CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000300290005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 1998
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 10, 1966
• Content Type: NSPR

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ~'Ho`f
Latvia.- 'How a orlt Vfetnagi, Art?" "T. 10 February 9966 hell with Vietnam. I wouldn't blend. There
,grjelease lA-RDP75-~~~ of
(By Donald Duncan) the theory that special forces men cannot
VIETNAM-"THE WHOLE THING , When I was drafted Into the Army, 10 years, be prejudiced about the color or religion of
WAS A LIE!" A MUCH DECORATED ago, I was a militant anti-Communist. Like other people.
COMBAT VETERAN'S TESTIMONY most Americans, I couldn't conceive of any. After graduation, I was chosen to be a
body choosing communism over democracy, procurement noncommissioned officer for
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in ' The depths of my aversion to this ideology special forces to California. The joke was
the February 1966 issue of Ramparts, was, I suppose, due in part to my being Ro- made that I was now a procurer. After seeing
there is published an article entitled man Catholic. In part to the stories in the how we were prostituted, the analogy doesn't
"Th-, Whole Thing Was a Lie!" written news media about communism, and in part seem a bad one. General Yarborough's in-
to the fact that my stepfather was born in structlons were simple: "I want good, dedi-
by former M. Sgt. Donald Duncan, holder Budapest, Hungary. Although he had come : cated men who will graduate.. If you want
of the South Vietnamese Silver Star, the to the United States as a young man, Most him, take him. -Just remember, he may be
Combat Infantry Badge, the Bronze Star, of his family had stayed in Europe. From on your team someday." Our final instruc-
and the U.S. Army Air Medal. time to time, I would be given examples of tions from the captain directly In charge
The article illustrates Master Sergeant, the horn :s of life under communism of the program had some succinct points.
Duncan's disillusionment with the var- Shortly after basic training, I was sent to. I stood in shocked disbelief to bear, "Don't
lance between what he was told about Germany. I was there at the time of the So- send me any niggers. Be careful, however,
the situation in Vietnam and what he, vlet suppression of the Hungarian revolt. not to give, the impression that we are
'Everything I had heard about communism prejudiced In special forces. You won't find
actually found there. was verified. Like my fellow soldiers I felt It hard to find an excuse to reject them.
The article is well worth reading and. frustrated and cheated that the United Most will be too dumb to pass the written
I ask unanimous consent that it be print- States would not go to the aid of the Hun- test. If they luck out on that and get by the
ed in full in the RECORD at the conclu-' garians. Angrily I followed the action of the physical testing, you'll find that they have
brute force being used against people who some sort of a criminal record." The third
Sion of my remarks. were armed with sticks, stolen weapons, and. roan I sent to Fort Bragg was a "nigger."
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- a desire for independence. And I didn't forget that someday he might
.out objection, it is so ordered. While serving In Germany, I ran across the' be on my team.
(See exhibit 1,) special forces. I was so impressed by their My first impressions of Vietnam were
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, cer- dedication and elan that I decided to volun- gained from the window of the jet while fly-
tain statements in the article are worth teer for duty with this group. By 1959 1, ing over Saigon and its outlying areas. As
had been accepted into the special forces I looked down I thought, "Why, those could
underscoring. Master Sergeant Dun- and underwent training at Fort Bragg. I be farms anywhere and that could be a city
can makes the observation that: was soon to learn much about the outfit and ' anywhere." The ride from Tan Son Nhut to I
The whole thing was _a lie. We weren't the men in it. A good percentage of them the center of town destroyed the Initial il-
preserving freedom in South Vietnam. were Lodge Act people-men who had come luslon.
There was no freedom to preserve. To voice out from Iron Curtain countries. Their My Impressions weren't unique for a new
opposition to the Government meant jail anticommunism bordered on fanaticism.' arrival In Saigon. I was appalled by the
or death. Neutralism was forbidden and Many of them who, like me, had joined spe- heat and humidity which made my worsted
punished. Newspapers that didn't say the cial forces to do something positive, were to uniform feel like a fur coat. Smells. Ex-
right thing w@f@ @lda@d denim: i eopl@ al`@ 1@?1V@ b@@e?IA.e things W@ren't haappefillq fhat hflUst fu91e@ (rpm the lundreds of blue and
not even free to leave and Vietnam is one enough. They were to show up later in Af- white ftet ault ta1f1e and military V@hle1ee
of those rare countries that doesn't fill its rica and Latin America in the employ of Human excrement; the foul, stagnant, black
American visa quota. It's all there to see others or as Independent agents for the CIA. mud and water as we passed over the river
C once the Red film is removed from the eyes. Initially, training was aimed at having ; on Cong Ly Street; and, overriding all the
We aren't the freedom fighters. We are the U.S. teams organize guerrilla movements in others, the very pungent and rancid smell
N Russian tanks blasting the hopes of an foreign countries. Emphasis was placed on of what I later found out was nuoc mam, a
Asian Hungary. the fact that guerrillas can't take prisoners, sauce made much In the same manner as
We were continuously told, "You don't have sauerkraut, with fish substituted for cabbage.
He further states: to kill them yourself; let your indigenous No Vietnamese meal is complete without it.
