THE DANGEROUS GAME OF BAITING THE CIA
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CIA-RDP75-00149R000200310052-2
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K
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Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 14, 2003
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52
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Publication Date:
February 17, 1964
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PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 8 8th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION
The Dangerous Game of Baiting the CIA
HON. THOMAS J. DODD
OF CONNECTICUT
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
lkfonday, February 17, 1964
Mr. DODD. Madam President, I have
been disturbed, as I am sure many of my
colleagues have been, by the virtual epi-
demic of attacks on the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in recent months.
Some of these attacks have clearly
been the product of irresponsible and
speculative news reporting by men who
are more concerned with the headline
value of something that smacks of sen-
sation or scandal than they are with the
security of the country.
But there have also been attacks, or
sharp criticisms, by commentators of
national reputation who are generally
careful about their facts but who have
apparently been impressed by some of
the rumors and stories and inaccuracies
which seem to have become credible be-
cause they have been repeated so often.
There have also been attacks on the
CIA by distinguished Members of Con-
gress which seem to me exaggerated and
without foundation. These men are
friends of mine, whom I respect and who
are greatly respected by the country.
Their views are very influential and be-
cause of this I feel an obligation to make
reply to some criticisms which I feel are
unwarranted.
Baiting the CIA almost seems to have
achieved the stature of a popular na-
tional pastime.
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It is a highly dangerous pastime be-
cause the CIA is one of the essential ele-
ments of our security,
There is also something unbecoming
about the pastime, because the CIA can-
not defend itself. Attacking the CIA,
indeed, is something like beating a man
who has his arms tied behind his back.
For reasons of national security, the
Agency cannot confirm or deny pub-
lished reports, true or false, favorable or
unfavorable. It cannot alibi. It can-
not explain. It cannot answer even the
most outrageously inaccurate charges.
It was to this situation that President
Kennedy addressed himself when he
spoke to the CIA personnel at their head-
quarters in Langley, Va., on November
28, 1961.
Your successes are unheralded-
Said President Kennedy-
Your failures are trumpeted. * * * But I
am sure you realize how important is your
work, how essential it is-and, in the long
sweep of history, how significant your efforts
will be judged. So I do want to express my
appreciation to you now, and I am confident
that in the future you will continue to merit
the appreciation of our country, as you have
in the past.
The charges that have been made
against the CIA in recent months are al-
most as numerous as they are sensa-
tional.
We have been told that the CIA has
been running wild, that it has been func-
tioning without control or supervision
either by Congress or the administration,
that it has been making foreign policy.
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The CIA has been criticized for the U-2 This charge is totally and demon-
overflight. strably untrue. Indeed, the CIA Is prob-.
It has been blamed for the Bay of ably one of the mostsupervised agencies
Pigs disaster. in the Government.
And it has even been criticized for the In both the House and Senate there are
anti-Mossadegh coup in Iran and for the special subcommittees of the Armed
overthrow of the pro-Communist Arbenz Services Committee and of the Appro-
government in Guatemala. priations Committee that oversee the
Whether the critics realize it or not, activities of CIA.
these charges also constitute an attack In the House these subcommittees are
on the wisdom and integrity of both headed by Representatives CARL VINSON
President Eisenhower and President and CLARENCE CANNON; in the Senate
Kennedy. It is tantamount to accusing they are headed by Senator RUSSELL and
them of passively allowing an executive SENATOR HAYDEN. These men are among
agency to function without control or the most knowledgeable and conscien-
supervision, and to make foreign policy- tious legislators our Nation has pro-
in other words, to usurp the President's duced; and I, for one, am willing to abide
own authority. This is patently ridicu- by their judgment on matters which, for
lous. Neither President would ever have reasons of security, cannot be revealed to
permitted such a thing. all Members of Congress.
