FURTHER REMARKS ON THE CONGO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000200330033-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: October 17, 1961
• Content Type: OPEN

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United States
of America
Vol. 107
TOR91 r
Refr,ord
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 87 1b CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1961
Further Remarks
on the Congo
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. THOMAS J. DODD
OF CONNECTICUT
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Wednesday, September 27, 1961
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, during the
month of September I spoke repeatedly
in the Senate, criticizing U.N. interven-
tion in Katanga and the composition of
the Adoula-Gizenga coalition govern-
ment in Leopoldville, which has been
fostered by the U.N.
At that time, I had the feeling of
belonging to an ineffective minority.
The general trend of editorial policy
seemed to support the U.N., although
with some misgivings.
Within the past 2 weeks that has been
a significant shift in editorial opinion.
And the last few days have brought
highly encouraging news concerning the
conclusion of a formal cease-fire agree-
ment between the United Nations forces
and the Government of Katanga.
Over a 2-week period, the following
articles and editorials appeared in na-
tional newspapers and periodicals, and I
ask unanimous consent that they be in-
serted in the Appendix of the RECORD.
First. Article in the. Wall Street Jour-
nal describing how U.N. was forced to
intervene to prevent the Leopoldville
Government from using U.S. aid dollars
to purchase Communist arms in guise of
"machinery."
Second. Editorial in the New York
Times stating that the U.N.'s attempt to
end the Katanga secession by force has
failed, and that a solution must be found
by conciliation within a federated state
structure. It warned that the U.N.
troops must not be tricked into aiding
Gizenga and his Communist-oriented
army take over the Adoula government
from the inside.
Third. A feature article by Mr. S. L.
A. Marshall which appeared in the edi-
torial page of the New York Herald
Tribune, presents the case for Katanga
and President Tshombe.
Fourth. A lengthy letter to the editor
of the New York Times written by Mr.
George H. T. Kimble, former director of
the American Geographical Society and
head of the Geographic Department at
Indiana University.
Fifth. An editorial in the New York
Herald Tribune entitled "Let's Keep an
Eye on the Congo," which takes the
stand that the real threat to Congolese
independence comes not from the Bel-
gians whom President Tshombe has used
to help maintain order, public services
and economic vitality; "it comes from
the Soviets and their allies who have
been sheltered and encouraged in
their intrigues by Antoine Gizenga
and his demagogic predecessor, Patrice
Lumumba."
Sixth. Editorial entitled "Are We
Helping Deliver the Congo to the Com-
munists?" from the Saturday Evening
Post.
Seventh. New York Times article
dealing with cease-fire agreement in
Katanga.
There being no objection, the articles
and editorials were ordered to be printed
in the RECORD, as follows:
[From the Wall Street Journal]
REDS IN THE CONGO: THEY INTENSIFY POWER
BID, HOLD KEY POSTS IN LEOPOLDVILLE RE-
GIME-U.S. AID DOLLARS ALMOST Buy ARMS
FOR PRO-COMMUNISTS IN GUISE OF "MA-
CHINERY"-THE VOICE OF RADIO MOSCOW
(By John R. Gibson)
LEOPOLDVILLE.-Could the United States
unwittingly help finance wily Communists
attempting to take over the Congo?
As unbelievable as it seems, this is exactly
what might have happened here except for
last minute intervention the other day by
United Nations representatives who suddenly
spotted and became suspicious of a proposed
Congolese trade agreement with East Ger-
many.
Here is what happened, according to U.N.
officials:
A high-ranking minister in the Congo's
coalition central government, aided by a
leftist Belgian adviser, secretly formulated
an agreement to exchange 40 million francs
($800,000 at the official exchange rate), palm
oil, and other products for East German "ma-
chinery." The only immediate outlay from
the Congo's scanty foreign exchange would
have been a 5-percent payment into a Swiss
bank account. This 5 percent would have
come out of $10 million in economic aid fun-
neled into the Congo by Uncle Sam through
the U.N. earlier this year.
"MACHINES" WERE ARMS
The proposed deal got almost completely
through channels before it was discovered
and blocked by the U.N. It took little in-
vestigation, U.N. sleuths report, to establish
that the "machinery" actually was to con-
sist of armaments, probably destined for
No. 176
Communist-sympathizing Congolese army
troops based at Stanleyville.
