ALTERNATIVES TO 'CONTAINMENT'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000400020012-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 1999
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: January 13, 1956
• Content Type: NSPR

X 11 ONifOR lv~~ JAN 131956
Approved For-Release-2 P-7.5.OO.M
Alternatives to 'Containment' .
F0 Ti[E Cu IAN SCIENCE MONITOR:
Dt~spite the "curtain of silence" drawn
by many of the columnists and most of
thq editors of the metropolitan press, now
i hat knowledge of the failure of the "con-
tainment" policy Is finally Altering
through to the public, perhaps you will
publish a few observations concerning
this policy, first announced by George F.
Keenan, Foreign Affairs, July, 1947, in an
article entitled "Sources of Soviet Con-
duct."
Walter Llppmann Immediately replied
In a series of articles i11 the IIew York
Herald Tribune, that the policy, if adopted,
would prove beyond our capabilities and
accordingly would surrender the initia-
tive in the worldwide struggle to the
Soviet bloc.
We. have for a long time been offering
and Supplying arms to many countries-
large and small, democratic and totali-
tarian, "free" and "slave"-any, in fact,
that .would join with us or our other allies
in the "cold war" against" the Soviet bloc.
We even offered arms to Egypt under
these terms. All obviogsly in pursuance
of the "containment" policy. India pro-
tested vigorously over the arms supplied
to Pakistan by us, as did Israel over
those to Iraq.
Why then should anyone be surprised
that Czechoslovakia, given the opportu-
nity, should join the arms "peddling"
business, or doubt she would be given
that opportunity eventually?
What informed person really expects
the Russians to agree to German unifica-
tion with the whole incorporated into
NATO? What have democratic elections,
one may ask, to do with power politics
under the balance of power theory of the
nation-state system? Certainly they would
have none with us if they Involved our
vital interest. What causes us to think
then that we can properly protest acts
similar to our own when committed by
others; or prove convincing by crying
"surprise" and pretending "alarm" over
events which any one could have easily
predicted?
The "containment" 'policy makes at
least tt##e assumptions which seem to
RAGE mental! erroneou . First, it as-
sumes that the cu t es plaguing the
world arise from communism per re in-
stead of communism arising from these
difficulties: poverty, Ignorance, and
bigotry.
Second, it assumes that the soviet chal.
lenge is primarily a military one. It can
probably be shown that many aatious
have a vested interest in this assumption
-if there were no Communists to "cold-
war". agitators would have to invent
some.
Third, It assumes that all nations out.
side the. Soviet bloc have the same caused
for fear of and equal reasons for apposing'
communism. When, In fact, Pakistan fears
India, Korea fears jspan,' Israel !ears
Egypt, France fears Germany, .Greece
now fears Turkey; yes, and nos,
tionallsm continues to fear colonial..
ism, even more than any, one of them
fears communism itself. These differences
cannot easily be reconciled or their gov-
ernments fused into an effective Military
alliance, even if such an alliance could
achieve the real objective-security.
NATO, SEATO, ANZUS et al, had they
been in existence, might and probably
would have either delayed or prevented
World War II, but they are almost cer.
tain to fail to contain communism now.
Two-thirds to three-fourths of the human
race want and demand adequate food,
shelter, clothing, and education. And they t
want these now. United Nations Technl.
cal Assistance, Point Four, UNICEF, and
UNESCO make better vessels for achiev-
ing these purposes then do bombs and
airplanes, naval craft and military alli-
ances.
For these reasons, I believe, the sooner
the foreign policy-makers of this coun-
try not only recognize "containment" for
what it really is-the diplomatic counter-
part of the "Maginot" Line-but also' take positive steps Inside the United Na-
tions to develop a stable economic and
political world as suggested here, the bet-
ter for the peace and security of all.
And it Is important to remember that
a bipartisan foreign policy In itself. is no
substitute for a sound one. And If it
proves an erroneous one as "containmentt",
by giving the illusion of strength through
the appearance of unity. Since It is already
late, no more time should be lost In
betinrina a "seat debate", on
foratan C
Brig. Gen. U.S..Army (Retd)
Phil delphia.
Thl. Mdwsva}tlrefeleoMes cor,aa is.Nose Aroie rewire. rho briefer the Sr., the better ftt their
(fit of pwWootton. All ere 1YbIdet to 0011.1ew/atfee. W. eeeame s0 reapon sibllifr for sletemostis is
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP75-00149R000400020012-6