I propose to say a few words about The Director of the CIA and the chair-
some of these charges. man of the House and Senate subcom-
I feel that I am in a position to do so, mittees have frequent meetings during
because In the course of my travels the course of the year. The subcom-
around Europe, Asia, and Africa, I have mittees are advised and fully informed
come to know many of the CIA's field of special or unusual activities. They
representatives, and, from long conver- are also informed upon the receipt of
sations with them, I have some appreci- significant intelligence.
ation, I believe, of the work they do. In In 1963, the Director of Central Intel-
addition, I know something of the head- ligence or his deputy, Gen. Marshall S.
quarters operation because senior offi- Carter, appeared before congressional
cers of the Agency have on a number of committees on some 30 occasions. In
occasions appeared before the Senate addition to briefings of the CIA subcom-
Subcommittee on Internal Security and mittees in the House and Senate, these
have given testimony of vital signifl- appearances included briefings on sub-
cance. jects of special interest to the Joint Com-
If the overall quality of an agency may mittee on Atomic Energy, the Foreign
be judged from the quality of the men Affairs and Foreign Relations Commit-
who compose it, then the CIA would have tees, the Senate Preparedness Subcom-
to be given a triple A rating. I have mittee, and other committees.
never encountered in any Government I recall the clamor that Immediately
agency a body of men whose ability and arose when our U-2 plane was shot down
dedication impressed me more, over Soviet territory in May of 1960.
Perhaps the most popular charge di- Many people jumped to the conclusion
rected against the CIA is that it operates that the CIA had been operating on its
completely without congressional over- own, without the authorization of Presi-
sight or supervision. It is this charge dent or Congress. The U-2 flights were
that has given rise to the clamor for a charged with endangering the security of
congressional watchdog committee. the Nation, when, in fact, they had de-
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fended us against the possibility of a sur-
prise missile attack.
President Eisenhower put an end to
the speculation about the lack of Execu-
tive authorization by informing the
press that he had personally approved
the U-2 program. Unfortunately, it did
not receive quite as much attention when
Representative CANNON on May 10 rose to
inform the House that the House sub-
committee was fully apprised of the proj -
ect, had approved it, and had recom-
mended the funds for it.
Let me quote his words on that occa-
sion, because I think they constitute an
adequate response to all those who, in
ignorance of the facts, still charge that
the CIA operates without congressional
supervision.
This is what Representative CANNON
said :
The plane was on an espionage mission
authorized and supported by money pro-
vided under an appropriation recommended
by the House Committee on Appropriations
and passed by the Congress.
Although the Members of the House have
not generally been informed on the subject,
the mission was one of a series and part of
an established program with which the sub-
committee in charge of the appropriation
was familiar, and of which it had been fully
apprised during this and previous sessions.
The appropriation and the activity had
been approved and recommended by the Bu-
reau of the Budget and, like all military
expenditures and operations, was under the
aegis of the Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces of the United States, for whom
all members of the subcommittee have the
highest regard and in whose military capac-
ity they have the utmost confidence.
It seems to me that what some Mem-
bers of Congress have been complaining
about in advocating a joint congressional
watchdog committee is that they have
been unaware of certain activities con-
ducted by the CIA. But the informa-
tion gathered by CIA and the activities
conducted by it must, of necessity, be
confined to a careful selected and re-
stricted committee. If this information
were made available to all Members of
Congress, the security essential for na-
tional defense would cease to exist.
The Members of Congress are all trust-
worthy; but a secret ceases to be a secret
when it is shared by more than 500
people.
Even if a joint congressional watchdog
committee were established, it would
have to observe the same rules of secrecy
that today govern the activities of the
House and Senate subcommittee; and
those Members of Congress who today
complain that they do not know what
the CIA is doing, would still find that
they know precious little about it.
Which, I may say, is the way things
ought to be.
Whether or not a joint committee of
Congress could more effectively supervise
the activities of the CIA than the House
and Senate subcommittee now in exist-
ence is a purely mechanical question
which I frankly consider to be of a third-
rate importance. This proposal appears
to be based on the false assumption that
the CIA has engaged in unauthorized ac-
tivities. It also casts doubt upon the
competence and dedication of the distin-
guished Members of the House and Sen-
ate who now serve on the two subcom-
mittees.
