(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000400460021-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: March 20, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

STATINTL
Sanitized - App MON 4098 CONGIZESSI PNALF - A
Insofar as China was a potential menace, it should be held out that the adverse party
could not be a menace for some years to will conform to it.
come. The cold war with the Soviet Union The argument is made that the Geneva
had ceased to be urgently menacing, accord of July 21, 1954, contained a
The United States had a President who, provision for a general election to be held
as it happened, was much better fitted to
conduct a quiet foreign policy than an active in July 1956, in order to obtain a free
one. At the same time, the evil consequences expression of national will. The 1954
of our neglected domestic problems were accord also stated that consultations
pressing upon us, and the country needed would be held on the subject of free
a President who knew how to use the.Ameri- elections between the competent repre-
can political system to deal with the ardent 5erLtative authorities of the two zones
domestic problems. from July 20, 1955, onward.
z.B.a.'s 180-DEGREE TURN Mr. President, open, free, and honest
On these two themes, to be quiet and un- elections on the basis of the conduct of
involved abroad and to repair, reform and
reconstruct at home, Lyndon Johnson con- the. Communist north were simply im-
ducted his triumphant election campaign of possible of achievement in July, 1956.
1964. He told the people, and they believed The conditions in North Vietnam during
him, that he would not involve them in a that period were such as to make impos-
war in Asia; he said he would heed and grasp sible any free and meaningful expression
and deal with our problems at home. of popular will. In the north and in the
I shall not attempt to spell out for you south, the Communist system of terroriz=
what has actually happened as a result of the ing the people into compliance with the
180-degree turn away from the 1964 election.
But I cannot pretend to think that such dictation of the Communist leaders .was
a radical and violent change of course will rampant. Communist leaders were run-
not affect the country greatly. I do not lose Ding a police state; where exeutions, ter-
faith. I do not doubt that in the long run
we shall find a way through the consequences
of the crucial decisions which changed the
course which was set by the people in the
election of 1964.
You who are remaining close to the sources
of power and the center of decision will
have much to do before the ship of state has
righted itself and Is again sailing on its true
course. ' II
As for myself, I shall be doing my. little
bit, having given myself the advantage of
some distance from the daily details.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, earlier
in the day there was a colloquy concern-
ing the issue of whether the United
States is the aggressor in South Viet-
nam. . I took the position that it was not,
After my statements were made, there
were placed in the RECORD certain docu-
ments and declarations which were in
conflict with what I said; and I should
now like to make a recitation of my
analysis of the situation in South Viet-
nam.
The Geneva accord of 1954 is one of
the important documents involved in the
discussion of the day. It was violated by
the Communist North Vietnamese from
the very day that it was signed by them.
The Communists left military forces and
supplies in South Vietnam, in violation
of their agreement. Certainly some of
,the Communist guerrillas moved from
the south to the north, supposedly in
compliance with the Geneva accord, but
in truth for further training in guerrilla
warfare and Communist subversion, In-
filtration, terrorism, and other tech-
niques; and then, after they were fully
trained, they were sent back into South
Vietnam in violation of the Geneva ac-,
The Communist aggression in South
.Vietnam became especially intensified
during 1961, with increased infiltration
and a marked stepping up of the Com-
munist terrorism in the south. The Com-
munists of the north violated the Geneva
accord, not the United States. It would
have been folly for the South Vietnam-
ese, after the repeated and many viola-
tions of the accord by the Communists, to
abide by the agreement. It is a common
understanding in law that when one par-
ty violates an agreement, no expectations
ror, and torture were commonplace. No
one in the north would have dared to
vote except as directed. An election un-
der. those circumstances manifestly
would have meant turning the country
over to the Communists.