As if this were not disturbing enough, it is
believed the 5-percent payment eventually
would have found its way back to the Congo,
partly as a payoff to the minister and his
Belgian adviser, and partly to finance propa-
ganda activities against the present central
government headed by Cyrille Adoula. Al-
though this government, being a coalition,
contains some pro-Communists, it is sup-
ported by the United States and generally
is regarded as pro-Western.
The proposed deal with East Germany was
just one of the many angles being tried here
by the Communists and their allies, follow-
ers of the slain Patrice Iaumumba. Their
aim is simple: To take over the Congo. Their
strategy, as deduced by westerners aware of
what's going on: To twist the Adoula gov-
ernment to their purposes or, if that doesn't
work, to turn the Congo once again into a
brawling basin of tribal warfare-probably a
fatal blow to U.N. prestige here,
REDS STAGE! COMEBACK
Although the Communists and their sym-
pathizers haven't had too much influence in
Leopoldville since they were driven out by
Congolese Gen. Joseph Mobutu a year ago,
the near-success of the trade deal with East
Germany points up their rapid comeback
here.
As often is the case in new countries
where everyone is bidding for personal power,
it's difficult to tell which politician is a
Communist, which a power seeker with no
sincere political philosophy, and which is
merely for sale to the highest bidder. In
some ways, however, it makes little differ-
ence here in the Congo which of the three
types a politician. may be; If any of the three,
he is probably getting his support from the
Communists and would follow Moscow's
direction.
Leading the list of pro-Communists here
is Antoine Gizenga, a vice premier in the
central government. Mr. Gizenga, a Lu-
mumba follower, set up a rump government
in Stanleyville last year after Lumumba's
death and received counsel from known
Communists. But many insiders believe Mr.
Gizenga lost political power by hesitating
for several weeks before deciding to enter
the present Leopoldville government.
These authorities consider Chrystophe
Gbenye, who was Mr. Gizenga's right-hand
man at Stanleyville, as the most dangerous
leftist leader in Leopoldville. As interior
minister, he controls the police. He and his
aides have been suggesting to some news-
papers supporting the Adoula government
that they may face censorship if they don't
advocate tougher action against secessionist
Katanga Province. Mineral-rich Katanga,
headed by Moise Tshombe, so far has vigor-
ously resisted Communist influence and re-
union with the rest of the-Congo.
OTHER LEFTISTS HOLD HIGH POSTS
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Jason Sendwe, the other vice premier of
the Leopoldville regime, also rates as a dan-
gerous leftist, Westerners say. Mr. Sendwe
lost out to Mr. Tshombe as Katanga's presi-
dent. Other pro-Communists in the Adoula
government: Remy Mwamba, minister of
justice; Marel Bisukiro, foreign commerce
minister; Joseph Lutula, who has the curious
title of minister of the middle classes; and
Egide Bochely-Davidson, whom pro-Reds
pressured Mr. Adoula into naming chief ad-
ministrator in Katanga, a job he still hasn't
taken over.
With such men in powerful positions, it
stands to reason that there will be a sharp
increase in leftist activities, Westerners say.
Already, such a trend is noticeable. Al-
though the old Lumumbist newspapers died
out during the past year, a new one, Le
Matin, has just made its bow. It shouts the
leftist line that the Adoula government
should squash Katanga fast with arms and
without consulting the United Nations. No-
tices announce meetings of "young Lumum-
bist" groups.
These organizations have been hampered
by a lack of leaders. After General Mobutu
forced Russian and other Communist diplo-
mats to flee Leopoldville, paid Red agents
simply went underground or to Stanleyville.
Now every plane from Stanleyville brings
more of these leaders back.
From outside the Congo, Russia's Radio
Moscow booms in over the short wave radios
most. Africans have access to. East Germans
circulate a brochure declaring their policy to
be "Africa for Africans."
Westerners expect Communist agitation
here will increase after resumption of formal
diplomatic relat1 ns between the Congo and
Red lands. "The Communists are keeping
quiet, until they win recognition," asserts one
Western envoy. "When they get that they'll
open up. We're dealing with experts."
Moderate government leaders, notably
Justin Bomboko, foreign minister, and Jo-
seph Ileo, information minister, are trying to
stave off the Red advance. But the job isn't
easy.
Leftist Gbenye's authority over the police
means the government must find other
means of enforcing a clampdown on Red
propaganda. Some moderates favor turning
the job over to General Mobutu's army but
that would raise the danger of losing control
over the trigger-happy soldiers. The U.N.
has :helped some by deporting during the
past 2 weeks 30 local Belgians known to be
Communists or some other breed of agitator.