As for the oft-repeated charge that
even the President does not know what
the CIA is doing, let me quote a few para-
graphs from the National Security Act
of 1947, under which the Central Intelli-
gence Agency was established:
There is hereby established under the Na-
tional Security Council a Central Intelligence
Agency with a Director of Central Intelli-
gence, who shall be the head thereof.
The National Security Act further pro-
vides in section 102(d) :
For the purpose of coordinating the in-
telligence activities of the several Govern-
ment departments and agencies in the in-
terest of national security, it shall be the
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duty of the Agency, under the direction of opposition generally lacks organization,
the National Security Council- lacks know-how, lacks discipline, lacks
(1) to advise the National Security Coun- funds.
cil in matters concerning such intelligence In every country that has been taken
activities of the Government departments
and agencies as relate to national security; over by the Communists or that has
(2) to make recommendations to the Na- been menaced by communist takeover,
tional Security Council for the coordination there have always been men of under-
of such intelligence activities of the depart- standing and of courage who are pre-
ments and agencies of the Government as pared to risk their lives for freedom.
relate to the national security; There have been situations, and there
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence will, I am certain, be situations in the
relating to the national security * * *; future, in which some sound advice plus
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the exist- some limited assistance in the form of
ing intelligence agencies, such additional
services of common concern as the National funds, or even arms, may make the
Security Council determines can be more difference between victory or defeat for
efficiently accomplished centrally; the forces of freedom.
(5) to perform such other functions and If we are not prepared to give this as-
duties related to intelligence affecting the sistance to those who share our beliefs,
national security as the National Security then we might as well run up the flag
Council may from time to time direct. of surrender today: because it can be
The text of any piece of legislation predicted as a certainty that the Com-
makes dry reading, but I have gone to munists will move without serious op-
the trouble of reading these paragraphs position from one triumph to another.
of the National Security Act for the rec- I do not propose to draw up a score-
ord because they repeatedly make it clear card of CIA victories and CIA defeats.
that the CIA functions under the direc- I do not know for certain whether they
tion of the National Security Council, played any role in the uprising that over-
and as an arm of the National Security threw the pro-Communist government
Council. of President Arbenz in Guatemala.
They also make it abundantly clear Nor do I know whether the Agency was
that the CIA was to have duties broader in any way connected with the over-
than the simple gathering of intelligence throw of the lunatic Mossadegh regime
data, operating under the direction of in Iran In 1953. But I would like to
the National Security Council. discuss these two events because I con-
The wording of the National Security sider them to be outstanding examples of
Act was a reflection of the growing rec- the kind of perilous situation I have just
ognition that we cannot compete with described.
communism if we confine ourselves to In the case of Guatemala, the Arbenz
orthodox diplomacy and orthodox Intel- government, which had been elected on
ligence collection, a nationalist and reform program, was
Over and over and over again, it has moving, in a manner later to be emulated
been demonstrated that a handful of by Castro, toward the complete com-
trained Communists can seize control of munization of the country. As the gov-
a trade union or a student federation, ernment Introduced more radical meas-
or for that matter, of a country. The ures, it lost its hold over the people and
fact that the overwhelming majority of over the armed forces. But the regime
the people are non-Communists or anti- would not have toppled had it not been
Communists has, in most such situations, for the courageous action of a hand-
not.seriously Impeded them because the ful of patriots under Col. Castillo Armas,
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who invaded Guatemala from Honduras
in 1954.
When this small band of determined
patriots established themselves on Gua-
temalan soil, the Arbenz regime collapsed
like a house of cards. Hardly a shot was
fired in its defense, so completely with-
out support was it among the people
and among the Guatemalan armed
forces.
A similar situation existed in Iran
under Mossadegh in 1953. Mossadegh
had come to power as a Nationalist.
But his nationalism was of the lunatic
variety that was prepared to give carte
blanche to the Communists in return for
their support. Had he remained in
power another year, it is probable that
today Iran would be on the other side
of the Iron Curtain.
In August 1953, mass demonstrations
against the Mossadegh regime erupted
in Teheran. Within 48 hours, the re-
gime had been swept out of power, the
Communist Tudeh Party had been
crushed, and wildly cheering throngs
hailed the return of the young Shah to
his throne.
