SOVIET ECONOMIC CHALLENGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000400480026-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 1999
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: April 21, 1959
• Content Type: NSPR

APR 2 1 1959
UMES
[vow YOLK
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-R
Capabilities of Russia rge
Realistic - Appraisal ? of Industrial
U d
of the Russian claims and also i
ignore the drop in United States out-I
put, it would be unwarranted,to esti-
mate 1958 Soviet industrial output
at any Iess' than 45 per cent of ours. I
is a member , of tic staf f of the Rtu-1 Using this 45 per cent ratio, and
siata Research Center of Harvard the quite "sane" estimate of expected
Soviet rate of industrial growth of
n -f.A TTnifnA
1'o T11 ) qno? TUE N.'.wYoaxTIMES; States rate ofNIndustrial growth of
soothing rather than stimulating
overtones.
This is especially regrettable since
the ,,97Q?_,..comparison, made ? by
o
4t f g p anta
rt
tunately carried as the lead item by
the press (including The New York'
Times) and the radio, thus distorting
the meaning of the speech, giving iti
t1~at Soviet industrial' output' iii"19701 sometmng wmcn, at present rates
Will be' only 60 percent of ours. Thisl of growth, will last indefinitely. In
n'-wsunfor-fact, it will most likely last 'only
--T,-7r- ~t1.4 -
3 l ti
. i e -before 1980.
the Central Intelligence ligency in-
r
w
n
y
l output about
challenge. He warned against the,
spread of "comforting illusion(s)"
which. , servo as "false tran-
quilizer(s)." It is therefore regret-
",f
tted on dpi{fl` clearly intended to
p
alert the American people to the
danger' of the Russian economic,
Gt} re are two key elements
t I~C~b7 inn, of such foreeasts:
0
States industrial output, and second,;
an estimate of the expected rates of!
industrial growth in each country.
As for the current ratio.. Mr.
Dulles statedt "Our own analyses of
Soviet industrial output last year
concluded that It whs not more than
4.0 per cent of our own." It is diffi-
cult to understand what was meant
by this statement, 11. the'an . alysis"
i'e nett to'did not pertain to 1958
First, an estimate of the current
(1958) ratio of Soviet to United
at all, but rather to 1J56:' "'""~
Ratio of GroAlTr
In a speech reported in The Times
April .29, 1958, Mr. Dulles' said that
15oviet industrial output in 1956 was.
9:0 per cent of ours. In the inter-
vening two years, however, it has
been claimed that Russian industry
has'grown at an annual rate of 10
per cent; while our industrial but-
put in 1958 was actually 6 per cent
lower than it was in 1956. This
implies that starting from C. I. A. 's
own calculations for 1956, in 1958
Soviet industrial output was more
t;han.50 per cent of ours.
1970 Soviet Industrial output will
be from 70 to 100 per cent ' of ours,
Moreover, even in the most favorable
case (Russian rate of. industrial;
growth, 8 per cent; United States, 4i
per cent) the Russians threaten to I
catch up to us in aggregate Indus-!.
t
ia
t
e
t
years,
another ten to twenty years.
Assurances to the contrary, how-
ever unintended, do not perform a
service to the American people.
Surely the lesson of sputnik.is that
we must be realistic in our appraisal
of Russian capabilities. It Is neces-
sary now for us to assess realisti-
cally the. Soviet economic challenge
and upon'this, realistic assessment
build our response to this challenge,
ambridge, Mas ., prirTh, 1859
C
~lk I W... -*I
FOIAb3b
roved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400480026-1
C. I. A,'s analysts is open to serious