ANATOMY OF DECISION - FICTIONALIZED STUDY OF EXECUTIVE DECISION PROCESS IN AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000400490010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 22, 1998
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: May 1, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

MAY 11963 FOIAb
Sanitized - A6fteo4=RQ~7 ray
struck down by the Supreme Court, and
which has caused the whole structure of
policy negating the idea that thatrepre-
s nts the American way, which It defi-
%; n rely does not. ,-- 1 .,, .,?-4-1- 1-
law, or whether it must sit with its hands
folded an4 allow a provision of law with
which such, a great majority of the coun-
try disagree s, and which the U.S. Su-
preme Cou=kstruck down as being con-
trary to oui beliefs. The question is
whether that provision must remain
imbedded in tI law because we do not
have the necess?ry procedures or a way
of manifesting ot1r will to change it. I
shall do everythin I can to bring about
such change. It s a real challenge to
the Congress, and of}e of those challenges
which will determirig how the Congress
stands in the eyes. o he country. If we
cannot cope with an thing as elemen-
tary as that problem, 1 seems to me the
country must take a ry dim view of
our capacity for running the country's
business.
SIXTH ANNUAL OBSERVANCE OF
LAW DAY, US
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. 'resident,
today, May 1, marks the 6th a nual ob-
servance of Law Day, USA. Obl, ervance
of this day, inaugurated by the 4kmeri-
can Bar Association in 1958, an now
designated by Presidential proclam tion,
gives us Americans an excellent o or-
tunity to reaffirm our devotion to nd
respect for the great heritage of Am i-
Emlrodied in our Constitution we tints Lion will hold ceremonies today directed
the basic tenet that we are a govern at fostering an abiding respect for law
ment of laws and not of men. Article V \ and providing an occasion for the Ameri-
of the Rill of Rights assures each per- an people to rededicate themselves to
son that the Federal Government shall itreedom.
not deprive him of life, liberty or prop- .Our observance will serve to focus at-
erty without due process of law. The _ to tion on the rule of law where the
14th amendment provides that the State rig is of people are governed by estab-
government shall respect this same rule. lash d rules, where the essential inter-
Through the consistent and continuous ests " of individuals are guaranteed
application of this principle we assure throuh limitations on the authority of
the freedom and equality of every in- the state, and where disputes are de-
dividual. ' cided UV impartial courts. It will help
Due process of law is maintained and to demolstrate to the world the mean-
protected through our courts. These ing of re
bodies interpret our legal ideals and
roclamation of January 28,
of these principles. While our rules of as Law Days and to participate in cere-
law and means for enforcing them are monies suitably signalizing its signifi-
not perfect, they allow, more personal cance, President Kennedy stated:
freedom than any other system known to In a time wheis all men are properly con-
man. cerned lest nations, forgetting law, reason,
Many people have been attracted to and moral existence, turn to mutual destruc-
tion, we have all the more need to work for
the shores of this Nation, knowing that a day when law may govern nations as it
in America they need not fear discrimi- does men within nations; when systemized
nation and tyranny. These immigrants reason may bring us a confident future;
have recognized and appreciated the when moral development of the human race
climate of freedom and security which may assure us a peaceful and law-abiding
the Anglo-American tradition of law world.
has been able to offer. It is in this spirit and with this hope
The o~casion'that we Americans ,are that we. Celebrate Law Day today, know-
conrimemorating today is in sharp con- ing how essential law has been to the
N..? trast to the observances presently going preservation of our own freedom and
on in Communist nations. We, reserve believing that the greatest promise for
this day as a reminder of the many free-
doms we enjoy as Americans, freedoms
which are constantly protected by our
body of laws. The Communists use this
day for a raw display of power which
serves to intimidate their people and to
physical power, administered by men
outside of a framework of law. There is
no room in such a system for individual
freedom and expression.
We must remind ourselves and the rest
of the world that the strength of our
system is based on far more than overt
displays of physical force. It is our be-
lief in the protection of human rights,
rights which the Communists refuse to
recognize, which can best express the
idea that we seek to make peace and,
prosperity, with freedom, a living real-
ity throughout the world.
To survive and to fulfill its purpose,
our code of law and the Nation which it
sustains need the support and dedica-
tion of the people whom they serve. Law
Day provides us with an appropriate op-
portunity to reflect on the importance
of law in the American way of life.
Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr.
President, today, as on every May 1st
since 1958, the Nation is celebrating Law
Day. It is altogether fitting that we
should pause for a moment in this age
of rockets and missiles, to give recogni-
tion to our system of law which is so
basic to peace and order in our own so-
ciety as well as in the world at large.
The purpose of Law Day is to help
us_ to become more aware of the signifi-
cance of the rule of law in the preserva-
tion of freedom and the maintenance of
peace. Bar associations, civic groups,
the consummation of our expectations of
peace and tranquillity for the future lies
in the development of a system of law
among nations.
,11
ANATOMY OF DECISION"-FIC-
TIONIZED STUDY OF EXECUTIVE
DECISION PROCESS IN AN INTER-
NATIONAL SECURITY CRISIS
Mrs.~MUTH. Mr. President, 3
motitlis ago on i+'ebruary 1, 1963, a writ-
ten study was filed at the,j,.JTJniversity
at Mal 11_Air_Y_orce Base, Ala., that is
of specific interest with relation to the
international Haitian-Dominican crisis
of the past few days.
It was a fictionized sly of the execu-
tive decision g"~"`biir 9 In an international
security crisis entitled "Anatomy of
Decision." I think it Is interesting read-
ing on the fntt;rplay between the White
House, the Department of ?tate, and the
Depart nt of Defense on the making
of vital decisions in time of crisis.
It is a unique piece of writing, for
while it is fiction, it is documented fic-
tion with some ? citations from some
14--,publications.- Yet I think its
achievement of sustained interest gives it
the potentiality of an excellent 3-act
play.
Because of the interest that I feel that
Members of this body would have in
reading it and because of the potential
interest that students of government and
international and military affairs might
have in it, I ask unanimous consent that
it be placed in the body of the RECORD
at this point.
There being no objection, the study
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ANATOMY OF DECISION-A FICTIONIZED STUDY
OF THE EXECUTIVE DECISION PROCESS IN AN
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CRISIS
(Peet by William C. Leyris, Jr., brigadier
general, U.S. Air Force eeerve, for com-
pletion of vol. II of course 4, War College
Extension Course, Air University, Fruary
1, 1963)
PART 1. DETECTION
Chapter I. Discovery
It had been a raw, bone-chilling day so
typical of Washington in mid-March. The
days were getting longer but that was not
much consolation from the mixed weather
pattern of snow, sleet, and rain-and those
reckless impatient drivers, who literally
panicked at the drop of the first snowflake-
making the drive home even to nearby
Georgetown a nightmare.
S( sat by the warming fireside
leisure y enjoying his nightly predinner mar-
tini with his attractive wife Martha, who had
a knack for relaxing him withent con-
versation about,, ttera other than intel-
lige e-Central IItelligence (14:57), that is.
As his -right hand stroked the soft hair of
the head and back of "Cappy," the English
setter, sitting by his chair, he gave a gentle
sigh of relief with this fleeting peace of mind.
Central Intelligence Agency
For T -W things-had not been
going well for .,~h 9l:31). Hindsight
on the Quahog Bay invasion failure had cast
such a shadow-9n th _Agency fora year that
his predecessor as Dlreetor had resigned in
b Mess (5:7). Faulty intelligence had,
a major defeat in the Abua misadven-
ture (94:68). Scott himself had been one
of the critics pushing for the resignation-
and when it came the President in a "put up
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contact with the white physicians already on
the staff.
Interest of influential persons
ction by Negro physicians
and cases are heavily
socioeconomic income i
Negro hi
In the six unities w]
est of integration as
phl
nde f the percentage of N
ng appointments at predom tly white
8 ospitals. These communities
NGary,
ew York, Philadelphia, Los Angel
apolis, and Boston. Detroit, wheA4 Negro
hospitals were relatively unimportai was
in seventh place, and the communitie Ith
Important Negro hospitals followed. I
Our data indicate that the presence,lf
Negro hospitals influences the process of in
tegration in two ways.
First, that Negro hospitals can provide a
focal point for the self-segregation of
Negroes. Such a hospital provides a place
where Negro doctors can hospitalize their
patients .and thus reduces the doctors' needs
to become a predominantly
In view of the prevalence of professional
contacts between Negro and white physi-
cians, there were comparatively fe - ihS
physicians or administrators appeared
to be especially active in
tion. We encounte
stances where int tion in specific hospitals
was clearly t ult of esult of the interest of key
persons e e staffs.
In o case , tl,e hospital was a very large
one.
egro physicians on the staff pointed
ii
su_,
and
preaominantly
wale. Furthermore, a predomi-
nantly Negro hospital provides a physical
facility where Negro physicians meet, and
this, in turn, can easily lead to the forma-
tion of a strong Negro ingroup, which may
even resist integration.
Second, the presence of Negro hospitals re-
duces the pressure on white physicians and
hospital administrators to admit Negroes to
staff positions at predominantly white hos-
pitals. The absence of Negro hospitals, on
the other hand, puts strong pressure on
whites to make some provision for the needs
of Negro physicians and patients.
At the time of study in 1956 Detroit had
three predominantly Negro hospitals which
Accreditation of Hospitals. These three hos-
pitals had a total of 324 beds. In the total
situation of medical services for the Negro
community and hospital affiliations for Negro
ws separate but equal
es and Negroes in hos-
odating the require-
1- rton Act. This act
a
vernment a very
npG=t she in tliq construction of
s and pre is a situation
tly requires leislative atten-
on. literally shalrkeful that in
ay and age, after f4a Supreme
rt decision of Brown against the
oard of Education in 1954, we still have
imbedded in the Hill-Burton Act-and,
incidentally, in the Morrill Act with '%;
respect to land-grant colleges-the sep-
arate but equal doctrine which has been
munity awareness
degree of community
t which was focused on
The contacts established
and Negro physicians were
ments at predominantly white
Detroit. A study of the 25 Negr
Detroit. At these hospit
lished professional relation
securing affiliation at a white hospital by
staff members of this hospital with whom
hehad workedat the Veterans' Administra-
tion hospital. In another case, close pro-
fessional relationships between the staffs of
a white and a Negro hospital led to the ap-
pointments of at least three Negro physi-
cians to the staff of the white hospital. In
this instance, the superintendents and medi-
cal directors of the two. hospitals were close
personal friends; some of the key men at the
'White hospital also served on the stag of the
Negro hospital; the chief pathologist of the
white hospital conducted most of the meet-
ings for the staff of the Negro hospital; and
furthermore, the Negro hospital often used
the laboratory of the white hospital.
In another case, a Negro physician was abl
an appointment at a clinic
clinic was also serviced by imp
cians from the hospital with
sired affiliation. This techni
clan was able to get the ap
wanted.
Cause a Negro physician had studied or
worked under white physicians of high pres-
tige in other communities. We also found
instances where Negro physicians on a staff
were instrumental in getting other Negro
physicians appointed.
In general, we found in Detroit that the
majority of appointments to hospital staffs
required that somebody on the staff be ac-
tively interested in pushing the application.
A white hospital administrator made this
point:
In every case where a Negro has been ac-
cepted he has been screened very carefully,
and there was always somebody on the staff
who had personal knowledge of the individ-
ual concerned and would speak up for him.
It would be very difficult for a Negro to be
put on the staff if he had not had previous
the administrator. This particular person
had been. Interested in integration for many
years, but he felt that it should be encour-
aged by persuasion and education,' rather
than by determination of policy on his part.
Consequently, his effect on integration in
hospital appointments developed only slowly
and required the operation of some of the
other forces that have been discussed.
The other case concerned a medium-size,
predominantly white hnsnita.i A mimhar of
hos-
still
hich he de-
proved suc-
gree of integration
they influence the i
physicians, the three Negro hospitals were
not significant either in the actual services
they provided or in their influence on the
actions of the Negro community. This is
illustrated y _the fact that an attempt to
the lack of community support. There was
no indication that the three Negro hospitals
influenced integration in other Detroit hos-
pitals either positively or negatively.
REPORT OF PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION
The panel created by President Kennedy to
study the problem of mental retardation has
published its report, "A Proposed Program for
National Action To Combat Mental Retarda-
tion." The report defines mental retardation
as "a group of complex phenomena stem-
ming from many different causes, but one key
common characteristic found in all cases is
inadequately developed intelligence." Ex-
cept in the very young, mental retardation
can be distinguished from mental illness by
the fact that it is usually present at birth
or begins In childhood, whereas mental ill-
ness usually occurs after there has been nor-
mal development.
