THE DANGEROUS GAME OF BAITING THE CIA

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CIA-RDP75-00149R000200310052-2
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RIFPUB
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K
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7
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December 15, 2016
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November 14, 2003
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52
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Publication Date: 
February 17, 1964
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r v I / - DP75-00I49R000206 10052-2 ion o PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 8 8th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION The Dangerous Game of Baiting the CIA HON. THOMAS J. DODD OF CONNECTICUT IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES lkfonday, February 17, 1964 Mr. DODD. Madam President, I have been disturbed, as I am sure many of my colleagues have been, by the virtual epi- demic of attacks on the Central Intelli- gence Agency in recent months. Some of these attacks have clearly been the product of irresponsible and speculative news reporting by men who are more concerned with the headline value of something that smacks of sen- sation or scandal than they are with the security of the country. But there have also been attacks, or sharp criticisms, by commentators of national reputation who are generally careful about their facts but who have apparently been impressed by some of the rumors and stories and inaccuracies which seem to have become credible be- cause they have been repeated so often. There have also been attacks on the CIA by distinguished Members of Con- gress which seem to me exaggerated and without foundation. These men are friends of mine, whom I respect and who are greatly respected by the country. Their views are very influential and be- cause of this I feel an obligation to make reply to some criticisms which I feel are unwarranted. Baiting the CIA almost seems to have achieved the stature of a popular na- tional pastime. A P 2003/12/02 It is a highly dangerous pastime be- cause the CIA is one of the essential ele- ments of our security, There is also something unbecoming about the pastime, because the CIA can- not defend itself. Attacking the CIA, indeed, is something like beating a man who has his arms tied behind his back. For reasons of national security, the Agency cannot confirm or deny pub- lished reports, true or false, favorable or unfavorable. It cannot alibi. It can- not explain. It cannot answer even the most outrageously inaccurate charges. It was to this situation that President Kennedy addressed himself when he spoke to the CIA personnel at their head- quarters in Langley, Va., on November 28, 1961. Your successes are unheralded- Said President Kennedy- Your failures are trumpeted. * * * But I am sure you realize how important is your work, how essential it is-and, in the long sweep of history, how significant your efforts will be judged. So I do want to express my appreciation to you now, and I am confident that in the future you will continue to merit the appreciation of our country, as you have in the past. The charges that have been made against the CIA in recent months are al- most as numerous as they are sensa- tional. We have been told that the CIA has been running wild, that it has been func- tioning without control or supervision either by Congress or the administration, that it has been making foreign policy. CIA-RDP75-00149R000200310052-2 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : PIA-RDP75-00149R000200310052-2 The CIA has been criticized for the U-2 This charge is totally and demon- overflight. strably untrue. Indeed, the CIA Is prob-. It has been blamed for the Bay of ably one of the mostsupervised agencies Pigs disaster. in the Government. And it has even been criticized for the In both the House and Senate there are anti-Mossadegh coup in Iran and for the special subcommittees of the Armed overthrow of the pro-Communist Arbenz Services Committee and of the Appro- government in Guatemala. priations Committee that oversee the Whether the critics realize it or not, activities of CIA. these charges also constitute an attack In the House these subcommittees are on the wisdom and integrity of both headed by Representatives CARL VINSON President Eisenhower and President and CLARENCE CANNON; in the Senate Kennedy. It is tantamount to accusing they are headed by Senator RUSSELL and them of passively allowing an executive SENATOR HAYDEN. These men are among agency to function without control or the most knowledgeable and conscien- supervision, and to make foreign policy- tious legislators our Nation has pro- in other words, to usurp the President's duced; and I, for one, am willing to abide own authority. This is patently ridicu- by their judgment on matters which, for lous. Neither President would ever have reasons of security, cannot be revealed to permitted such a thing. all Members of Congress. I propose to say a few words about The Director of the CIA and the chair- some of these charges. man of the House and Senate subcom- I feel that I am in a position to do so, mittees have