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December 9, 2016
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February 1, 1999
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January 30, 1966
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I'd ;,4.0.'?.. G~ e,e.;.D01/OZ : CI 1 j I. &1 03600 Abduction of Ben Barka in Pa'ris' o1lo1US eF ~e7 Of Dreyf its, Olhe ,,Sc r,ndals By W(iverley Root -ARIS-" can a s, an anonymous philosopher wrote in the weekly Express last week, "are to politics what diseases are to the human organism: inevitable. At least once a generation a scandal becomes an 'affair'-the Drey- fus Affair, the Stavisky Affair, the Ben Barka Affair." The nature of the scandal, the edito- rial continued, reveals the particular disease from which the affected regime suffers-in other terms, what occult in- fluences are running the government. The Dreyfus Affair exploded under the government because the army was calling the tune. The Stavisky Affair almost ended the Third Republic be- cause money dominated that bourgeois regime. In the Ben Barka Affair, this country discovered with horror that two of its own police officers had kid- naped Mehdi Ben Barka, Morocco's left- ist opposition leader, and delivered him to gangsters allegedly hired by .Moroccan Interior Minister Gen., Mo- hammed Oufkir and apparently to his death. This demonstrated that the poi- son in the veins of the Fifth Republic is the power of the police. Laud of Intrigue TOT THAT THE Fifth Republic is' .IN unique in this respect. "France is the favorite stamping ground for mys-. terious organizations which, in partner- ship with the power or behind its back, exercise a decisive influence on events," wrote leftist Gaullist' Charles D'Ara- gon, a former Deputy, in an article which appeared in Le Monde by re- markable coincidence on the same day that policeman Louis Souchon broke down and confessed 'that he had kid- naped Ben Barka. "Napoleon had his Barbouzes ('spe- cial' police). The Restoration also. They worked for the Tuileries (the Royal Pal- ace). They worked for the Pavilion de Marsan (Interior Ministry). Divergent causes were defended with the same arms. Nothing is more typical than the manner in which the men of the Con- gregation (church information agents) a decisive influence on the future of the regime and of Algeria. Few. states- men have marked a' page. of history with the seal of their will to a com- parable extent." In Napoleon's day, agents kidnaped the Duke. of Enghien on Germah tej?ri- tory and took him back to France`'for execution. THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON From the Ern to suffer from abuses of police power, it is true that the turbulent history of the epoch of Gen. Charles de Gaulle has been marked. more strongly than most by the imprint of police, 'particu- larly of secret police-sometimes legal, sometimes extralegal. Before 1940, secret forces were most. ly military. But when de Gaulle set up his exile headquarters in London, the acted alternately for and against the "need for eyes and ears in occupied royal authority. Under the Fourth Re- France and the problems of directin p1-mAppnowec44er Re4aasaj20AVJ07/3?d: ll t~ ~ e0b~1~~11@91 Q WASHINGTON POST AND TIMES HERALD JAN 3 0 1966 coatttnzo WASHINGTON POST JAM b 0 !966 Approved For Release 20913/2A 1ff -R?2 J2 0149R000100360029-4 CPYRGHT ance movements required a secret po- lice. Under Capt. Andre Dcwavrin, whose alias was Passy, it became in- volved in some exceedingly scabrous episodes which were never revealed because' it was wartime. The same thing was happening on the other side, where Vichy's police, mostly anti-German, were serving the regime in public and scuttling it in private. The Resistance was getting in- formation about Vichy plans from se- cret documents taken from government files by its owi employes. Vichy secret police were involved in the sensational escape from Koenigs- berg of Gen. 1-Ienri Giraud, who for a time shared the presidency of the pro-- visional French government based in Algeria with de Gaulle. Whom they weres really working for still is a mys- CAPT. ALFRED DREYFUS ?ire to the Fifth Republic, France has tery. So is the identity of the group which organized the assassination in Algiers of Adm. Jean Darlan. Giraud protested to de Gaulle when Jacques Soustelle was named head of the provisional government's secret services because he was a civilian. "If that bothers you, I'll dress him up in a general's uniform," de Gaulle said. Soustelle now is in exile for heading a secret anti-de Gaulle group after hav- ing helped bring de Gaulle to power with a secret pro-de Gaulle group. Soustelle's General Direction of Special Services was the ancestor of today's Service of External Documen- tation and Counterespionage, the group most deeply tarred in the Ben Barka Affair. Moved from Algiers to France, it became the General Direction of Investigations and Reserach. There might have been less need for it if the Indochinese revolution had not occurred. The name of SEDC came in then before the Algerian war broke out and created a need for still other special services. It was the Algerian war that fastened the most disreputa- ble of French police forces on the Fifth Republic. The first group came from Algeria: ADM. JEAN DARLAN been afflicted by overzealous police and Algerian born Europeans who were im- ported into France to fight Algerian terrorists. They inflicted upon France -the shame of extensive police use of.' torture. They were brought in because, supposedly, they were experts in deal-. ing with Algerians and insisted on do- ing things their own way. Then terrorism shifted sides. The Europeans of the Secret Army Organ- ization began to employ it and the of- Approved For Release 2001/07/26 