Severe mental retardation is frequently
associated with organic defects and is usually
fairly evenly distributed throughout the pop-
ulation regardless of socioeconomic status.
known hazards in pregnancy such as radia- A,
tion and drugs, and extended diagnostic and
screening services; (3) educational and voca-
tional programs for both children and adults
geared to the needs of the retarded; (4)
more comprehensive and improved clinical
and social services; (5) development of a
wide range of local community facilities for
care; (6) a new enlightened legal as well as
social concept of mental retardation; (7) in-
tensified recruitment of professional person-
nel in all fields of science and service with
provision of opportunities for them to ac-
quire firsthand knowledge about mental re-
tardation and the creation of a Domestic
Peace Corps to stimulate voluntary service;
(8) programs of education and information
to increase public awareness of the problem
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cept the appointment as the C2A.1&g tor.
He had no choice but to accept-and now
2 years later he thongl`it -he `knew how the
man he had criticized felt. While he had
4/ given thq,~ a thorough overhauling, his
record was no, better on the surface than that
of. his predecessor. The seemingly dramatic
victory in the Abuc missile threat crisis had
launched,, his administration with a great
flush of success.
Yet, he and his Agency had not looked
nearly as good as Florida's-U.8. Senator Cut-
?ting, who had been so- right so far In advance
of. the the Russian buildup in Abuc.
Cutting had gambled on the reports of the
Aljuo refugees and had made a blistering at-
tack on the administration (61:44). The
more skeptical because it had been
more Cautious-and Cutting had emerged
smelling like a rose in public opinion.
And in the 2 years that followed, it seemed
as though the first flush of success on the
Abuc crisis had actually served as a contrast
to make the CIA look worse and worse. When
the Ollijurts had been deposed in the Domin-
leanRepublic, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had
warned of the danger of a Communist take-
over. But the CIA had sided with the State
Department in cy other
tha'h'aming up some naval vessels in the
adjacent seas.
Intelligence gathered by the CIA had
clearly indicated that the revolution had
been led by antidictator tolaels, rather than
by Ceo~m?~munists. That intelligence was ac-
fell now it 'did not look so to the
Ai . tfcan "pudic.
For the vacuum of our hands off policy had
been quickly filled by Russia in her exploita-
tion of the fierce nationalism-neutralism feel-
ing of the successful Dominican rebels. Eco-
nOmic_ and technical assistance was poured
into the Dominican Republic by Russia and
through such assistance imperceptibly a Rus-
sian orientation set in.
On top of this, the Russian representatives
and technicians inspired the Dominican
rebels to pursue their latent national aspi-
ration to take over neighboring Haiti. And
they had done it within 2 -years after de-
posing the Ollijurts-not by invasion or
military action, but rather by infiltration
and subversion, which they had quickly
learned from the Russian representatives and
technicians.
New Carribbea
The final act was supposedly a plebiscitg
of Haiti and the Dominican Republic that
voted for a merger of the two countries into
the new nation of Carribbea-more ac-
curately, Communist Carribbea. Intelli-
gence gathered by the IA revealed that it
was a rig eg d pleblsci w 'fch-TlI great
majority o n"f3-ofi5nunists' and those
Haitians opposed to the merger were not per-
mitted to vote. But the United States had
been unable to do anything about it because
of the doctrine of respect for self-determi-
nation and because of the fierce sensitivity
of 1,41' `American countries to outside In-
te yei}t p. , . -
.Many refugees from 'Haiti and the Do-
minicar Republic=from the new Carrib-
bea-had gone to Florida and New York-
and several articulate' ones to Senator Cut-
ting with grave stories of a Russian buildup
in new Carribbea. Scott Davidson so ,often
in these days had felt like saying, "This is
where I carne in" (63:A-15).
No; the days had been long and hard.
But this end of a hard, long and cold day
was peacefully pleasant with comforting
Mprtha, loyal "Cappy," the glowing fireplace
and the n}artini, Martha had. stopped talk
lug for some 5 minutes as _she had sensed
6Catt' et gpective mood.
phone on the bookshelf back of Scott's
lounge chair. A reluctant "Davidson speak-
ing" was answered with "The President
wishes to speak with you" and quickly fol-
lowed by the irritated and troubled voice of
the President.
"Scott, have you heard about the show
that' Cutting and Hartley put on in the
Senate late this afternoon?"
"No, but they do it so aften these days
that there outpacing the Ed and Chesley
show-and they say the same thing over and
over."
"Well, this time it isn't the same thing.
My Senate liaison man was in the gallery
and he is of the opinion that it is serious.
He said that Cutting not only produced
statements of Dominican refugees that the
Russians are trahsforming new Carribbea
into a huge bunker (30:42a) (108:28, 30)
but also produced what they claim are pic-
tures of Russian missiles, planes, submarines
and ships in new Carribbea-and he told
me that the pictures are going to be shown
on the 8 o'clock 'Today' program in the
morning with C.n13$ arartley appearing
on that program. a checked with NBC and
they confirmed this. I also asked Cutting
for copies of the pictures--and he told me
that he was sending them over."
Straightening up in his lounge chair,
Davidson said, "But, as you know, Mr. Presi-
dent, the J]lse Intelligence Board has
taken the position that the Russians would
never put offensive missiles in Carribbea
because they would be too exposed (46:4).
I'll be right over."
"No need for that Scott, right now. I'm
not concerned about Cutting because he is
a meticulous man.- But I am concerned
about Hartley. You'll remember he called
for our blasting Abuc out of the Caribbean
and he's up for reelection this year and this
is a natural for him. Ordinarily he wouldn't
be taken seriously, but this time the Cutting
pictures could make a difference, and pub-
lic opinion on new Caribbea seefs to be
ripe for political exploitation by Hartley.
"What can I do, Mr. President?" Scott said
a little wearily.
"Get your _l boys together with er l
Cutting pictures sent over to General Mack's
office. I'll have Mack notified to set, the
conference up in his office for 9 o'clock to-
night and to have his people there to meet
with you and your people. But be sure to
have your dinndr because you'll, have a full
night. I want you and Mack to have a full
intelligence report on the Russian buildup
in Caribbea together with an analysis and
evaluation of the Cutting pictures on my
desk at the White House at 6:30 tomorrow
morning.. That will give me time to prepare
comment and reply to whatever Cutting and
Hartley say on the "Today' show."
Chapter II. Investigation
With a "Will do, Mr. President," by Scott
the conversation terminated. Scott then
called_his si.eputy and gave Instructions
for _Slie,,cgxlf_erri.Gengrgl .Maok'e..Ai ce
Shortly thereafter upon call from the
White House, Lt Gep Carroll Mack, U.S.
Army Director of the l~,e(eslse .Intelligence
Agency (21:51) (22:197), in turn called the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
0:140, 148), tha,,,3 ?IO Director of Naval
Intelligence (28:156, 160) and the Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
(24:181, 189) and requested their attendance
at the conference at 9 o'clock that night.
He also called the Director of Intelligence
and Research of the Slrtil& Department
(121:5) inviting him to attend the con-
ference.
tree s
h , ? At 9 o'cloc shag in room 3E258 27: C-9
lv.e ent he' E t .
qTftn vas no o last long, as it ' toe Pntag .. . on, the conference was called
But te
the chairmanship of the conference over to
Scott Davidson, By that time several sets
of prints of the Cutting pictures had. been
made. They were passed around to the at-
tendants at the conference. In addition to
these prints, the White House had obtained
copies late that afternoon from the Senate
official reporters of the remarks made by
Senators Cutting and Hartley a few hours be-
fore in the Senate.
Davidson outlined the situation summing
up with the requirement of the President
that the group make a thorough but suc-
cinct evaluation and analysis of the status
of any Russian military buildup In Carib-
bea-and specifically, evaluation of the Cut-
ting pictures-to be placed, on his desk in a
little more than 12 hours later at 6:30 the
next morning. "In short," he said, "gen-
tlemen, our time is short and our mission
is awesome. Yet, we have to a great extent
already made our personal evaluations. The
o yl factor at this point is the.Qutting
pictures. Are they genuine? Do they make
a' !'rificant difference?"
The group worked throughout the night
(61:50) calling in photogr hie Intelligence
experts of their" staffs and`fhe latest intelli-
gence evaluations of new Carribbea and its
Russian relations. Comparisons and argu-
ments were made. The Air Force and the
Navy contended that the Cutting pictures,
even if authentic, did not change their evalu-
ations which had been that a very threat-
ening Russian military buildup had been
underway for some time and that the Cut-
ting pictures only corroborated those evalu-
ations.
The prior evaluations of the Army and the
IA had been that admittedly Russian mill-
t3T equipment had been sent into Carribbea
but that it was in the nature of military
assistance for mal_security rather than
for external,. action and was of defensive
rather that offensive character and thus con-
stituted no serious threat. T>__,.,,fta.te De-
partment Director of Intelligence and Re-
search sidde~d :~with -the evaluation that there
was no sS1`ious threat.
Evaluation
At 2:30 the combined photographic intelli-
gence experts reported to the group that
they were of the unanimous opinion that the
Cutting pictures were: (1) authentic and (2)
disclosed evidence that was indicative, but
not conclusive, that the character and num-
bers of missiles, IL-28 jet bombers (8:A1)
(17:A1), submarines and ships had extensive
external potentials.
After an hour of close questioning and
discussion, the Army, tl CIA, and the State
Department representatives concluded that
there was indication of a significant change.
At that point, two staff members were di-
rected to draft a report. That draft was
completed in an hour and a half and then
presented to the group. A few changes were
made and the final draft was approved by
the group, as an informal agent of tug ,t7,S.
I,)11,te111gaBCe Board (5:7) (60:6), and signed
by Sett Davidson as head of the CIA: and
,aaenera YVlaclc as Director of Defense Intelli-
gence Agency with noted concurrence by
the State Department Director of Intelli-
gence.
The group dispersed to return to their
offices or homes for short naps. At 5:30 a.m.,
Scott Davidson called Jac Brandt, the Spe-
cial Adviser to the Pres ent on'f5'ational Se-
curity Affairs, out of bed with a cryptic,
"We've finished the report the President
wants. Meet me at the White House as soon
as you can get there." At 6 Davidson handed
the report to Brandt-and at 6;30 Brandt
knocked on the small library room door of
the President and entered with the report
(2:18).
. .
The President sat down at the small desk
and began to read the four-page report,
first with a hurried scanning prompted by
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ONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
Y
Impatience to get the findings, and then tion as Eisenhower spoke of on Indochina relentless woman can't pierce. What do you
second and third elpw readings as If he were in 1954? (13:261) I mean military and phys- really think?"
digesting the facts and observations support- ical 'danger-aside from the psychological "Frankly, I'm concerned, Mr. President.
frig the findings-fin s, that the Cutting factor and international prestige." Perhaps it's because I can't forget that Cut-
pictures were auj;helapand significant, but Secretary of Defense ting looked so good so far in advance on the
at this point only strongly indicative rather Abuc missile crisis. The photographic in-
than conclusive. He was most impressed Topping slowly adjusted his glasses, leaned telligence analysts say the Cutting pictures
back in his chair, rubbed his nose and sthred
with the ch~tloxxs of the Armes OL9~ are not proof positive but they hedge and
> #~ upward as though addressing the ceiling in- say that they should
No offense was taken not be discounted or
an ate. stead of the President
.