If the present government here fails to
control the left, as many pessimists believe
will be the case, there is the possibility Gen-
eral Mobutu will return to action. He is
rated, strongly anti-Communist and hasn't
said much during recent months. Ob-
servers question how much of the Congolese
national army he controls but they concede
it is enough to cause a new crisis. Another
point: If General Mobutu should go into
action, the U.N. might feel obliged to oppose
him.
General Mobutu's lack of control over the
important Stanleyville arm of the national
army adds another advantage for the Reds.
The Stanleyville force is controlled by Gen.
Victor Lundula, Mr. Gizenga's chief of staff
during the Stanleyville separatist regime.
General Lundula has volunteered to march
his army on Katanga, and Mr. Tshombe's
government radio station periodically an-
nounces the Lundula army is on the move.
V.N. representatives scoff at these charges
but privately they fret that just this may
happen.
What all this adds up to is a possible col-
lapse of the central government here and an
abrupt end to the United Nations and Ameri-
can Influence. At worst, Westerners figure,
this would lead to a Communist takeover; at
best, It might result in a long period of un-
rest and neutralism.
surpassed in importance only by the Berlin
crisis and the crisis over the Secretary Gen-
eralship. This problem is the Congo, where
an uneasy truce threatens to explode into
new violence that could again rock Africa,
the United Nations, and the world.
The Congo presents three problems, in one.
The first Is how to reunite the Congo, in par-
ticular how to reintegrate secession-minded
Katanga, whose riches and revenues are es-
sential to make the Congo a viable state.
The United Nations' attempt to end Ka-
tanga's secession by force has failed. A so-
lution must be found by conciliation, not
new U.N. ultimatums, and within the long-
projected federal structure that provides for
substantial self-government for the feder-
ated states. This seems to be what President
Tshombe really seeks. He is now half In, half
out of the Congo, but he has appealed to
Premier Adoula for a "palaver," which is the
African way of settling things. The Premier
should not refuse.
The second problem is how to prevent Com-
munist-oriented Deputy Premier Gizenga and
his still independent army under General
Lundula from taking over the Adoula gov-
ernment from the inside. Soviet agents, now
returned to Leopoldville, are working toward
that end. The U.N. troops, financed mainly
by the United States, must not be tricked
into aiding such a plot.
The third problem is how to maintain the
United Nations troops in the Congo as a
stabilizing force in the face of mounting
deficits that threaten the United Nations
with bankruptcy. Far too many states are
following the Russian example in refusing to
pay their assessments. It is up to the As-
sembly to take action against them. They
are violating their charter obligation, the
prescribed penalty for which is suspension
of membership or expulsion.
[From the New York Herald Tribune]
THE STRANGE CASE OF KATANGA
(By S. L. A. Marshall)
In the Congo story there is nothing more
ironic than the course of events which makes
Moise Tshombe of Katanga the villain, the
main antagonist of the United Nations, while
Antoine Gizenga, the skulker from Oriente
province; emerges as cooperator of sorts and
almost a hero.
That happens only because the U.N. has its
own design for the Congo, however much
that plan may be against nature, and irre-
spective of the sufficient proof over the past
15 months that it is an excessive expecta-
tion.
It happens also because Gizenga sees what
he thinks is a first-class opening by which
ultimately to subvert the U.N.'s undertak-
ings by grabbing power himself, which
would mean riddance to the U.N. and all Its
works in darkest Africa.
Also, it happens because Tshombe still
holds out, preferring that the little some-
thing solid (meaning Katanga) in the Congo
quicksand to union with a central govern-
ment which merely drifts along without
either gaining political control of the coun-
try or demonstrating a capacity to admin-
ister it if it did.
The U.N. had great dreams. All of the
Congolese chieftains were to get together in
one big happy political family and hence-
lapse. Villain or no, Tshombe kept his prov-
ince solid, productive and reasonably tran-
quil, considering the obstacles strewn in his
path. The mines continued their output.
The people were fed. And though Katanga
cargo took a different route to the sea, its
communications for the most part remained
in repair, in contrast to other provinces. To
Tshombe's credit, he at least did a more ef-
fective job of administering a large area, and
avoiding chaos, than any other single Con-
golese. Further, he did not initiate separa-
tism in Katanga. It has always had semi-
autonomous control of its own affairs be-
cause the Belgian mining companies were
powerful enough politically to keep it that
way.
