CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- APPENDIX

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000100500019-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 1999
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: August 3, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

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trolling who votes, who runs, who has so-
cons to the media Mad what they can say.
It Is hardly even necessary to engage In
fraud to insure the proper results. High
turn-out of the eligible voters can be Insured
by the rumor that those who do not vote
may have trouble getting food rations. And
If worse cones to worse, the advance threat
by the Premier of a military coup against
any unsuitable government should clinch
the case.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that after
the September 3rd election, we will see the
repetition of half-truths, they tend finally to
reject the whole truth.
If the prospects of a speedy military solu-
tion are dim, as is the almost unanimous
view of knowledgeable observers, what is the
possibility of n negotiated settlement, given
the present negotiating positions of the two
sides? Will the Vietcong and North Vietnam
Join us at the negotiating table, accepting
our oft-repeated assurance that we are ready
for "unconditional" negotiations? The an-'
swer to this question is again, No.
The reasons for this are simply stated. The
vast expenditure of U.S. planning, Intrigue,
effort and resources In Vietnam since 1954
practically demands that the Administra-
tion paint the situation there in terms of tre-
mendously significant emotional issues-pro-
tecting freedom against tyranny-stemming
the global communist tide,-defeating the
Communist Chinese-created strategy, of
"Wars of National Liberation", as I have just
indicated. Hence it is true now, just as it
was 13 years ago at Geneva, that our Govern-
ment cannot accept a solution which results
in a government other than the one we are
supporting, even if it were elected by the
people of South Vietam in impartially super-
vised elections. We rejected the path of su-
pervised elections in 1956, and to go back to
It now would make mockery of a course to
which thousands of bureaucratic careers in
the CIA, the State Department, the Pentagon
and the Executive offices have been com-
mitted, and would deny the validity of the
great motives we have ascribed to our in-
volvement. Hence we have encouraged and
accepted a South Vietnamese Constitution
which makes Communism a crime, which
even the U.S. has not yet done.
We hall with jubilation the results of elec-
tions in which Communists, Communist
sympathizers, neutralists, militant Bud-
dhists, and opponents of the Military Junta
are permitted neither to run nor to vote.
-We make no protest over Premier Ky's state-
ment that if an elected government sought
to come to terms with the NLF he would
'overthrow it with the Army. We describe
with horror the possibility of National Lib-
eration Front participation in the Govern-
ment in even the smallest way as "letting
the fox in the Chicken coop,"
By all these means we make it clear that
to us "negotiation" means discussing where
the Vietcong will turn in their arms and'
which routes they will take back to No th
Vietnam. And we describe this happy sthte
of affairs as restoring freedom and democ-
racy to South Vietnam,
The National Liberation Front sees these
actions and accepts them as the true Indi-
cation of our position rather than the gen-
eralizations made by President Johnsop for
domestic U.S. consumption. Their position,,
on the other hand, is that the South Viet-
namese government is merely a puppet of
the U.S., with no support from the people,
and is both corrupt and dicatorlal. Their aim
Is to root it out completely. Between these
two extremes there can he no compromise.
To complicate the picture even more the
Liberation Front and Hanoi completely dis-
trust the U.S. To them our often-reported
offer to negotiate is merely a cover to pla-
cate U.S. and international opinion, while
continuing to escalate. They feel we be-
trayed the Geneva Agreements, just as
France betrayed several agreements, she
made with the Viet Minh prior to 1954.
This explains in part Hanoi's Insistence
on specific actions, such as an end to the
bombing of the North, before even consid-
ering further efforts to negotiate.
At one point in time, I felt that the elec-
tion of a civilian government in South
Vietnam would Increase the chances of a
negotiated settlement. I am now extremely
dubious of that. The present military gov-
ernment, with advice and guidance from
U.B. experts, has become quite adept at
shaping the outcome of elections.. By con-
same people performing the same jobs and
following the same policies and practices.
The only difference will be in their claim
to legitimacy through an overwhelming man-
date of the people In a "free" election-thus
It was with Diem in 1055 when he received
98% of the vote in a rigged contest against
the discredited Bao Dal, who ran from the
French Riviera.
In view of those rather pessimistic asser-
tions on my part, what do I see for the
future?
As to a military victory, as I intimated
earlier, I see no chance whatsoever. An
enemy which we claim has roots In only
five to seven million of the 14 million popu-
lation of South Vietnam has suffered over
600,000 military casualties in the last 6
years, at least. another 600,000 civilian
casualties, and the evacuation of over a
million of its women, chilc)ren, and elderly.
This is the destruction of one-third to one-
half of its total base of support, according
to our figures. Yet this enemy 1s now nearly
4 times as strong in numbers as it was six
years ago, better trained and equipped, and
apparently with higher morale. He has
sanctuary in Cambodia, Laos, and North
Vietnam. According to General Westmore-
land, his manpower is replenished at rates
as high as 8,000 per month from North Viet-
nam, in spite of the greatest aerial bombard-
ment ever used against an enemy. Recruit-
ment from the local peasants seems to re-
ifiain.at a high level. And if we should seek
to destroy his sanctuary, especially in North
Vietnam, the odds become dangerously high
that we involve the 700,000,000 Red Chinese.