_IDiali of National Security Council underrated. They resort to the escape
by the President as he had beconje accus- clause distinction between the words `indic-
Looking very tired at the very start of the tonged to this gesture-and had even good ative' and `conclusive'."
day, he glanced upward and said, "Jack, call naturedly told Topping that sometimes he The Vice President
the members of the National Security Coun- didn't know whether he was ta, ling to a
ell (109:31) and tell .them to be here for higher Authority or seeking Divine Guidance At this point, Vice President Landon, who
a meeting at 9 this morning. This should for his answer. had remained uncomfortably silent since
be a good test of, their ability to bridge the In ' Teasured words, the Defense Secretary the President had cut him off with the no
gap between civilian policymakers and mili- said, "I don't know. I thought the Russians politics remark, broke in with "I think that's
tary strategists (74:49) for a judicious CO- after their quick backdown on Abuc would the nub of our problem here. The Cutting
ordination of our political and military not push so hard again so soon. But I can't pictures are indicative enough-with his
strength-the elements of national policy forget how accurate Cutting was on the Rus- past record of being so right-that we can't
(74:56). On your way, have my breakfast sian buildup in Abuc. I never did believe discount them. Yet, this is too serious and
sent in." that he got all his information from refugees risky business to accept them as gospel truth
At 8 he watched Cutting and Hartley but strongly suspected much of it came di- and act prematurely and precipitously on
on television. Surprisingly their discussion rectly from sources inside the Pentagon. them. I suggest that we try to corroborate
lacked the dramatic punch he had antics- Whatever the sources, he was right and made them before we make any decision on how
gated. It was conducted on such a re- us look bad-and I axn not about to discount great the threat is and on what we decide
strained key as almost to be dull. Hartley him again on these pictures." to do."
was remarkably restrained. Perhaps it was "You've got a point, Jim," the President
because the precise and meticulous Cutting Secretary of State admitted, "We've got to double check."
dominated the discussion and obviously Turning to Secretary of State Burgess With soft sarcasm, Jim Landon replied,
strained for an unemotional, matter-of-fact (29:63, 73), the President said, "How about "Oh, that's something I learned from poli-
tone. Perhaps it was because, at the outset, you, Art? Do you think Khrushchev is pre- tics-especially that time when I was elected
the obviously proadministration NBC mod- paring for two steps forward after his one to the Senate by is thin 100 votes."
orator-commentator had cuttingly reminded step backward on Abuc?" "TouchL, Jim. I had a,close one myself.
Hartley of the effective manner in which the "I doubt it, Mr. President," Burgess But how do we doublecheck without tipping
President had met the Abuc threat without quickly replied. "I think Khrushchev our hand to the Russians? The only thing
Invasion and bombing. learned his lesson in the Abuc crisis on Amer- about the Senate show and the telecast this
And perhaps it was because to the un- lean credibility that our patience and wil- morning that worried me was the disclosure
trained eyes of the viewing public the true Iin;gness to go more than half way for ne- of the Cutting pictures."
meaning of the pictures did not come gotiated peace is not unlimited and that we Defense Boss Topping moved forward to
through. Whatever it was, the President was will fight when we are convinced we are the edge of his chair and volunteered, "I
conildent that It would not significantly stir really threatened. But I'd rather get the don't think that will be too difficult, Mr.
the public any further from its already in- thinking of my Kremlinologists (7:17) be- President. We already have the Navy-Marine
dicated concern about Caribbea. fore giving you a firm opinion." amphibious exercise going on in the Carib-
Yet, the President was concerned because Emergency Planning Director bean (19:6) and specifically in the Windward
he knew the Russian Embassy was carefully Nodding at Emergency Director Kelly, the Passage and Mona Passage-maneuvers that
watching the telecast and he could not know president said, "It's your turn, Tom. What were scheduled and announced several weeks
what impact the Cutting pictures had on are your thoughts?" ago. We could have some carrier-based air-
those maneuvers accidentall fly
the Rsian is app experts. of this tand he With his typical disarming candor, Kelly craft
and do photographic re onnais-
h
praisal the lack of appeal raised his hands outward and sighed, "I'm
telecast to the public, he called his press not an expert on this and you know it, Mr. sance on the western half of Caribbea per-
secretary at the end of the program and said, President. My job is to mobilize the re- hags without arousing suspicion. To cover the eastern ",Toe the cast hurt enoto re- sources to back up the military and diplo- from Ramey half AirwForrcelBase make Aiiyoverse
quire
It down in q a reply. I want play matic decisions (32a:59). All I'll say is`that
order to avoid tipping our hand in any man- I wouldn't put a wooden nickel on that "But that would bring diplomatic reper-
ner to the Russians. So tell the press that loudmouth Hartley. He tries to yellus into cussions and protests from Caribbea," ob-
I have, no comment on the matter." a shooting war yet he violently opposes giv- j ted diplomat boss Burgess, "and we run
Chapter 111, National Security Council' ing us a cent for civil defense and screams the risk of Caribbea protesting to the OAS,
At 9 sharp the members of the National about the waste of taxpayers' money on and perhaps the U.N. It could damage our
Security Council (76:58, 57) (108:30) en- stockpiling." image in Latin America.
CIA Director "To hell with our image in Latin America,"
dent the Landon, offloe of the Presddef State State Arthur The exploded the "Veep," "the greatest impair-
Bururgess, Jim Secre Secretary of y irony was o eiey' reflected sr in `r the ks about sardonic smile Senator ment we had there was from our timidity on
of Defense C r ter the Quahog Bay invasion fiasco. They'll
and Emergency arming r-~ee o t Kelly.Topping of Hartley the President as he wheeled his chair respect us a damn sight more if we do stand
Others present were the secretariat officials around to face Scott Davidson, who had been re re
Je randt, Special Assistant to the Presi- seated to his immediate right for reading up
m Issue (6 (68e:AA-1414) as before we finally did backsliding on on the the Abuc
buc
demofNational Security Affairs. (109:35), the report. "Ayn ou_ ~SCQ h ues- marine bases there. Sure, they may gripe
his deputy Carl Smith, and the Executive t pned.
Secretary Brinkley Walter (109:3(1)--and , this is getting close to policy de- and criticize us-but only like a younger
ott Davidson, oision, Mr. President, and you know i1 brother scolds his older and bigger brother."
3u save Cutting and Hartley on Is o b en from policy forxi ulatfon. I'm With obviously hurt feelings, Burgess met
the NBC telecast at 8," was his manner ever x dful' of the gap ,IF 6) or line this explosion with a muted, "I'm a little
of opening the meeting.. Vice President drawn between intelligence and policy. tired of having the charge of timidity hurled
Landon .responded`Srst with "Yes, that damn (33:17)." at the State Department--we have just as
Hartley has more guts than brains-but he Co ~, n1? .~SC9t _. you much courage as anyone else, I'm only try-
caII hurt up at the, next election." wo;lcellw o' ing to think ahead. Besides, if Caribbea
Open With CIA Briefing "170, o cou a no , u you never know should protest to the OAS, it might give the
when that woman on the Senate,. Armed Russians a cub to protest to the U.N. and
"We're nor- i es~ise'" politics," the
Sei;,,,W flinmi`ttee will ask me when I am thus set up a doubleheader program for
President observed acidly, "and we might as before the committee whether I ever made stalling. That could hamper you, couldn't it
well get to the point immediately. Scott policy decisions-and I want to be able to Carter?"
(109:40) read the report and then we'll get - remain snow white pure so that I carr'i`ay I Defense Secretary Topping drawled out a
down to brass tacks and, make nin1m1;.m de- only"-Collect and evaluate intelligence and slow, "Yes," and then continued, "But since
cisions." x}ever'recommend decisions (15:53, 54, 83). you are thinking about my department, Art,
When Scott finished reading the report, the They won't be able to ignore her seniority I'll do a little thinking about yours-you
'President turned to Defense Secretary Top- and keep her off the Subcoxiamittge; on the know, under the law we do have to integrate
ping (26:121, 128) and said, "Intelligence CII evermilitary policy and foreign policy. I tuggest
has thus performed its warning role (48:8) V ~y irritated, the President glared, that to take the focusoff of Caribbea we
Cacter. what's your reaction? Are we in real "Forget about her-there is such a thing as also have carrier-based planes in the maneu-
troub e? Are we in a 'falling domino' post- executive privilege, you know, that even that vers make the mistake of flying off course
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'149R0004004900'f0-7
) G ES$1O L ECOR - SENA . E
"Then if they all protest it will tend to
confuse the protests of Caribbea and Rus-
sia-r if Jamaica and the Leeward Islands
o
don't protest, Caribbea and Russian pro-
tests will be discounted to that extent as far
as Latin American countries and the OAS
are coaserned."
Chapter Its. Initial Presidential decisions
and staff implementation
At that point, the President broke in,
"I agree with Jim that we immediately
double-check the cutting pictures. While
I'm not'-so-sure, Carter, that pincer aerial
reconnaissance you suggest can be pulled
off without incident, I think your plan is
sound and I want it carried out today."
Presi ht's First Decis~ion~s
Turning to h s Special Adviser on National
Security Affairs, he said, "Jack, jot down
these decisions from this meeting.
"First, I want'the Secretary of Defense
upon leaving this meeting to start the ball
rolling. on the aerial photo reconnaissance
over rribbea-such sur" efliance would give
me ours of warning, time enough to head
- -
off any attack, (18:,47.)-.
ganp- gncy will'Sa've a"t"fioroti' h analysis
_on these flyovers. Then he shall give a
bri the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
o tfie Dirg r tiig CIA, and the
Under Secretary of'Stata for Political Affairs.
'Third, that group' shall then give its
appraisal of the situation in a report-and
make it short,
"Fourth, the Secretary of State shall hold a
briefing conference with the Under Secretary
of State, the State Department Director of In-
telligence, the Deputy Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs, and the Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Af-
fairs -in anticipation of diplomatic protests
against the lyovers. He shall direct the
Kreu}iin4iogists (7:17) and the Deputy As-
sistant Secretar" 4ke, 'litico-Military Affairs
to re ar,
t n4r me as
t Q ses onat' Khru-
shchevand .can stooges may do
about the flyovers.
"Fifth, the composition ' of the National
Security Council is too limited for pooling
the best. brains ,on this, threryt, While. j, want
the NSC to continue aa~__a?body for very can-
did discussion and debate (31:64), f want
to make sure ,that it is more a planning
agency than a bargaining forum (44:145).
So I'm setting up an Executive Committee
of the National Security Council (46:4): In
addition to myself, it will be composed of the
regular members of the NSC except the Emer-
gency Planning Director, you as my Special
Adviser on National Security Affairs, the
Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney Gen-
eral (40:4), the Under Secretar of State, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, t Direc-
tor, the Chairman of the Join hiefs of
Staff, the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs and the Ambassador
tp the. United Nations (36:A1) (101:A21).
Notify them immediately. The ''Executive
Committee, in effect my 'War council" will
take over as the agent of the NaC until we
have made our final decisions. It will take
the place of both the old Operations Coordin-
ating Board (47:71, 72) (42`56, 57) (82:64)
(109:36) that was abolished in 1961 (81:649)
105 24) and the NSC Planning Board_
(4 (95! M) (169:$'7), which has been
dormant; n niy administration as contrasted
Be then, rose.froui his, aQ" w th.. "That
wraps it up. The Executive Committee Will
Carter Topping summoned to his office
Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilbert Roswell
(26:121, 129), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Gen. Tigh Maxwell (26:125, 137),
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
General Mack, Assistant Secretary for Man-
power Paul Norman (26:124, 133), and As-
sistant Secretary for Installations and Logis-
tics Robinson toderick (26:123, 131) and
relayed the instructions of the President.
"Tigh, get the wheels turning immediately
on aerial photo reconnaissance flights over
Carribbea by Navy F84 Crusaders, Air Force
RF-101 Voodoos, and SAC U-2's (106:E5).
General Mack, give Tigh a set of the Cutting
pictures, for I want special attention by the
Kremlin's mental processes and reaction to
our making flyovers on Carribbea-and if
necessary, alternative actions ranging from
a strong diplomatic note protesting any
Communist military buildup in Carribbea
to full scale invasion of Carribbea. Tell
them I want a 'think' memorandum from
them by noon tomorrow. They'll probably
have to work all night."
Thus, the spadework started at Defense
and State. It continued around the clock
the rest of that day and for all of the next
day. For the time being the Indians were
taking over and the chiefs were the
"waiters"-for policy, strategic and tactical
decisions had to wait for analysis, appraisal
and anticipatory evaluation.
allegedly cover. I want a thorough analysis,
evaluation, and report within 36 hours.
"We didn't get to any discussion of pos-
sible action this morning but the broad al-
ternatives are fairly clear now ranging from
doing nothing more than a strong diplomatic
protest to full-scale invasion of Carribbea-
with the possible Intermediary thresholds of
air and sea blockade or selective pinpoint
bombing. We've got to be ready for any-
thing and plan for ? the worst and hope for
the best. Personally I think the Cutting
pictures will hold tip.
"So, Tigh, I want the JSC to review all
war gaming to date and direct intensive
war game planning on all reasonably fore-
seeable potentials (108:30) in this situation.