frequent meetings during because In the course of my travels the course of the year. The subcom- around Europe, Asia, and Africa, I have mittees are advised and fully informed come to know many of the CIA's field of special or unusual activities. They representatives, and, from long conver- are also informed upon the receipt of sations with them, I have some appreci- significant intelligence. ation, I believe, of the work they do. In In 1963, the Director of Central Intel- addition, I know something of the head- ligence or his deputy, Gen. Marshall S. quarters operation because senior offi- Carter, appeared before congressional cers of the Agency have on a number of committees on some 30 occasions. In occasions appeared before the Senate addition to briefings of the CIA subcom- Subcommittee on Internal Security and mittees in the House and Senate, these have given testimony of vital signifl- appearances included briefings on sub- cance. jects of special interest to the Joint Com- If the overall quality of an agency may mittee on Atomic Energy, the Foreign be judged from the quality of the men Affairs and Foreign Relations Commit- who compose it, then the CIA would have tees, the Senate Preparedness Subcom- to be given a triple A rating. I have mittee, and other committees. never encountered in any Government I recall the clamor that Immediately agency a body of men whose ability and arose when our U-2 plane was shot down dedication impressed me more, over Soviet territory in May of 1960. Perhaps the most popular charge di- Many people jumped to the conclusion rected against the CIA is that it operates that the CIA had been operating on its completely without congressional over- own, without the authorization of Presi- sight or supervision. It is this charge dent or Congress. The U-2 flights were that has given rise to the clamor for a charged with endangering the security of congressional watchdog committee. the Nation, when, in fact, they had de- 72&-476-02122 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 CIA-RDP75-00149R000200310052-2 Approved For Release 2003/12/023: CIA-RDP75-00149R000200310052-2 fended us against the possibility of a sur- prise missile attack. President Eisenhower put an end to the speculation about the lack of Execu- tive authorization by informing the press that he had personally approved the U-2 program. Unfortunately, it did not receive quite as much attention when Representative CANNON on May 10 rose to inform the House that the House sub- committee was fully apprised of the proj - ect, had approved it, and had recom- mended the funds for it. Let me quote his words on that occa- sion, because I think they constitute an adequate response to all those who, in ignorance of the facts, still charge that the CIA operates without congressional supervision. This is what Representative CANNON said : The plane was on an espionage mission authorized and supported by money pro- vided under an appropriation recommended by the House Committee on Appropriations and passed by the Congress. Although the Members of the House have not generally been informed on the subject, the mission was one of a series and part of an established program with which the sub- committee in charge of the appropriation was familiar, and of which it had been fully apprised during this and previous sessions. The appropriation and the activity had been approved and recommended by the Bu- reau of the Budget and, like all military expenditures and operations, was under the aegis of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, for whom all members of the subcommittee have the highest regard and in whose military capac- ity they have the utmost confidence. It seems to me that what some Mem- bers of Congress have been complaining about in advocating a joint congressional watchdog committee is that they have been unaware of certain activities con- ducted by the CIA. But the informa- tion gathered by CIA and the activities conducted by it must, of necessity, be confined to a careful selected and re- stricted committee. If this information were made available to all Members of Congress, the security essential for na- tional defense would cease to exist. The Members of Congress are all trust- worthy; but a secret ceases to be a secret when it is shared by more than 500 people. Even if a joint congressional watchdog committee were established, it would have to observe the same rules of secrecy that today govern the activities of the House and Senate subcommittee; and those Members of Congress who today complain that they do not know what the CIA is doing, would still find that they know precious little about it. Which, I may say, is the way things ought to be. Whether or not a joint committee of Congress could more effectively supervise the activities of the CIA than the House and Senate subcommittee now in exist- ence is a purely mechanical question which I frankly consider to be of a third- rate importance. This proposal appears to be based on the false assumption that the CIA has engaged in unauthorized ac- tivities. It also casts doubt upon the competence and dedication of the distin- guished Members of the House and Sen- ate who now serve on the two subcom- mittees. As for the oft-repeated charge that even the