ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES AND THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000100830004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 27, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

FOIAb3b
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE July 27, 1967
ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES AND THE the periphery of the country with the
MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX mission to protect us from a "light" nu-
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the Viet- clear attack-whether launched by the
nam war-and now the Middle East Soviet Union or also, most notably and
crisis-have dominated our thoughts and specifically, Communist China. Such a
all but numbed our senses. Yet there is defense, if accompanied by a "spot" de-
other pending national business that fense of sprint missiles deployed either
demands our attention. Aside from the around a few cities or more likely around
t . htb
e
i
Vietnam war, I believe the most pressing
issue before us is whether the United
States should build and deploy an anti-
ballistic-missile defense.
I speak today in support of President
Johnson and Secretary McNamara, who
have decided against such deployment.
As Senators know, the deployment of an
ABM system has become a particularly
serious issue now that the Soviet Union
has deployed a so-called anti-ballistic-
missile defense around Moscow in addi-
tion to the Tallinn system, which may
or may not be a primitive antiballistic
missile system, in other parts of the
country. At the outset it should be stated
that neither of these systems could pro-
tect Moscow or any other part of Russia
from complete destruction by our inter-
continental ballistic missiles were we to
attack Russian targets in strength.
Nevertheless, a momentous question
is now before us. Should we follow the
Soviet Union's lead and deploy our own
ineffective Nike X ABM's, or should we
merely strengthen our offensive strategic
weapons as the Secretary has recom-
mended? Should not the United States
resist the temptation to take its ap-
pointed turn in moving the nuclear arms
race up one more notch?
In my view, the American public is
thus far only dimly aware of the per-
plexing character of the antiballistic
missile question and almost certainly
unaware of the full implications of the
choices we will be forced to make in the
near future.
Let me say at once that I fully support
the position of President Johnson and
Secretary McNamara, as reflected in the
Defense appropriations program for
1968, that the United States defer any
decision on the deployment of an anti-
ballistic missile system, President John-
son feels that our present research and
decvlopment program is adequate and
that his request for a contingency fund
of $377 million for a possible deployment
of an anti-ballistic-missile system is all
that is necessary at this stage. As Sena-
tors know, the United State and Russia
have agreed to discuss the deescalation
of both offensive and defensive nuclear
weapons. It is hoped that negotiations
ng sr es, mfg
our own ABM launch
effective against the first or even the sec-
ond oncoming enemy IBM. It would be
useless against an attack in strength.
I think it imperative that all of us
should take a careful look at not only the
military arguments for this ABM sys-
tem, but also the psychological and po-
litical implications of such a program
for both the United States and its allies.
I say this because I am firmly convinced
that if the United States should decide
to deploy a "light" area and "spot" anti-
ballistic-missile defense, we would simul-
taneously be making the decision to build
and deploy a full anti-ballistic-missile
system as well. Let us not be confused
by what Is at stake here. Our country is
simply incapable of taking halfway
measures.
Buy the area defense at bargain rates
and you have bought the whole package
at many times the cost. With this as-
sumption as a starting point, the first
question to be answered is: Why are we
considering an anti-ballistic-missile sys-
tem? Can it really protect us?
Mr. President, ever since Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, sensible men have been
saying that there is no defense against
nuclear weapons. This does not mean
that the United States is incapable of
destroying attacking aircraft, submar
Ines, or even some ballistic missiles carry-
ing nuclear warheads. What it means is
that there is no defense in sufficient
depth against nuclear weapons which is
reliable enough to prevent the offense
from overwhelming the defense and de-
stroying the target. Cyrus Vance, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, underlined
this elemental fact of International life
when he told the Subcommittee on Dis-
armament of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee last May something
about "winning" a nuclear war:
Let me simply say-
And here I am quoting Mr. Vance-
nobody could win in a nuclear war. It should
be suicide for both countries.
Operating under this threat of what
the distinguished senior Senator from
Illinois [Mr. DIRKsEN] has appropriately
called coannihilation, the nuclear powers
have made the foundation of their secu-
ture. There is some reason to believe the rity the deterrence of nuclear attack not
Russians are not yet in accord within through defensive but through offensive
their own Government as to what line to weapons. To maintain this balance of co-
pursue. We can afford to give them a annihilation the United States and the
reasonable time to make up their minds. Soviet Union have built powerful offen-
What concerns me this morning, Mr. sive strategic forces capable of overcom-
President, is not the Defense Depart- ing all efforts at defense. In the process,
ment's program for antiballistic missiles the United States and the Soviet Union
for fiscal year 1968, but reports that Sec- have reached a point of "nuclear stand-
retary McNamara is under heavy pres- off" where nuclear war has become un-
sure to decide favorably on the deploy- likely under ordinary circumstances.
ment of the so-called area and spot ABM Despite the fact that an effective de-
defense for the United States. fense against nuclear attack is, for- the
The area defense concept calls for the foreseeable future, unattainable, . the
emplacement of a number of Spartan champions of defense ,systems. such as
anti-ballistic-missile batteries around the antiballistic missiles are constantly
Sanitized - Approved FFoQI~~tease :
trying. The United States and the Soviet
Union have, since the war, Invested en-
ormous amounts in surface-to-air mis-
siles in the hope of protecting their citic,
from aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.