Tshombe sinned in two ways. The
first was his bid for independence which was
offensive to U.N.'s controlling idea toward
the Congo, though it has recklessly supported
the principle of self-determination practically
everywhere else on the globe. His collateral
transgression was the withholding of reve-
nues by the Congo's one prospering province.
The central government is many millions
worse than bankrupt, and hurting worse every
day in its pocketbook. So blame Tshombe.
But listen also to this comment on the Leo-
poldville government by the U.N.'s Dr. Carl
Sture Linner: "Its lack of money is not as
dire as its lack of knowledge about how to
spend it." If that be true, Tshombe's crime
was that he would not help finance prof-
ligacy and ineptitude in .a ministry whose
control over the Congo extends hardly be-
yond the near horizon.
Furthermore, it was not Tshombe through
his separatism and withholding of taxes, who
prostrated the Congo. His withdrawal was
an exacerbating factor but not the main
squeeze. The damage done by it could be
remedied soon enough, unless the U.N. em-
broils the whole community in trying to dis-
cipline one man, since Tshombe at least
kept Katanga reasonably whole.
When Gizenga, the heir of the late Patrice
Lumumba, withdrew to Stanleyville with his
military cohorts, making by his presence a
fief-holding of Oriental province, that was
what scuttled the Congo's main chance for
a gradual recovery. It also settled famine
and worklessness on millions of Congolese.
There ensued a political blockading of the
Congo River over the 1,100-mile stretch of
its navigable waters between Leopoldville
and Stanleyville. It was pressed from both
directions as the politicos at both ends
each sought to starve the other out, irrespec-
tive of the costs to the multitude.
When nothing moves on that great water-
way, the Congo is in fully desperate straits.
The stream is the life artery of the whole
central basin of Africa and the immediate
surrounding highlands. Roads and rails tie
into it to make a communications network
possible. Except that the jungle is more
fruitful, depriving the region of this water-
way is like keeping the Nile from Egypt.
That was Gizenga's contribution. The U.N.
and the Congo moderates have temporarily
made peace with him becuse it seems polit-
ically expedient. They should know better.
The whole territory abounds with other
alligators.
[From the New York Times]
T S C N
HE M
LDE
IN
O GO
forth speak the language of brotherly love. U.N. IN KATANGA-ACTION HELD CONTRARY TO
Thereafter, with the U.N. leading them by AGENCY'S ROLE, PLEBISCITE ADVOCATED
the hand they would be tutored into that de-
gree of wisdom requisite to reestablishing
the Congo as a thriving and productive
union of provinces populated mainly by sav-
ages. It was foolish from the start. The
leading Congolese had no such potential.
But what was the fundamental job, really?
Simply this, the return of law and order, so
that men and women would return to work,
trade and industry would resume, food would
move where it was required and creature
satisfactions would return to normal. There
would then be something for government to
(The writer of the following letter, former
director of the American Geographical So-
ciety and head of the Geography Department
at Indiana University, is the author of
"Tropical Africa.")
To the EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK 'DIMES:
There is something deeply disturbing
about the recent activities of the U.N. in
Katanga. For here is an agency dedicated
to the finding of peaceful solutions to world
problems, engaged in a war against people
whose chief offense is that they happen to
be richer than their provincial neighbors and
O
R
G
Among the ApptemadFie Ralease 2000tf t r'gp -u 11 - Vft"2b033=t the prospect of being either run or
now leaderless United Nations is one that is Katanga did not share in the general col- No matter how well meant this interven-
 Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00149R000200330033-1
tion may be, it can scarcely fail to disillusion
those who hitherto have thought of the U.N.
forces in the Congo as a kind of peace corps.
This intervention is also calculated to con-
firm the suspicion of those who are beginning
to wonder if the U.N. is not resorting to the
very kind of coercion it has long condemned
in the colonial powers.
Then, again, it is bound to produce anx-
iety in the minds of many yet-to-be-liber-
ated peoples, for if the U.N. imposes its will
on the inhabitants of Katanga, will it not
later try to do the same on the Baganda, the
Barotse, the Masai, and all the other African
groups who equally have no taste for subjec-
tion to their stronger neighbors.