If the CIA did have a role to play in
Guatemala and Iran, then It played its
role successfully. It inflicted two great
defeats on the Communists and thereby
saved two vital countries from slipping
into the Communist orbit. Is this some-
thing we should apologize for? No, on
the contrary, it is something of which
every American should be proud.
There are some people who would have
us place an absolute prohibition on any
form of assistance to the forces of free-
dom in other countries in the name of
"nonintervention."
Some of these are of the absolute paci-
fist variety, who would rather let the
Communists take over the world than
fight against them.
Others are muddleheaded moralists,
who might be willing to fight if their
own country were threatened by a Comm-
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munist takeover, who are prepared to
admit that the Communists engage in
massive subversive activities of every
kind, but who, for some strange reason,
consider it wrong for the United States
to do anything about it.
At least a few of the critics of the
CIA's operations are unquestionably fel-
low travelers and Communists.
What Is most damaging and most per-
plexing, however, is the criticism that
comes from Members of Congress who
are staunch anti-Communists, who do
not believe that the United States
should stand by, indifferent and supine,
while the Communists proceed to take
over in other countries, but who, never-
theless, argue that the CIA should not
have an operational function. They say
that if the United States is to conduct
operations designed to meet the Soviet
subversive threat, this should be done by
a separate agency.
Once the need for clandestine opera-
tions Is conceded, I frankly do not see the
importance of the argument that they
should be conducted by a separate
agency. In either case, the United States
would still be involved in the business
of covert operations which so disturbs
the ultramoralist critics of the CIA.
From a strictly practical standpoint,
moreover, I believe that grave harm
would be done by separating the conduct
of clandestine operations from the care-
ful processing of intelligence which must
govern such operations.
It may disturb some people, but I think
it can be stated as a certainty that many
countries that remain free today would
not be free if it had not been for the
CIA.
The U-2 flights which the CIA con-
ducted with such outstanding success for
some 4 years before the shooting down
of Gary Powers also disturbed some of
our ultramoralists. But I think that
the vast majority of the American peo-
ple take great pride in the knowledge
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that we had been able to penetrate So- ernment, and against a man's integrity,
viet secrecy. were obviously based on a one-sided pres-
The CIA has been attacked from entation from some official source. Mr.
many different directions for the role it Richardson and the CIA could not de-
played in the Bay of Pigs invasion. I fend themselves. I have always taken it
am not saying that the CIA is blameless for granted that American newspaper-
or that it has made no errors. But men in any controversial situation en-
I do oppose what appears to be a mount- deavor to obtain the facts from both
Ing tendency to shift all the blame for sides, and all the more so when such
the Bay of Pigs disaster onto the much sweeping accusations are involved. Not
abused head of the CIA, because the only have I taken it for granted, but it
record made it clear that many people is also true what the vast majority of
shared the blame. our newspapermen do. But the cor-
Essentially, it failed because we had respondent in question apparently con-
not made the decision that it must not sidered this unnecessary.
be permitted to fail. In the third place, the charges against
This is the position I took in speaking Mr. Richardson were a tissue of false-
on the floor of the Senate on April 24, hoods. President Kennedy, when he was
1961, hard on the heels of the disaster; asked about the charges against the CIA
and since that time and up to this min- and Mr. Richardson at his press confer-
ute, no information has been adduced ence of October 12 said:
which would lead me to revise this posi- I must say I think the reports are wholly
tion. untrue. The fact of the matter is that Mr.
The propaganda campaign against the [CIA Director John] McCone sits in the Na-
CIA reached a crescendo during the re- tional Security Council. I Imagine I see him
cent Vietnamese crisis. Last October at least three or four times a week, ordi-
4, an article written by a correspondent narily. We have worked very closely together
for an American newspaper chain in the National Security Council in the last
2 months attempting to meet the problems
charged that the CIA had been subvert- we face in South Vietnam. I can find noth-
ing State Department policy in Vietnam, ing, and I have looked through the record
and that John Richardson, the CIA very carefully over the last 9 months, and
man in Saigon, had openly refused to I could go back further, to indicate that the
carry out instructions from Ambassador CIA had done anything but support policy.