I want Operation X (invasion of Carribbea
if ordered) updated (61:50). Get going on
this immediately-together with the draft-
ing of such plans and orders as are neces-
sary for movements of personnel and equip-
ment.
"Robby, get your boys working on a re-
port on the logistics capabilities and the
nlajor logistics problems arising from the
situation. And Paul, I'll want a thorough
manpower appraisal (62:96) especially our
Reserve Gallup capability with specific atten-
tion to the airlift capability of the troop
carrier wings of the Air Force Reserve. '
"Gil, we've got precious little time if the
Cutting pictures do hold up: It's the old
story of wanting something yesterday on a
time target. But I want all of this I have
requested as soon as possible because I'm
sure the Executive Committee of the Na-
tional Security Council will be called into
session by the President within a couple of
days-and then the discussion on decisions
to be made by the President will start. I
want as much as you can get me by that
time. So you've got the job of riding herd
on Tigh, General Mack, Robby, and Paul, and
putting together their reports in an overall
summary for me. That's it-now get going,
fellows."
StUG,, n lementgtion
At the same time, wheels had started turn-
ing in the State Department. State Secre-
tary Art Burgess called Under Secretary Jim
Batt (29:63, 73) to his office and said, "Jim,
I've just come from a NSC meeting at the
`White House and it looks as though we may
be on the brink of the moment of truth
with Khrushchev for the Communist build-
up In Carribbea may be greater than we
have calculated. I want to get committees
started considering proposals ranging from
invasion to a diplomatic approach to Russia
(56:A31). I want you to set up a luncheon
conference for me today. Besides yourself
-have the Under Secretary for Political Af-
'fairs (29:63, 74), the Assistant Secretary for
'Inter-American Affairs (29:64, 78) and the
Director of Intelligence and Research (29:63,
75) (80:975) there to brief me on the Car-
meet'as soon a we get the evaluations from "ribDeasituation.
the Syvvers. -,Good huntilig, Carter-and "Also get the Deputy Assistant Secretary
from $.ILri*cbev A,U...i11,?.t%arrigoee.. sto ge. (79:8) together with our Kremlinologists
Thank, you for coining" this afternoon for a brainpicking "session
This was a time of a relative behind-the-
scenes silence-a silence of urgency that
was to be broken 2 days later bys:G,ggeral
Mack's telephone call to CIA Director Scott
Davidson at an early hour of 6 a.m., with
t1i1t?, terse words, "The new pictures have
been made and fully analyzed-they back
up the Cutti pictures 100 percent."
(62:95)
"I'll be at your office at 8 sharp," was the.
reflex response of Davidson, "I'll get the
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
and bring him with me. Will you see that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff are there?"
"Right,',' Mack replied, "it shouldn't take
long for the briefing for it's so clear cut.
May take a little time for the group to draft
an appraisal report for the President."
Four hours later his National Security
Affairs Adviser, Jack Brandt, handed the
group's three-page appraisal report to the
President. He read it slowly at first with-
out expression, oral or facial-put it down
on his desk and then sighed, "It's even worse
than what the Cutting pictures indicated,
Round up the NSC Executive Committee for
a meeting here in an hour-at 11 o'clock
sharp. Also have General Mack here."
PART 2. DISSECTION _
Chapter V. First meeting of NSC executive
committee
There was a full attendance at the meet-
ing. The President opened it with the ob-
servation "Aerial reconnaissance photo-
graphs taken of Carribbea by our RF-101's in
Florida, our B-47's at Ramey Air Force Base
in Puerto Rico, our U-2's (87:Ell) there and
at the Guantanamo Naval Base, and the F-8U
Navy planes from the Second Fleet on ma-
neuvers in the Windward Passage, establish
beyond any doubt that an offensive buildup
in Carribbea has reached a highly developed
stage (63:A-15). It represents a threat of
very serious proportions to the United States
both here at home and abroad."
Intelligence Photographic Briefing
"General Mack will now show you pictures
taken during the past 2 days."
Detailed blowups of the pictures were then
flashed upon a large screen and General Mack
meticulously coordinated his briefing pointer
and commentary In analysis of the pictures.
It was a study of grim faces when the brief-
ing terminated and the lights were turned
back on. The pallor grew even heavier when
CIA Director Davidson read the three-page
]5 idson-Mack report which had triggered
the President's call of the meeting.
President Frames the Picture
Again the President took over. "As I see it,
gentlemen, the beginning of the decision
time starts right now-and time is of the
essence (104:26) in these decisions. We have
certain obvious alternatives (11:45). On
one extreme end, I can make the decision to
do nothing-to let matters ride along and.
hope that the buildup Is nothing but a cal-
culated bluff by Khrushchev in the belief
that he would not start a nuclear war with
attack on this country from Carribbea be-
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aa'use 'ff he so decided to attack he could
strike 'is with ICBM's launched from Rus-
sia itself: I can make the decision to do
nothing for fear of starting something that
Will eventually escalate into nuclear war.
"On the other extreme, there is the alter-
native of a sudden, without warning full-
scale invasion of Carribbea on the hypothesis
that with the military advantage of sur-
prise, we can occupy Carribbea as a quick
bait accompli before Russia can take any
effective retaliatory action. But this in-
volves the greatest risk of all-out-war-and
We must guard against disaster (11:46).
"In-between alternatives are (a) carry a
protest to the United Nations, or (b) block-
ade Carribbea until the offensive military
capability is removed, or (c) make air strikes
on the offensive sites (81:60).
"Which shall it be-or what shall it be-
is there any course that will accomplish the
objective of meeting the threat without Im-
pairing the security of our country? The
floor is open for discussion and for the sake
of or(er, we shall proceed by presidential
succession seniority. That means that you
are up first,_Mr. 'Veep."'
"Veep" Sizeup
In the characteristic gesture that tele-
graphed nervousness and concern to his close
associates, Jim Landon tightened his mouth,
pushed his lip up and backwards a'? the same
time And stiffly rubbed them with the three
midilpgers of his right hand.
"You will recall, Mr. President," he na-
sally drawled, "that at the meeting 2 days
ago of the NSC. I made two basic observa-
tions. The first was that we should make
.the flyovers immediately to double check on
the Cutting pictures. The second was that
we should do so regardless of the risks-
that it was about time we shed our seeming
timidity and took on a posture of courage-
that our image in Latin America and the
world had been weakened far too much by
our past caution.
"We shed our timidity at first on Abuc
and forced the Russian pullout of missiles
and bombers, We established, credibility
with Khrushchev. Bun then we backslid
as We did nothing when it was discovered
that the Russians' had missile submarine
bases in Abuc under the guise of fishing
bases' (2:18) and retained Russian aircraft
and military . forces under the defensive
facade. We lost much of the credibility
We had gained (18a:35).
"I think the worst decision that we could
make , .. now, would be the decision to do
nothing-to take a cautious wait-and-see
decision and.. to hope for the better. For
there comes a time .When we must stand.
Thank God, we did stand in'Abuc up to
the point of the submarine bases-but that
will mean nothing if we do not stand now.
"I'm not so sanguine now as to advocate
that we make a full-scale invasion of Car-
ibbea-because I want to hear what . the
Joint Chiefs of Staff say first. But if the
choice is between do nothing and coast or
invade as soon as possible, I'm for invad-
ing-because there is only one direction for
'coast{ng-and that is down hill. That's
my say in a nutshell."
Showing no reaction, the President looked
at Art Burgess and simply said, "Your time
at bat, Art."
Secretary of State Urges Restraint
Tapping his knee with his fingers, the
Secretary of State moisted his lips and said,
"Well, Mr. President, I guess that I'm in-
grained with the traditional diplomatic at-
titude that all differences should be, settled
by agreement at the conference table rather
than by bullets- on the battlefield, to use
archaic war terms. In my first task to iden-
tify the crucial international problem
(112:64), I must first stress peace through
negotiation.
"I disagree fundamentally with the Vice
President, for I think the worst thing we
can' do would be to invade-to be guilty of
starting the warfare. It would violate our
deepest traditions (19:6). I think even if
we pulled it off with complete victory and
without any retaliation of force from
Khrushchev, we would still be the loser-
for we would have lost the impeccable
reputation of never having started a war-
of never having been the attacker-and we
would lose what remaining confidence,
prestige and influence we have not only in
Latin America, but throughout the entire
world as well. We must maintain a decent
respect for the opinions of mankind (37:5)
(102:14).
"'Fortunately, I don't think that we are
faced with the disastrous choice of nuclear
,war or humiliating surrender. I think we can
take action that will sober and restrain
Khrushchev. That action is to lodge a
complaint In the forum of world opinon, the
listening post of the human race (115:71)-
the United Nations-against the Russians
and Caribbea-to exercise our right to
bring the matter before the Security Coun-
cil of the U.N. (47:A-4) and to demand
that the U.N. send an inspection team into
Caribbea.
"By doing this I think we would expose
Khrushchev to the world-and we would will
a psychological victory of significant propor-
tions-significant in that it would bring
home to the people of Latin America, as
nothing else has before, the Communist
threat against their own security and free-
dom. I think, and so do my Kremlinologists,
that this would have a significantly enough
psychological effect on Latin American coun-
tries as to make Khrushchev stop and pause.
Our Ambassador to the U.N. shares this
opinion.
"I would propose that'we concurrently call
for a session of the Organization of American
States and push for an OAS resolution con-
demning the buildup and expressing soli-
darity in opposition to it. We must recog-
nise that foreign policy and defense policy
are directed toward the world environment
(84:47). My Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs, our Ambassador, to the
OAS, and my Politico-Military Affairs staff
have expressed confidence that we would get
solid backing on this in the OAS.
"Even if these estimates should be wrong,
we would still have open the alternatives for
military action. But I do agree with the
Vice President on one point-that I'm not
irrevocably wedded to this position because
I first want to hear what the Joint Chiefs
of Staff-and the Secretary- of Defense-
have to say-particularly about what mili-
tary strength we have to back up any
stronger foreign relations policy than that
Which I have now proposed."
Defense Secretary Favors Firmness
Now it was Defense Secretary Carter Top-
ping's turn. in the line of presidential suc-
cession. He looked at the Secretary of State
and directed his initial remarks to him in-
stead of the President with "Art, have you
received any protests from Carribbea or
Khrushchev on the flyovers?"
"No," replied Burgess, "and frankly I'm
very surprised. There hasn't been a peep
from them. I think that Ehows that they
are not trigger happy-and that we can have
some hope that they are amenable to reason."
Scowling, his face flushed but the knuckles
of his hand white with tenseness, the usually
impeccably cool Topping, with the cutting
incisiveness of an M-60machinegun, said,
"Well, I've received a complaint from them-
not in words but In a missile that killed one
of my boys now in a watery Windward Pas-
sage grave with his U-2 plane. They were
trigger happy enough to pull the trigger on
him. I received the confirmation of this just
before I left the Pentagon for this meeting."
(2:18) (57:A2)
Then turning to the President, Topping
said, "To me, Mr. President this is more than
the loss of a young, heroic Air Force major.
It is a clear indication that Khrushchev and
his stooges in Carribbea are acting instead of
talking-that they are not going to be re-
strained by diplomatic words alone-that the
only thing they will understand and pause
about now is action on our part.
"In my opinion, taking this up in the U.N.
and the OAS first before acting will not
only not restrain them-but will tip our
hand and will give them more time to stall
and delay us-and in in the meantime to
accelerate their own buildup in Carribbea.
"I can tell you now that we certainly have
the strength to restrain them and whip them
if they choose to fight. For this time we
will be fighting in an area of greatest ad-
vantage to us rather than in a place to their
own advantage like Berlin, Laos, or Vietnam.
"I don't think we will have to resort 'to a
full-scale invasion-at least not at the very
beginning. I think we can take action short
of that. But I do think that we will have
to take some military action instead of wish-
ful-hoping diplomacy alone in a United Na-
tions that has amply demonstrated its diffi-
culty in achieving quick response-or in an
OAS which, with the exception of the Abuc
crisis, has failed to give us solid backing.
"I think we should act first and then take
the diplomatic steps-for r think the OAS
will be more likely to support us after we
have acted unilaterally than if we go hat in
hand In advance begging their help.
"I think we have more than one choice
between invasion and the U.N. We could
invoke a full blockade-or i limited block-
ade. Or we could decide on selective, pin-
point bombing of offensive points. But I
have not reached a firm conclusion in my
-own mind."
