IN SUPPORT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO OVERSEE THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000400200004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 17, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

;C)RD
Sanitized - ApprovedFE8r'RRII0se : CIA-R
IN SUPPORT OF THE ESTABLISH-
MENT OF A JOINT CONGRES-
SIONAL COMMITTEE TO OVERSEE
THE CIA
Mr. DAVITS. Mr. President, the time
has come for the Congress to exercise
legislative oversight on the intelligence
community generally and the CIA in
particular In a consistent, formal, con-
tinuing, and responsible way. Since the
CIA was instituted in 1947 as a part of
the National Security Council, the Con-
gress has proscribed itself by statute
from checking the activities of the CIA
to the extent that Congress normally
oversees governmental policy. As a re-
.sult, the activities of the CIA are mon-
itored by the Congress only_in a limited
way and this monitoring is done by a
number of congressional committees, but
FOIAb3b
mainly in the appropriations process.
Before elaborating on the need for a We in Congress also appreciate the fine
Joint Congressional Committee on the job now being done with the CIA by the
Central Intelligence Agency as proposed variou:4 congressional committees. But
by Senator YOUNG, from Ohio, I should' there is a need for line authority and
like to review-the statutory background responsibility In exercising the legisla-
land congressional committee responsi- tive oversight function of the Congress.
bility as regard the CIA. The joint committee proposed by the
In'the National Security Act of 1947, Senator from Ohio [Mr. YOUNG] seems to
Congress made the Director of the CIA' fit the bill, for the following reasons:
responsible for "protecting intelligence I First. Intelligence gathering is a ma-
sources and methods from unauthorized, jor operation in foreign policy and na-
disclosure." In the CIA Act of 1949, tional security affairs, involving the ex-
Congress specifically exempted the CIA penditure of vast amount of funds.
from existing statutes which required all, Second. Intelligence agencies some
governmental agencies to publish "the times find themselves making policy'
orgahization,L functions, -names, official' rather than simply executing it. This
titles, salaric;, or numbers'of personnel" sometimes occurs without conscious de-
which they employed. The act also for sign on the part of the intelligence
bade the Director of the Budget from agency either because policy directives
issuing the usual reports to Congress. from above do not exist In certain areas
In 1956, the Senator from Montana' or because the CIA has people on the
[Mr. MANSFIELD] moved to establish a scene when the action happens who are
joint committee, but his bill was defeated not responsible to the local ambassadors.
on the floor of the Senate by 59 to 27.; By force of circumstance, then, the work
-Subsequent bills have been Introduced, c of the CIA sometimes in effect creates
but they have all died In committee., the policy where the President has not
Recognizing the necessity and impor- acted or even had a chance to act. There .
tance of intelligence activities, Congress, must be accountability to Congress for
has deliberately tied its own hands in an'. these on-the-spot decisions.
attempt to maintain the security 'and Third. The intelligence field is broad
Integrity of the CIA. and complicated. Congress needs ex-.-
Rather than establish a joint commit- pertise on these matters, and the staff'
tee, Congress has decided to oversee the of the joint committee would be a step
CIA through a variety of separate com- in that direction.
mittees. There are, at least, six different Congress has demonstrated restraint;
committees in both Houses of Congress and reliability in past cooperation with'.
which monitor the CIA to greater and the executive branch in respect of Intel-
I lesser degrees: the House and Senate ligence. The Joint Atomic Energy Com
Appropriations Committees, the House mittee is a good example of this. There;
and Senate Armed Services Committees, is little reason for the executive branch
and the Senate Foreign Relations and to fear that Congress through the joint-
the House Foreign Affairs Committees. committee would now abuse this privi-;
None of these committees has the timo lege. Congress has the responsibility to
or the inclination to probe the CIA care- exercise legislative oversight over future'
fully and deeply, except in cases of sen- Intelligence operations and activities on
sational events such as the U-2 flights a closer, continuing, and formal basis.
and the Cuban missile crisis. For these reasons, I join with the Sen-;
Most Americans recognize the need for ator from Ohio [Mr. YOUNG] In cospon-
Intelligence agencies in a dangerous soring S. 2815, a bill to establish a Joint,
.world; most Americans also recognize Committee on the Central Intelligent
..the need, for security in these matters. Agency...
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000460200004-5