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000100360029-4 N Approved For ReIea V4 :.GIA RDP75-00`000100360029-4 ~M ON ,NNn 1 ficial police, open and secret, turned out to be useless. The sympathies of too many of them were antigovern- ment, Terrorists were tipped iii ad- vance of actions planned against them. The answer was the creation of special police forces, more or less extralegal, which were clubbed "barbouzes" (false whiskers), a nickname given to secret agents in the spy novels of Dominique Ponchardicr, a former secret agent and now French Ambassador to Bolivia. The barbouzes were a`tough lot and some were recruited from unsavory backgrounds. There were a few Re- sistance heroes among them, but there were also toughs who had manhandled their countrymen for the Gestapo dur- ing the Occupation, and there were simple criminals. When the Algerian war was over, the Al. least three persons connected with the Ben Barka kidnaping are suspected of having had something to do with the Argoud case. One is Georges Figon, a lawyer and possibly the No. 1 nian in the Ben Barka Affair., Police found him shot dead and de- scribed it as suicide, a theory which is not finding universal acceptance. Another is a gangster named Julien Le Ny, alias Le Grand Dede, accused of being one of,the criminals in Moroccan pay who took delivery of Ben Barka from the two French policemen who kidnaped him. The third is Gaullist Deputy Pierre Lemarchand, commonly supposed to have been the chief of one group of barbouzes during the Algerian war. But does the group still exist? The French Bar Association seems. to think so, for it has just opened a debate on whether or not it is incompatible with a lawyer's functions to direct' an extra- legal police force. Figon said Lemarch- and dined with a group of criminals, some of them implicated to the Ben Barka case, and told them that he ex- pected to be named Secretary'of State for Police in the new government, and /that he then intended -to put them al in jail-perhaps a warning to them t leave the country. A Well-Hated Alaii - R - , , 0 '1'111 anti-Secret Army barbouze of Jacques Foccart still exist. Foccart, Secretary-General of d Gaulle's Elysee Palace office staff, assigned to handle African and Mada gascan affairs, directed this clandestin force during the Algerian war. But no that the was is over, it ,may very wel 1 . have been disbanded. Antoine Lopez, the SEDC agent wh is the No. 1 figure in the Ben Bark case if Figon isn't, told a poiicema whom he was trying. to enroll in th affair that he was "covered" by Fo - cart-or so the policeman says. Lop has denied that he involved Foccar - Foccart is one of the most hated me in France in extreme right circles b - cause his barbouzes were so effecti in dealing the death blow to seer t army terrorism, so no opportunity s missed to smear him. Whether the barbouzes still cxi t as an organized force is not necc - rarily significant in the Ben Bar cas4..' The scandal is that regul r Frene h police services were involve l. Figon may' have started the affair, but if he did he had to call on the services See BARKA, Page E4, Column 1 MEIIDIII-BEN BARKA secret agents. problem arose, "How do you get rid of a barbouze?" One answer seemed to he to use him for piecework-for instance, the. kidnaping of Col. Antoine Argoud, the Secret Army Organization leader, from Germany. That episode had a cer- tain resemblance to the Ben Barka A[- fair. The supposition has always. been that criminals did the job and obligingr- ly deposited their captive, bound hand and foot, in a delivery truck near po- lice headquarters. Approved For Release 200 1N 149R0001' 0360029-4 AND T BAItKA, From Page El of Lopez of the SEDC, who knew that the kidnaping was planned five months in advance and helped to arrange its details when it finally came off. The SEDC is almost the exact coun- terpart of the Amcricad~CIA. Its activi- ties are restricted to the'-foxcign field. It is an immense organization and -in- habits imposing headquarters called the Barracks of Tournelle. Its budget is secret, and no one outside of a few persons in the government knows how much it costs. It is split into different, often warring, divisions, separated from one another by hermetic partitions. Its agents have a habit of making policy by undertaking, on their own responsi- bility, acts that cannot fail to affect national policy. There can hardly be a better exam- ple than the Ben Barka case, which has embroiled an unsuspecting French government with Morocco. The two French policemen who kid- naped Ben Barka last Oct. 29, accord- ing to the accepted version. of what happened, drove him to a suburban villa and handed him over to a group of thugs hired by Moroccan Interior Minister Oufkir. Ben Barka supposed- ly was murdered but there is no proof, and no corpse has been found. The only evidence that Ben Barka was killed is the testimony of Figon, who is dead. Figon said he saw Oufkir torture Ben Barka at the villa,.but Ben Barka was moved to a second villa and.Figon assumed he was then killed, but wasn't present. One theory circulating is that Ben Barka was taken to Brest'and then to Morocco by freighter and is now im- prisoned. The rivalries within the SEDC are paralleled by those among the differ- ent French. police forces, traditionally hostile to each other except when they have to band together when they get. into a -bad bind. This may account for several episodes in the present case. For instance, did Lopez try to freeze Figon out of the reported $140,000 the' Moroccans were offering for, Ben Barka by organizing the kidnaping himself, and is that why Figon got back into the act by taking a taxi to the villa where two official.police cars had conducted Ben Barka? Was' Lopez arrested because the rival General