CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE KNCZAK'S IMMEDIATE SUPERIOR WAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000100170002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 22, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

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November 22, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 15801
measure of international fame in 1949
when he was expelled from Hungary by
the Communists after they charged that
he served as the intermediary between
Hungarian Cardinal Mindszenty and the
U.S. Minister to Budapest.
Koczak began to have his $18,000 a
year job pulled out from under him while
serving as head of the political section
reporting on Communist East Germany
in Berlin in 1960-61. Involved against
Koczak are persons directly connected
with the notorious "Warsaw sex and spy
cases" including the celebrated Scarbeck-
Discher scandal. Scarbeck, it will be re-
membered, was second secretary of the
U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, Poland. After
being surprised in bed with his mistress,
Scarbeck agreed to collaborate with the
Polish Government. It was here, too, that
the marine guard was compromised by
female, Communist intelligence officers
and the Embassy thoroughly bugged by
the Communists.
Koczak came to Berlin in 1960 follow-
ing a promotion and assignment for the
State Department after "brilliant" work
in Israel where he was stationed during
the Suez crisis of 1955. He was made head
of the political section as well as Deputy
Chief of Eastern Affairs at the U.S. mis-
sion in Berlin.
Koczak's immediate superior was
Thomas A. Donovan, who was reportedly
transferred to Berlin in September of
1960 because of allegations made by U.S.
marine guards who implicated him in
illicit associations with Polish women
suspected of being Polish agents. Rank-
ing as head of the U.S. mission and the
superior of both men was E. Allan Light-
ner, later Ambassador of Libya and now
Deputy Commandant of the National
War College. In between Lightner and
Donovan was Howard Trivers.
Following his sudden transfer, Dono-
van still kept ties with Warsaw. Koczak
frequently traveled from West Berlin
into East Berlin on official trips. His boss,
Donovan, would go with him. From East
Berlin, Koczak discovered that Donovan
would place calls to Communists in War-
saw. These calls were never reported by
Donovan to colleagues in West Berlin,
nor were they reported to Ambassador
Jacob Beam in Warsaw, the receiving
end.
Koczak's career as a Foreign Service
officer started toward its end when, in
addition to the phone calls, Donovan
made an unauthorized trip to Warsaw at
the exact time when Khrushchev aided
by the Polish Government, launched his
drive to expel the United States from
Berlin. This was too much for Koczak
who reported the breaches of security
and of orders to Howard Trivers, deputy
chief of the mission in West Berlin and
Donovan's superior.
By asking Trivers to bring to the at-
tention of Ambassador Beam the phone
calls and the unauthorized trip of Don-
ovan, what Koczak termed the "excep-
tional circumstances of my superior's-
Donovan's-telephone calls and his un-
authorized trip to Warsaw," Koczak was
rewarded with an exceptionally low effi-
ciency rating.
Koczak has stated that he chose go-
ing over his boss' head with the problem
after facing this dilemma: if he kept
FOIAb3b
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silent about the clandestine trip and
phone calls, he might be party to a secu-
rity risk; if he chose to talk with Trivers,
he would be a "squealer." Ironically,
nothing happened. There was no reac-
tion from Trivers, so Koczak decided to
go even one higher, to Lightner. But, to
his dismay, both Trivers and Lightner
advanced the argument that Donovan
had taken advantage of lower telephone
rates in East Berlin. Presumably, there
was no justification advanced for the un-
authorized trip and this item was merely
suppressed.
Characteristically, Koczak learned that
Trivers had not informed Ambassador
Beam of Donovan's activities, and had
even failed to inform Lightner.
Information compiled in the years
since have indicated that Koczak was
definitely up against one of the cliques
within the State Department and it was
probably futile to attempt to maintain
good security if it meant danger to an
"insider."
Although Koczak had been in the top
10 percent of the personnel, Donovan
gave him the low rating in 1961 and an
even lower rating in 1962. Koczak was
told in March 1963 that he had been "se-
lected out", in his case, retired. Although
he fought for and gained reinstatement,
the State Department came back in 1964
with another, and final decree which
even letters to the President could not
overrule.
