CAPITOL STUFF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000100340001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 25, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 18, 1964
• Content Type: NSPR

NEW YORK
? ? DAILY NEWS
Sanitized -Approved For Release : CIA-RD
JUN 181?.64
F-1 1,
By TED LEWIS
as lns o .
j government of Red China knows more about a clandestine
U.S. military operation abroad than cur' own State De-
p u tmeut, it suggests; to .put it mildly, that a most dan--;
gerous communications flaw exists in our national security
operittionl.
The report that civilian American fliers were in combat in
?Africa against Congolese rebels come out of Peking Sunday. It was
flatly denied by the State Department Monday. But on Tuesday the
department reversed signals and
said the Peking report was sub-
stantially true.
lye explanation, for this em-
'.,hal'r?assing switch only empha-
i si cs the messed-up way the, fed-
oral bureaucracy often operates.
It appears the State Department,
when first asked whether the
Rod China charge was true or,
false, queried a certain "chan-
nel" ill, the Central Intelligence
Agency.
The, presumably "solid" infer-
mation came hack from the hush-
hush source, that no Americans
were engaged in combat in_Alle
Con o.
The State Department decided
to be even more careful. It asked
for a recheck through the same
GI A , channel. The word carne
back that all that was ]cnown,
' r could ;r; told, was that the
hired American fliers were train-
ing Congo pilots to fly T-29 re-
conaissance p lanes recently
supplied to the hard-pressed John MCCone
government forces. The Amer!- The CIA's Lest administrator
calls night have participated in
reconnaissance missions, but that was all.
But this wasn't all ? as the State Department found cut on
Tuesday when it checked another division of the CIA. Peking was r~is:a~ recd anti said it .,.,is "'Max", an agent with a German seem
credited with saving Congolese forces.froin a disastrous rout by a,~ysier~ i;cr. . f:,e ray Gi P;~s
rebels in Kivu Province. ~
Passing the. ruck to CiA Ps ? 3orrnui Bender is a real mystery future. He was a key operative in 1Ir
mining of exiles for the Bay of Pigs and, according to some +:
Obviously, the CIA, now headed by the best adnrinistlator it re prisoners released later, led them to believe _that U.S. air fa,
ever had, John McCone, is considered by the State Department wholly -i ;uld be depended on if necssary to make the invasion succe- cr ul
responsible for that communications'snafu. In the early stages of the invasion plan Bender really h. rl .
This is normal operating procedure-pass. the, buck to thb,rpy oak of secrecy wrapped around him. Ile told such exile le. jlcr
:co. r
agency when caught with your own pants down. s Manuel Artime that ho was not connected with toe L. S.
We don't; go entirely for State's explanation of how, by tapping cut in any way. He was only working for "a big v.id
the wrong CIA channel, it was made to look ridiculous. It is our nnpany" willing to spend a lot of Money to free Cul,a ireru' mh
guess that, despite all McCone has been able to do since he tool:.: ommunists.
charge at the CIA in October, 1fi(1, sonic of his most capah}e agents ' That is the undercover way that" a CIA agent blocs is ..pc?'at
would rather give State the wrong steer than the real McCoy. id that the agency likes to have him operate. it is prob: }?ly s
There has been a constant clash between agency opemat.ives and ;e sort of way that the operation in the Congo has beer; cari:.:1 an
the department's boys. The latter thine they should run all rnase ? If so, it would explain why the CIA is reluctant to to}l th., r::t
of our foreign policy maneuvers r.broad and think the CIA is trying epattment what is happening, unless the squeeze is really r'.':t cr
to take over the real trouble spots inn sneatcy,_c]andcstine. soft of ? ? And it should not ce forgotten that American ci:idian
way. ?ive been used before in just the combat way they :sere i
The U.S., ~mha,.y crowd in'Saigon, for example, has always Cq~1~,
privately blmnb1aX11A ize4 foA Y~dnF?FsRe ~1 C -7"~I~FS~~c~- ?at CQ{i c~ OO34000v'~I;&s ti: ere ]filled i
Nam. and vice versa. lunteer Slights at the last stages of the cf Ngs invasion
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
FOIAb3b
The SecrcF U. S. :`orr in 'he Congo
The CIA would certainly deny it, as it is required to, but a.
mg, ago as January, 196.3, it was clear to most interested dip]o
C
ongo govern
atic sources here that were acting to bolster the
rent's military power 'oii a clandestine oasis.
We recall that shtortly after the return of .tame 1'ansoirled 13a
f Pigs prisoners from Cuba, it was revealed by certain anti-Casty
uuan fliers in an interview here that ~ somewhat secret U.S
fort was underway in the Congo.
One of these fliers, who had been picked up at sea after 0
ay of Pigs fiasco, was kept under wraps in a CIA hideout anti
he prisoners had been released.
lie reported that sonic his fellow fliers had. found jobs in t.l.
ongo, and he had a letter from one reporting that the same CI.
gent who had been active in the training of invasion troops
'uatenmala had turned up in Leopoldville.
One of these Bay of Pigs veterans, Manuel :'enahaz, idcntifie?