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November 16, 2016
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December 15, 1998
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October 20, 1966
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PDF icon CIA-RDP75-00149R000400140004-2.pdf139.33 KB
T.t5-rmrTtc CPYI GFfE 0 ING C(lU\7'1'..14 M Q11 v; is F Re lea n ; /P n 'if iiccs I,Aiid Rhnf hcr.nns CPYRGHT tI e Unitcci .tiiatcs vs as the leading cap To Ilse l:rli art,, talist povvcr. Ih_ very existence of th 0 1 Car perovitz(Sept. 8) speaks of Alle (United Slates t+as, by definitive, r,..nn.?w .. 1.21- _ !menace to Snvict security. Nnihinn Ili 11.1": U11TIV III P14~ .Pis of You don't hav` it nrnt,l 11a1?c rli..pellcc, staliri's I11isiru4 he Barry Gold titer to sec the foll w , tt y a rl of the conversion of the Unite accrihing the Cold \Var to our havin States into a Stal islet despotism, an urt Joseph Stalin's feelings. One cool ;even this vrnnld not have sufficed, n aisle away from a reading of Proles the experience of Yugoslavia and Chin or Alperovitr,'s "review" bclievin later shoved, unless it were accom talin to have been little more than panied by total less sobitici-virrice to Mos enign comrade-in-arms twitted by cow. So long as the United States re S intelligence officer's ambitions. mained a capitalist democracy, give my we had played it square will Stalin's rigid theology, no America he man, there would have been n policy could win basis Soviet confi ton Curtain, no enslavement of Fast dente, and every Anr.rican initially rn Europe. Ile would have lrrr.tred a was poisoned frnrn.the source. ,cn. . . . This is the hair shirt elan merican liberals still like to ilo b Vie wartime collaboration was crc c n 1 nlerican conservatives. Certainly nut Unwed. The Salta conference. whit. s-c canon was a diplomatic boner, look place in the shadow of the Rund rid issiinly he should have been stedt counteroffensive in the Ardea-ics red for countermanding Roosevelt' was the last expression of the vcartim rders, but to credit : him with tilmood. In the weeks after Yalta till real tragedy of the Cold War gives military situation changed with grea inn n stature, and Stalin a benevolence, rapidity. With Nazi Germany shattered oat could serve only Charles' 'de the need for cooperation was disap aulle's notion, of American naivete. gearing. The Soviet Union therefore b Donald ITutle gin the post-war political battle fo sew Canaan, Europe, moving quickly to violate th onnecticut pledges it had just made at Yalta fo , 1 fired by one thing, and one thing alone 1111plics a n,is-reading of history Jos the threat of Nazi victory, So long fi sin,plcnlindcd as the devil tuner this threat n?as real. collaboration con crnumrnism cherixiied by 111111 on to turn against the west on poor begin it) negotiate for the surrender -of political freedom in Poland and Ru mania. The definitive proof of the Soviet change of'-line was, of course, the arti cle by .lacques Duclos in the April 1945 issue of Colticr?.c (fit Conrniunfsme This article, with its savage attack on "Brovdcrisnl"-the policy of post war support for bourgeois democratic governments, like that of Franklin Roosevelt-was plainly an authoritative ---- -- announcement by the Comintern offi. the Fdirorr: cial formerly responsible for the west- rely- the time has come to blow the ern Communist parties that the period isle before the current outburst of of anti-fascist Collaboration. was over. isionism regarding the origins of the he Duclos piece must obviously have d war goes much further. In your ten planned and scheduled at least Vie of September 8, Mr. Gar Alper- six or eight weeks before its publica. tz, in effect, blames the Soviet de. ton--that is, well before Allen Dulles I which does little credit to the i:er- sncss of the Russian leaders. Stalin his , Associate$ were, after. all, .. raWs. 'hey regarded the 111 lHd pose that "suspicions arising ' from ry 1944, "A post-war Roosevelt ad- se events in early 1945" led to'the inistration would continue to be, as iti Asian decision to abandon the war. s now, an imperialist government." e coalition. It is also an lnterpreta. he Soviet "change" of line was the: f vtr. Alperovitz is a gifted young his. can Coninvinist Party and brought the an: But it is a hopelessly shallow PUSA policy into line with Moscow, srpretation of the Soviet Union to titer boasted of having said in Janu. ties in . Italy. By his handling of 'affair, Mr. Alperovitz concludes, Lilies helped set in motion the events It we know as the Cold War " nonuls before starry Truman orderedl, h t h a t e atomic bomb he dropped on apan. William Z. Foster, who re. placed Browder as leader of the Ainer- reer result of two things: (1) this' ntransigent Marxist view of the Unit- d States, which had been submerged ut not altered during the war; and The United States government may he pursuing strange policies in Viet. jj,M,j,V0410114Q-GQf b0remorse, e u p. Pose that Inc United Statcs-or even the CIA-has been responsible for eve- rything that has gone wrong in the world in the last twenty years. The record shows beyond dispute that Allen Dulles did Print -ttiirt th- --I , City University CPYRGHT Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. of New York CPYRGHT Gar Alperovitz replirs: Arthur Schlesinger',., statement of the doctrine of historical Inevitability helps set the terms of debate over the orl- gins of the Cold \Var. He writes: "One thing, and one thing alone," permitted wartime Soviet-American cooperation; "nothing" could have dispetlcd Stalin's mistrust; "no" American policy could have won confidence; "every" Ameri- can initiative was poisoned from the, source, Since Stalin's "rigid theology"~ required him to start It brittle for t;n-I rope, American hctivities could h( played no substantial role in the tie. ginning' of the Cold War. . ? In my review of The Secret Strrren der I argued neither that Allen Dulles started the Cold \Var, nor that the United States has been responsible for everything which has gone wrong in the last twenty years, What I wrote was quite specific: "The Cold War can- not be understood simply as an Amer--' can response to a Soviet challenge, but. rather as the Insidious litferactlon of mutual suspicions, blame for which. must be shared by all." As an illustra- tion I pointed out we now have evi- dence that Dulles's secret 1945 nego- tiations with the Nazis undermined American-Soviet relations In much the, same way as did the later U-2 Inci- dent. One approach to a discussion of dif- fering interpretations of the Cold War is to recall the view urged by Secre- tary of War Henry L. Stimson in 1945: He held, contrary. to Mr. Schlesinger's idea, that the United States had it in Its power profoundly to influence post.'; war relations with the Soviet Union. This responsibility, be believed, de- manded that provocative actions be avoided. Arguing against the hawks of his day--especially on European. mat. ters-Stimson urged "the greatest care and the greatest patience and the greatest thoughtfulness." By the ? time of his resignation, however, he had lost the debate. And on nuclear matters he as dismayed to find Secretary of'Statd Byrnes "very touch against any at- tempt to cooperate with Russia... " Most observers, agree the major turn?1 ng point of the Cold War' came in 947. What happened earlier? Stimson as aware the ,tough no had woo out , Approved For Rele ,e,~dlMft _4w_I1_-R_#__klO 149 R00040014000~u~o