The security involved in Donovan's
calls and visits to Warsaw, and the fact
that nothing was done about the breach,
indicates the overriding considerations
which insiders can use to shore up the
failings of one of their boys.
While Koczak was retired, Donovan
was given a good assignment in the De-
partment's Bureau of Intelligence Re-
search, even in the face of serious
charges that he was implicated in the
Warsaw scandal-and therefore shipped
to Berlin-and subsequently continued
his contacts with the Polish Communists.
It has been reported also that while in
Warsaw, Donovan's apartment was
"bugged" by Polish intelligence, ,Soviet
intelligence, and even the CIA. /
In addition to Donovan's continuation
in State positions, Trivers and Lightner
are also going their merry ways; Trivers
is now the consul general in Zurich and
Lightner Deputy Commandant at the
National War College.
The reasons why Donovan was not
fired after his Warsaw escapades, and
why Trivers, Lightner, and Ambassador
Beam run such similarly loose ships, can
only be that they are a few of the in-
siders. It has been pointed out that Beam,
Lightner, and Trivers all graduated from
Princeton within a year of each other. In
fact, common usage has come to identify
one of the cliques in the State Depart-
ment as the "Henderson-Princeton
pack." The Henderson here is the former
Under Secretary for Administration, Loy
Henderson, who is supposed to have engi-
neered the reassignment of Donovan
from Warsaw to Berlin following a re-
quest to this effect from Trivers and
Lightner.
Although Koczak has come up against
the power of this inside group, he also
appears to have caused another faction
dire concern; this group having the title
of the "Macy-Crockett camp."
The security problems posed by these
self-promoting groups are obvious. Less
obvious is the problem of poor policy
judgments which can be fostered by ex-
cluding some officers or, at the least, dis-
regarding their individual judgments.
Again, the case of Stephen Koczak as an
example.
Koczak, in his position as political offi-
cer, predicted that the Berlin wall was
going to be built, and presumably passed
his predictions-with justifications-on
to his superiors. On August 12 Koczak
was talking with a news correspondent
and stated that he would not be sur-
prised if the Communists began the wall
the next day. It would seem that while
the administration was shocked when
the wall did go up the next day, Koczak's
information should have mediated this
blow. Granted, luck was involved but
there was also sound judgment and ef-
ficient, if not brilliant, work behind
the statement. One can only assume
that the clique did not approve in some
way and the information was never
passed on or properly examined.
Few will ever know what action might
have been taken had the Berlin wall
been planned for and an effective coun-
termeasure ready.
At the center of the Koczak case is the
misuse of the efficiency report system,
now expanded to include the so-called
development appraisal report. In the
past it has been a secret item, and in
Koczak's case he charges that his rec-
ords were manipulated to such an ex-
tent-in attempts to justify his selec-
tion out after years of service in the top
10 percent-that its contents were in
part destroyed, forgeries made and back-
dated and then substituted for originals.
In addition, Koczak charges that his file
contained a statement that he had read
the full report when, in fact, he had not.
The newer development appraisal re-
port has been made available to the in-
dividual concerned only since June 1967,
and this action by the State Department
came only after pressure from the Amer-
ican Federation of Government Em-
ployees which stated more than a year
and a half ago that the report was
startling, dangerous and secretive. But
even now the report can be seen only in
Washington and even at that, the writer
cannot be confronted by the person who
may be charged. For the Foreign Service
officer overseas, it may be years before
he even sees his report. This assumes
that State will continue to allow officers
to read the report even under these
highly limited conditions.