President does not know what the CIA is doing, let me quote a few para- graphs from the National Security Act of 1947, under which the Central Intelli- gence Agency was established: There is hereby established under the Na- tional Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelli- gence, who shall be the head thereof. The National Security Act further pro- vides in section 102(d) : For the purpose of coordinating the in- telligence activities of the several Govern- ment departments and agencies in the in- terest of national security, it shall be the Approvec~6For telease 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000200310052-2 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 :4CIA-RDP75-00149R000200310052-2 duty of the Agency, under the direction of opposition generally lacks organization, the National Security Council- lacks know-how, lacks discipline, lacks (1) to advise the National Security Coun- funds. cil in matters concerning such intelligence In every country that has been taken activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security; over by the Communists or that has (2) to make recommendations to the Na- been menaced by communist takeover, tional Security Council for the coordination there have always been men of under- of such intelligence activities of the depart- standing and of courage who are pre- ments and agencies of the Government as pared to risk their lives for freedom. relate to the national security; There have been situations, and there (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence will, I am certain, be situations in the relating to the national security * * *; future, in which some sound advice plus (4) to perform, for the benefit of the exist- some limited assistance in the form of ing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National funds, or even arms, may make the Security Council determines can be more difference between victory or defeat for efficiently accomplished centrally; the forces of freedom. (5) to perform such other functions and If we are not prepared to give this as- duties related to intelligence affecting the sistance to those who share our beliefs, national security as the National Security then we might as well run up the flag Council may from time to time direct. of surrender today: because it can be The text of any piece of legislation predicted as a certainty that the Com- makes dry reading, but I have gone to munists will move without serious op- the trouble of reading these paragraphs position from one triumph to another. of the National Security Act for the rec- I do not propose to draw up a score- ord because they repeatedly make it clear card of CIA victories and CIA defeats. that the CIA functions under the direc- I do not know for certain whether they tion of the National Security Council, played any role in the uprising that over- and as an arm of the National Security threw the pro-Communist government Council. of President Arbenz in Guatemala. They also make it abundantly clear Nor do I know whether the Agency was that the CIA was to have duties broader in any way connected with the over- than the simple gathering of intelligence throw of the lunatic Mossadegh regime data, operating under the direction of in Iran In 1953. But I would like to the National Security Council. discuss these two events because I con- The wording of the National Security sider them to be outstanding examples of Act was a reflection of the growing rec- the kind of perilous situation I have just ognition that we cannot compete with described. communism if we confine ourselves to In the case of Guatemala, the Arbenz orthodox diplomacy and orthodox Intel- government, which had been elected on ligence collection, a nationalist and reform program, was Over and over and over again, it has moving, in a manner later to be emulated been demonstrated that a handful of by Castro, toward the complete com- trained Communists can seize control of munization of the country. As the gov- a trade union or a student federation, ernment Introduced more radical meas- or for that matter, of a country. The ures, it lost its hold over the people and fact that the overwhelming majority of over the armed forces. But the regime the people are non-Communists or anti- would not have toppled had it not been Communists has, in most such situations, for the courageous action of a hand- not.seriously Impeded them because the ful of patriots under Col. Castillo Armas, 723-476-92122 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 CIA-RDP75-00149R000200310052-2 Approved For Release 2003/12/22 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000200310052-2 who invaded Guatemala from Honduras in 1954. When this small band of determined patriots established themselves on Gua- temalan soil, the Arbenz regime collapsed like a house of cards. Hardly a shot was fired in its defense, so completely with- out support was it among the people and among the Guatemalan armed forces. A similar situation existed in Iran under Mossadegh in 1953. Mossadegh had come to power as a Nationalist. But his nationalism was of the lunatic variety that was prepared to give carte blanche to the Communists in return for their support. Had he remained in power another year, it