DETERMINING STATUS
Be this as it may, I take leave to wonder if
the action of the U.N. is really in harmony
with the spirit of. its deliverances on the
subject of self-determination. One of these,
made in 1955 at a meeting of the Social
Commission of the Economic and Social
Council, stated that "all peoples and all na-
tions shall have the right of self-determina-
tion-namely, the right freely to determine
their political, economic, social, and cultural
status."
If this statement means anything, it means
freedom for the inhabitants of Katanga to
decide, without internal compulsion or ex-
ternal fixing, what kind of government they
want and who shall govern them. True, they
may not qualify as a nation in the Western
sense of the word, but most of them have as
much identity as the 18th century Ameri-
cans and the 20th century Jews, and as much
right to the appellation of peoples.
The fact that they find themselves living
inside the same political boundaries as sev-
eral dozen other peoples is, I submit, no
reason for the United Nations insistence
that they should go on doing so, for the
boundaries were artificial (being unethni-
cal) in the first place, and in the second
place, the peoples have few, if any, common
bonds, other than their former subjection
to Belgian rule and opposition to it. Many
of them, in fact, differ at least as much as
the Swedes do from the Spaniards.
EQUATORIAL TERRITORIES
The United Nations did not insist that
the peoples of the heavily mineralized
Gabon should continue to live in political
association with those of the other three
territories of French Equatorial Africa when
they received their independence in 1960.
On the contrary, it welcomed all four of
them immediately and unanimously into its
growing membership.
If, as is commonly affirmed, the main rea-
son for the United Nations insistence on the
continued political adherence of Katanga to
the rest of the former Belgian Congo is be-
cause this province is heavily mineralized,
it is surely surprising that the U.N. did not
likewise insist on the continued political as-
sociation of Gabon with its erstwhile French
neighbors for, insofar as they are known,
the geographical endowments of the Central
African Republic and the Republics of Chad
and Congo (Brazzaville) are individually
smaller than those of the six provinces of
the former Belgian Congo.
Not, of course, that the Central African
Republic and the Republics of Chad and
Congo (Brazzaville) ar6 alone in their slen-
der means. At least 10 of the African
countries welcomed into the membership of
the United Nations during the past 6 years
have smaller revenues than any of the 6
Belgian Congo provinces had on the eve of
the country's independence in 1980. At
least five have, it could be argued, a lower
"viability rating" than any Congolese prov-
ince.
Would it not be better perhaps for the
United Nations to use its meager financial
resourci.s for supervising a plebiscite to de-
cide what kind of political allegiances the
peoples of the Congo desire to form, rather
than enforce an alien, and palpably unwel-
come
will on one of them? There is a
,
precedent for ~t l l w" 2000PO5124'' t- N~P
jg #M#n0330033-1
recently taken ri is ameroons w na s wil a k [From the New York Times]
quite satisfactory results. There is also a Leaving aside the pompous nonsense re-
compelling reason for it, namely, the main- garding the need to "bring peace to the
tenance of world peace-and the United Congo," the fact is that United Nations
Nations own high standing as the chief in- troops (financed for more than $40 million
strument of such peace, by the United States) brought war to the
GEORGE H. T. KIMBLE. one part of the Congo where there was peace,
SOLSBERRY, IND., September 26, 1961. prosperity, cooperation among the various
races and an imposing "infrastructure" (to
borrow a word from U.N. gobbledygook) of
President Tshombe
modern civilized living
,
LET'S KEEP AN EYE ON THE CONGO of Katanga had agreed to go along with
For years it was possible to say, "Let Dag a federation of Congolese States, but the
do it," with the knowledge that a difficult United Nations insisted that Katanga must
situation would at least be in the hands submit to the total authority of a Commu-
of an immensely capable and incorruptible nist-dominated central government.
public servant. But now there is no Dag, Why representatives of the United States,
and this makes a world of difference-quite which is a federal system, should crack down
notably in the Congo, where he so Crag- on the federal form of government for the
Ically and abruptly lost his life. Congo is beyond us. Even more mysterious
Though an uneasy truce still prevails in
Katanga, the Congo is by no means out of
danger.
As it always has, the real threat to Con-
golese Independence comes not from the
Belgians Whom Moise Tshombe has used to
help maintain order, economic vitality, and
essential services in Katanga; it comes from
the Soviets and their allies, who have been
sheltered and encouraged in their intrigues
by Antoine Gizenga and his demagogic
predecessor, Patrice Lumumba.