It's not democracy we brought to Viet- 'counterpart do that." In a course entitled, People-masses of them. The smallest chil-
nam-it's anticommunism. This is the only "Countermeasures to Hostile Interrogation, dren, with the dirty faces of all children of
choice the people in the village have. This we were taught NKVD (Soviet Security) their age, standing on the sidewalk unshod
is why most of them have embraced the methods of torture to extract information. and with no clothing other than a shirt-
Vietcong and shunned the alternative. The It became obvious that the title was only, waist that never quite reached the navel on
people remember that when they were fight- camouflage for teaching us other means of, the protruding belly. Those a little older
Ing the French for their national independ-. Interrogation when time did not permit more wearing overall-type trousers with the crotch
ence it was the Americans who helped the sophisticated methods; for example, the old seam torn out-a practical alteration that
French. It's the American anti-Communist cold water-hot water treatment, or the dell-' eliminates the need for diapers. Young,
bombs that kill their children. It's Amer- sate operation of lowering a man's testicles grade school girls in their blue butterfly
lean anticommunism that has supported one Into a jeweler's visa. When we asked directly' sun hats, and boys of the same age with
dictator after another in Saigon. When if we were being told to use these methods, hands out saying, "OK--Salem," thereby ex-
anti-Communist napalm burns their chil- the answer was, "We can't tell you that. The hausting their English vocabulary. The
dren it matters little that an anti-Corn- mothers of America wouldn't approve."; women In ao dais of all colors, all looking
munist special forces medic comes later to This sarcastic hypocrisy was greeted with, beautiful and graceful. The slim, hlpless
apply bandages. laughs. Our own military teaches these and, men, many walking hand in hand with other
even worse things to American soldiers, men, and so misunderstood by the newcomer.
These are important observations by a They then condemn the Vietcong guerrillas' Old men with straggly Fu Maim Chu beards
fighting man who served 18 months on for supposedly doing those very things. I' staring impassively, wearing wide-legged.
active combat duty in Vietnam. -The' was later to witness firsthand the practice of' pajama-like trousers.
position of the United States in Vietnam turning prisoners over to ARVN for interro Bars by the hundreds-with American-
and its future course of action should gation and the atrocities which ensued. style names (Playboy. Hungry 1, Flamingo)
Throughout the training there was an ex-' and faced with grenadeproof screening.
be judged in the light of these observa- citing aura of mystery. - :nts were con- Houses made from packing cases, accom-
tions and the other matters discussed in tinually being dropped at this very modating three or four families, stand along-
this article. moment special forces mu: were in various ! side spacious villas complete with military
Extusrr 1 Latin American and Asian countries on secret guard. American GI's abound in sport shirts,
missions. The anti-Communist theme was slacks, and cameras; motorcycles, screaming
THE WHOLE THING WAS A LIE
woven throughout. Recommended reading to make room for a speeding official in a
(M. Sgt. Donald Duncan left the U.S. Army, would invariably turn out to be books on large, shiny sedan, pass over an intersection
in September of 1065 after 10 years of service, brainwashing and atrocity tales-life un- that has hundreds of horseshoes Impressed
Including 6 years in the special forces and 18. der communism. The enemy was the enemy. in the soft asphalt tar. Confusion, noise,
months on active combat duty in Vietnam. There was no doubt that the enemy was smells, people-almost overwhelming.
While In Vietnam he received the South communism and Communist countries.' My Initial assignment was in Saigon as'
Vietnamese Silver Star, the Combat Infantry There never was a suggestion that special 1, an area specialist for 3d and 4th Corps tacti-
Badge, the Bronze Star, and the U.S. Army Air, forces would be used to set up guerrilla war- ' cal zone in the special forces tactical oper-
Medal. He was nominated for the American fare against the government in a Fascist- ations center. And my education began here.
Silver Star and was the first enlisted man in controlled country. The officers and noncommissioned officers
Vietnam to be nominated for the Legion of It would be a long tir_,e before I would were unanimous In their contempt of the
Merit. Both nominations are still pending. look back and realize that this conditioning Vietnamese.
He participated in many missions behind, about the Communist conspiracy and the, There was a continual putdown of Saigon
enemy lines In war zone D, Vung Tao, and the enemy was taking place. Like most of the: officials, the Saigon government, ARVN
An Khe Valley. Last March he turned down men who volunteered for special forces, I; (Army Republic of Vietnam), the LLDB
the offer of a field commission to the rank of, wasn't hard to soil. We were ready for It. (Luc Luong Dao Bfet-Vietnamese Special
captain. Instead he left Vietnam on Septem-, A. fur my classmate and roommate, Forces) c.nd the Vietnamese man in the,
her 6, 1965, and received his honorable die- was livi-,g for the day when he would "lead street. The Government was rotten, the of-
charge 4 days later.) _tpg.Srst. a ick' o. the first team to go into. flcfals corrupt. ARNV cowardly. the LLDB
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all three. and the man in the street an filtrated Ins? Laos. The primary purpose of people on a mission that had little or no
ignorant thief. (LLDB alsd qualified under dropping the.(. learns Into Lnos was to try chance of success. It became apparent that
and find the llo Chl4,11nh trail and gather we were not Interested In the welfare of the
I was shocked, I was working with what information on traffic, troops, weapons, etc. Vietnamese but, rather, In bow we could best
were probably some of the most dedicated This was purely a reconnaissance Intelli- promote our own Interests. We sent 40 men
Americans in Vietnam. They were sup- gence mission, but the possibility of forming who had become our friends. These were
posedly in Vietnam to help "our Vietnamese guerrilla bases later was considered. There exceptionally dedicated people, all volun-
friends" in their fight for a democratic way was some talk of going Into North Vietnam, teers, and their commanding officer showed
of life. Obviously, the attitude didn't fit. , but not by Project Delta. Another outfit, up drunk at the plane to bid the troops fare-
It occurred to me that if the people on Special Operations Group (500) was al- well-just all boozed up. Six returned,'the
"our side" were all these things, why were ready doing just that. SOG was a combined rest were killed or captured.
we then supporting them and spending $1.5 forces effort. The Air Force (U.S.) As it turned out, the mission found
million a day in their country? The answer Navy. Army, and detached special forces per- damned little. Most teams didn't last long
was always the same: "They are anti-Corn- sonnel were all In on the act. enough to report what, If anything, they
munlsts," and this was supposed to explain Project Delta was paid for by Uncle Sam saw. The six survivors came completely
everything. from CIDG funds. We had to feed, billet, through the areas and observed no troop
As a result of this insulation, my initial and clothe the Vietnamese. Free beer was movements, no concentrations of troops, and
observations of everything and everyone supplied and lump sums of money were little vehicle traffic, day or night. In the
Vietnamese were colored. I almost fell into agreed on, money to be paid after comple- final stages, two of the project helicopters
the habit. or mental laziness, of evaluating tion of training and more to be paid when flew two missions a day for 4 days, looking
Vietnam not on the basis of what I saw the teams returned. for the teams. They saw nothing and were
and heard, but on what I was told by other Here we are in South Vietnam to help not fired at. As for the highway from Tche-
biased Americans. When you see something these people "preserve their freedom, etc.," pone to Muong Nong, one helicopter flew
contradictory, there is always a fellow coon- willing to risk our lives to that end and the highway, taking pictures with a hand-
tryman willing to interpret the significance here we are paying them to help themselves. held 35-millimeter camera. It was low
of It, and it won't be favorable to the Viet- These were men already being paid their enough to take straight-on shots of people
namese. This is due partially to the type of regular pay in the Vietnamese Army and we standing in doorways.