Treasury Secretary Sides With Diplomacy Aft
Now it was Treasury Secretary George
Dawson's turn. A direct look from the Pres-
ident was sufficient signal to him. "My
judgment is questionable on two points, Mr.
President. First, Treasury has little basis
for informed judgment as copipared to State
and Defense. Second, as d former Under
Secretary of State, we all know that I am
oriented to the diplomatic approach on a
matter like this. I agree with Art. I think
We should exhaust our diplomatic potentials
before resorting to military action-but with
a warning in that diplomacy that we will
resort to military action if necessary."
Attorney General Raises Moral Issue
"What's the judgment of our legal expert?"
the President asked of Attorney General
Ken Roberts.
"Mr. President, as a lawyer I think in terms
of the legality of any action that we take-
and actually that means thinking in terms
of the morality of any action that we take,"
was Rdberts" solemn response (19:6).
"The Secretary of State made a good point
when he said that we should not stain the
impeccable moral reputation and prestige
that we have of never having started a war.
I agree with him-but I don't think he is
quite accurate because our country does have
one stain in its record and that was the
Mexican War. In my travels around the
world that is the one argument thrown
against me by the Commies that I have
,never been able to deny.
"Far us to attach Carribbea-either by
.full-scale invasion or by limited, pinpoint
bombing-without warning, would be just as
immoral as the Japanese sneak attack on
Pearl. Harbor (87:E11). It would impair the
confidence of -the other nations in the
world against us for a long, long time. And
as a nation we would have a guilt complex
for a long time. It just Isn't worth the
military tactical advantage of surprise.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
"Whatever we do--X feel strongly that we Cha ter V~. Task orces its members wilf be the Assistant Seer etary
ram now ap- of Defense for Public Affairs (23:25), the
should clearly and firmly establish in ad- "In orde achieve this
,
vane a legal and moral basis for our action," pointing five task forces (105:24) to work Assistant Secretary of State for Public Af-
he concluded. from the close of this meeting continuously fairs (26:124, 133) (29:64, 76), the Special
Impact of the Attorney General's words until I call another session of the Executive Assistant to the President for Congressional
was Clear from the prolonged silence among Committee. I want each task force to be Relations, and my Press Secretary. It will
the group. That silence was not broken prepared at all times with a succinct but report to me through the Vice President.
.unti the $r, dens d, 'I don't think there "I shall expect
all task forces to consult.
thorough report of its evaluations and rec- is Aey . lpr a y further discussion from the confer and cross-check with each other as
ommendations to me in the mission assigned
cross-check of you present since the rest of the to it. Those missions are clear from the may be found necessary or desirable-and I
Executive Committee are under those who titles of the task forces." shall expect each task force to prepare a
have, already spoken-that is; unless any of program of Implementation in its own area
you who have not spoken do have a point Intelligence Task Force of action once the basic decisions have been
you would like to make." "Task Force 0 w-M--bbe the In- made,
Chairn),an otthe JCS Speaks Up telligence Task Force. It will be chairmaned "I want the Strategic Air Command put
At that point, Ti h Maxwell, the Chair- by the Director of the Central Intelligence on alert 3 and all other Armed Forces on
Agency, and-its members will be the Direc- alert 4 (18:47).
Man ",0$ the inti,efs Fiai* stood up tor of Defense Intelligence Agency, the Di- "Be prepared for call at any time, gentle-
erectly and said, 11 fr. resident, as a mili- rector of intelligence and Research of the men. I don't want a case of mixture of im-
tary man I am not unmindful of the moral Btate Department and the Director
obligations we have to mankind and I am e (121:5), p100:3 tion and panic as on Die sting. hu
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It (100:35). That concludes the meeting."
roud of'the
oral histor
co
ntr
f
p
m
y o
our
u
as high as possible: But will be in effect the U.S. Intelligence Board One by one the group quickly filed out of
y. 1 want to keep It.
there i? more tan high way s measure (32:39) muftis the ABC and military services the President's office with a sense of urgency
there ty, It is not immoral to shoot oot a a nure representatfvts (5:7). It will report to me to get the task forces into action. The only
deoer3,ip q It is n o &e, 1?t, is not im; rai. tg through Jack Brandt, my Special Adviser on remark made was that of the Secretary of
BttaGis , thgge who, if given more time and National Security Affairs." State that "Unless we keep our wits, we may
further opportunity, will kill all freedom Diplomatic-Political Task Force be fighting for our lives within a week."
must demonsjrate by actions as well as by Political Task force. It will be chairmaned Task Forces at Work
Words that we are militarily invincible while by the Under Secretary of State with the Within the hour, all Ave task forces (86:
supremely devoted to peace." (34:25) Vice Chairmen being the Under Secretary of 47) were hard at work-giving real meaning
U N. Ambass dQ Fires Bads State for Political Affairs and the Assistant to the observation that "Defense and foreign
Almost simultaneously as Tigh Maxwell sat Secretary of Defense for International Se- policy are a seamless web. (44.133) No. 1
down, Steve Adler, the U.S. Ambassador to curity Affairs (6:1-6) (23:23) (26:123, 132). (Intelligence) started with the reports of the
the United Nations, was on his feet. This Its membership will be divided into two latest U-2 flyovers of Caribbeaand then
was the second moment of personal differ- teams. Team A will be the Soviet Affairs turned to consideration of intelligence which
ence tension in the discussion and the tre- Team captained by the Assistant Secretary might give clues as to what might be the
mor `of Adler's voice threatened an emo- of State for European Affairs (29:65, 78) objective of Khrushchev and what other
tional explosion as he said, "Mr. President, 'and composed of our Ambassador to the steps might be anticipated. Was this mere-
We American., are not the sole judges of mor- United. Nations (29:70, 88), the Department ly a squeeze play directed to put pressure to
ality-and we cannot fashion and shape the of Defense Regional Director for. the Sino- get us out of Berlin? Was it a further move
Soviet Region (26:124), the State Depart- of the Soviets to control the major narrow
venien4e standards xcsuit Nor our can 'I own -con-
agreeee ment Director of the Office of Soviet Union water passages of the world-the Skaggerak,
and , expediency.
with 'Defense Topping that the Affairs (29:65, 68), and Art Burgess' the Dardanelles, Suez, the Malacca Straits,
trnit&d N4tiQrjs has amply demonstrated its `Kremlinologists.' Panama (49:83,1)2) and this time the Wind-
diffloi lty fn achieving quick response. I "Team B will be the Western Hemisphere ward Passage and the Mona Passage?
would recall your attention to the mag- Affairs Team captained by the Assistant Team A of Task Force 2 was brainpicking
its Kremlinologists on the possible reaction
t
f St
f
I
t
A
i
i
S
t
Aff
ecre
ary o
a
e
or
n
er-
mer
can
a
ra
lllflce}itly quick response that the United
Natiope gave , when South Korea was in- and composed of our Ambassador to the of "Khrushchev and Company" to each of
waded by the Communists. Organization of American States (29:561), the alternative courses of action set forth by
"But that was accomplished only because the Department of Defense Regional Direc- the President. It then turned to discussion
the Russians had absented themselves at the tor for the Western Hemisphere Region of what had to be done with respect to our
time in a boycott they were carrying on (26:132), and the State Department Direc- allies---especially those of NATO-on these
against the tfnited Nations," broke in Top- tor of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican possible courses of action. Should we con-
ping, "had the Russians been present they Affairs (29:64, 78). fer with them before making decisions or
would have used their veto in the Security "Task Force No. 2 will report to me should we act unilaterally-but with ad-
Council to block ands all action Look what through the Secretary of State." vance notice and how short notice? Should
they did when the iIungarian uprisin''was Military Task Force we bypass the United Nations?
- The other half of Task Force 2, Team B,
D ought before the U.Si." "Task Force No. 3 will be the Military began its discussion with the anticipated re-
Adler then shot back with, "Well if you Task Force, It will be chairmaned by the action of Latin American countries to each
decide to invade don't keep me in the dark Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice of the alternatives and quickly came to
as you did on the Quahog Bay invasion fl- Chairman will be the Chairman of the Joint agreement that invasion or air strike would
asco and yet look to me to defend such a Chiefs of Staff and its members will be the alienate these countries in varying degrees.
policy in the U.N.' (00i$11) Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Assistant Secretary On the other hand, there wan general agree-
President Steps In of Defense for Installations and Logistics,. merlt., that we sbQuld.avold the appearance
Sensing that the discussion was about to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Man- of asking their permission to act for while
Shift front an;objective discussion of policies power, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of that might please their national egos it
to a 'subjective clash of personalities, the State for Politico-Military Affairs (79:8) could indicate weakness and timidity in our
President Incisively cut in with "Gentlemen, (105:24). It will report to me through the leadership.
this is no time for the luxury.of polemics- Secretary of Defense." Defense Secretary Topping, upon return
or for 'gales of controversy' (67:50) as Sena- Legal Task Force to the Pentagon, called in his special assist-
tor Jack Henry has put it. Nor is it a time "Task Force No. 4 will be the Legal Task ant, his comptroller, and his Assistant Sec-
for final decisions, Force. It will be chairmaned by the Deputy retary on Manpower and gave them instruc-
Platt, t49 dsctr81 on; has been cop r3.i tlv. Attorney General (20:6) and Its members tions for "crash" action. The special
pal _tr n es,_ 4nd I eoi1.d ugt, will be the Legal Adviser of the State De- assistant was instructed to prepare a memo-
have,ale gd fQ_r greater productiveness than partment (29:63, 75) (20:6) (121:6), the randum on the economic effects,of each of
this sessip llas given me. ]:'rankly, If has General Counsel of the Department of De- the alternative courses of action. The comp-
resulted to steering MY tentative decisions troller was instructed to set the wheels in
fence (26:125, 134), and the Special Counsel
in specific directions. Other than to say Z to the President (19:6). It will report to me motion for all financial authority neces-
am prepared to use force, but prefer to use easy (62:96) The Assistant for Manpower
through the Attorney General."
the teat otJorce first (10i :A 3), Z am not Information Task Force was instructed to draw up necessary papers
yet ready to ndicate what those directions for a callup of the Reserve and National
ar imply because I will not-make final "Task'Force No. 5 will be the Information Guard (62:86).
deciS o } llk,44em r _m(gjp4aylojp a 'Task x'oice. It will liechat rmhnne h7 the -Task Force No. 3 (Military) began with a
more?sec a evaluation,' b1rect3r of'tie D.S. ~niormation Agency and review and continued updating of Opera-
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 latest intelligence not only on U-2, RP-101
and P-8U photos of the critical sites and
area but also for related intelligence with
respect to the Soviets and Latin America.
These three task forces exchanged opinions
not only as to Intelligence clues o Xhru-
shchev's real intentions on Carribbea itself
but also as a part of the overall pattern
on tactics and strategy.
Task Force 2 queried Task'Force 3 on the
CIA rector Daviclson pounded and
emptied his pipe on the ash tray stand ad=
jacent to his chair as he started with "There
is basically nothing that I can add on behalf
of the Intelligence Task Force to the briefing
that I gave you the other day-other than
to state that the situation has grown graver.
In our opinion, the Carribbea-Russian forces
extent of our military strength to back up a week or 10 days at the latest. If we are
alternative diplomatic actions, threats and going to take any action other than a pro-
commitments. In turn, task Force 3 queried test, we are going to have to take it within
Task Force 2 for frank appraisal of what the next 2 or 3 days. We just can't wait
support we could expect from our allies- even a week.
specifically NATO-as to the best evaluations "Were we of the Intelligence Task Force
of their intentions on giving military sup-
port. Would they be alienated by a block-
ade? If the matter was taken first to the
U.N. and the OAS for debate before action.
how long would,, it take? How much time
would be taken by diplomatic maneuvering-
precious time in which military forces could
be deployed and prepositioned?
Task Force Reporting
The chairman of each task force reported
at least every 4 hours to the Designate for
further reporting to the President. These
Designates, in turn, did two things-first,
they relayed the reports with their personal
observations to Jack Brandt, the President's
Special Adviser on National Security Affairs-
second, they met with each other twice a
day to report to each other, to discuss and
exchange opinions.
Their reports were then amalgamated into
one report prepared by Brandt for the Presi-
dent (43:65). From time to time, the Presi-
dent called one or more of them in to ask
questions and to consult further-and to
request further information.
Time Closes In
This process continued around the clock
for 4 days. In midafternoon of the fourth
dam I_A nirg gr Scott Davidson went to
the office of Jack Brandt, the President's
Special Adviser on National Security Affairs
and with grim face said to Brandt, "Our
decision planning time has about run out.