Add to this the fact that the develop-
ment appraisal report is today the prin-
cipal criterion on which promotion or
selection out is based. Here again are
Mr. Griner's statements, this time on the
report and the selection boards which
pass judgment. As can be seen, not only
is the report an atrocious weapon, but
the horror is compounded by the built-
in inadequacies of the selection board:
We have also carefully examined the meth-
ods, procedures, and composition of the Se-
lection Boards which rate officers for "selec-
tion out" as well as promotion. At the outset
we wish to can attention to the fact that
the Boards are primarily composed of For-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE November 22, 1967
eign Service Officers whose own future as-
signments, careers and promotions may very
well depend on the way they perform on
these Selection Panels. This alone is itself
already a situation which needs safeguards
through an appeals procedure to prevent bias
and favoritism. Not only is the composition
of the Panels a matter of criticism, but the
Board's procedures are unsystematic, hap-
hazard, and we believe, unenlightened. We
are told that hundreds of efficiency records,
each containing up to as many as twenty
individual annual and other reports, are as-
sembled for each Panel. To these are added
further hundreds of so-called Development
Appraisal Reports, whose illegal institution
we have already condemned in the past.
Moreover, none of the Development Appraisal
Reports written in the past three years were
seen, we wish to note, at the time of writing
by the Officers; many have not been seen
in the interval. Some may never be seen by
the officers being rated.
All this vast assemblage of unseen, un-
systematic material is given to the respective
Panel for each class; each of the five or six
Panel members then proceeds to '/s or ?16
of these heaps of records, sorting them into
three piles-one pile, usually approximately
ten per cent, is accumulated for persons ten-
tatively considered for promotion; one pile,
also usually approximately ten per cent, is
for Officers tentatively considered for "selec-
tion out." And a third pile, usually seventy
five to eighty per cent, is put away not to be
read again unless some special message comes
from the personnel office suggesting the re-
reading of certain files. These will be neither
promoted nor "selected out" that year.
Comments we have received from Panel
members indicate that dreariness, boredom,
and fatigue soon overtakes them. None of the
persons being rated ever appears individ-
ually-the names thus are faceless. No one
knows for sure whether the reports them-
selves are accurate or not. No one can even
meaningfully ask whether the reports are
authentic, or, as on person has publicly
charged, whether they sometimes contain
even forgeries.
It is important that Stephen Koczak
have his day in court against his accusers,
but his case points up more than just one
man fighting the establishment. It also
reveals the "system." It is this system
within the State Department which must
be the target of Congress, and it is
through elimination of this system that
the Government and the people served
will gain better foreign policy, tighter
security, surer personnel practices, all
through better men allowed to work in a
clean, competitive environment.
OTHER U.S. CASES
If the State Department would expend
as much energy in ridding its ranks of
security risks as it has in the Otepka and
Koczak cases, the Philbys and Macleans
might not be such importance. Clark
Mollenhoff, the Pulitzer Prize winning
reporter for the Des Moines, Iowa, Reg-
ister and one of America's most fearless
reporters, listed 14 cases in the Register
of October 4, 1967, wherein violations of
security procedures were charged. Here
again it must be stressed that security
risks are not confined to Communist affil-
iations or sympathies alone. Issuing of
false statements, immoral conduct,
homosexuality, intoxication, and mental
defects are bases for adverse security
judgments. Among the violations men-
tioned by Mollenhoff are these:
1. A security officer stationed in Athens,
Greece, who failed to report a large number
of security violations yet was appointed dep-
uty chief of the Division of Security Evalua-
tions at the State Department.
2. A security officer who withheld informa-
tion from his superiors concerning the loss
of classified documents by an American am-
bassador. The officer was not censured and
was promoted to be a top lieutenant of
Reilly.
3. A security officer stationed in Moscow
who permitted himself to be enticed into the
apartment of a Russian woman, an agent for
the secret police. The secret police used con-
cealed cameras to photograph the American
and his nude companion and tried to get him
to spy for the Soviet Union. He never was
criticized or disciplined.
4. A foreign service officer who admitted to
security officers and State Department medi-
cal authorities that he had engaged in
homosexual acts. The medical officers found
him unfit to serve abroad because in their
judgment his homosexual tendencies made
him a potential security risk. He was sent
abroad, however, and was assigned to a crit-
ical post behind the Iron Curtain.
