LETTERS COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000400140004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 20, 1966
• Content Type: NSPR

T.t5-rmrTtc CPYI GFfE 0 ING
C(lU\7'1'..14 M Q11 v; is F Re lea n ; /P n 'if iiccs I,Aiid Rhnf hcr.nns
CPYRGHT tI e Unitcci .tiiatcs vs as the leading cap
To Ilse l:rli art,, talist povvcr. Ih_ very existence of th
0 1 Car perovitz(Sept. 8) speaks of Alle (United Slates t+as, by definitive,
r,..nn.?w .. 1.21- _ !menace to Snvict security. Nnihinn Ili
11.1": U11TIV III P14~
.Pis of You don't hav` it nrnt,l 11a1?c rli..pellcc, staliri's I11isiru4
he Barry Gold titer to sec the foll
w , tt
y a
rl of the conversion of the Unite
accrihing the Cold \Var to our havin States into a Stal islet despotism, an
urt Joseph Stalin's feelings. One cool ;even this vrnnld not have sufficed, n
aisle away from a reading of Proles the experience of Yugoslavia and Chin
or Alperovitr,'s "review" bclievin later shoved, unless it were accom
talin to have been little more than panied by total less sobitici-virrice to Mos
enign comrade-in-arms twitted by cow. So long as the United States re
S intelligence officer's ambitions. mained a capitalist democracy, give
my we had played it square will Stalin's rigid theology, no America
he man, there would have been n policy could win basis Soviet confi
ton Curtain, no enslavement of Fast dente, and every Anr.rican initially
rn Europe. Ile would have lrrr.tred a was poisoned frnrn.the source.
,cn. . . . This is the hair shirt elan
merican liberals still like to ilo b Vie wartime collaboration was crc
c n
1
nlerican conservatives. Certainly nut Unwed. The Salta conference. whit.
s-c canon was a diplomatic boner, look place in the shadow of the Rund
rid issiinly he should have been stedt counteroffensive in the Ardea-ics
red for countermanding Roosevelt' was the last expression of the vcartim
rders, but to credit : him with tilmood. In the weeks after Yalta till
real tragedy of the Cold War gives military situation changed with grea
inn n stature, and Stalin a benevolence, rapidity. With Nazi Germany shattered
oat could serve only Charles' 'de the need for cooperation was disap
aulle's notion, of American naivete. gearing. The Soviet Union therefore b
Donald ITutle gin the post-war political battle fo
sew Canaan, Europe, moving quickly to violate th
onnecticut pledges it had just made at Yalta fo
, 1
fired by one thing, and one thing alone
1111plics a n,is-reading of history Jos the threat of Nazi victory, So long fi
sin,plcnlindcd as the devil tuner this threat n?as real. collaboration con
crnumrnism cherixiied by 111111
on to turn against the west on poor begin it) negotiate for the surrender -of
political freedom in Poland and Ru
mania.
The definitive proof of the Soviet
change of'-line was, of course, the arti
cle by .lacques Duclos in the April
1945 issue of Colticr?.c (fit Conrniunfsme
This article, with its savage attack on
"Brovdcrisnl"-the policy of post
war support for bourgeois democratic
governments, like that of Franklin
Roosevelt-was plainly an authoritative
---- -- announcement by the Comintern offi.
the Fdirorr: cial formerly responsible for the west-
rely- the time has come to blow the ern Communist parties that the period
isle before the current outburst of of anti-fascist Collaboration. was over.
isionism regarding the origins of the he Duclos piece must obviously have
d war goes much further. In your ten planned and scheduled at least
Vie of September 8, Mr. Gar Alper- six or eight weeks before its publica.
tz, in effect, blames the Soviet de. ton--that is, well before Allen Dulles
I which does little credit to the i:er-
sncss of the Russian leaders. Stalin
his , Associate$ were, after. all, ..
raWs. 'hey regarded the 111
lHd
pose that "suspicions arising ' from ry 1944, "A post-war Roosevelt ad-
se events in early 1945" led to'the inistration would continue to be, as iti
Asian decision to abandon the war. s now, an imperialist government."
e coalition. It is also an lnterpreta. he Soviet "change" of line was the:
f
vtr. Alperovitz is a gifted young his. can Coninvinist Party and brought the
an: But it is a hopelessly shallow PUSA policy into line with Moscow,
srpretation of the Soviet Union to titer boasted of having said in Janu.
ties in . Italy. By his handling of
'affair, Mr. Alperovitz concludes,
Lilies helped set in motion the events
It we know as the Cold War "
nonuls before starry Truman orderedl,
h
t
h
a
t
e atomic bomb he dropped on
apan. William Z. Foster, who re.
placed Browder as leader of the Ainer-
reer result of two things: (1) this'
ntransigent Marxist view of the Unit-
d States, which had been submerged
ut not altered during the war; and
The United States government may
he pursuing strange policies in Viet.
jj,M,j,V0410114Q-GQf b0remorse, e u p.
Pose that Inc United Statcs-or even
the CIA-has been responsible for eve-
rything that has gone wrong in the
world in the last twenty years. The
record shows beyond dispute that Allen
Dulles did Print -ttiirt th- --I ,
City University
CPYRGHT
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
of New York CPYRGHT
Gar Alperovitz replirs:
Arthur Schlesinger',., statement of the
doctrine of historical Inevitability helps
set the terms of debate over the orl-
gins of the Cold \Var. He writes: "One
thing, and one thing alone," permitted
wartime Soviet-American cooperation;
"nothing" could have dispetlcd Stalin's
mistrust; "no" American policy could
have won confidence; "every" Ameri-
can initiative was poisoned from the,
source, Since Stalin's "rigid theology"~
required him to start It brittle for t;n-I
rope, American hctivities could h(
played no substantial role in the tie.
ginning' of the Cold War. . ?
In my review of The Secret Strrren
der I argued neither that Allen Dulles
started the Cold \Var, nor that the
United States has been responsible for
everything which has gone wrong in
the last twenty years, What I wrote
was quite specific: "The Cold War can-
not be understood simply as an Amer--'
can response to a Soviet challenge, but.
rather as the Insidious litferactlon of
mutual suspicions, blame for which.
must be shared by all." As an illustra-
tion I pointed out we now have evi-
dence that Dulles's secret 1945 nego-
tiations with the Nazis undermined
American-Soviet relations In much the,
same way as did the later U-2 Inci-
dent.
One approach to a discussion of dif-
fering interpretations of the Cold War
is to recall the view urged by Secre-
tary of War Henry L. Stimson in 1945:
He held, contrary. to Mr. Schlesinger's
idea, that the United States had it in
Its power profoundly to influence post.';
war relations with the Soviet Union.
This responsibility, be believed, de-
manded that provocative actions be
avoided. Arguing against the hawks of
his day--especially on European. mat.
ters-Stimson urged "the greatest care
and the greatest patience and the
greatest thoughtfulness." By the ? time
of his resignation, however, he had lost
the debate. And on nuclear matters he
as dismayed to find Secretary of'Statd
Byrnes "very touch against any at-
tempt to cooperate with Russia... "
Most observers, agree the major turn?1
ng point of the Cold War' came in
947. What happened earlier? Stimson
as aware the ,tough no had woo out ,
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