I'v of sge the President."
utomatic reflex, Brandt said, "Let's
go," and they walked directly to the office
of the President where they were immedi-
ately ushered in. As soon as the door closed,
Davidson tersely said, "Mr. President, our
time for deliberation has run out. The
aerial photo reconnaissance (7:18-25) (86-
38-41) (108:29) over Caribbea strongly in-
dicates, the Russian buildup is going
at such an amazing pace that their missiles
will be fully installed and operational and
their bombers will be completely assembled
and operational within a week." (2:16)
"That settles it then," the President con-
cluded, "Jack, call a meeting of the Execu-
tive iri`ommittee of the N$0 for tomorrow
morning at 9 o'clock. Tell the task forces
to be prepared with their final recommen-
dations for tomorrow will be D-day--deci-
sion day-for me."
Chapter VII. Task forces' recommeaidations
The next morning the President opened
the meeting on the dot of 9 o'clock with the
short statement of "Gentlemen, as you may
know, photo reconnaissance over Carribbea
.in the past 4 days reveals that the Russians
and their Caribbea puppets will be ready
to go operationally with their missiles and
bombers there against us within a week (2:
16). And as you may have guessed, I have
not finally decided-but I can no longer
delay my final decision. That is what this
meeting is for-to hear from the task
forces-and the Cabinet members under
whom they have worked. We'll start first
with th Task Force
No. :L-the ntelc~e'Task Force. Speak
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J~/ti wra ti nAflit 'I : _i, i.i... r. ,...~. ? t.-i r. 71?_._.
plan of Carib
( tfon ,X (61:50) an invasion
#rea that had first been drawn if 3'months
revletoltis for specified places and timing.
Cogcul'> ently, it gave instructions that each
Of' the > lternative military courses of action
listed by the President be war' gamed.
Afte;. some.disCUssion, it was decided that
lnaamugh as any military action would be
essentially sea and air-at least at the oiit-
set bei;ore, placing `any ground forces on
Carrbbea-the , Chief , of Naval Operations
,be ,designated the operational commander
(7:26) (61:50), subject to final decision by
the Commaxder in Chief, In turn, his prin-
eipai deputies would be the Commander of
- the Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANT), the Com-
manding General of the Army Forces, Atlan-
tic (Cfl CARL AN'T') , and the Commanding
General of the Air Forces, Atlantic (CINC-
AIPLAN') (96:11)
It was further decided that sea, air, and
land forces should be immediately deployed
into prepositions designed to carry out any
of the listed alternative courses of military
action instead of waiting until the decision
Was Made by the President on which course
of action to take .initially. This entailed
the movement of Army divisions, Air Force
units, and naval forces to the southeastern
United'$tates-a concentration of Air Force
units at Ramey 'Air Force `Base in Puerto
Rico-rushing marines to the Guantanamo
Naval Base-and the positioning of naval
vessels in the Caribbean area, particularly
around the Windward Passage and the Mona
Passage and that portion of the North At-
lantic between the two passages.
Task Force No. 4 (Legal) first indulged
in self-analysis and concluded that its mis-
sion was more than just deter'mining' the
legal aspects of each of the alternative
Courses, but instead included the drafting
of, such proclamations (61:52), statements
or addresses that the President might make.
Task'?orce No. 5 (Information) in very
short. order came to the conclusion that its
mission was to get the word out once the
final decision had been made-and to not
only get the word to the American and for-
eign press In such form as the President de-
cided but to the key Members of Congress-
and to the people of the Caribbean and Latin
America areas, especially to the people of
Caribbea.
"Cross-Fertilization"
Once all task forces had gotten well un-
derway on their own identifications of their
missions and plans to execute those mis-
sions, a "cross-fertilization" of inquiries and
exchange of opinions between the task forces
set in. It was this "cross-fertilization" that
actually, even though unconsciously, not
only informally: coordinated the work of the
task forces-b more important, veered
them. gradually some grounds of agree-
ment despite their differing original
courses.
For example, the Rremlinologists of Team
A of Task Force '2 (diplomatic-political) con-
tacted Ta.k.Force 4 (legal) stressing the im-
portance of the legality factor with the re-
port that the Russians "had, a feeling. for
'legality' " (19:6) and that a good legal basis
and presentation would undoubtedly have
a sobering effect on the Russians.
Team B (Western Hemisphere affairs)
members of Task Force 2 advised Task Force
5 (information) of. its opinion that getting
information to the, people of the Caribbean
and Latin American, areas, as soon as pos-
sible after the principal decision had been
made, was extremely desirable psychologic-
ally. They requested Task Force 5 to develop
plans for requests to selected American radio
stations to beam special broadcasts in Span-
ish once the decision bad beenmade and ap-
proval given by the President.
Task Force 9 (diplomatic-political) and
Task Force 3 (military) were continuously
will be in an operational position, at their
present rate of buildup, to strike us within
making the decision, we would act first and
talk later. For in our opinion, thus far,
talk has gotten us practically nowhere. We
recommend selective air strikes not only on
the missiles (87:Ell) (98:A2) and the bomb-
ers in place on Carribbea-but also air
strikes on the oil refineries and petroleum
depots to cripple general operations in Car-
ribbea-strikes to be made without warning
for our intelligence estimates are that any
advance threat or notice would result in the
Russians flying heavy concentrations of their
own aircraft in Carribbea ahead of us if
they can.
"We believe that the best course of action
is fait accompli because we have again lost
credibility with the Russians and this is the
action that is necessary to restore that
credibility. That's our recommendation."
It was clear from the expression on the
President's face that this recommendation
troubled him as he turned to the Diplomatic-
Political Task Force No. 2 Chairman, the
Under Secretary of State, and said, "All
right, now let's have the advice of the Diplo-
matic-Political Task Force."
Diplomats Recommend Political Negotiation
Slowly clearing his throat, the Under Sec-
retary. of State, in the formal tone that had
been ingrained in him as a career foreign
service officer, said, "Mr. President, we be-
lieve that we must arrive at the kind of
measured response that would remove the
threat by (a) posing a minimum risk to
ourselves and our allies, (b) involve a mini-
mum danger of escalation toward higher
orders of violence, (c) be consistent with
our treaty obligations, and (d) not contra-
vene the principles for which we stand as a
nation. (9:A12) (107:1)
"Mr. President, Task Force No. 2 is of the
firm opinion that we should make at least
one more try at reason with the Russians.
We prefer political negotiation to military
action. I want to point out, in this respect,
that this preference is fully concurred in
by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (10:20), who
is regarded as the key person at the cross-
roads of State-Defense-JCS relations
(79:3)-and between the two focal points
for 'military' and 'political' advice (109:39).
"To take military action against Carribbea,
either by invasion or by selected air strikes,
would not only cost us friends and allies In
Latin America (61:50), but would brand us
as an aggressor in the eyes of the world. It
would probably result in the killing and in-
jury of Russian military and technical per-
sonnel in Carribbea, which could lead to
nuclear retaliation on our country by
Khrushchev and we would be escalated into
that which we all want to avoid-an all-out,
nuclear war. Public support for U.S. foreign
policy to be effective is absolutely neces-
sary (38:59). We doubt if the American
public favors an invasion.
"We recommend that we take the case to
the United Nations and to the Organization
of the world is threatened, and the security
of the Western Hemisphere is jeopardized,
 ~ftv
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to the situation and act just as it did in
ote s iTd that the OASmember states will
at, leapt' see the threa? and solidly flack us."
i Military Recommend Invasion
No reaction was registered by the Presi-
dent, who then said, ' "How about the Mili-
tary'Task Force?"
Tile Deputy Secretary of Defense stood and
said, "Mr. President,' it is the` considered
judgment of the Military Task Force that
military action is ' mandatory and urgent.
We do not believe that the Russians will
respond to political negotiation. We agree
with the conclusion that we have again lost
our credibility with the Russians because we
have bent ovgr :backwards so long in pro-
longed talk'in this protracted conflict of the
cold viar that they doubt that we will act.
We believe tht "military action is necessary
to restore that credibility.
. "Nor do we believe that we can obtain-the
necessarily effective reaction and prompt ac-
tion in taking our case to the United Nations
or the Organization of American States. In
the first place, we have seen how our tradi-
tional allies-epecificafly our NATO allies-
acted ' when we tried to persuade them not
to trade wittvi Abuc a few years ago and how
they initially protested our quarantine as
violation of freedom of the seas , (16:35) .
"We have seen how the so-called neutral
nations, who held themselves in such right-
eous indignation as the moral arbiters of the
world, how thpy were so silent when Khru-
ahehev resumed open-air nuclear tests (13:
66) and when Red China invaded the leading
neutralist nation, India. And we have seen
in the past how difficult it was to gain sup-
port from the members of the` OAS through
attempted persuasion-but how, when we
exercised our power and acted, they fell in
step behind us in solid unity.
"No, we believe that military action is ab-
solutely necessary in this crisis. For further
detail on why and what action we believe
should be taken, with your permission, I
would like to defer now to the Vice. Chair-
man of the Military Task Force, the Chair-
man of. the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Maxwell."
As the President nodded his approval, Gen.
T3gh Maxwell strode over to a map on an
easel and picked up a pointer. "Mr. Presi-
dent," hesaid, "what I am about to say is
the unanimous opinion of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (26:125, 136). Khrushchev has
caught us with our southern flank exposed
(71:8). Your attention is first called to this
narrow water strait between Caribbea and
Cuba-the Windward Passage-and to the
Mona Passage between Caribbea and Puerto
Rico., We, believe that among the principal
reason d for Khrushcli,ev's grab for Caribbea
is his, overall strategy of gaining control of
the narrow water. passages throughout the
world-the Suez Canal, Gibraltar, the Skag-
gerak; the Dardanelles, the Malacca Straits,
the Panama ?Canal (49:83, 92)-and the
(Windward Passage and the Mona Passage
here.
"lf he remamils in Caribbea, not only does
he , present an immediate threat of ' missile
and bomber attacks on our country from
Caribbea (68:A-14)-'but also a longer range
threat of.taking over control of the waters
approaching the Panama Canal. Not only
that, he would greatly neutralize and offset
the present military-geographical defensive
advantage that we have against unfriendly
(faribbea in the Guantanamo Naval Base to
her west and Puerto Rico to her east. So
muclj for the Western Hemisphere.
"Now let us look at > urope-and specifi-
cally at Berlin. If Khrushchev establishes
),uSl r-p ,pable,, operptional missile bomber
eiit~ ,s~umg Ile for ea fn ,j ribbea "1ie'o$=
sets the present wire advantage and surer
bea. It would particularly have a so d
legal basis if we were to place the propos
blockade before the United Nations and the
Organization of American States for their
approval. This is what we recommend."
Information Recommendations '
All eyes then shifted to the Director of
the U.S. Information Agency, the Chairman
of the Information Task Force, as the Presi-
dent nodded in his direction. His brow
wrinkled and his eyebrows shifted up and
down as he looked up with a reticent smile
and through the smoke of the ever-present
cigarette that had become his trademark
in the past pre-Government days with TV
audiences.
"I feel as though I was about to do a TV
documentary, Mr. President. My Informa-
tion Task Force is sharply divided on the
big decision, although it is unanimous on
what to do once that big decision is made,
whatever it is. We're practically evenly di-
vided between military action and political
negotiation. Perhaps the Deputy Attorney
General has given us the easy way out with
the middle compromise his task force recom-
mends.
"But, of this, we are unanimous and sure.
Whatever the decision-It must be given to
as many people as quickly as it can be (93:1,
2)-so that they may know why we have
made the decision that we have. And it
should be announced as dramatically as pos-
sible and with the maximum impact.
"In a democratic society the public must
be kept informed of the major issues in na-
tional defense policy. It is extremely im-
portant that public opinion in our own
country vigorously support the decision. It
is extremely important that the message
be gotten across to the people of Latin
America (35:12)-and especially to the peo-
ple of Caribbea. We must get the message
through to the Russian people. We must
use all the facilities at our command. Even
in this crisis, the truth must be our guide,
but dreams must be our goal--dreams of
peace (114:4).
"Not only are the media of communica-
tion of great importance-but for impact
purposes, the forum or forums of comihuni-
cation are of the greatest importance-for
the atmosphere, the arena and the sur-
roundings of the message can well control
the mental and emotional manner in which
the message is received.