5. A foreign service officer stationed in Mex-
ico and Caracas, Venezuela, who was guilty
of a series of incidents of sexual misconduct,
including an affair with the wife of the am-
bassador of another nation. His conduct
was excused by State Department politicians.
6. A man dismissed as a security risk by the
Mutual Security Agency and characterized
as having "a rotten file," who was appointed
to a State Department position and given
full security clearance.
7. A foreign service officer who admitted he
furnished 18 documents, some of them clas-
sified "secret" to Philip Jaffe, the publisher
of Amerasia magazine and on whom there
was a considerable record of Communist ac-
tivities and affiliation. The officer was per-
mitted to take an honorable retirement and
pension.
In two other cases mentioned by Mol-
lenhoff the subjects are still with the
State Department. In one case the For-
eign Service officer concealed the fact
that he had been a member of the Young
Communist League and the Communist
Party. In the other case a Foreign Service
officer stationed in an eastern European
post admitted homosexual tendencies
and other personal misconduct but was
given responsibility for supervising the
Marine guard personnel and protecting
all safe combinations at the American
Embassy. His negligence permitted for-
eign agents to have access to classified
reports at the Embassy. He was not disci-
plined, received normal promotions, and
like the other case listed above, he is
still with the State Department.
In connection with security risks at
the State Department it is only fair to
state that each year this subject is re-
viewed by the House Appropriations
Subcommittee which reviews State's
appropriations requests. Each year State
provides the number of employees who
have departed from the Department for
security reasons of various types. How-
ever, the testimony before the subcom-
mittee is briefly dealt with, as it must
be, because of the very large volume of
work handled by the subcommittee. The
number of risks per year is not the prime
consideration here, for how can one
measure the value of one Philby or
Maclean in terms of lesser security risks.
What is important is the nature of the
present security system with its down-
grading of strict security precautions, the
waiving of security checks for question-
able persons, and the elimination of
hardheaded employees who place na-
tional security above Department
pressures.
Concerning the above-mentioned sub-
committee and its annual inquiry into
the security risks in the State Depart-
ment, the Government Employees' Ex-
change reported in its issue of July 26
of this year that reference to one "ad-
mitted homosexual" was omitted in testi-
mony before the subcommittee earlier
this year. This officer was included on the
1967 Foreign Service promotion list and
his promotion to a FSO-1 was confirmed
by the U.S. Senate.
Another account of this case was
placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on
November 3 by the gentleman from
Iowa, Congressman H. R. GROSS. This
account by Clark Mollenhoff, of the Des
Moines Register, reports that the officer
had admitted his deviations to security
officers and that a State Department
medical team warned that as a "latent
homosexual" he should not be placed in
any position where sensitive security
matters are handled. In answer to a con-
gressional inquiry State replied that the
man had "a valid clearance, and is not
currently under investigation." Accord-
ing to the Government Employees' Ex-
change, this case has been referred to
the appropriate committee, and I am
hopeful that the circumstances sur-
rounding this case will be brought to
public attention and corrective action
taken.
THE ROSTOW CASE
Another case which has a direct bear-
ing on security matters is that of Walt
W. Rostow, now a special assistant to
the President on national security af-
fairs. According to various press accounts
just recently, Rostow was refused a se-
curity clearance three times in the 1950's.
Rostow, in turn, stated, according to the
Washington Post and Evening Star that:
From 1951 onward, I had continuous secu-
rity clearance from various agencies of the
Federal Government.
Senator STROM THURMOND noted in the
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of October 19 that
Rostow's reply was not "responsive to the
allegations presented by Mr. Otto Otepka
in his brief filed recently before a State
Department hearing." It is claimed that
Rostow was initially rejected for a high-
level clearance by the Department of the
Air Force; and again in 1955 by Her-
bert Hoover, Jr., then Under Secretary
of State; and again in 1957 by Roderick
O'Connor, then Administrator of the
State Department Bureau of Security.