is probable that today Iran would be on the other side of the Iron Curtain. In August 1953, mass demonstrations against the Mossadegh regime erupted in Teheran. Within 48 hours, the re- gime had been swept out of power, the Communist Tudeh Party had been crushed, and wildly cheering throngs hailed the return of the young Shah to his throne. If the CIA did have a role to play in Guatemala and Iran, then It played its role successfully. It inflicted two great defeats on the Communists and thereby saved two vital countries from slipping into the Communist orbit. Is this some- thing we should apologize for? No, on the contrary, it is something of which every American should be proud. There are some people who would have us place an absolute prohibition on any form of assistance to the forces of free- dom in other countries in the name of "nonintervention." Some of these are of the absolute paci- fist variety, who would rather let the Communists take over the world than fight against them. Others are muddleheaded moralists, who might be willing to fight if their own country were threatened by a Comm- 723-476-92122 munist takeover, who are prepared to admit that the Communists engage in massive subversive activities of every kind, but who, for some strange reason, consider it wrong for the United States to do anything about it. At least a few of the critics of the CIA's operations are unquestionably fel- low travelers and Communists. What Is most damaging and most per- plexing, however, is the criticism that comes from Members of Congress who are staunch anti-Communists, who do not believe that the United States should stand by, indifferent and supine, while the Communists proceed to take over in other countries, but who, never- theless, argue that the CIA should not have an operational function. They say that if the United States is to conduct operations designed to meet the Soviet subversive threat, this should be done by a separate agency. Once the need for clandestine opera- tions Is conceded, I frankly do not see the importance of the argument that they should be conducted by a separate agency. In either case, the United States would still be involved in the business of covert operations which so disturbs the ultramoralist critics of the CIA. From a strictly practical standpoint, moreover, I believe that grave harm would be done by separating the conduct of clandestine operations from the care- ful processing of intelligence which must govern such operations. It may disturb some people, but I think it can be stated as a certainty that many countries that remain free today would not be free if it had not been for the CIA. The U-2 flights which the CIA con- ducted with such outstanding success for some 4 years before the shooting down of Gary Powers also disturbed some of our ultramoralists. But I think that the vast majority of the American peo- ple take great pride in the knowledge Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000200310052-2 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CL4-RDP75-00149R000200310052-2 that we had been able to penetrate So- ernment, and against a man's integrity, viet secrecy. were obviously based on a one-sided pres- The CIA has been attacked from entation from some official source. Mr. many different directions for the role it Richardson and the CIA could not de- played in the Bay of Pigs invasion. I fend themselves. I have always taken it am not saying that the CIA is blameless for granted that American newspaper- or that it has made no errors. But men in any controversial situation en- I do oppose what appears to be a mount- deavor to obtain the facts from both Ing tendency to shift all the blame for sides, and all the more so when such the Bay of Pigs disaster onto the much sweeping accusations are involved. Not abused head of the CIA, because the only have I taken it for granted, but it record made it clear that many people is also true what the vast majority of shared the blame. our newspapermen do. But the cor- Essentially, it failed because we had respondent in question apparently con- not made the decision that it must not sidered this unnecessary. be permitted to fail. In the third place, the charges against This is the position I took in speaking Mr. Richardson were a tissue of false- on the floor of the Senate on April 24, hoods. President Kennedy, when he was 1961, hard on the heels of the disaster; asked about the charges against the CIA and since that time and up to this min- and Mr. Richardson at his press confer- ute, no information has been adduced ence of October 12 said: which would lead me to revise this posi- I must say I think the reports are wholly tion. untrue. The fact of the matter is that Mr. The propaganda campaign against the [CIA Director John] McCone sits in the Na- CIA reached a crescendo during the re- tional Security Council. I Imagine I see him cent Vietnamese crisis. Last October at least three or four times a week, ordi- 4, an article written by a correspondent narily. We have worked very closely together for an American newspaper chain in the National Security Council in the last 2 months attempting to meet the problems charged that the CIA had been subvert- we face in South Vietnam. I can find noth- ing State Department policy