Vietnamese that the typical American meets, actually had to pay a bonus each time they To many in Vietnam this mission con-
coupled with typical American prejudices. went to the field on training missions or firmed that the Ho Chi Minh trail, so-called.
During his working hours, the American sol- made a parachute jump, all of which was and the traffic on It, was grossly exaggerated,
dler deals primarily with the Vietnamese supposed to be a normal part of their duties. and that the Vietcong were getting the bulk
military. Many (or most) of the higher Originally. it was thought that the teams of their weapons from ARVN and by sea.
ranking officers attained their status through would be composed of four Vietnamese and It also was one more piece of evidence that
-family position, as a reward for political as- two Americans. Although many of the peo- the Vietcong were primarily South Viet-
sistance, and through wealth. Most of the ' ple we were training had natural aptitudes Siamese, not imported troops from the north.
ranking civilians attained their positions In for the area of operations, strong and effec- One more thing was added to my growing
the same manner. They use their offices tive leadership was lacking. It was empha- lists of doubts of the "official" stories about
primarily as a means of adding to their per- sized constantly to the Pentagon and to the Vietnam.
sonal wealth. There Is hardly any social ambassador by those Intimately involved in When the project shifted to in-country
rapport between 01 Joe and Ills Vietnamese tlc training program, that if any degree of operations Americans went on drops
counterpart. succrae was to be realized It was Imperative throughout the Vietcong-hold aroma of bouth
Most contact between Americans and Viet- that Americans must accompany the teams. Vietnam. One such trip was Into war zone
namese civilians is restricted to taxi drivers, When at the last minute we received a D north of Dong Xol, near the Michelin
firm "No Go" for the U.S. personnel, we asked,
laborers, secretaries, contractors, and bar ..Why?" The answer was that it was an plantation. There 1s no such thing as a typl-
girls. All these people have one thing in cal mission. Each one is different. But
election
ear and it would
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common: They are dependent on Americans this one revealed some startling things.
barrassment If Americans were captured in
~ for a living. The last three have something Later I was to brief Secretary of Defense Me-
else in common. In addition to speaking Laos. Anything of that nature would have Namara and General Westmoreland on the
varying degrees of English, they will tell to wait until after the election. The reac- limited military value of the bombing, as
Americans anything they want to hear as tion to this decision on the part of the Amer- witnessed on this mission.
long as the money rolls in. Neither the icons was one of anger, disappointment and As usual we went in at dusk-this time In
civilian nor military with whom the Amerf- disgust, a heavy rain squall. We moved only a nom-
can usually has contact is representative of The one thing that made It possible to ac-
- trial distance, perhaps 300 meters, through
the Vietnamese people. complish the things we did was the relation- the thick, tangled growth and stopped. With-
ship we had established with the Vietnamese..
Many of our military, officers and enlisted, Each man took it upon himself to establish out moonlight we were making too much .
have exported the color prejudice, referring a friendly relationship with the men on the noise, It rained all night so we had to wait
to Vietnamese as "slopes" and "gooks"-two teams. We ate the same food, wore the same until first light to move without crashing
words of endearment left over from Korea. clothes, lived in the same tents, shared the around. Moving very cautiously for about
Other fine examples of American democracy same hardships. We worked more hours and ::n hour, we discovered a deserted company
in action are the segregated bars. Although carried the same loads. We made ourselves headquarters position, complete with crude
there are exceptions, In Saigon, Nha Trang, the guinea pigs In experiments. The pitch tables, stools, and sleeping racks. After re-
and Da Nang. and some of the other larger was, "We don't ask you to do anything we porting this by radio, we continued on our
towns. Negroes do not go into white bars won't do ourselves." It worked. We had way. The area was crisscrossed with well-
except at the risk of being ejected. I have dedicated teams. traveled trails under the canoe:-. . .
seen more than one incident where a Negro After the decision to eliminate Americans hours later we reached the c,: ,
newcomer has made a mistake and walked from the drops, the Vietnamese felt that rubber plantation without _inc,:
into the wrong bar. If Insulting catcalls . they had been cheated. Petty complaints Ing to the thick growth surrou-,di:nb t:,c
weren't enought to make him leave, he was became rampant; e.g., if we do not get wool plantation, we skirted the perimeter. We dis-
thrown out bodily. There are cases where sweaters and better watches we will not go. covered that It was completely surrounded
this sort of thing has led to near riots. They felt this was one more example of Amer- by deserted gun positions and foxholes, all
It Is obvious that the Vietnamese resent leans standing back advising Vietnamese on with beautiful fields-of-fire down the even
us as well. We are making many of the how to get killed without risk to themselves. rows of rubber trees. None gave evidence of
same mistakes that the French did, and In We started getting an increase in a.w.o.l.'s. having been occupied for at least 3 or 4 days.
some Instances our mistakes are worse. Ar- The Americans had to watch their teams We transmitted this information to the Tac-
rogance, disrespect, rudeness, prejudice, and , board the infiltration aircraft without them.' tical Operations Center (TOC) and then the
our own special brand of ignorance, are not Hands were shaken but with eyes averted, team proceeded across the plantation, head-
designed to win friends. This resentment "Good lucks" were said but with bent heads. ing for the headquarters and housing area
runs all the way from stiff politeness to ob- We felt guilty. We had strongly advised that in the center.