Senator THURMOND pointed out:
Anyone who knows anything about secu-
rity clearances knows they are granted for
various degrees of accessibility and by vari-
ous agencies. The standards of each agency
may be, and frequently are, entirely differ-
ent; and they may be bypassed completely
by high-level command.
Senator THURMOND further observed
that:
Whatever level of clearance he may have
had, the fact is that he has been denied
strict high-level clearance on the three occa-
sions mentioned. For example: under the
Hoover action of 1955, Rostow was disap-
proved to attend meetings of a psychological
warfare panel of the Operations Coordinating
Board-OCB-which operates directly under
the jurisdiction of the National Security
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November 22, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
Council. This is, of course, a very high level,
critical clearance.
This is not the first time that Rostow's
clearance has been questioned. In June
1962, Everett S. Allen, staff writer for the
New Bedford, Mass., Standard-Times and
winner of a National Headliners Award
for outstanding achievement in journal-
ism in 1959, had a series of eight articles,
entitled "What's Wrong With the State
Department?" published in the Stand-
ard-Times. The series was the result of
18 months of investigation and interview
and was shortly thereafter inserted in the
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD by the gentleman
from Massachusetts, Congressman HAS-
TINGS KEITH. Concerning Rostow, Allen
stated in article No. 7:
A well-informed former State Department
official, with more than a quarter-century's
experience with the Federal Government,
made certain statements to me regarding the
professional qualifications of Walt W. Rostow.
Allen went to the State Department
and placed these statements before them
in the form of questions. The substance
of State's reply was, in Allen's words:
There is no record of any denial of security
clearance by the State Department security
office or by an undersecretary in a previous
Administration. The department felt it was
not appropriate to comment further on what
happened in a previous Administration.
As was mentioned above, Herbert
Hoover, Jr., was Under Secretary of State
in 1955, and it was he, according to the
Otepka brief, that denied to Rostow
the high level security clearance to at-
tend OCR meetings. It would appear then
that if the charges of three security re-
jections against Rostow are true, then
"an undersecretary in a previous admin-
istration" was definitely involved, con-
trary to the above statement by the
State Department.
WHAT'S TO BE DONE
It is quite evident that the task of en-
forcing strict security regulations on
executive agencies is primarily one for
Congress. By means of investigation and
legislation changes can be made as in
the case of the National Security Agency
several years ago. It will be recalled that
when two NSA employees, Bernon
Mitchell and William Martin, turned up
in Moscow as traitors, the House Com-
mittee on Un-American Activities un-
covered evidence that far more was in-
volved than just the fact that two NSA
employees had defected to the U.S.S.R.
With the purpose of strengthening secu-
rity laws and in performance of its leg-
islative oversight authority, the commit-
tee launched an investigation of NSA
security practices which consumed 2,000
man-hours of its investigators' time, and
which covered 15 States, resulting in a
total of 16 separate executive hearings.
The outcome of the committee's effort
was the initiation of 22 corrective secu-
rity steps on the part of NSA. Legislation
was drawn up based on the committee's
recommendations and is now Public Law
88-290. NSA's Director of Personnel, who
had falsified information on his form 57
and then covered it up, resigned and the
dismissal of 26 individuals because of
sexual deviation was effected. The com-
mittee's annual report for 1961 stated in
part:
Former investigators for agencies which
conduct background inquiries of NSA em-
ployees told of homosexuals and sex deviates
within the Agency. They related how difficult
it was to check on some NSA personnel be-
cause often the only references given by em-
ployees were personal friends or fellow em-
ployees.
The report then cited a condition
which could well be applied to cases in
the State Department:
The most outspoken complaint against
NSA by former investigators, however, was
that occasionally, prior to the committee's
investigation, when derogatory information
was uncovered during background investiga-
tions, responsible officials in the Office of
Security Services ignored it.
The similarity to the State Depart-
ment lies in the fact that security pre-
cautions were ignored, both here and
abroad. Worse still, some of those who
undertook to enforce strict security pro-
cedures were subject to various devices
calculated to remove them from their
positions.