With the world's attention diverted, Iron
Curtain agents have been pouring into
Leopoldville to work their mischief, or at
least to try to the best of their considerable
ability. Premier Adoula has apparently been
trying to steer an independent middle
course, but whet er he can succeed Is still
an open question Vice Premier Gizenga
and his lieutenant, Christophe Gbenye, in
the vital post of Interior Minister, are at
least Communist sympathizers, and there
has been little evidence that Glzenga has
abandoned his ambition to rule the Congo.
The U.N, army was turned against the
only consistently stable, Western-oriented
regime the Congo has known, which threat-
ened no one. And the central government's
plan to make a Red-leaning Gizenga deputy
boss of Katanga if the U.N. operation had
succeeded should be ample indication that
all is not yet well in Adoula land.
It should be a warning to the West that
any further efforts to force unification had
better be scrutinized with care before they
are allowed to proceed.
Congolese unity is still a goal to be pur-
sued-but not unity at any price. Not at
the price of freedom; not at the price of
forced submission to a regime in which Com-
munist agents and/or sympathizers have
been allowed to gain control.
They have not yet gained control of the
Leopoldville government. But there is a
real danger that they may, unless the West
plays its cards with care and determination.
Premier Adoula still has to prove himself.
The U.N., after its spectacular blunder in
Katanga, has to reestablish its claim to con-
fidence. This will be harder without Mr.
Hammarskjold.
Meanwhile, the U.N.-which has been as-
sembling an air force in the Congo-ought
to be put on clear notice that any renewal
of its military offensive would be intolerable.
And the United States-which as chief sup-
port of the U.N. operation has a moral as
well as practical stake-had best keep a close
watch.
Right doesn't alone make might in this
imperfect world. It has to be made to pre-
vail.
[From the Saturday Evening Post]
ARE WE HELPING DELIVER THE CONGO TO THE
COMMUNISTS?
The New York Times put it conservative-
ly when it stated recently that the United
Nations, in invading the Katanga Province
of the Congo, had set a precedent "at con-
siderable risk to itself." Surely if the United
Nations can invade the Congo to enforce its
own, theory of what this country's Govern-
is our support of the United Nations effort
to force Katanga to weaken its economie
and military posture by deporting white
officers and officials. Mercenaries these are
called, except when they are Communist
Czechs, Poles, or Soviet citizens; then they
become technicians. Following this im-
position of racism, unwanted by the Ka-
tangans, came the demand, also backed by
the United States, that Katanga knuckle
under to the Communist-dominated central
authorities.
As to the central authorities, Senator
THOMAS J. DODD, of Connecticut, produced a
translation of an article in the Soviet pub-
lication New Times which stated that the
followers of Lumumba had a clear majority
In the Congolese parliament and that Pre-
mier Cyrille Adoula was committed to carry
out all decisions made earlier by the Lu-
mumba government. It was already known
that Adoula had agreed to make one of the
Red-trained Gizenga's men minister of the
interior (in charge of the police), and that
one Egide Bochely-Davidson, another Lu-
mumba protege, was to be chief administra-
tor of Katanga.
Had it not been for the tragic accident
which ended his life. Secretary General Ham-
marskjold might have rescued the United
Nations from the consequences of its blun-
ders. That the mess may have been created
by U.N. representatives on the spot, without
sanction by the horn office, is suggested by
the willingness of President Tshombe of
Katanga to deal with Hammarskjold despite
his previous refusal to talk with Dr. Conor
Cruise O'Brien, the local U.N. "enforcer."
The invasion of Katanga was obviously or-
dered without approval by the Security
Council, as is made plain by the protests of
the foreign offices of Great Britain and
France. Lord Lansdowne, Britain's parlia-
mentary undersecretary for foreign affairs,
who talked with the late Secretary General
before his death, is convinced that the U.N.
forces had exceeded their instructions. We
may be sure, in spite of the uneasy truce,
that the Communists have not given up in
the Congo.
Why do we go along with a course so
freighted with disaster to the Congo and
our commercial and strategic interests? For
one thing, there is in the United States a
heavily brainwashed but socially and finan-
cially prominent minority which has what
the kids call a "thing" about the United Na-
tions. These people pay little attention to
what the United Nations actually does. All
criticism is met by cries that "the United
Nations is the hope of the world," or that it
"stands between us and the horror of nuclear
war." This sort of thing may represent the
triumph of hope over experience, but it does
constitute a considerable part of American
public opinion to which any administration
feels obliged to pay some heed. So the Com-
munists get the strategic key to Africa-and
the cobalt-and we get the consciousness of
having acted nobly and disinterestedly.