vlous hatred. It Is so common that if a the teams not be sent until the Americans When we arrived at a point 100 meters
Vietnamese working with or for Americans could go, but to no avail. from our destination, the team leader and I
is found to be sincerely cooperative, ener- Like everyone, I was disappointed. This went forward, leaving the team in a covering
getic, conscientious, and honest, It automa- was the one thing, If I had to single one out, position. As we got closer, we could hear
tically makes him suspect as a Vietcong that made me really start questioning our sounds from the houses, but assumed these
agent, role in Vietnam. It suddenly occured to me were only workers. ' The briefing had ne-
After my initial assignment in Saigon, that the denial of American participation glectod to tell us that the plantation was sup-
which lasted two and one-half months, I was not based on whether it z right or pozc_ to be deserted. Crawling, we stopped
G volunteered for a new program called Project wrong for us to be going to Lacs. The pri- about 45 meters from the first line of houses.
Delta. This was a classified project wherein mary concern was the possible embarrass- Lifting our heads, we received a rude shock.
specially selected men in special forces were meat to President Johnson during an sloe- These weren't plantation workers. These
to train and organize small teams to be In- ton r_-mpai;;a. Tw.;.-.f this end we sent Were VieUooong soldiers, complete with blue
FEB 10 ^i carltlnueB
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uniforms, webbing, and many with the new
Soviet bloc weapons. The atmosphere seemed
to be one of relaxation. We could even hear
a transistor radio playing music. After 30
or 40 minutes we drew back to the team posi-
tion. We reported our find to the TOC and
estimated the number of Vietcong to be at
least one company. The whole team then
retraced the two kilometers to the jungle
and moved Into it. Crawling into the thick-
est part, we settled down just as darkness
and the rain closed in on us.
Underneath ponchos, to prevent light from
our flashlights escaping, the Vietnamese
team leader and I, after closely poring over
our maps, drafted a detailed message for
TOC. In the morning we sent the message,
which gave map coordinates of a number of
small landing zones (LZ's) around the area.
We also gave them a plan for exploiting our
find. It was fairly simple. Make simultane-
ous landings at all LZ's and have the troops
move quickly to the deserted Vietcong gun
positions and man them. At the sight of
bombers approaching, the Vietcong would
leave the housing area for the jungle. This
would involve them having to travel across
two kilometers of open plantation into pre-
pared positions. We told TOC that we were
going to try and get back to the housing area
so we could tell them if the Vietcong were
still there. If they didn't hear from us on
the next scheduled contact, they were to as-
sume that we had been hit and hadn't made
it. If this occurred It would be verification
of the Vietcong presence and they were to
follow through with the plan. We would
stay In the area and join the Rangers when
they oAme in.
This time; we were ni0i5 cautiou? in our
trip across the plantation. On the way, we
found a gasoline cache of 55-gallon drums.
We took pictures and proceeded. Again the
Vietnamese team leader and I crawled for-
ward to within 25 meters of the houses. It
was unbelievable. There they were and still
with no perimeter security. Now, however,
there was much activity and what seemed
like more of them. We inched our way
around the house area. This wasn't a com-
pany. There were at least 300 armed men in
front of us. We had found a battalion, and
all in one tight spot-unique in itself. We
got back to the team, made our radio contact,
and asked if the submitted plan would be
implemented. We were told, yes, and that
we were to move back to the edge of the
jungle. There would be a small delay while
coordination was made to get the troops and
helicopters. At 1000 hours (10 a.m.) planes
of all descriptions started crisscrossing this
small area. I contacted one plane (there
were so many I couldn't tell which one) on
the Prick 10 (AN/PRS-10 transmitter-
receiver for air-ground communications). I
was told that they were reconning the area
for an operation. What stupidity. No less
than 40 overflights in 45 minutes. As usual,
we were alerting the Vietcong of impending
action by letting all the armchair com-
mandos take a look-see. For about 30 min-
utes all was quiet, and then we started to
notice movement. The Vietcong were mov-
ing out from the center of the plantation.
Where were the troops? At 1400 hours Sky-
raiders showed up and started bombing t,-.e
center of the plantation. Was it possli.c
that the troops had moved in without our
knowing it? TOC wouldn't tell us anything.
The bombing continued throughout the af-
ternoon with never more than a 15-minute
letup. Now we had m .ch company in the
jungle with us. Everywhere we turned there
were Vietcong. I had to agree that, In spite
of the rain, it was a much better place to be
than In the housin;; center. Why didn't we
hear our troops firing?
Finally, the bombing ended with the day-
light, and we crouched in the wet darkness
within hearing distance of Vietcong elements.
Darkness was our fortress. About 2030 (8:30
p.m.) we heard the drone of a heavy aircraft
In the rainy sky. We paid little attention
to it. Then, without warning, the whole
world lit up. leaving us feeling exposed and
naked. Two huge flares were swinging gently
to earth on their parachutes, one on each
side of us. At about the same time, our radio
contact plane could be heard above the
clouds. I grabbed the radio and demanded to
know, "Who the hell is calling for those flares
and why?"
"What flares?"
"Damn it, find out what flares and tell
whoever is calling for them that they're
putting us in bad trouble." I could hear the
operator trying to call the TOC. I figured
that friendly troops in the area had called
for the flares to light their perimeter..
Crack-trump. I was lifted from the ground,
only to be slammed down again. I broke in
on the radio. "Forget that transmission. I
know why the flares are being dropped."
"Why?"
"They're being used as markers for jets
dropping what sounds like 750-pounders.
Tell TOC thanks for the warning. Also tell
them two of the markers bracketed our posi-
tion. I hope to he'll they knew where we are."
A long pause.
"TOC says they don't know anything about
flares or jet bor.;bers."