The most recent and comprehensive
investigation of security at the State De-
partment was carried out by the Senate
Internal Security Subcommittee, a sub-
committee of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee. Had it not been for the per-
sistent efforts of this body, and Otepka's
refusal to make a "deal" with State,
much of the information now made pub-
lic would have gone uncovered. On No-
vember 6 of last year, after the subcom-
mittee had released the 20th part of its
hearings on State Department Security,
Willard Edwards, the Chicago Tribune's
experienced Washington reporter,
stated:
The subcommittee, it was learned, is now
working on a report which will draw con-
clusions and make recommendations based
on the 1,500,000 words of testimony it took
in the Otepka case. The task is enormous
and will take months. The eventual report
will be from 50,000 to 100,000 words in length.
All indications point to a historic paper, an
account of intrigue designed to destroy a
government official and a high-level adminis-
tration conspiracy to frustrate a Senate sub-
committee's investigation of the affair.
A number of months before the sub-
committee had completed its hearings,
Senator JAMES EASTLAND introduced
S. 3388 which was designed to correct a
number of security problems at the State
Department which were revealed during
the hearings. Cosponsoring the bill were
Senators DODD, DIRsxEN and HRUSKA, in-
dicating the bipartisanship nature of
this issue. Here are the nine provisions
of the legislation:
First. Guarantee continued existence
of the Passport Office and Visa Office,
and provide against abolition of the posi-
tion of Director of either Office.
Second. Assure the Office of Security
will be staffed by professional security
officers, under civil service. Foreign Serv-
ice officers will not investigate or evaluate
each other for security purpose.
Third. Guarantee that all evaluative
functions in personnel security will be
performed by professional security offi-
cers trained in evaluations, within Eval-
uations Division of the Office of Security.
/Fourth. Require that a copy of any
document transmitted to the State De-
partment by the FBI or CIA and marked
H 15803
for the attention of the Secretary, must
be transmitted immediately and directly
to the Secretary's office, flagged for his
personal attention.
Fifth. Provide that no Foreign Serv-
ice officer or other employee of the State
Department having any responsibility to,
or subject to any orders or instructions
from, any ether agency of Government
may be concerned in any way with (a)
policymaking, or (b) administration of
any function of the Bureau of Security
and Consular Affairs or the Office of
Security, or any other security function
of the Department of State.
Sixth. Direct that all field investiga-
tions in State Department personnel
security cases are to be conducted by an
agency other than State-except that
interrogations may continue to be made
by State Department officers abroad.
Seventh. Assure that no State Depart-
ment employee shall be prohibited from
communicating directly or indirectly,
orally or in writing, with Members or
committees of the Congress.
Eighth. Establish legal requirement for
security clearances of all U.S. nationals
for employment with international
organizations.
Ninth. Write into law the present pro-
vision of State Department Security
Regulations prohibiting reinstatement or
reemployment of a Foreign Service officer
or other officer or employee of the De-
partment discharged for security reasons.
There can be no doubt that the Con-
gress alone must act to improve security
and personnel policies in Government
agencies such as the Department of
State. The need for congressional action
exists but along side this need are the
duty and mandate deriving from the in-
vestigative and legislative functions. As
in the NSA case mentioned above, Con-
gress can do the job. The machinery for
doing it exists through presently consti-
tuted committees and subcommittees of
both the House and the Senate.
A beginning must be made and I be-
lieve that Senator EASTLAND's bill, S. 3388,
is that beginning. Although it is only the
first step it does state nine demanding
points which should be covered. To this
same end I have introduced compli-
mentary legislation, the same bill, on
the House side. Investigation and dis-
closure are helpful and necessary but
they are merely a demand for legislation;
they can serve as diagnosis but only leg-
islation can effect a cure.
(Mr. ASHBROOK (at the request of
Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama) was granted
permission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include ex-
traneous matter.)
[Mr. ASHBROOK'S remarks will ap-
pear hereafter in the Appendix.]
HALLUCINOGENIC DRUGS MUST BE
CONTROLLED
(Mr. BROTZMAN (at the request of
Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama) was granted
permission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include ex-
traneous matter.)