Lodge. It does not create policy; it attempts to exe-
The correspondent who wrote this arti- cute it in those areas where it has compe-
cle was guilty of openly identifying a tence and responsibility. I know that the
CIA representative abroad, thus re- transfer of Mr. John Richardson [CIA official
in Saigon] who is a very dedicated public
ducing, if not destroying, his potential servant has led to surmises, but I can just
usefulness forever. Visiting Congress- assure you flatly that the CIA has not car-
men and members of the press may ried out independent activities but has op-
sometimes know the identity of the CIA erated under close control of the Director of
representative, but it has been taken for Central Intelligence, operating with the co-
granted that they do not reveal his iden- operation of the National Security Council
tity to the public. and under my instructions.
To the best of my knowledge, this was So I think while the CIA may have made
the first instance in which an American mistakes, as we all do on different occasions,
correspondent has been guilty of this and has had many successes which may go
flagrant breach of the ethics of security. unheralded, in my opinion in this case it is
Moreover, these sweeping charges unfair to charge them as they have been
against an important agency of the Gov- charged. I think they have done a good job.
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President Kennedy's characterization
of Mr. Richardson, I can wholeheartedly
endorse from my personal knowledge of
Mr. Richardson. In most countries I
have visited, the briefings by CIA repre-
sentatives have been limited to an hour
or two. But in May 1961, when I was in
the Far East, Richardson briefed me for
some 7 or 8 hours, all told. Certainly, it
was the most detailed, most balanced,
most knowledgeable briefing I have ever
been given. But I was even more im-
pressed by Mr. Richardson as a man than
by his exceptional competence as an in-
telligence officer. Indeed, of all the hun-
dreds of people in the American service
whom I have met in the course of my
travels through Europe, Africa, and Asia,
I can recall no one for whom I formed a
higher esteem than John Richardson.
There is a final word I wish to say in
this connection. It is clear that the ar-
ticle in question originated in some offi-
cial source. It had to. The official who
was guilty'of giving out this story to the
press was himself guilty of violating the
rules of security as well as the ethics that
should govern relations between govern-
ment departments. This officer, in my
opinion, should be identified and dis-
missed.
The time has come when Members of
Congress and members of the press must
take stock of the growing campaign
against CIA and of the part they them-
selves may have played in forwarding this
campaign.
I am not suggesting that the CIA
should be immune to criticism because of
the sensitive nature of its operations. No
government agency should be immune
from criticism.
I do believe, however, that there has
been far too much sensationalism, far
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too many inaccuracies, and far too little
concern for the national security in some
of the criticism that has heretofore been
made of the CIA.
I believe that, before we indulge in
criticism of the CIA, we should take into
account the fact that it cannot defend
itself. We should also take into account
the fact that every critical statement,
whether accurate or inaccurate, will be
picked up by the special bureau of the
Soviet secret police whose task it is to
discredit the CIA, and will be put to work
through all the information and propa-
ganda channels open to the Kremlin and
through all its agents in the world's news
media.
Because these things are so, we all
share a special responsibility, if we feel
constrained to criticize the CIA, to check
our facts painstakingly, to weigh our
words carefully, and to speak with re-
straint. If we have questions or com-
plaints, I believe that, before taking them
to the mass circulation press, we should
discuss them with the Director of the
CIA, or his deputy, or with the chairmen
of the four House and Senate commit-
tees charged with the supervision of the
CIA's activities. And if, after checking
in this manner, there is any one of us
who still considers it necessary to speak
out against certain policies of the CIA,
the proper place to do it would be on the
floor of Congress rather than on tele-
vision, or through the mass circulation
periodicals. This would provide an op-
portunity for rebuttal and debate, and
the press accounts, hopefully, would re-
flect all sides of the discussion.
For whatever its errors and shortcom-
ings may be, I believe, with President
Kennedy, that the CIA will in the future
continue to merit the appreciation of our
country, as it has in the past.
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