Another screwup. "Well how about some-
body finding out something and when they
find out, how about teling us unimportant
folks? In the meantime, I hope that'goonie-
bird' (C-47 plane) has Its running lights on."
"Why?,.
'Ibmum any nionlsnt now th@ pilot is
going to find he is dawdling around in a bomb
run pattern. Come back early in the morn-
ing and give me the hot skinny."
"Roger-we're leaving-out."
I was mad, a pretty good sign that I was
sc,aed. The bombing continued through the
night. Sometimes it was "cramp" and some-
times It was "crack," depending on how close
the bombs fell. When it finally stopped
sometime before dawn, I realized that it was
a dazzling exhibition of flying-worthless-
but impressive. The flare ship had to fly so
low because of the cloud cover that its flares
were burning out on the ground instead of
in the air. The orbiting jets would then
dive down through the clouds, break through,
spot the markers, make split-second correc-
tions, and release their bombs. However,
while It was going on, considering what a
small error became at jet speeds, a small
error would wipe us out. Should this hap-
pen, I could see a bad case of "C'est in guerre"
next day at air operations. I couldn't help
wondering also how "Charlie" was feeling
about all this-specifically the ones only 25
or 30 meters away. It didn't seem possible,
but I wondered if the shrapnel tearing
through the trees tops was terrifying him as
much as us.
First thing in the morning, my Vietnamese
counterpart made contact on the big radio
(HC-162D). After some talk into the mike,
he turned to me with a helpless look:
"They say we must cross plantation to
housing area again."
"What? It's impossible-tell them so."
More talk. "They say we must go. They
want to talk to you."
When the hollow voice came through on
the side band, I couldn't believe it-it was
the same order. I told them it was impossi-
ble and that we were not going to go.
"You must go. That is an order from way
up...
That figures. The Saigon wheels smelling
glory have taken over our TOC. "My answer
is, Will not cn .zply; I say again, c 11 not
comply. Tell those people to stop trying to
outguess the mzm on the ground. If they
want someone to assess damage on the hous-
Ing area send a plane with a camera. Better
yet, have the Rangers look at It, there's more
of them."
"There are no other friendly troops in the
area. You are the only ones that can do it.
You must go. There will be a plane in your
area shortly. Out."
Up to this point we had assumed friendly
troops were in the area and that if we got
in trouble, maybe we could hold out until
they could help us. No troops. Little won-
der the Vietcong are roaming all over the
place not caring who hears them.
Soon a plane arrived and I received: "We
must know how many Vietcong are still
in the housing area. You must go and look.
It is imperative. The whole success of this
mission depends on your report. Over."
"I say again, Will not comply, Over."
(Hello court martial.) I looked at the Viet-
namese team leader. He was tense and
grim, but silently cheering me on. While
.waiting for the plane I asked him what he
was going to do. He replied:
"We go, we die. Order say we must go, so
we go. We will die."
Tell me Vietnamese have no guts. An-
other transmission from the plane:
"Why won't you comply? Over."
These type questions aren't normally an-
swered. I knew, however, that the poor
bastard up there had to take an answer
back to the wheels. Well, he got one: "Be-
cause we can't. One step out of this jungle
and it's all over. I'm not going to have
this team wiped out for nothing. There are
no Vietcong in the village; not since 1400
yesterday. The mission was screwed up
when you etart@d the bombing without sand=
Ing in troops yesterday. As for the mission
depending on us, you should have thought
of that yesterday before you scrapped the
plans anti didn't bother to tell us. Over."
"Where are the Vietcong now? Over."
"Which ones? The ones 25 meters from
us, or the ones 35 meters from us? They're
in the jungle all around us. Over."
"Roger. Understand Vietcong have left
houses-now in jungle-have information
necessary-you do not have to go across
plantation."
This was unbelievable. On TV it would
be a comedy-a bad one.
Shortly after this uplifting exchange, the
bombers returned, and we spent the re-
mainder of the day moving from one Viet-
cong group to another. We would come upon
them, pull back, and then an Al-E (bomber)
would come whining' down, machine-gun-
ning or dropping bombs.
I discovered that the old prop fighter-
bombers were more terrifying than the jets.
The jets came in so fast that the man on
the ground couldn't hear them until the
bombs were dropped and they were climb-
ing away. The props were something else.
First the droning noise while in orbit. Then
they would peel off and the drone would
change to a growl, Increasing steadily in
pitch until they were a screaming whine.
Under the jungle canopy, this noise grabbed
at the heart of every man. And every man
knew that the plane was pointed directly at
him. The crack of the bomb exploding was
almost a relief. Many of these bombs landed
25 to 35 meters from where we were lying
on the ground. The closest any of us came
to being hurt was when a glowing piece of
shrapnel lodged In the pack on my back.
I couldn't help thinking, "These are our
planes. They know where we are. What
must it be like for a woman or child to hear
that inhuman, impersonal whine directed
at them in their open villages? How they
must hate usl" I looked around at my team.
Others were thinking. Each of us died a
little that day in the jungle.-
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At 1730 (5!30 p.m.) the last bomb was
dropped. A great. day for humanity. Almost
28 hours of bombing in this small area with
barely a break.
On the next afternoon we were told by
radio to quickly find an LZ and prepare to
leave the area. We knew of only one within
reasonable distance and headed for It. A
short distance from the LZ we could hear
voices. Vietcong around the opening. We
were now an equal distance between two
groups of the Vietcong.
Finally they allowed the pickup ship to
come In. Just as the plane touched down
and we started toward it, two machinegun
positions opened up-one from each side of
the clearing. The bullets sounded like gravel
hitting the aluminum skin of the chopper.
My American assistant took one position
under fire and I started firing at the other.