Mr. BROTZMAN. Mr. Speaker, Con-
gress has an excellent record of provid-
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CONGR_ESS1ONAI RECORD - HOUSE No vembef? '?, 1967
ing Federal enforcement agencies with
whatever authority is needed to protect
the American people-and particularly
our youth-from the consequences of
drug abuse.
History shows that there always has
been a small element in our midst which
will fight for the individual "right" of
self-corruption by drug use. Opium had
its champions, and so have heroin and
marihuana.
Fortunately for our Nation, this lobby
of permissiveness, which seems to be
made up of both the vicious and the mis-
guided, has made little headway in Con-
gress. We have stood firm against re-
peated demands that penalties for il-
licit drug sales and use be softened or
repealed.
But, unfortunately for our Nation, the
development of new and potent mind-
warping drugs has made our laws ob-
solete. LSD has become a part of our
national lexicon and apparently usage is
increasing.
Scientists and academicians are en-
gaged in extended investigations into
just how harmful LSD and other hal-
lucinogenic drugs may be to the human
mind and genetic structure.
And while they are engaged in this
very necessary investigation, the lobby of
permissiveness is counseling us to do
nothing until we can precisely measure
the worst effects of these drugs.
I have read a great deal of testimony
and background information on this
subject in recent weeks, and it seems
evident that we can today demonstrate
that tangible damage to individuals and
society results from the promiscuous
use of hallucinogenic drugs, and no de-
finable benefits result.
I can cite heinous crimes committed
under the influence of LSD. I can quote
statistics about temporary and perma-
nent mind damage which is associated
with LSD.
The time has come, Mr. Speaker, to at
least move ahead with minimum penal-
ties so that our law-enforcement agencies
can begin a positive control program.
It may well be that we will want to
modify these laws, once all of the scien-
tific and medical evidence is in, but to
hold the matter in abeyance until that
time would be a disservice to the Nation.
Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing
a bill which would, for the first time, give
our enforcement agencies the legal tools
they need to prosecute those who illicitly
sell hallucinogenic drugs.
My bill also would make it unlawful to
possess LSD and similar drugs except
under carefully specified conditions.
While I am mindful of the fact that the
users should perhaps be treated more as
medical patients than as lawbreakers,
there clearly is a requirement for pos-
session penalties in order to effectively
control traffic in these drugs.
SUPPORT FOR ACCURACY IN
BUSINESS ACT
(Mr. BROTZMAN (at the request of
Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama) was granted
permission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include ex-
traneous matter.)
1,11r. BROTZMAN. Mr. Speaker, last
May 15 I was pleased to join two of my
colleagues, the gentleman from Nebraska
[Mr. DENNEY] and the gentleman from
New Jersey [Mr. HUNT] in introducing
H.R. 9966, the Accuracy in Business Act,
and a companion resolution, House Res-
olution 476. Subsequently, the gentleman
from Oklahoma [Mr. SMITH I introduced
similar legislation in November.
Recently, we joined together in asking
the chairman of the Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations and the chairman of
the Rules Committee to hold hearings
early in 1968 on these measures. These
measures are designed to give the Con-
gress better information on the infla-
tionary impact of appropriations which
we are called upon to enact.
Mr. Speaker, this proposal has at-
tracted nationwide attention. Recently
the Omaha World-Herald and the Shel-
byville Indiana News carried edito-
rials supporting this measure and Mr.
DENNY'S continuing battle against the
forces of inflation. I am inserting these
editorials in the RECORD in the hope that
other Members will take the time to read
these comments and lend their support
to this important proposal.
J From the Omaha World-Herald, Nov. 17,
19671
A BUSINESSLIKE IDEA
Congressman Robert V. Denney of Nebraska
is sponsoring a resolution requiring that ev-
ery proposal submitted to the House of Rep-
resentatives include an estimate of its cost
for the next two fiscal years.
Cumulative totals would be published
twice a month.