in Vietnam, ing, and I have looked through the record and that John Richardson, the CIA very carefully over the last 9 months, and man in Saigon, had openly refused to I could go back further, to indicate that the carry out instructions from Ambassador CIA had done anything but support policy. Lodge. It does not create policy; it attempts to exe- The correspondent who wrote this arti- cute it in those areas where it has compe- cle was guilty of openly identifying a tence and responsibility. I know that the CIA representative abroad, thus re- transfer of Mr. John Richardson [CIA official in Saigon] who is a very dedicated public ducing, if not destroying, his potential servant has led to surmises, but I can just usefulness forever. Visiting Congress- assure you flatly that the CIA has not car- men and members of the press may ried out independent activities but has op- sometimes know the identity of the CIA erated under close control of the Director of representative, but it has been taken for Central Intelligence, operating with the co- granted that they do not reveal his iden- operation of the National Security Council tity to the public. and under my instructions. To the best of my knowledge, this was So I think while the CIA may have made the first instance in which an American mistakes, as we all do on different occasions, correspondent has been guilty of this and has had many successes which may go flagrant breach of the ethics of security. unheralded, in my opinion in this case it is Moreover, these sweeping charges unfair to charge them as they have been against an important agency of the Gov- charged. I think they have done a good job. Approve ReJease 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000200310052-2 Approved For Release 2003/12/0? : CIA-RDP75-00149R000200310052-2 President Kennedy's characterization of Mr. Richardson, I can wholeheartedly endorse from my personal knowledge of Mr. Richardson. In most countries I have visited, the briefings by CIA repre- sentatives have been limited to an hour or two. But in May 1961, when I was in the Far East, Richardson briefed me for some 7 or 8 hours, all told. Certainly, it was the most detailed, most balanced, most knowledgeable briefing I have ever been given. But I was even more im- pressed by Mr. Richardson as a man than by his exceptional competence as an in- telligence officer. Indeed, of all the hun- dreds of people in the American service whom I have met in the course of my travels through Europe, Africa, and Asia, I can recall no one for whom I formed a higher esteem than John Richardson. There is a final word I wish to say in this connection. It is clear that the ar- ticle in question originated in some offi- cial source. It had to. The official who was guilty'of giving out this story to the press was himself guilty of violating the rules of security as well as the ethics that should govern relations between govern- ment departments. This officer, in my opinion, should be identified and dis- missed. The time has come when Members of Congress and members of the press must take stock of the growing campaign against CIA and of the part they them- selves may have played in forwarding this campaign. I am not suggesting that the CIA should be immune to criticism because of the sensitive nature of its operations. No government agency should be immune from criticism. I do believe, however, that there has been far too much sensationalism, far 723-476-92122 too many inaccuracies, and far too little concern for the national security in some of the criticism that has heretofore been made of the CIA. I believe that, before we indulge in criticism of the CIA, we should take into account the fact that it cannot defend itself. We should also take into account the fact that every critical statement, whether accurate or inaccurate, will be picked up by the special bureau of the Soviet secret police whose task it is to discredit the CIA, and will be put to work through all the information and propa- ganda channels open to the Kremlin and through all its agents in the world's news media. Because these things are so, we all share a special responsibility, if we feel constrained to criticize the CIA, to check our facts painstakingly, to weigh our words carefully, and to speak with re- straint. If we have questions or com- plaints, I believe that, before taking them to the mass circulation press, we should discuss them with the Director of the CIA, or his deputy, or with the chairmen of the four House and Senate commit- tees charged with the supervision of the CIA's activities. And if, after checking in this manner, there is any one of us who still considers it necessary to speak out against certain policies of the CIA, the proper place to do it would be on the floor of Congress rather than on tele- vision, or through the mass circulation periodicals. This would provide an op- portunity for rebuttal and debate, and the press accounts, hopefully, would re- flect all sides of the discussion. For whatever its errors and shortcom- ings may be, I believe, with President Kennedy, that the CIA will in the future continue to merit the appreciation of our country, as it has in the past. Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDRZ NQQ149A QQ,Q:2Q0310052-2