Our backs were to the aircraft and our eyes
on the jungle. The rest of the team started
climbing aboard. The machineguns were
still firing, but we had made them less ac-
curate. I was still firing when two strong
hands picked me up and plumped me on the
floor of the plane. Maximum power and we
still couldn't make the trees at the end of
the clearing, but had to make it half circle
over the machineguns. All of a sudden
something slapped me In the buttock, lift-
ing me from the floor. A bullet had come
through the bottom of the plane, through
the gas tank and the floor. When it ripped
through the floor it turned sideways. The
slug left an 8-Inch bruise but did not
penetrate. Through some miracle, we were
on our way to base-all of us. We would all
get drunk tonight, It was the only way we
would sloop without reliving the past days,
It would be at least 3 days before any-
body would unwind. That much is typical.
I had seen the effect of the bombing at
close range. These bombs would land and go
for about 15 yards and tear off a lot of foliage
/ from the trees, but that was it. Unless you
drop these things In somebody's hip pocket
they don't do any good. For 28 hours they
bombed that area. And It was rather amus-
ing because, when I came out, It was esti-
mated that they had killed about 250 Viet-
cong in the first day. They asked me how
many Vietcong did I think they had killed
and I said maybe six, and I was giving them
the benefit of the doubt at that. The bomb-
ing had no real military significance. It
would only work If aimed at concentrated
targets such as villages.
One of the first axioms one learns about
unconventional warfare is that no insurgent
or guerrilla movement can endure without
the support of the people. While doing re-
search In my job as an area specialist, I
found that, In province after province, the
Vietcong guerrillas had started as small
teams. They were now In battalion and
regimental strength. Before I left, the Viet-
cong could put troops In the field in division
strength In almost any province. Such
growth Is not only impossible without popu-
lar support, it actually requires an, over-
whelming mandate.
We were still being told, both by our own
Government and the Saigon Government,
that the vast majority of the people of South
Vietnam were opposed to the Vietcong.
When I questioned this contradiction, I was
always told that the people only helped the
Vietcong through fear. Supposedly, the
Vietcong held the people In the grip of terror
by assassination and torture. This argu-
ment was also against doctrine. Special
Forces are taught that reliable support can
be gained only through friendship and trust.
History denied the terror argument. The
people feared and hated the French, and they
rose up against them. It became quo
obvious that a minority movement could
not keep tabs on a hostile majority. South
Vietnam Is a relatively small country, dotted
with thousands of small villages. In this
very restricted area companies an- battalions
of Vietcong can maneuver and live under the
very noses of Government troops; but the
people don't betray these movements, even
thought it 1s a relatively simple thing to pass
the word. On the other hand, Government
troop movements cLru always reported. In an
action against the Vietcong, the only hope
for surprise is for the Government to move
the troops by helicopters. Even this is no
guarantee. Gen. Nguyen Khan, while still
head of the Saigon Government, acknowl-
edged that Vietcong sympathizers and agents
were everywhere-even in the inner coun-
cils-when he made the statement: "Any
operation that lets more than ', hours elapse
between conception and implementation is
doomed to failure." He made these remarks
In the last days of his regime, right after a
personally directed operation north of Saigon
ended In disaster.
To back up the terror theory, the killing of
village chiefs and their families were pointed
out to me. Those that were quick to point
at these murders ignored certain facts.
Province, district, village, and hamlet chiefs
are appoint td, not elected. Too often petty
officials are not even people from the area
but outsiders being rewarded for political
favors. Those that are from the area are
thought of as quislings because they have
gone against their own by cooperating with
Saigon. Guerrillas or partisans who killed
.quislings in World War II were made heroes
in American movies. Those who look on the
Vietcong killings of these people with horror.
and use them as justification for our having
to beat them, don't realize that our own
military consider such actions good strategy
when the tables are reversed. When teach-
ing Special Forces how to set up guerrilla
warfare in an enemy country, killing un-
popular officials 1s pointed out as one method
of gaining friends among the populace. It
is recommended that special assassination
teams be set up for this purpose.
I know a couple of cases where it was sug-
gested by special forces officers that Viet-
cong prisoners be killed. In one case In
which I was involved, we had picked up
prisoners in the valley around An Khe, We
didn't want prisoners but they walked into
our hands. We were supposed to stay in
the area 4 more days, and there were only
eight of us and four of them, and we didn't
know what the hell to do with them. You
can't carry them. Food Is limited, and the
way the transmission went with the base
camp you knew what they wanted you to
do-get rid of them. I wouldn't do that,
and when I got back to operation base a
major told me, "You know we almost told
you right over the phone to do them in."
I said that I was glad he didn't, because it
would have been embarrassing to refuse to
do it. I knew goddam well I wasn't going
to kill them. In a fight it's one thing, but
with guys with their hands bound It's an-
other. And I wouldn't have been able to
shoot them because of the noise. It would
have had to be a very personal thing, like
sticking a knife into them. The major said,
"Oh, you wouldn't have had to do it; all you
had to do was give them over to the Viet-
namese." -Of course, this is supposed to ab-
solve you of any responsibility. This is the
general attitude. It's really a left-handed
morality. Very few of the special forces guys
had any qualms about this. Damn few.
Little by little, as all these facts made
their impact on me, I had to accept the fact
that, Communist or not, the vast majority
of the people were pro-Vietcong and anti-
Saigon. I had to accept also that the posi-
tion, "We are In Vietnam because we are in
sympathy with the aspirations and desires of
the Vietnamese people," was a lie. If this Is
a he, how many other.. are there?
I -,; ose that one of the things that both-
ered me from the very beginning In Vietnam
was the condemnation of ARVN as a fight-
Ing force: "the Vietnamese are cowardly
? ? ? the Vietnamese can't be disciplined
? ? the Vietnamese just can't understand
tactics and strategy ? ? ? etc., etc." But
the Vietcong are Vietnamese. U.S. military
files in Saigon document time and again a
Vietcong company surrounding two or even
three ARVN companies and annihilating
them. These same flies document instances
of a Vietcong company, surrounded by ARVN
battalions, mounting a ferocious fight and
breaking loose. I have seen evidence of the
Vietcong attacking machine-gun positions
across open terrain with terrible losses. This
can't be done with undisciplined bandits.
