PARTISAN POLITICS FOR CIA TOO?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000200190008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 1999
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 2, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

MAY 2 1963
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP75
.-thatAt has, been
_411ite clear. I have
it o
u
lack
Mr. Speaker,
h
e:wUS. Intelligence
nev iQ 4, lfl f
ur -
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h
emo
SiSI~TY118SL
of the g _
Forei In
rl .e Ativicory
Eoarrl with n, .,-
X=U- ~ hBS replaced
o
-----
.~r orialfoo
DTQn1-tha New York Ti
I
is
ageji y as
.i#8 ,] 9taxlt CIA.
3CS,_
?,w York Times an
n+~ +.. +s;-s-uu _?~,
editorial nn;
CLJAS_f~hcre.might be
-', flute -su'fscatiimitf; ch' has been
"tjriietly investigating the $ufiitah crisis, has
,a1Peady found consideralgd!dence that the
l' intelligence estimates df 1asb-:eummer and
aTl-werekeyed t-o'tIie eft i happen here"
atmosphere, then prevalent 1n Washington.
The belief of an the Nation's top Soviet
experts that. Premier` Khrushbhev would
never risk installing Russian missiles in Cuba
appeai'b to have influenced most of the in-
_!l8.77SP ~nPOT- telligence judgments that reached the Presi-
t dent in that period. The awakening led to
C! alanlr e n
f a iedncentration on missiles only, that caused
us to downgrade the significance of the small
Soviet force that had been sent to Cuba.
-Today the basic differences' botwCen the
Pliesident and his critics conteih'tl:e si ' of
th$s ovice, and whether it is being reduced.
:"$stedsy andai?r KEATING are
`__ " ._
informdtfbn" frbm the same
nan days. 13, 1nti ll gene agencies.
htto_do,
this but I type amt has be orh, a partisan
_1a4L . of I N not easy for ' op level estimates
ive enough to cor- - reach tie real to r
- " pletei ob active. The men h_a provide
these eats area ?iatet 'the Presi-
ant a iinistratiba*."t iv n'the pres-
ent' ot+ntrali tion of fa' llige~iee:activities,
iWis especially hard forminority views, which
' --Tdgn"a tda'b8'right, to reach the top.
a. Ti31s zil'Will not be helped by. the
0 19Q31 appoinfiri@nt of Clark M. Clifford to replace
--+ -vv vw awuw - ?C ttX4 a.q 0 KCGU111A&0U11a41V11
e . T s about how many Soviet or X15 Hover Comma ion in 1956 to moni-
Irl ub&cguld rreflect aaserious `tor'bontinuously CIA and other Intelligence
"'? --- ?` 1-441iig -19r. Clifford has a brilliant mind, but, as
WLA be hunt. s long-time troubleshooter for the Demo-
4-thin administra- cratic Party, he Is inextricably associated with
.. It 4iiginat@ with the Cuban -p tlsan politics. He replaces a skilled and
i ..W40, n Intelligence becomes, as it obiective scientist-administrator. The selee-
the very cornerstone of tion is at best
nf
t
t
u
or
una
e It is bound to
. iC an almost avnrrh,,,,4? ~' activity to give- the
94part,o; our in y impression that our intelligence
telligence chiefs activities Will now be monitored, not by a
Devaluations tailored chairman who is an expert in the field, but
Tntalllgenrg, if-it is to be worth by one who is essentially a politician.
AhIng, must be completely nonpartisan,,,,,e
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP75-00149R000200190008-5
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