"For that reason, we recommend that the
President make the announcement of his
decision-what it is and Why-in the world's
foremost international forum, the United
Nations. As soon as the decision has been
made, we recommend that the President re-
quest a time to go before the General As-
sembly of the United Nations to make an
address of utmost importance. We further
recommend that such address be televised
to the world through our communications
satellites Telstar II and Skyfon, thus taking
advantage of the U.N. multilingual concur-
rent translations. We recommend that the
Vice Persident shortly thereafter go before
the Organization of American States with
substantially the same message on behalf of
the President.
"Finally, not only do we recommend that
all Government broadcast facilities such as
VOA (92:1), the AFRTS (78:76) and RIAS
(111:86) be assigned to such broadcasts, but
also that powerful American commercial
non-Government radio stations, that can
beam broadcasts to Latin America, be used
for such purposes, preferably through vol-
untary cooperation-but mandatory, if nec-
essary, through national security authority.
Any other recommendations we have, Mr.
President, deal only with detailed fm?-
plementation of your decision-and add
nothing to the discussion at. this time."
iority that we have over Russia on ICBM
operational capability (99:A15). By such a
military 'leap fro ' action he will drastically
change the missile balance of power (120:46)
presently from one of a decided inferiority to
one of a clear superiority for Russia.
"For if he moves to take Berlin and to
push us out and we threaten to resist, he can
then point to his missiles in Caribbea poised
to zero In on us. Then we have the choice of
backing down or not only of fighting a
nuclear war in a place of his choosing but
also of his having the ability to rain nuclear
bombs on us that he does not now have.
"We do not believe that he is prepared to
go to war now-and particularly in an area
to his own disadvantage-in the Caribbean
Sea-which has been regarded as an Ameri-
can ocean. But If Mr. Khrushchev is ready
to go to nuclear war over Caribbea now, he
is ready to go to war now or at any future
time (61:16) in other places throughout the
world far more to his advantage geographi-
cally. If he is going to launch missiles from
Caribbea, he will simultaneously launch
them from the Soviet Union itself (68:A-23).
"We think he's bluffing-otherwise he has
picked the wrong wtr in the wrong area and
at the wrong time. And we think he is
bluffing from a combination of his own des-
perate weakness of ICBM inferiority (99:A15)
and the lack of our own credibility in his
mind. He's bluffing like we did on the ulti-
matum for him to get out of Laos and when
we did nothing when he called that bluff.
We think the tables are reversed now.
"We believe we must take military action
to call his bluff-again to restore our credi-
bility-and to prevent him from drastically
changing the balance of military power by
this one bold, desperate attempted leap-
frog, this attempted blackmail (55:60).
"That action can range from an air and
sea blockade to all-out invasion. We think
the most realistic step is the most unpleas-
ant step-invasion. For even if we do block-
ade and the Russian missiles and bombers
are taken out of Caribbea, the Communist
government will still be there-and still con-
stitute a potential threat to the peace of
the Western Hemisphere and ultimately to
our own security."
"We have the necessary capacity (54:A-10)
and strength (59:A1, A4) (96:11) (117:A-1,
A-5) (98:11) (117:A-1, A-5) for a success-
ful, full-scale invasion (20:37), which could
be completed within a few days-or, at the
most, a month, if the resistance is strong
(61:50)."
General Maxwell then gently laid his
pointer at the base of the map and walked
back to his seat.
- The President then pointed to the Deputy
Attorney General and said, "You're up now
for the Legal Task Force."
Lawyers Recommend Blockade
"Mr. President, the members of the Legal
Task Force are neither military experts nor
political-diplomatic experts, so we are some-
*hat embarrassed to recommend outside the
legal aspects. But you have asked us to-
and we will-and admittedly with our
opinion being dominated by the legal aspects
of military action or political negotiation.
"We are opposed to invasion because we
do not believe that there is a sound legal
basis for it. We are a highly moral-con-
scious Nation and people-and 'legal' is but
another term for 'moral'-for what is right
morally. For the same reason, we are op-
posed to' selected air strikes or any other
similar military action. We-do not want
the 'United States placed in the position of a
Pearl Harbor in reverse.
"On. the other hand, we can see, a sound
legal basis for an air and sea blockade against
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in the room as the President thought of
how the survival of the world in the next
few days depended upon his wisdom and
coursge-upon how well he could guess-
and. upon the frightening unknown of how
sane and prudent a man Khrushchev really
was-or was not-through all of his bluster
and bluff. Only the President could make
the decision (109:41).
"'We must bring this discussion to a
close-and I am going to do this by asking
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of De-
fense, the Attorney General, and the Vice
President in that order to express their opin-
ions and recommendations. My mind is
made up sufficiently at this point to disclose
my decision to you when they have fin-
ished-but I want to hear them one more
time because what they have to say may
change my mind in some respects and in
some details. Art Burgess, will you start
it off and make it as short as possible?"
Secretary of State-Diplomacy
At that point the President pivoted his
chair around to face Jack Brandt, his Spe-
cial Adviser on National Security Affairs,
and said, ,"Jack, you have been coordinat-
ing the work of the task forces-arid I must
say that, in my 'judgment, the task forces
have done an excellent job in spite of their
different conclusions and recommenda-
tions-they have gone forward with vigor-
and you have had the best overall knowl-
edge of the work and the recommendations.
Because of that t want to have your opinion
and recommendations."
Special Adviser on National Security Affairs
Edging to the front of his chair and
biting his lower lip, Brandt said, "It may
appear that I'm bellicose-and maybe I
am-maybe I'm on the 'hard' side between
the division of your 'hard' and 'soft' ad-
visers (55:60)-but the more I think on
this and the more information that we get,
the more I am convinced that this is really
the moment of truth in the cold war up
to this point-and that we have no choice
but to take a calculated risk of, nuclear con-
frontation that admittedly has a dangerous
chance of escalating into nuclear war.
In my opinon, Khrushchev is either pro
Feeding from great strength or great weak-
ness. If he is proceeding from great
strength, then I think he is willing to start
a nuclear,. war now or at any time in the
future. So that I don't think that in the
long run any temporizing expedient such as
political negotiation in the United Nations
will ether bring peace or enhance our na-
tlonal 'security.
"It only delays the day of reckoning. And
a delay now, that perlhits him missile,
bomber, and submarine operational capa-
bility In Caribb'ea, strengthens him and
weakens us in the balance-of-power strug-
gle.
"Because we are so far ahead'of him on
ICBM strength (99:A15), I am convinced
he is leading from weakness. We have the
conventional strength with which to invade
Cariblaea-and I think the term 'liberate'
Is more accurate and, better psychologically
than the term 'invad.' Khrushchev doesn't
have the conventional strength to match
ours-and especially with his enormous prob-
lem of logistics, as he would have to fight
far from his source of supplies, while we
fight almost in our own backyard.
? "Thus, it seems to me that the only choice
left for him is to decide whether Caribbea
is sudtciently in' the national interest of
Russia-in the long-term strategy of com-
munism-to fight a nuclear war. I don't
think it is-because, not only do we now
have_a great ICBM superiority over him but
a clear nuclear superiority (120:46).
"No, I think he'll back down-and run
away to confront us another day at some
other place of greater advantage to him-
just like he did in the Abuc crisis. In short,
he has again doubted our credibility because
we didn't push against his submarine-
phony fishing-bases in Abuc. 2 think this
is the chance to prove our credibility to him
again. If we don't do it now--it will be that
much harder later on-and perhaps fatally
impossible.
"Im for all-out liberation military ac-
tion on daribbea instead of timid,. political
negotiation. Any in-Between action such as
blockade or air strikes is only a difference in
degree for once we take an act of confron-
tation, the risk of war is one. The principle
is'the same as declaration of war from the
standpoint of risk-the difference is only
Decision Count-I>own
The President slowly turned his chair as
if the words of Brandt had fallen very
heavily upon him. There was a long silence
The Secretary of State emitted a sigh audi-
ble throughout the room and started with
"My position is not easy, Mr. President, but
I still believe that there must be left an
ounce of reasonableness in Khrushchev.
Perhaps we could discuss With him the pos-
sibility of our dismantling our missile bases
in Turkey if he will do the same in Abuc
(1:A21) (69:A25) (75:B-1) (98:A1), as sug-
gested by Columnist Pearlipp and the con-
servative press in London (50:404).
"Rusian history shows a clear pattern of
Russia itself refraining from initiating mili-
tary action except from fear (64:A-13). I do
not think we have yet reached the disastrous
point where our differences cannot be dis-
cussed at the diplomatic table-where we
have to start shooting instead of talking.
If we shoot, then I think we will destroy the
last shred of any reasonableness left in
Khrushchev. He will shoot back and the
escalation game will be on and will not end
until all-out nuclear war has perhaps killed
off the entire world.
"I do not like to wear my war record on my
sleeve-but I have no choice at this time.
As a holder-of the Congressional Medal of
Honor for action In World War II, I say with
all the sincerity of which I am capable that
we should not take military action-we
should not act unilaterally-we should take
our case to the United Nations and the
Organization of American States."
Secretary of Defense-Controlled Response
and Options
The depth and warmth of feeling with
which Secretary of State Arthur Burgess
spoke was In sharp contrast to the detached,
unemotional, and seemingly cold tone in
which Defense Secretary Topping spoke. To
some, he was seemingly an electronic, me-
chanical computer that had taken on human
form (62:95). The few close, close friends he
had, protested that such characterization did
not do the man justice (02:99). But
throughout the discussions on the crisis, his
image was certainly more than of an elec-
tronic machine than that of a mortal human
being with emotions and fears.
"It is my concept, Mr. President," he began,
"that while this crisis presents grave danger
to us, ,it also gives us % golden opportunity
(92:96) in more than one respect. First, it
Is a golden opportunity because we can make
a stand-a confrontation-in an .area of the
.world to our advantage and to the disadvan-
tage of Khruschev-militarily because of the
logistics factor-weaponwise because of our
conventional advantage in equipment, in our
strike command, in our naval control of the
Caribbean--and psychologically in the deeply
Instilled feeling of the Latinos against for-
eign control.
"Second, it gives us a golden opportunity
to reconvince Khrushc~ev, beyond any
doubt, of our credibility-and I mean specif-
1cally nuclear credibility, which the woman
Senator alleged we have again , lost when
we failed to push against his submarine bases
in Abuc. I must. admit that she apparently
was right to some extent because otherwise
Khrushchev would not have had the nerve to
attempt making Carribbea a submarine, mis-
sile, and nuclear bomber base against us.
For if we stand-with our conventional su-
periority at this particular place on the
globe-Khrushchev cannot hope to fight a
conventional war with us. He then has no
choice but nuclear war or a backdown.
"That brings me to the third reason why
I feel this is a golden opportunity. It is a
golden opportunity for us because it is we,
who have the choice. It is we, who have
what I call the power of controlled response
(3:24) and the exercise of options (2:20).
We maintain the initiative from the start-
we act first-Khruschev can be kept con-
stantly in the position of reacting and coun-
ering. And this is certainly a refreshing
change for us.
"We are not in the position of our choice
being limited to a surrendering backdown
or starting a nuclear war. We have the
options (2:20)-and several of them. We
can plan step by step. We can force
Khrushchev to make the decision to-raise
the threshold-to escalate-instead of hav-
Ing that decision forced upon us.
"Our missile bases in Turkey are about
outmoded and we have been on the verge
of removing them (88:B23)-the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have made this decision be-
cause we have enough intercontinental mis-
siles so that we no longer need the inter-
mediate range missiles (89:D13) in Turkey.
"But the suggestion of a dismantling trade
on missile bases in Abuc and Turkey is un-
thinkable because Turkey is in NATO and
this would undermine the confidence of all
other NATO nations in us.
"I vigorously Oppose limiting our action
to an appeal to the United Nations and the
Organization of American States. I oppose
starting our action that way because it
would waste the loss of valuable time-and
that could be fatal.
"Nor do I agree with CIA Director David-
son that we make air strikes without warn-
ing-or with your special Adviser on Na-
tional Security Affairs and with the Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that we
should invade Carribbea. Either action
would limit our options and reduce our con-
trolled response.
"Instead I propose that the first step to be
taken be the imposition of a sea and air
blockade of Carribbea (98:A1) and that it
be maintained until Carribbea and Russia
do two things. First, they must dismantle
and ship out of Carribbea not only all mis-
siles and bombers but all Communist mili-
tary equipment, whether from Russia or any
of her satellites. Second, I propose further
that the blockade be maintained until in-
spection teams from the Organization of
American States can fully determine that
such action has been taken.