Each effort in both countries has failed.
Radar networks, air defense centers,
automatically aimed surface-to-air nu-
clear missiles of all varieties-all these
are part of the many billions of dollars
the United States and the Soviet Union
have spent on defense in a futile attempt
to keep up with the offense. The trouble
Is you cannot be even reasonably sure
of hitting the first attacking missile and
there is very little chance of hitting the
second or third.
I give you one example of the futility
of the defense in trying to catch up with
the offense. In 1959, the U.S. Army, pro-
posed the deployment of the Nike-Zeus
system, the father of the present highly
touted Nike X system. The total cost of
deploying the system was then estimated
at $13 to $14 billion. This proposal was
turned down by President Eisenhower
who said that-
It is the consensus of my technical and
military advisers that the system should be
carefully tested before production is begun
and facilities are constructed for Its deploy-
ment.
I think we should remember these
words as we approach the decision on
the Nike X system.
We should also heed the words of Sec-
retary of Defense McNamara when lie
referred to the Nike X system in January
of this year. Mr. McNamara said:
Had we produced and deployed the Nike-
Zeus system proposed by the Army in 1959 at
an estimated cost of 813 to $14 billion, most
of it would have had to be torn out and re-
placed, almost before it became operational,
by the new missiles and radars of the
Nlke-X system. By the some token, other
technological developments In offensive
forces over the next seven years may make
obsolete or drastically degrade the Nike-X
system as presently envisioned.
The Subcommittee on Disarmament of /i
the Foreign Relations Committee, of
which subcommittee I am a member, has
recently completed a series of hearings
on the general question of what the
United States should do about the Soviet
Union's apparent decision to deploy an
antiballistic missile system. The wit-
nesses we heard included Richard Helms /f
fense Department's Research and Engi-
neering, Drs. May and Bradbury, nuclear
specialists of the AEC, Cyrus Vance,
General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary Rusk. I
carne away from these hearings con-
vinced that the present Soviet anti-
ballistic defenses, both the Moscow sys-
tem and the Tallinn system, are quite in-
capable of defending the Soviet Union
or its people against anything except the
most primitive missile attack. We were
also told that our own Nike X system can
easily be overcome by an all-out Soviet
attack, no matter where our defenses are
located or in what form.
Moreover, Secretary Vance told the
subcommittee that if the United States
built. and deployed a Nike X system for
the protection of our' cities against the
kind of sophisticated missile attack the
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vide adequate education for our youth, to
rebuild our cities, to feed the hungry,
and to eliminate air and water pollution.
A large part of the problem we face
with these new demands for an ABM de-
ployment stems from that highly orga-
nized military-industrial complex against
l"hich General Eisenhower warned us in
his last speech as President in these
words:
In the councils of government-
He said-
We must guard against the acquisition-of un-
warranted influence, whether sought or un-
sought, by the military-industrial complex.
The potential for the disastrous rise of mis-
placed power exists and will persist.
President Eisenhower went on to say:
In holding scientific research and discovery
in respect, as we should, we must be alert to
the equal and opposite danger that public
policy could itself become captive of a scien-
tific-technological elite.
We should all realize that the United
States is all too often victimized by the
zeal of our scientific-military elite-the
"weapons cult," if you will. Let me read
you what one such cultist has had to say
about the advance of weapons technol-
ogy and public opinion. In March of 1967,
Dr. Harold Agnew, Director of the Los
Alamos Laboratories Weapons Division,
remarked that-
The basis of advanced technology Is in-
novation and nothing is more stifling to in-
novation than seeing one's product not used
or ruled out of consideration on flimsy prem-
ises involving public world opinion.
ABM system is no good and why the Rus-
sian ABM system is no good. But I am
not permitted to state these facts, be-
cause expediency has been allowed to in-
tervene with what I believe is incontro-
vertible evidence to support my conten-
tion.
Mr. President, I am convinced that the
construction and deployment of an ABM
system at the present time is both un-
warranted and unwise. I also believe that
this conclusion is strategically sound and
militarily defensible.
In any issue of this magnitude, how-
ever, there is inevitably a political con-
sideration as well. At a time when the
peace of the world is based to a large
extent upon a tenuous balance of nu-
clear power-a delicate balance of ter-
ror, as it has been so often called-the
concept of national security is directly
affected by progress in the field of inter-
national disarmament--the only viable
alternative to mutual annihilation.
It is for this reason, Mr. President,
that I have long regarded the negotia-
tions in Geneva on a nonproliferation
treaty as of overriding importance to our
own security, as well as to the security
of other nations from which ours in part
derives. I have also proposed that if
agreement; is ultimately reached on this
issue, the chances for a further extension
of the nuclear test-ban treaty to Include
underground experiments be explored in
the light of current scientific detection
techniques.
