eign Office's American department. The
Washington Post of October 16, 1967, ex-
cerpted material from the London Sun-
day Times relating to Maclean's role in
the Korean affair. It stated:
The State Department has compiled an
analysis of Maclean's role at the time which
credits him with knowledge of the U.S.-Jap-
anese treaty negotiations and the Korean
War strategy.
The State Department accounts says that
Maclean was aware of the critical American
decision to "localize" the Korean conflict.
Instead of the Korean war ending up
as a short and ill-advised fiasco for the
Reds, it turned into a long-drawn-out
stalemate so costly in American lives.
Because of the invaluable information re-
layed to the Chinese Reds, the Korean
war was extended to July of 1953 when
the armistice was signed. American losses
over the 3-year period amounted to 33,-
629 battle deaths, 20,617 other deaths,
103,284 nonmortal wounds suffered for a
total of 157,530 American casualties. The
Korean war is an excellent case in point,
as I have stated, of the enormous penal-
ties exacted because of weak and inade-
quate security procedures when dealing
with a clever international adversary,
the Communist conspiracy.
OTHER SUCCESSES
Although Korean war information is
probably the most graphic of any involv-
ing these three Communist agents,
Philby, Burgess and Maclean, they were
also active in other vital areas.
In 1949, on the occasion of the first
U.S.S.R. atomic bomb explosion, Philby
and staff reportedly spent 4 days and
nights coding and decoding messages be-
tween the United States and Britain.
Burgess, in 1946, served as assistant
private secretary to an under secretary of
the Foreign Secretary.
In contrast and not to be outdone,
Maclean served as secretary of the
United States-British Combined Policy
Committee on Atomic Development. This
position gave him nearly unlimited ac-
cess to the tightly guarded Atomic
Energy Commission files in Washington.
This access, the London Sunday Times
reported, "gave Maclean access to the
greatest storehouse of atomic knowledge
that there is." Maclean could have, and
probably did, leak to the Russians the
where and how much concerning Allied
purchases of uranium. At this time the
United States was engaged in preemptive
purchase of uranium since it was
thought the supply was limited. He also
could have-he certainly had the ac-
cess-told the Communists that the
United States had perfected a method of
concerting low-grade ore into high-
grade, a fact of certain interest to Soviet
scientists.
The same congressional committee
which received the testimony of defector
Petrov also reported what might be a
totally unpublicized area of Donald
Maclean.
The committee reported that it heard
in closed session a number of Americans
who testified to the activities of Burgess
and Maclean. These hearings were "de-
signed to determine the possible involve-
ment of our people here":
(The investigators have] the identity of a
long series of individuals who were intimates
of the pair here. In this connection, we ob-
tained the desk pad of Alger Hiss which re-
vealed that Hiss had had a date at the
British Embassy with Maclean on Septem-
ber 14, 1946.
Should evidence of continued associa-
tion, direct or indirect, between Hiss and
Maclean be found, it would greatly
broaden the area to which Maclean had
access and also provide multiple chan-
nels for passing on information.
It is absurd that security procedures
should allow three Communists to func-
tion year after year after year, especially
when one considers that their university
days would certainly make them more
suspect than had they not been Commu-
nist oriented. But, even being generous
and granting that this would have been
difficult to trace, security violations of
other types should have forced their re-
moval from any position in the Govern-
ment.
Astoundingly, British security kept no
tabs on possible homosexuals, although
sexual deviates are prime targets for
blackmail. If British security had been
concerned with this area, Burgess and
Maclean might have been routed from
service earlier.
Early in 1950 security authorities in-
formed the Foreign Office that in late
1949 while on a vacation abroad, Burgess
had been guilty of "indiscreet talk" about
secret matters which he knew. Action
against this breach consisted only of a
reprimand, and evidently security offi-
cers did not followup to determine
whether this was an isolated incident.
In addition, both Maclean and Burgess
had drinking problems and Burgess ran
amuck of the police in Virginia three
times in 1 day for traffic offenses. The
third time the Burgess car was involved
in an accident, police found out the man
driving had been picked up along the
road, had no license, and was a homo-
sexual with a police record.
Assuming that security missed the fact
that Philby became a solid Communist
during his Cambridge days, investiga-
tion and disclosure of the activities of
Burgess would have exposed Philby also,
since Burgess lived in the Washington
home of Philby from August 1950 to C pril
1951.
Former CIA Chief Allen Dulles
summed up the security violations in
these words:
Neither a Burgess nor a Maclean should
ever have been allowed to have anything to
do with-classified matters. Even a reasonably
casual review of their activities during the
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