I am convinced that while neither China
nor Russia wish to be involved in this war,
they will commit troops If either Hanoi or
.the Liberation Front is faced with military
destruction. In the meantime, they will pro-
vide an increasing array of military hardware
and the training to use it. Reports of the use
of 122 mm rockets of 6-mile range and pin-
point accuracy are only an indication of our
potential problem If the U.S.S.R. should de-
cide to supply North Vietnam with a. full
range of sophisticated military hardware.
Russia and China will also encourage mili-
tary diversions on a world-wide scale, Those
diversions may Include the Middle East,
Burma, Thailand, Hong Kong, Korea, the
Philippines, various parts of Latin America,
and possibly Africa. In this game of escala-
tion and diversion the enemy enjoys a tre-
mendous leverage because of the nature and
location of the war, and of the tactics used.
According to our military doctrine we re-
quire a superiority of 10-1 in manpower to
control guerrilla tactics. Yet we fight at the
back door of 25% of the human race as po-
tential.enemies. Because of the location of
the enemy, our logistics problem is massive.
Because of the sophistication of our tech-
nology, it is tremendously expensive. All these
factors run our costs to 25 billion per year at
present levels. The enemy's costs probably
run to 250 million per year, or 1% of ours.
One successful diversionary effort by the
enemy involving another of the 50 or so "free-
dom-loving" nations to which we have made
a "commitment," at a similarly remote part
of the world, would require total mobilization
of the American people and resources.
The present level of involvement in Viet-
nam has produced major impacts on Ameri-
can society, and will produce even more. An
Sanitized - ApprovedObk-HRUle
unhappy and frustrated people will be made
even more unhappy by a major federal tax
increase in the next few months. For Califor-
nians, this will be added to the largest state
tax Increase In history, which becomes effec-
tive today. Despite Its size, the federal tax In-
crease will not be enough to prevent the
largest budgetary deficit In history, except
for the years of WW II. This will increase
government borrowing, Increase Interest
rates, reduce the flow of residential mortgage
funds, and have a generally unsettling eco-
nomic effect.
Ail Indignant Congress and an unhappy
President will cut domestic expenditures for
the War on Poverty, education, space, health,
urban blight, and n variety of other pro-
grams, crippling many of them and saving
2 or 3 billion dollars, which will have an
insignificant effect on the deficit. However,
because the programs cut will be those
widely hailed an the basis for a "great so-
ciety", and for which expectations were for
a great increase, rather than a cut, the re-
sulting gap between expectations and per-
formance will encourage more and bigger
riots. These riots may cost the economy con-
siderably more than the budgetary savings,
if the estimates I have seen so far of riot
costs are any Indication.
At the political level I see very little chance
for the re-election of President Johnson
under the present circumstances. I likewise
see very little chance of the Republicans
nominating a candidate who will do any
better, None of the three top Republican
Presidential prospects-Romney, Reagan, and
Nixon-have given a single Indication of
having a program that can cope with the
crisis facing the U.S. and the world today.
This country deserves better than what it
apparently faces for next year from its great
democratic system.
At the very minimum next year's election
should provide a dialogue and a choice on
the great Issues of our time. Is Vietman
really a great crusade, worthy of the full
support of the American people? Or is it n
tragic error perpetuated by a stubborn and
arrogant Executive bureaucracy, from which
we should withdraw with a degree of humil-
ity? Is the noble effort to create world order
under law, conceived In WW II by the Great
Powers, to be replaced by a new U.S. Im-
perialism? Is the Cold War to be the per-
petual condition of mankind? Are the prob-
lems of poverty, race, urban decay and a
society which massively befouls its own en-
vironment to be solved, as an example to
all mankind, or be disregarded?
My guess is that these questions will be
submerged in waves of rhetoric, rarely asked,
and never answered In realistic terms for
fear of alienating a voter. Yet they must be
answered 'soon and adequately, If we are to
cope with the present crisis of mankind. They
are each related to the other, they require
a political philosophy as different from the
present as day from night, and yet nowhere
on the horizon does there appear such a
philosophy.
I have left until last a few brief comments
about my own program for a solution in
Vietnam. My previous remarks should have
made clear my complete disillusionment with
the course we have followed. I regard that
course as a compound of all that is bad in
American foreign policy, Yet as responsible
citizens we should always try to answer the
question "What would you do if you were
making the decisions?"
Up until the present time I have always
felt that, although I stn a vocal dove in
criticizing our Vietnam policy, I could fit
within the limits of the concensus posture of
the President. I have never advocated a U.S.
pull-out of Vietnam. J have never urged
turning the government over to the National
Liberation Front. I consider our troops to
be brave men doing an ugly job In the best
way they can. I have accepted in good faith
the President's verbal assent to the Geneva