In- formation Service of the Paris Police Prefecture was happy to pin something on the SEDC? To date, the following official police services have been more or less tarred in the case: ? The S'EDC, not only through Lo- pez but through his superior, to whom he had reported what was going on. The SEDC was a more or less autono- Involved told Frey's bureau chief about it, All of these individuals and services, more or less fully informed about the crime within a few days after It hap- pened-and the SEDC months before it happened-withheld what they knew from the judicial authorities investigat- Ing the case for ten weeks. They kept much of it from De Gaulle as long as they could-for Instance, the circum- stance that French police were in- volved-and even, it appears, from the police commissioner working on the case, who had to get his first precise .leads from the Express, whose detec- tive work brought it into the open. Express is being sued by Papon on a charge of libeling the French police, along with the sensational weekly Min- ute, a refuge for the, defeated die-hard French Algeria faction - which, inci- dentally, derives some of its informa- ,. tion from the connections retained by , mous organization reporting to Pre- ~ mier Georges Pompidou's office. De' one of its backers who was removed Gaulle has now transferred it to the some years ago from the hand of one army. ? The Judiciary Police, through its Morals Brigade, which deals with nar- cotics, prostitution, etc., from which the two police.. kidnapers were recruit- ed; through its Criminal Brigade, which investigated the 'case, though it seems' not to have been given informa- tion which was in the possession of its eriorsthrough its General Informa su of France's more accult official police services, because he was becoming too powerful. Police 'Autonomy HE INDEPENDENT power of the French police accounts for the con- siderable degree of autonomy they often exercise, which makes possible an operation'.stlch as the Ben Barka one, p tion Bureau, which had Figon's confess Which plunged the government into sion two days after the crime and difficulties because police served a through its ..two chiefs, to whom they . foreign power. without government police kidnapers confessed five days..-knowledge. later. The Judiciary Police are under . -There were several reasons for this. the Paris Police Prefecture, and Pre- One which interested the individual feet Maurice Papon also was informed actors was the money. Another, which of what had happened within a few secured the go-ahead from superiors, days of the kidnaping. was the "you scratch my back, I'll ? The Interior Ministry, which con- scratch yours" give and take common trols the police throughout the nation, among secret services the world over. became involved when Papon, whose This was intensified by the fact that prefecture handles only the Paris Po- many operators are double or triple lice, passed on his information to Inte- agents. rior Minister Roger Frey, while others Rabat Is the headquarters for thej s Approved For Release 2001/07/26 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000100360029-4 WA rON POSY . i t1,'l 3 0 isu+ Approved For ReI 2-~J P,/i}1DP75-001498000100360029-4 F each secret services working every-. w icre in Africa. They therefore were r ady to oblige Oufkir. Moreover, a c uple of years ago, the Moroccan s N-ct services returned one of F ance's barbouzes, who was arrested fr trying to blow up Ben Barka's p edecessor as opposition leader. So it as Morocco's turn to ask a favor. Finally, Oufkir had worked in in. t lligence when he was in the French a -my and had cooperated with French, a 'cnts in "Morocco when he headed the IN oroccan secret police before becom- i Interior Minister, so though it seems unlikely, as some have spec- u ated, that a Moroccan minister could have been an out-and-out agent o the French secret services, he was n doubt on the -best of terms with t em. The antonomy of French police serv- I es which permits them to carry on Secret Aellons Have Been Way o Life y Since Napoleon private deals of the sort apparently made with Oufkir stems partly from the power of the information they have on the most powerful men in the country- including the politicians who are sup- posed to be their bosses. Few of those are completely secure from blackmail. "You make a bad mistake in your cduntry," I was told not long ago by a man who knows the power of the French secret police because he head- ed one branch of it for several years. "You leave your police heads in power too long. We change them every five to seven'years. It takes five years for the top policeman to really learn all he needs to know, but by the end of seven, he knows too much. You have -to get him away. from. those secret files." Thus the police become a law unto themselves. Their primary ^interest is to preserve their own position, - not that a the governme French ministry has found the police dragging their feet because their zeal for obeying the government was tem- pered' by a desire not to get in wrong with the next government. At the time of the prewar Cagoulard Affair,, when the determination of In- terior 'Minister Marx Dormoy to get at the top men behind extreme right terrorisan so alarmed others that the government resigned, a long cabinet crisis seemed to be developing over Dormoy"s desire to uncover the higher- ups before a new government could be formed. ' Dormoy lost, and he was bound to lose. For the 'police, knowing that he would not be their boss for long, stopped executing, his orders. They knew his successors intended to let a few heads drop, and they did not care to have their own included. Approved For Release 2001/07/26 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000100360029-4