For many years now the tactics and strategy
of the Vietcong have been so successful that
massive fire power and air support on our
side is the only thing that has prevented a
Vietcong victory. These are all Vietnamese.
What makes the difference? Major "Charg-
ing Charlie" Beckwith, the special forces
commander at Plel Me, used the words "dedi-
cated," "tough," "disciplined," "well-trained,"
and "brave" to describe the Vietcong-and,
almost in the same breath, condemned the
Vietnamese on our side.
It became obvious that motivation Is the
prime factor in this problem. The Vietcong
soldier believes In his cause. He believes he
Is fighting for national Independence. He
has faith In his leaders, whose obvious dedi-
cation is probably greater than his own. His
officers live ^:e huts and eat the
same foe ment counterpart
knows t:. ..^. their positions
because ; reward for poli-
tical fovea. .is officers' primary
concern is gaining wealth and favor. Their
captains and majors eat In French restau-
rants and pay as much for one meal as they
make in a week. They sleep In guarded villas
with their mistresses. They find many ex-
cuses for not being with their men In battle.
They see the officers lie about their roles in
battle. The soldier knows that he will be
cheated out of his pay If possible. He.knows
equipment he may need Is being sold down-
town. His only motivation is the knowledge
that he is fighting only to perpetuate a sys-
tem that has kept him uneducated and In
poverty, He has had so many promises
made to him, only to be broken, that now he
believes nothing from his government.
I have seen the South Vietnamese soldier
fight well, and at times ferociously, but
usually only when in a position where there
1s no choice. At those times he is fighting
for survival. On Project Delta there were
many brave Vietnamese. When I knew them
well enough to discuss such things, I asked
them, "Why do you go on these missions
time and again? You are volunteers. Why
do you not quit and do less dangerous work?"
The answer was always the same: "We are
friends. We fight well together. If we quit.
it will make the project bad." Never, "We
are fighting for democracy-freedom-the
people"-or any cause. The enemy he was
f,ghting had become an abstraction. He was
fighting, and fighting well, to sustain the
brotherhood of his friends. The project had
created a mystique of Individualism And
c:iteness. He felt Important. Trust and
ith was put in him and he returned It In
kind. The Americans didn't condescend to
him. The life of every American on the team
was dependent on the Vietnamese, And we let
them know we were aware of it. We found
out early that appealing to them on the basis
of patriotism was a waste of time. They felt
that thc?r nothing more than tools of
the sch_..., Saigon politicians,
A=i V- ops and their commanders know
that if ,_? y don't bother the Vietcong they
will be safe from Vietcong attacks. I'll never
for ct what a shock It was to find out that
various troo2 commanders and district chiefs
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-were actually making per.;. a tl deals with
"the enemy." The files in Saigon record in-
stances where government troops with
American advisers were Wad by the Vietcong
to lay down their weapons and walk away
from the Americans. The troops did just
that and the Vietcong promises of safety to
the troops were honored.
in an effort to show waning popularity for
the Vietcong, great emphasis was placed on
;figures of Vietcong defections. Even if the
unlikely possibility of the correctness of
these figures is accepted, they are worthless
when compared to ARVN desertions. The
admitted desertion rate and incidents of
draft dodging, although deflated, was stag-
gering. Usually, only those caught are re-
ported. Reading OPSUMS (Operational
Summaries) and newspapers while in Viet-
nam, I repeatedly saw references made to
hundreds of ARVN listed as missing after
the major battles. The reader is supposed to
conclude that these hundreds, which by now
total thousands, are prisoners of the Viet-
cong. They are definitely not listed as
deserters. If this were true, half of the
Vietcong would be tied down as guards in
prisoner-of-war compounds-which, of
course, is ridiculous.
This lack of enthusiasm and reluctance to
join in battle wasn't difficult to figure. The
majority of the people are either anti-Saigon
or pro-Vietcong, or both, and ARVN Is drafted
from the people.
I was not unique among my contemporar-
ies in knowing most of these things. How-
ever, whenever anybody questioned our
being in Vietnam-in light of the facts-the
old rationale was always presented: "We have
to stop the epreid of eonlinunloin somewhere,
If we don't fight the commies here, well
have to fight them at home. If we pull out,
the rest of Asia will go Red. These are un-
educated people who have been duped; they
O don't understand the difference between de-
mocracy and communism"
Being extremely anti-Communist myself,
these "arguments" satisfied me for a long
time. In fact, I guess it was saying these
very same things to myself over and over
again that made it possible for me to par-
ticipate in the things I did in Vietnam. But
were we stopping communism? Even dur-
ing the short period I had been in Vietnam,
the Vietcong had obviously gained In
strength; the Government controlled less
and less of the country every day. The more
troops and money we poured in, the more
people hated us. Countries all over the
world were losing sympathy with our stand
in Vietnam. Countries which up to now had
preserved a neutral position were becoming
vehemently. anti-American. A village near
Tay Nish in which I had slept in safety 6
months earlier was the center of a Vietcong
operation that cost the lives of two American
friends. A Special Forces team operating in
the area was almost decimated over a period
of 4 months. U.S. Operations Mission
(USOM), civilian representatives, who had,
been able to travel by vehicle in relative
safety throughout the countryside, were
being kidnaped and killed. Like the mili-
tary, they now had to travel by air.
The real question was, whether commu-
nism Is spreading in spite of our involvement
or because of it.
The attitude that the uneducated peasant
lacked the political maturity to decide be-
tween communism and democracy and "we
are only doing this for your own good," al-
though It had a familiar colonialistic ring,
at first seemed to have merit. Then I re-
membered that most of the villages would be
under Vietcong control for some of the time
and under Government control at other
C times. How many Americans had such a
close look at both sides of the cloth? The
more often Government troops passed
through an area, the more surely it would
become sympathetio to the Vietcong, The
Vietcong might sleep in the houses, but the
Government troops ransacked them. More
often than not, the Vietcong helped plant
and harvest the crops; but invariably Gov-
ernment troops in an area razed them. Rape
is severely punished among the Vietcong.
