SEN. FULBRIGHT'S CRITICISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000200530004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 1999
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 16, 1965
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 1-99'9/OgH1 G.IA-I4BP 0014
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` J aui? 4'IAL ! STATI NTL
2;-34,469
(' . THE CRITICISM of United States policy in the
i' Dominican crisis voiced in the Senate yesterday.
by Sen. J. W. Fulbright points up a sharp division' `
of opinion in the Senate's Foreign Policy Commit-
ice. The Arkansas Democrat, chairman of the.
committee' charged that the massive American in-
tervention in that Latin American country was an
"over-action" in panic that the revolution was Com
munist-dominated,' or would certainly become so..,A
The main point of the senator's criticism, We-
gat ier, is that it has not been proved that the revo-
i. lution in the Dominican Republic was Communist-
rising was given by the Communists. He asserted ..
that such support was to be expected since "vir-?
Muni St. support."
His presumption'is that this nation after res
cuing its nationals from the dangers of the violent:
n~ should
hi
i
c
l
sat -back
witdtil
ae un wascearwether:
l
h
Communist "support" had become "domination"'. J
t
of the revolutionary movement,
There is, unfortunately, no documented answer"
who is right in the argument. No one can say with.
nnv ['nrtninty 41,nf _ -'s
- ------~ ..---p"-.- .... .. A Yw~bLVU, Uuc
revolution would have ended with Communi
t
s
s
control of the Latin American nation or not.
if the exam
le o
-
- -
h
p
I
Cuba
~ --,
i.
as any mean-1
in, -non-intervention would have been a gamble. It
I will be remembered that, when the Castroites were
battling to oust the dictator Batista, the adminis- .7
tration in Washington regarded the Communist
faction as. Having negligible influence. Former
President Eisenhower just ri cently revealed that.
he was "provoked" because until the final days of
1958, the C.eLitral 0,tc]Ji,gence Agency did not give
1. him any suggestion that a Castro victory would not
be in the' best interests of the United States. ' It is
agreed that Gen. Eisenhower would have rea
t
d
e
c
11
more strofAgly had he known Castro wold
lun
e
p
g
uthat country into communism. By the .time the
full extent of the Communist take-over becam
e
clear, Castro was'firmly entrenched.
While S
F
l
en
u
bright is on precarid
.ous groun I ) in the main thrust of his criticism, there is one.,
point on which there should be agreement. He de-
clares that "economic development and social jus-
tice are themselves the primary and most reliable
security against Communist subversion." These.
comprise' however
l
a
ong range policy Once th
,,.,e t
shooting-starts, it is another matter. ..
Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP75-00149R0.00200530004-4