THE BAY OF PIGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000300580006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 1998
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 20, 1965
• Content Type: NSPR

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Sanitized - Approved For Release :
F ray EdU Other
9ccSo- Pcg Pogo
i LITTLE ROCK,, ARK.
ARKANSAS GAZETTE
S. 96,820
g. 110,936
JUL 2 0 196'
The Bay of Pugs
What appears at the time to be the
least consequential of presidential de,
`cisions often can have the most far-
reaching results. The' fateful sot of
presidential decision that is recognized
for what it is at the time-such as John
F. Kennedy's reluctant "go" signal for
the Bay of Pigs invasion-can have re-
.'sults that are literally incalculable, with
ample opportunity later on for speculat.
ing on might-have-beens.
The most immediately obvious might.
have-been to be considered in any post-
mortem on the Bay of Pigs is that Presi-
( dent Kennedy himself might still be
(alive if he had acted 'then as his head
Mold him to act, and simply scrubbed
the whole romantic business from the
CIA's drawing boards immediately upon
btslIcg apprised of it.
We are told now in Arthur M. Schles.
' anger's "A Thousand Days: John F. Ken.
nedy in the White House"-as it is being
f serialized in Life magazine In advance
(of publication-that one of the principal
reasons why Mr. Kennedy did act
!. against his better judgment was' out of
[fear of "disappointing" the expatriate is Cubans who had been assured by the'
CIA that they would have this chance'
to reclaim their homeland. If the thing
were simply called off, it was per,
suasively argued, disillusioned member
of the disbanded invasion force would;
:fan throughout the rest of Latin Ameri
ca, taking their disillusionment, with
them.
t So the thing was laid on, with conse?
quences more disastrous than anything,
'contemplated in the night thoughts of,
John F. Kennedy, even, with,the result
that the demoralized !survivors of thq
ftt Cuban liberation movement;,were 4is1
1,
t perse4.?~ i;o ighout',, the 'rest~ of , Intl
CPYRGHT
America (and, more - sign1ficaiify'jY'ell?
aps, throughout the United States), car-
ing their disillusionment with them.
The assassination of John F. Kennedy
wo-and-a-half years later was carried
out in an atmosphere of emotional ex-.
trernism that had been fanned at one end
b~,'the failure of the Bay of Pigs and at
the, other by the fact that the invasion
had been attempted' in the first place.
Almost everything that Mr. Schlesin-
ger has had to say in his "inside" ac-
co unt of the Bay of Pigs had ? already
een made public. However, his version,.
sounds all the more authoritative for the
fact that he is a trained historian, who,'
as a close adviser to President Kennedy,
was quite aware at the time that he was
watching history 'in, the making.
We are struck once again by an Im
pression that the Central Intelligence,
Agency has been the most "un-Ameri-
can" agency in the government in the ;j
sense that it is farthest from the dreams
of the Founders (although, to be sure,
not all that far from their nightmares).
At the Bay ' of Pigs, as on other occa-
sions befork,and since, the CIA actually
sought to "make" policy that not only j
was beyond. the lien of the legislative ?1
branch-as CIA . policy is deliberately,...
designed to be-buf? beyond the full con. ,w
trot of the executive branch as well.
We are struck for the first time by `i
how little there may actually be to those,
ostentatious -foreign policy "briefings"
that an incumbent President extends toj;
the opposition, Party's nominee in presi-
dential years: According to Mr. Schles-:.
inger, Mr. Kennedy first learned of the,"
well-matured Cuban plan 12 days after.1
his election as President, when former.!
CIA Director Allen W. Dulles gave It to
him `cold, representing, it as being all.
but a fait accompli barring what In of='
feet would have had, to be a presidential'
countermand.
Sanitized - Approved For Release**: CIA-RDP75 001.49R6003005800.06-31