Unfortunately, as of this date, direct
negotiations between the United States
This is indeed a shocking statement and the Soviet Union on the ABM issue
and a dangerous one. If we have any role have not yet commenced. However,
here in the Senate It is to advance what President Johnson and Premier Kosygin
Dr. Agnew calls the flimsy premises of were afforded a unique opportunity at
public opinion, or, in other words, the im- Glassboro to compare their respective
pact of an aroused democracy against the positions on the question of anti-
weapons cultists. Over the next few ballistic-missile defense systems and of-
months, as the United States brings tor fensive weapons, as well as on more wide-
head this longstanding issue of whether ranging arms control measures. If the
to produce and deploy an ABM system, results of this meeting are to have any
we will be Inundated by all shades and significant effect on the future of United
varieties of expertise-both real and States-Soviet relations, precipitate de-
bogus. How can we be expected to sort ployment action in the ABM field should
out the scientifically sound from the self- be postponed at least until an intensive
serving? We will be asked whether the diplomatic effort to reach agreement has
lives of a few million American citizens taken place and failed.
are not, for example, worth an invest- For it is apparent that the debate
ment of $4 to $5 billion. Senators will be which has raged in the Pentagon in re-
hard pressed to deal with such argu- cent years over this subject has also been
ments, particularly when the cultists are carried on behind closed doors in the
so anxious for their own pride and their Kremlin. Our deployment of an ABM sys-
pocketbooks to go forward with an in- 'tem at this juncture without serious ef-
effective ABM system. forts to come to an agreement would
I, for one, have confidence in the good certainly have the effect of strengthen-
sense of the American people, once they ing the hand of those Russian military
are informed of the facts. I do not believe advocates of such an investment in the
with the question of an ABM system,
Such a commission could provide a care-
ful and objective evaluation of the course
the United States should follow. The
precedent for such a commission was es-
tablished immediately after the Second
World War when President Truman de-
cided to establish an independent corn-
mission to assess the complexities of
U.S. defense policies in the air age.
The resulting report of what came to
be called the Finletter Commission was
bluntly entitled "Survival in the Air
Age"; and this report, primarily because
of the authoritative and independent
stature of the commission members,
came to be the focal point around which
subsequent international discussions of
air strategy revolved.
Ten years later--in 1957-President
Eisenhower established a blue ribbon
commission to assist him In coping with
the problems of defense in the era of
strategic missiles. Impressed by the mili-
;tary, political and even psychological
implications of developing an American
retaliatory offensive force President
Eisenhower established the so-called
Gaither Commission. The Gaither Com-
mission was comprised of distinguished
figures from the Nat-ion's business, finan-
cial, scientific, and academic communi-
ties. These men included H. Rowan
Gaither, a former head of the Ford
Foundation, William C. Foster, now Di-
rector of the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, James R. Killian of Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology,
Earnest O. Lawrence, I. I. Rabi, John J.
McCloy and Jerome B. Weisner, who
later became a Department of Defense
adviser to President Kennedy.
There is no doubt that the Gaither Re-
port had a significant effect both within
and outside the U.S. Government and
led to some very hard thinking about
America in the missile age.
A critical moment in our Nation's life
came when the Gaither report presented
the President with an objective account
of U.S. military strength vis-a-vis
the Soviet Union's and, in the proc-
ess, I Interpolate, Mr. President, it de-
stroyed some myths which had been pro-
jected for a good long while by certain
members of the military-industrial com-
plex of which I have spoken today.
Now another 10 years have passed and
again these seems to be justification for
the President to convene another blue
ribbon commission, this time to deal
with the momentous question of ABM
deployment. Surely the ABM question is
of such magnitude that, it is essential to
that they or their representatives can be U.S.S.R.-probably at an accelerated have a careful and objective evaluation
stampeded into taking an unwise, indeed pace. The result, I am convinced, would of the course the United States should
a dangerous, step if they understand be a vast, competitive expenditure of follow. I do not believe, for the reasons I
clearly the issue before them. But they money and resources with little gain in have already mentioned, that the milt-
must have the facts. They must have the real defense capability for either side, as tary-industrial complex is objective
benefit of full and free discussion in the Mr. Vance has so clearly pointed out, enough to advise the U.S. Con-
Congress and in the public media, unin- Mr. President, the history of the past gress or the President on how we should
d b f 1 d aild fo r secret We two decades has taught us-if it has proceed. This being the case, I strongly
e em s y
hibit
.
y a s
e
were told the basic facts in the hearings taught us anything-that every decision suggest that a temporary blue ribbon
before the Disarmament Subcommittee, to escalate the arms race is an irrevoca- commission drawn from all sectors of
but then the testimony was so censored ble decision in the long run. national life is the best way to bring a
by the Defense Department, the AEC, and Before such a decision is taken and thorough inquiry into the issues.
the CIA that I have been unable to use In order to provide the public with a full Our very national survival may be at
In this speech many facts the American and unbiased account of the ABM issue, issue in the ABM controversy. It Is time
people should be told. And this involves I recommend to the President that he - we put the best and most objective minds
the clear and scientific reasons why our convene a blue ribbon commission to deal In the country to work.
Sanitized - Approved For Release rCIA-RDP75-00149R000100830004-9