CALCULATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000100540015-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: November 25, 1963
• Content Type: NSPR

NI O V ? In, i ci
Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-R
Appr
Ca?Jc_u anti ins and Suggestions FOIAb3b
CPYRGHT
Can the U.S. exploit the Sino-Soviet rift? For one
deeply knowledgeable view, NEWSWEEK, turned to
Prof. Lhigniew Brzezinski, director of Columbia` Uni
versity'.c Resear"ch Institute on Commut.isit'bAflairs.
oc ac e o (~Jjjjjj has hurt the Chinese
-to bent' in mind w hen thinking about economy B,4ock i11
Ani r" n lip 1`,egonomieally by the
Q 4ef 4 lip y 1Rw ird China: Soviets, b 1' it b tale U.S.,
-~C} t]' Pf, for th 3 ~ Y Y
i ticlst ` otht~} lirccc ~ s o; uhons Itsl atir nali st nu sticl>cl2v 1 f >t ili
. hy eventually ac-
an cftfcli{skfffil {hail i' Ctfnif t,'i 1st. This tin- quire a sta.+lttruA international stability,
pieceklcxfied (Gdmbiu,ction eru~tes intense especiallyik,,4tc(} vc>sj eeome available
feelin .- jgrftim jtysni>.Iit }fftmosity that through '6 Ftles&h o}? West European
are h 4 y foouc ~frlo4dk g}}' i }~ rc l i Chinese in- trade. %\ ssftrlct ei courage such trade.
ternatxinaf or ., om c time. Itr the11r fits *e,%lf the Chinese do
2--As `~fongfat tli`ci SYt>?fi' bviet dispute not.ttsbd l ibifsi likely that Japan will
was prnrrarily>grrafogici and. ideological, increasingly emerge as a political force in
it was allW?tys,;yo,sistWt t{iaVsome reconcili- Asia probably spurred in that direction
ation as tit, the , S/ ' G(Y igoslav case, by the eventual s.uick-effect of the detona-
might some day take pp hce. But the es- tion by the Chinese of an atomic bomb.
calatirnt 'of fhe "`dis mite "into a bitter it, hooves er? the internal evolution of the
national-territorial hostility, reawakening Chinese regime, especially after Mao's
d }ieal conflicts, makes a death, should involve greater moderation,
re
aw, ilk. I lilikely. then it Wright be in the American interest
li
cy .accoruirii;ry, especially
U ,po
are global powers since the Soviet since~J the fundamental conflict between
Un n is determined to surpass the United the e;5e an the Soviets is likely to
States as a world pose since the per historical conflicts,
Soviet Union has the fo inflict ence? not become dormant
serious damage to Am mer an- rapidly
? 1 " i
h
i*
cumstances t
,,-
e pre
; conflicts (in spite e test-ban occuptrtiif victs with the Chinese
aglt6taient) are still more dangerous and might be v ul to us, and, after all,
nicrre fundamental than American- Chinese the United Stilt~5 as no interest in pull-
differei.ices, with China still basically only ing Soviet clresfnuts out of the fire. A
a regional power. weak China is I. ussia's interest: Russia
4-Although today China is directing can continue p*ssing the West without
its main hostility at the United States, its fear of its rear,.,;A stronger China might
basic national-territorial interests are more press the Soviet Union into a better re-
directly in-conflict with those of the Soviet lationship with the West.
Union tai. with America.
Bc firing the foregoing general proposi- TN sucn a context, the United States
tions in mind, in our policy toward China: 1 might find it advantageous, in addition
We should Strive to disprove the basic to continuing its policy of building up
Chinese foreign-policy calculation that a India and the',; other free nations in Asia,
sustained coiimitnxent to national libera- to begin trail g with China, as the first,
tir>n sting lea4" d local wars will force preliminary step to an eventual accom-
the "imperialist" powers to yield grad- modation in Asia on the basis of the
Wally. Au t irsgr less than resolute refu- present status quo. The admission of Red
tation us Chinese thesis actually China to the United Nations might then
would sv tr'fhe Soviet conviction that also become desirable. China's continued
local cssstiflt t5 ire risky and would incline exclusion would be more in the Soviet
also (I ig, Nt,v}el:f ,1Lito similar ventures; interest than in the American.
We sla?,4;],cl51 for the moment at least, Lastly, we should not forget that the
contintin fire policy of isolating China specter of partition is beginning to haunt
since thi513n ~ftably feeds back into the the Russians. In the West, the new
Sino-StOi: t) `rrlffitionship and intensifies Franco-German constellation has already
ChinelgijA3t>;iy,.to the Russians' policy raised the slogan of Europe to the Urals,
of co isite~p~ylth the United States; and this is beginning to find a responsive
if orth "\retrtamese aid to the civil echo in Eastern Europe and among some
war in 1 "tth "ffGtltli is of importance, we Western Soviet nationalities. More re-
shoul'rr: tbAh Jsealia is encourage the South cently, the Chinese have reopened their
VietnUiflfe jt,ppdertake reciprocal goer- old territorial conflict with the Russians,
rilla #fi~; elhr North Vietnvn, through by pointing to territories ceded by China
spporadiio oi6Pule raids, directed mainly at to Russia, and by agitating among the
(lie rb%_,cfi trlt''rrrii system Bated by the non-Russian Soviet Central Asians. All
peasa{rilrgrt:' Craipnrpose would be to force this should give the United States the
IIo G114A,BJ either to halt his aid to the advantage of flexibility and maneuver.
ofcivil be rhumv, sM- or to face h dii to to the Chinerisk se ,inchiweakercneighbors.tRussia sdseeing
by .isi itt~+ 1t eirf flrrmore help. Given the the emergence both in the east and in the
histori (1('ietnaniese ? fear of Chinese west of major powers, and both of them
domitlati }itlil;dlo Chi Minh's internal have more than hinted at the desirability
rg r'fl},a )F Iobleios, such pressure of partitioning the Soviet Union. In those
mr 1 E cr c a e hiin to desist from the circumstances, American goodwill and re-
spon5ork7ii~rilf?'tlie civil war in the south, straint will become more and more vital
thereby, ra mtaiuing this local conflict; to the Soviets' national interest. This gives
At the.;s le, howfvcr, \ e should its the opportunit de e t' i
i~t~f'tYfOlft f1iLr iSo 7nesC1 e)~'~1 005
Ott
g r in unpresslve le rir i l t e Soviet Union
(rate t wir policies. The Soviet trade if it misbehave glnbt1lly):
40015-9