The National Federation of Independent
Business reports that 82 percent of its 241
thousand members voted to support the
Denney resolution. Ninety-two per cent of the
Nebraska members favored it. The federation
said that if every piece of legislation carried
a price tag, Congressmen might vote with
more concern for economy.
Mr. Denney's proposal would introduce a
measure of business judgment into the delib-
erations of Congress. It's so sensible that we
wonder why it wasn't enacted long ago.
[From the Shelbyville (Ind.) News, Oct. 31,
19671
How ABOUT THE COST?
If "truth in packaging" and "truth in
lending" are valid national objectives-and
many people believe that they are-then It
would seem that "truth in pricing legisla-
tion" is also desirable.
At least a majority-82 percent to be
exact-of members of the National Federa-
tion of Independent Business, Inc., believe
that if every measure introduced before the
House of Representatives contained a "price
tag" showing its cost to the taxpayers, then
congressmen might vote with more concern
for economy.
This novel approach to legislative book-
keeping was proposed by Congressman Rob-
ert Denney of Nebraska. He would like to see
twice-a-month tabulations on the cumula-
tive cost of all bills and resolutions intro-
duced, and a similar total for all legislation
passed by the House.
The proposal was put to a vote of inde-
pendent business proprietors by the National
Federation of Independent Business, and 82
percent of the respondents registered ap-
proval of the idea, 12 percent were opposed
and 6 percent were undecided.
Businessmen, usually outspoken on the
subject of government spending, apparently
believe the Denney proposal would be a
worthwhile step toward money management
during the complex legislative process.
Aside from appropriation bills, many meas-
ures presented to Congress authorize gov-
ernment services and projects without any
mention of costs which will result. The costs
usually show up later in department appro-
priation bills.
Congressman Denney's measure would re-
quire that estimates of the cost for both
current fiscal year and the next fiscal year
be written into each piece of proposed legis-
lation. The Clerk of the House would pub-
lish in the Congressional Record the cumula-
tive cost figures for (1) bills and resolutions
introduced, and (2) legislation passed, on
the 1st and 15th of each month.
While some deficiencies may be acknowl-
edged-an "estimate" might be far off the
actual cost, and amendments could drasti-
cally alter expenditures-most businessmen
would like to see the Innovation.
CALIFORNIA'S MASSIVE WATER
CONSERVATION PROGRAM
The SPEAKER. Under previous order
of the House, the gentleman from Cali-
fornia [Mr. TUNNEY] is recognized for
15 minutes.
(Mr. TUNNEY asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. Speaker, there is
hardly a single Member of this body who
is not in some way concerned with a wa-
ter resource problem of one sort or an-
other, be it pollution, drought, or over-
abundance.
In the past year or more a consider-
able amount of our time and attention
has been focused on these nagging prob-
lems and as a result we have parsed some
impressive milestone legislation to com-
bat the threat to our rivers, streams, and
watersheds. These legislative efforts have
been reported widely, and justifiably so,
by all the news media and they, equally
concerned, have done a remarkable job
of arousing the public to the need for
better water management practices.
Now, however, I would like to take this
opportunity to speak about a relatively
small, and definitely less publicized, pro-
ject which is nearing completion in He-
met, Calif. With an unglamourous title
of "Reverse Osmosis To Remove Dis-
solved Solids From Reclaimed Water
Used in Ground Water Recharge Pro-
gram," it may be understandable that it
has received scant public attention out-
side California's 38th Congressional Dis-
trict but it has a significant purpose
which should interest every one of our
colleagues.
The twofold purpose of this $300,000 re-
search project is to find out whether, first,
large flows of brackish water can be
made usable continuously without tre-
mendous waste problems, and second,
the unit cost can be made reasonable.
According to the scientists in charge, the
capacity of the reverse osmosis desalting
facility will be 50,000 gallons per day by
next January.
If this pilot demineralizing plant
proves efficient and economical, its les-
sons can not only be applied to neigh-
boring water reclamation plants but to
other communities in similar straits.
That is not the entire Hemet story,
either. The Eastern Municipal Water
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