We can hardly be expected to stand by the
U.N., when the U.N. too often seems con-
cerned with prompting Soviet objectives,
especially in the Congo, whose people, inso-
far as they are articulate, want continued
 Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00149R000200330033-1
U.N.AND KATANGA AGREE, ON TRADING CONGO civil war.
PRISONERS-PROVISIONAL PACT ALSO CALLS United Nations officials here declined to
FOR 'WORLD BODY'S TROOPS To YIELD SOME comment on the agreement. There was no
POSTIS doubt that the concessions to Mr. Tshombe
(By David Halberstam) caught some officials here by surprise. Mr.
LEOPOLDVILLE, THE CONGO.-A prisonef ex- Khiari is withholding comment until he re-
change agreement between United Nations turns here and Dr. Sture C. Linner, head of
and Katangan officials was announced here the United Nations mission in the Congo, is
today by the United Nations command in also withholding comment.
the Congo. Mr. Khiari told officials here that the
The agreement is not final. It still re- afternoon session with Mr. Tshombe had
quires approval by United Nations headquar- been marked by several eruptions and then
ters in New York. returns. Mr. Tshombe called the new agree-
The accord, which the United Nations de- ment a victory for Katanga.
scribes as a protocol implementation of the It was noted here that the document made
cease fire that was agreed on last month, no reference to the February 21 resolution
also calls for the withdrawal of United Na- expelling mercenaries from Katanga. News-
tions troops from several positions they took men had been told there would be a refer-
during 8 days of fighting in Katanga. ence to this in the agreement.
The cease-fire went into effect September
21. It was agreed on in Ndola, northern
Rhodesia, between United Nations officials
and Moise Tshombe, President of secession-
ist Katanga Province.
The truce followed fighting that began
September 13 when United Nations troops
took over in Elizabethville, the provincial
capital, in an attempt to restore the province
to the control of the central Government in
Leopoldville.
TSHOMBE AGREES TO TRADE
President Tshombe and Mahmoud Khiari
of Tunisia, a United Nations official, reached
the prisoner-exchange agreement in Eliza-
bethviLle last night.
It calls for an exchange of prisoners with-
out further delay. This is scheduled to take
place Monday afternoon.
The Katangans have 191 United Nations
prisoners-184 Irish, 5 Italians, 1 Swede, and
1 Norwegian. The United Nations has an
estimated total of 220 Katangan prisoners.
The agreement also calls for the with-
drawal of United Nations troops from Eliza-
bethville's post office, radio station, the Lido
Hotel, and an underpass on the fringe of
town that had been a key point during the
fighting.
The agreement creates three subcommis-
sions, each composed of two Katangan of-
ficers and two United Nations officers, to
carry out inspection at any time and at any
place at the request of either party. A com-
plaint by either side on a possible violation
of the cease fire would be handled by the
subcommissions.
CIVILIANS DISARMED
The Katangans, according to the agree-
ment, would assure that no civilians carried
weapons. Both sides would work to stop
hostile propaganda. This has been a key
point. The United Nations has charged that
the radio station in Elisabethville had been
used primarily to stir up anti-United Na-
tions feeling.
The United Nations had expected to give
up the post office as part of the agreement.
But some of the other points of the agree-
ment, such as the withdrawal from the tun-
nel, were last-minute concessions to the
Katangese.
The agreement also will permit the Ka-
tangese to operate again at the airport,
which has been a United Nations stronghold.
Katangan troops will be allowed to return
to the airport and the Katangans will be able
to fly provisions out of the airport to their
troops in the back country. Civilian air
flights will be resumed.
In effect, the agreement puts the airport
under joint control.
Katangan forces and United Nations forces
will remain in the positions they occupied on
September 12 at Albertville, Niemba, Nyunzu,
and Jadotville.
The agreement also provides that the
United Nations will not consider the cease
fire to be violated if Katangan troops reply
to fire from some external attack.
Nothing more is given on this point. But
the central Congo Government has made it
clear that this agreement does not apply to
it. p
'ow%LF ;blRRleae 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00149R000200330033-1
The point is can
the United Nations mandate here calls for
It to take any action necessary to prevent
 Approved F
Approved
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