It is so common among the ARVN that it
is seldom reported for fear of even worse
atrocities.
I saw the airborne brigade come Into
Nha Trang. Nha Trang is a government
town and the Vietnamese airborne brigade
are government troops. They were orig-
inally, in fact, trained by special forces, and
they actually had the town in a grip of
terror for 3 days. Merchants were col-
lecting money to get them out of town;
cafes and bars shut down.
The troops were accosting ?somen on the
streets, They would go into a place-a bar
or cafe-and order varieties of food. When
the checks came they wouldn't pay them.
Instead they would simply wreck the place,
dumping over the tables and smashing
dishes. While these men were accosting
women, the police would just stand by,
powerless or unwilling to help. In fact, the
situation Is soifflcult that American troops,
if In town a the same time as the Viet-
namese airborne brigade, are told to stay
off the streets at night to avoid coming to
harm.
The whole thing was a lie. We weren't
preserving freedom in South Vietnam.
There was no freedom to preserve. To voice
opposition to the government meant jail or
death. Neutralism was forbidden and pun-
ished. Newspapers that didn't say the right
thing were closed down, People are not
even free to stave and Vietnam Is one of
those rare countries that doesn't fill its
American visa quota. It's all there to see
once the Red film is removed from the eyes.
We aren't the freedom fighters. We are the
Russian tanks blasting the hopes of an
Asian Hungary.
It's not democracy we brought to Viet-
nam-it's anticommunism. This is the only
choice the people in the village have. This
is why most of the.a have embraced the
Vietcong and shunned the altrenative. The
people remember that when they were fight-
ing the French for their national independ-
ence It was the Americans who helped the
French. It's the American anticommunist
bombs that kill their children. It's Ameri-
can anticommunism that has supported one
dictator after another in Saigon. When
anticommunist. napalm burns their children
it matters little that an anticommunist spe-
cial forces medic comes later to apply
bandages.
One day I asked one of our Vietnamese
helicopter pilots what he thought of the last
bomb raid. "I think maybe today we make
many Vietcong." In July, when Mr. Mc-
Namara asked me how effective the bombing
was in war zone D I told him. "It's an ex-
pensive defoliant. Unless dropped in a hip
pocket it was only effective in housing areas."
He didn't seem surprised. In fact, his only
comment after my recital of my team's ex-
periences In war zone D, was when he turned
to General Westmoreland who was sitting on
my right, "I guess we still have a small
reaction problem." Ambassador Taylor said
nothing.
While I was in Vietnam the American
and/or Saigon Government was forever carp-
Ing about North Vietnam breaking the
Geneva accords. Yet my own outfit, special
forces, had first come to Vietnam in civilian
clothes traveling on civilian passports for
the specific purpose of training and arming
the ethnic groups for theTa violation
of the accords. The Saigbh respect for the
accords was best symbolized'by a political
crrtoon in the.Salgon Post. It showed a man
urinating on a scroll labels' Geneva accords
l0.i'i. When the troops of ?roject Delta un-
covered the arms cache at Vung Ro Bay, Gen.
Nguyen Khan pointing at the weapons, hap-
pily presented them to the three ICC men as
proof to the world that Hanoi was breaking
the accords. Evidently they were too polite
to point out that they had been found by
men wearing American-supplied uniforms,
carrying American weapons; men who had
been trained by Americans and were being
paid by Americans. Neither did they men-
tion that the general flew to this spot In an
American helicopter and that the weapons
were being loaded onto an American-made
ship manned by American-trained sailors.
It had taken a long time and a mountain
of evidence but I had finally found come
truths. The world is not just good guys
and bad guys. Anticommunism is a lousy
substitute for democracy. I know now that
there are many types of communism but
there are none that appeal to me. In the
long run, I don't think Vietnam will bp bet-
ter off under Ho's brand of communism.
But it's not for me or my Government to de-
cide. That decision Is for the Vietnamese.
I also know that v:,; have allowed the crea-
tion of a military monster that will lie to
our elected officials; and that both of them
will lie to the American people.
To those people who, while loring the
war and bombings, defend it ;.he basis
that it Is stopping communise.:, remember
the words of the Vietnamese pilot, "I think
maybe today we make many Vietcong." The
Nazi bombing of London didn't make the
Londoners quit. We have no monopoly on
feelings for the underdog. People of other
nations will continue to be Increasingly
sympathetic to this sEnall agrarian country
that is being pounded by the riches: and
most powerful Notion In the world,
When I returned from Vietnam I was
asked, "Do you resent young people who,
have never been In Vietnam, or in any war,
protesting it?" On the contrary, I am re-
lieved. I think they should be commended.
I had to wait until I was 35 years old, after
spending 10 years in the Army and 18
months personally witnessing the stupidity
of the war, before I could figure it out. That
these young people were able to figure It out
so quickly and so accurately Is not only a
credit to their intelligence but a great per-
sonal triumph over a lifetime of condition-
ing and indoctrination. .I only hope that
the picture I have tried to create will help
other people come to the truth without
wasting 10 years. Those people protesting
the war in Vietnam are not against our boys
in Vietnam. On the contrary. What they
are against is our boys being in Vietnam.
They are not unpatriotic. 'Again the oppo-
site is true. They are opposed to people, our
own and others, dying for a lie, theie.;y cor-
rupting the very word "democracy."
There are those who will believe that I
only started to feel these things after I re-
turned from Vietnam. In my final weeks
In that country I was putting out a very
small information paper for special forces.
The masthead of the paper was a flaming
torch. I tried in my own way to bring a
little light to the men with whom I worked.
On the last page of the first issues were the
names of four men-all friends of mine-re-
ported killed in action on the same day.
Among them was Sergeant Horner, one of the
men I probured for special forces when he
was stationed at the Army Presidio in San
Francisco.
To those friends I wrote this dedication:
"We can best immortalize our fallen mem-
bers by striving for an enlightened future
where man has found another solution to his
problems rather than resorting to the fu-
tility and stupidity ofwar."
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