Under the Geneva Accord, there was
ci;eated an International Control Com-
nfissicin, consisting of representatives of
Poland, India, and Canada. In 1962, the
legal committee of the International
Control Commission made a report. I
ask those Senators now present in the
Chamber to listen carefully to the re-
port:
There is evidence to show that arms, armed
and unarmed personnel, munitions and other
supplies have been cent from the Zone in
the North to the Zone in the South, with
the objective of supporting, organizing and
carrying out hostile activities, including
armed attacks, directed against the Armed
Forces and Administration of the Zone in the
South.
The legal decision of the International
Control Commission further stated:
There Is evidence that the PAVN (People's
Arm, of Vietnam) has allowed the Zone in
the North to be used for inciting, encourag-
ing a.nd supporting hostile activities In the
Zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow
of the Administration in the South.
][t is shocking and painful to under-
sta.nd that, in the face of this finding by
the International Control Commission
consisting of representatives of India,
Canada, and Poland, arguments are still
made that the Communists of Hanoi
were not involved at all in the terrorist
taking of lives In the south and the sub-
version and infiltration that occurred. It
is ab,-olutely false to charge that the dis-
orders and violence in South Vietnam
were a spontaneous uprising of the peo-
ple against oppression and exploitation
of their rights. It is the same argument
that was made in respect to China. In
that instance the argument was made
that it was a peasants' revolution and
that Communists had nothing to do with
it. Subsequent events proved the false-
hood of the claim that it was a peasants'
revolution, and subsequent events estab-
lished clearly that everything that was
done was engineered, designed, and moti-
vated by the Communists.
TE---- -7- --JT1-afW20, 4196;
Why are we involved in this difficult;
in South Vietnam?
It is because the Nation's word ha;
been given that we would not tolerat(
the Communists taking over by aggro,.
Sion the governments of people who die
not want Communist control.
We, are involved in South Vietnam be.
cause Presidents Truman, Eisenhower,
Kennedy, and Johnson-selected by the
people of our country because of the con.
fidence which they had in them-clad
declared that the United States cannot
and should not suffer the expansion of
communism in southeast Asia again,
the will of the people of those nations if
the United States wanted to insure its
own security.
Mr. President, the argument was made
today about the great force and weight
of a Professsor Kahin. Professor Kahiii
went to southeast Asia. He then carne
back and made a report. Who is Kahin?
I wonder if any Senator Is able to idea.
tify Kahin. Yet Kahin's word is to be
taken in preference to the word of Pres-
idents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy,
and Johnson.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. LAUSCHE. I yield.
Mr. HATFIELD. The Senator is re.
ferring to Prof. George McTurnan Ka-
hin, who holds a distinguished chair at
Cornell University. He is Professor of
Government and Director of the Cornell
Southeast Asian Program.
Professor Kahin has written a number
of books and articles on southeast Asia,
and I think he is recognized as a great
authority on that area of the world.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Am I to take his word
over the word of Presidents Truman,
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson? I
simply cannot do so. It is just out of
the question.
We have, in addition to the word of
Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Ken-
nedy, and Johnson, the word of Acheson,
Dulles, Herter, and Rusk, and of every
Secretary of Defense, every chief of the
Central Intelligence Agenc,_-_ and of
every refs of
Staff of the U.S. Department of Defense.
I simply cannot take this man's word
in preference to the word of all of the
other officials.
Mr. President, in 1965 when the
Tonkin Bay joint resolution was pro-
moted on the floor of the Senate by the
Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRICHT]
and agreed to, the distinguished Senator
from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] made an
argument in which he pointed out in
substance what I have just stated. The
Senator from Kentucky set forth in his
argument on March 25, 1965, the state-
ments made by the Canadian delega-
tion, outlining the position of the United
States with respect to South Vietnam,
It may be that the Senator from Ken-
tucky would like to confirm what I have
just said.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I have
recently read a book on Vietnam by
Professor Kahin of Cornell University.
It is a rather interesting book.
To return to the matter to which the
Senator has. referred and to put it in
context, on March 25, 1965, nearly 2
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400460021-8