A POLICY OF PEACEFUL ENGAGEMENT HOW WE CAN PROFIT FROM COMMUNIST DISUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000100540026-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 26
• Content Type: NSPR

`glEl?LIC FOIAb3b
Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP7
CPYRGHT
1. claim cl-at, because US tests will be held over
h4 open :ca," they will "rule out any problem of
fallout in the immediate area of testing," thus implying
that the Soviet tests, which were conducted in the
Arctic, created just such a problem, is disingenuous.
Lcac'ng aside questions of amount, altitude of shots
,r wind and weather conditions, fallout over Novaya
Zetnlava is no different from fallout over Christmas
T viand. No one supposes that tests have been or will be
condor ted over populated places. Moreover, as Ken-
nedy knows, fallout over the test area itself is only
Hatt of the story. Radioactive debris spreads and cir-
culatcs in time over an enormous area, and these sec-
Ondarv effects raise many difficulties and dangerous
health problems imperfectly understood and impos-
sible to solve.
N it does the fact that our tests will take place over
the Pacific -- a soothing name - make them more peace-
I ul than tests conducted over the Arctic. The truth is
,,implo: the Soviet tests were immoral; ours are immor-
al; neither promo s life; both promote its extinctio .
As for Kenne statements that he finds it "deep!
regrettable" that any -radioactive material must b
added to the atmosphere,. "that, even one addition l
individual's health may be risked in. the foreseeab
future"; and that, "however remote and infinitesim I
those hazards are judged to be, I still exceeding'
regret the necessity of balancing these hazards again t
the hazards to hundreds of millions of lives whi
would be. created by any decline in our nuclear
strength" - these are examples of bathos. "This hurls
me more than it hurts you," may be suitable centime t
for father.when he punishes his son with a strap; b t
Kennedy is not my father, not the father of his cou -
try, let alone the father of mankind. I am not move
by his "regrets"; I regard them as an inadequate soh -
tium for the poisoning of the air. Instead of orator
about human freedom and decency, I suggest that f
we want to do something to promote peace we beg'
by being peaceful.
A Policy of Peaceful Engagement
Xozv We Can Profit from Communist Disunity
by.Zbigniew Bruzinski
CPYRGHT
1 he purpose of containment was to prevent Soviet ex-
ianson; the purpose of liberation was to roll back
Communist frontiers. These policie's have ceased to be
clevant. Both were based on the premise that there is
a, united Soviet bloc. In the Sixties, however, the unity
Communist camp is strained by the increasingly
oh en Nino-Soviet dispute. In recent days the Poles have
a'.en rhr unprecedented step of republishing a secret
r=c .. Delivered by Luigi Longo in December, 1y6o, in
during which Longo charged the Chinese with
attacks on KhTUshchcv; and Suslov,
in Ko m11121o?ist, has labeled support for the
as "alien to the spirit of Leninism." The
tion of the Sino-Soviet dispute is evident.
r,t a defense point of view, one can perhaps still
c: ' :-',c BRZE'ZINSKI is Director of the Research In-
1171 Conl111141list Affairs at Co1141nbia University,
cdfitioli of Ins book: The Soviet Bloc: Unity
~d ( onilie t has recently been published.
CPYRGHT
speak o a "bloc" in the sense that an attack by e
"imperialist enemy" on any one member of the bloc
would provoke ultimately a reaction from the others.
But offensively, it is no longer a bloc. Rather, there are
two constellations within It: the Soviet Union and the
East European states, and the Chinese-Albanian align-
ment - supported on some issues by the North Koreans
and North Vietnamese, although these last two parties
prefer to maintain a neutral position insofar as the
Sino-Soviet breach is concerned.
From the standpoint of Western policy, it is dan-
gerous to assume that the internal conflicts of the
Communist world will necessarily lead to a relaxation
in international tensions. The short-range consequence
of a Sino-Soviet split might be to intensify Soviet tend-
encies to unilateral, go-it-alone behavior. If an open
split takes place it will presumably involve mutual ac-
cusations, and the Soviets will be charged by the Chin-
ese with excessive moderation. The'split will produce
factional struggles in most of the Communist parties,
Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000100540026-7 13