"A deadline should be set for the begin-
ning of the dismantling and removal of the
missiles, bombers, and submarines-within
48 hours after the announcement of the im-
position of the blockade. That deadline
should have teeth in it with the notice that
unless such dismantling starts within that
time we will then exercise what I call our
second option-our second degree of con-
trolled response-the bombing of some mis-
sile sites.
"If that does not start the Russians dis-
mantling within. 24 hours, then I recom-
mend the exercise of our third option--
our third degree of controlled response-a
full-scale invasion of Carribbea. Our readi-
ness now is such that we can, in my opinion,
make successful landings and occupy all
of Carribbea within a few days because of
present maneuvers that are going on and the
concentration of forces we have built up in
Florida, Puerto Rico, and Panama. Even
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61:50).
,,At no time should we use nuclear ex-
plosives first. We should force that decision
*40pe upon Khrushchev. We should retain the
'conventional option' (3:24). Only after
Khrushchev's first use of nuclear explosives
should we consider nuclear retaliation ac-
cording to the damage caused, and the intent
indicated, by his use of nuclear explosives.
If Khrushchev attacks U.S. soil, then I pro-
pose war plan AA-1, which you know in
detail, be invoked.
"I recognize that a President is often left
to figure out his options for himself (77:56,
57)-but these are my recommended op-
tions."
Attorney General-To U.N. and OAS First
Looking at the Attorney General, the
President said, "All right, Ken, let's have
your final word."
"I am in basic agreement with the Secre-
tary of State that this s?iould first be taken
to the United Nations and the Organization
of American States. I am bitterly opposed
to either air strikes or invasion as I feel
this would be immoral-particularly to strike
without warning just to have the military
advantage of surprise," was the response of
the Attorney General.
"I think that we should take the legal step
of appeal to the international and regional
bodies of the U.N. and OAS first-for actually
that is appealing to the highest legal author-
ity there is-the court of world opinion. The
U.N. and OAS are our forums-our media of
communication-for appeal to the court of
world opinion (51:1).
"I admit that we have a good chance of
quick military victory with a surprise air at-
tack or invasion. But in the long run
(45:20), I think we will lose from it-we will
have won a battle but lost a war-for where
we now have world opinion on our side, we
would lose it-by military attack-and
Khrushchev would gain it.
"But I have changed my mind somewhat
since the. beginning of our discussions. I am
no longer completely opposed to any military
action with some reluctance I can see the
advantage of the military action of a block-
ade since it would not mean actual shooting
unless Russian ships-or potentially, even
ships of our NATO Allies-might try to run
the blockade. Even then I don't like the idea
of a blockade in that it cuts off shipments of
some necessities to the people of Carribbea.
"If your decision should be a blockade or
,an advance warning of air strike of missile
and bomber sites or possible invasion, I feel
that we still should go before the United Na-
tions and the OAS with such notice before
acting.. To that extent we would at least
have the semblance-and the image with
some-of having acted legally or with a legal
basis. And even the legal predicate approach,
our Kremlinologists tell us, makes a salutary
impression on the Russians (19:6).
"It's a little like the difference between
straight touch football and 'flag' football,
where grabbing the detachable flag from the
waist of the ball carrier removes any doubt
and avoids any argument as to whether the
ball carrier has been touched or not. And
now that I've gone off on touch football I'll
stop."
Vice President-All the way-Invasion
Turning to Vice President Jim Landon, the
President said, "Jim, the final quarterback
call is yours."
"My first point, Mr. President, is that I dis-
agree with the Attorney General that inva-
sion or air strike would be a reverse Pearl
Harbor-an attack without warning. After
all for months now-yes, even years-you
` , have been warning that the United States
v would not tolerate threats to the security of
the Western Hemisphere. You have even
spelled that out by specifically identifying
any Russian offensive military buildup in any
nation in the Western Hemisphere as a
threat to the security of the hemisphere.
"I'm afraid that the Attorney General,
like so many Americans, has been somewhat
confused in his thinking by the result of
the steady deterioration of our military
credibility after the first flush of victory on
Abuc wore off-to the extent that our strong
words of warning have little, if any, meaning
because we did not back up those strong
words with strong action on the submarine
bases in Abuc. In other words, that our past
strong words of warning so lost their mean-
ing by lack of backup action that they have
not been considered actually to be warnings.
"I don't like the limited action of a block-
ade-because even if you do get the Com-
munist missiles, bombers, and submarines
removed-and it will not be easy to deter-
mine when, and if, that has been done in
view of the way the Russians and their pup-
pets have lied-and specifically in denying
all along that they were building up in
Carribbea. As I started to say, even if you
get the missiles, bombers, and submarines
removed, you still will not have removed
the basic threat-the continued existence of
a Communist government in Carribbea that
would destroy our country any time the
Communists thought it could be done"
(65:A-19).
"The only real way to remove that.
threat-to cut out the cancer soon enough-
is to overthrow the Communist regime-and
the only way to do that is by invasion and
occupation.
"Let us not delude ourselves on two points
that have been raised-on the moral issue-
and on the claim that psychologically we
would lose the friendship of the Latinos by
invasion. If a criminal faces you with a
cocked gun on the verge of killing you and
then terrorizing your neighbors and your
community, whether you are a policeman or
not, it is your moral duty to shoot him not
only in self-defense but for the protection
of your neighbors and your community.
"As for the psychological reaction of the
Latinos, make no mistake about it. They
respect power (120:46). Historically they
have always responded to power. They have
contempt for any country that does not use
its power for its defense and for its dignity
and self-respect. I know-because I have
traveled and talked with the man in the
street in Latin America. To a man and
woman, they have told me that while their
politicians would probably have criticized
us for a short time if we had invaded Abuc
at the time of the invasion fiasco at Quahog
Bay, inwardly they would have had much
more respect for us if we had gone all the
way and thrown out that bearded 'psycho'
Ortsac (19:8).
"So I say that we shouldn't throw away
this second chance to do the right thing-to
go all the way-to invade, throw out the
Communist regime and liberate. Carribbea
with a free, democratic government.
"I have only one further thought. If you
should decide to announce publicly your
decision in advance by going to the United
Nations as recommended by the USIA Direc-
tor, I believe that you should also go before
the Organization of American States instead
of me going before the OAS-because the
Latinos are proud people and they would feel
alighted if you went before the United Na-
tions and did not go before the OAS. Psy-
chologically, they are just as important, if
not more important, than the people of
Europe and Asia on this matter. That's my
say-it's your ball now, Coach."
Chapter IX, Final presidential decisions
Measured Choices
There was a long silence. Then the Presi-
dent leaned forward placing his elbows on
his desk and said,. "Thank you, gentlemen.
I have made my final judgment (58:A1).
rather a matter of choices (77:56, 57)-
measured choices (73:E1). It is this-a
course of action to start at a minimum place
(54:A-10) (118:A-6) with a blockade to get
the missiles, bombers and submarines out of
Carribbea and, if necessary, to escalate up-
ward fist to air strikes and then to invasion.
"I shall observe certain legal and psy-
chological aspects by taking the matter to
the U.N. and the OAS and to the American
people in broadcasts tomorrow-broadcasts
announcing the blockade order and the
ultimatum but not disclosing the potential
escalating steps-broadcasts that I want
sent to every possible person in the world
through Telstar II, Skyfon and all the major
TV and radio networks and the Voice of
America, RIAS and all our facilities for over-
sea broadcast.
Blockade-Limited
"Now specifically, I have decided to order
a sea and air blockade against all shipments
of war materials (118:A-6) to Carribbea.
The definition and list of war materials will
be spelled out by the Legal Task Force and
the Military Task Force working together.
But it shall specifically include oil (68: A-14).
I have decided to cover the oil factor in this
manner first rather than following the rec-
ommendation of air strikes (72:A-31) 'on
petroleum facilities in Carribbea because of
the time and effort it would take to restore
such facilities to Carribbea's economy and
daily life should they be destroyed. And it
shall specifically exclude all items for food,
shelter and health of the people of Carribbea.
"The blockade shall start day after tomor-
row-D-day-at 6 a.m. and continue until
all missiles, bombers and submarines have
been removed from Carribbea (118:A-6)-
both offensive and defensive because I don't
want any loopholes given to the Russians..
"The blockade shall cover the range of
longitude 67' W. to 75' W. and latitude 17'
N. to 21' N. Pursuant to the previous rec-
ommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the blockade shall be commanded by the
Chief of Naval Operations."
Give Enemy Time To Think
"I want to avoid the mistake that has been
made too often in past wars-the failure to
give the enemy a face-saving manner in
which to retreat and back down. In this case
I want Khrushchev to be able to determine
in his own mind that he can honorably
back down (70:E1) and that he does not
have to start war. I want to give him time
to think. (2:16) (4:94)
"For that reason I want the first Russian
ship approaching or entering the blockade
zone to be permitted to pass through with-
out challenge (73:El). I think that will give
the message to Khrushchev to pause-that
we are still reasonable and that he still has
the opoprtunity to back down gracefully and
with face.
"However, if he doesn't back down after
the first ship is permitted to pass through-
then from that time on I want the chal-
lenges and inspections with each successive
ship entering the blockade zone to be stepped
up and become stronger. In other words,
stop the second ship but make only a token
inspection-then with the third ship make
a more detailed inspection, and so on-thus
showing Khrushchev we really mean business
but that he can still get himself out of the
situation peacefully."
Ultimatum To Remove Offensive Weapons
,,The declaration of the blockade shall
carry an ultimatum that unless dismantling
and removal of the missiles and bombers-
and removal of submarines and deactivation
of submarine bases-starts within 48 hours
after the declaration, we shall take military
action to render ineffective such weapons
and facilities. But we shall not disclose or
tip our hands as to what that military action
will be.
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ration that in order for us to determine
whether such -dismantling and removal has
started within the ultimatum period, that I
am ordering continuous aerial reconnais-
sance and inspection of Carribbea both by
high flights by our U-2's and low-level flights
at 200 feet (4:93) (53:A-12) (54:A-10) by
our RF-101 Voodoos and F-8U Crusaders."
Second Option-Air Strikes
"If such dismantling and removal does not
start within the 48-hour ultimatum period,
then I h.gve decided that the first offensive
military action shall be three air strikes-one
against the principal missile site, one against
the principal group of bombers, and one
against the principal submarine base-all to
be made simultaneously at 7 a.m. on D-plus-
two day at 1 hour after the expiration of the
ultimatum."
Third Option-Invasion
"If these air strikes do not produce a
favorable response within 24 hours, then the
second offensive military action will be taken
with a full-scale invasion of Carribbea, in-
cluding air strikes against all missile,
bomber, and submarine sites. Major forces
for the invasion operation shall be SAC and
StrikCom (95:19) (96:11).
"Any further offensive military action will
depend upon the response to the invasion.
Should Russia strike our country, then we
shall proceed with the first stage of Opera-
tion AA-1, which I have already authorized
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon a con-
tingency basis."
Take Case to United Nations
"At the close of this meeting, I want the
Ambassador to the United Nations to make
two requests to the U.N. The first request
will be for me to address the General As-
sembly on an undisclosed matter of extreme
urgency at 6 p.m. tomorrow night. The sec-
ond request will be for an extraordinary
meeting of the U.N. Security Council im-
mediately following my address at which
time our Ambassador to the U.N. will pre-
sent our case (47:A-4) (97:A-1) (110:A-21)
and call upon Russian to remove the mis-
siles, bombers, and submarines from Car-
tibbea-and ask for adoption of a resolution
calling for such action ifRussia refuses."
Task Case to Organization of American
States
"Also at the close of this meeting, I want
our Ambassador to the "Organization of
American States to request an extraordinary
session of the OAS in Washington for tomor-
row night at 8 p.m.-giving me time to re-
turn from the U.N. In New York-at which
time I shall make an address similar to my
U.N. speech but in which I shall call upon
the OAS to adopt a resolution which our
Ambassador will present immediately fol-
lowing my address.
"That resolution shall propose condemna-
tion of Russian interference in the Western
Hemisphere and pledge Western Hemispheric
solidarity In support of the decisions I will
have announced in my U.N. and OAS ad-
dresses. It shall also request the other mem-
bers of the OAS to provide military and
economic support to the United States on
the Caribbea crisis. I shall propose in both
my U.N. address and my OAS address that
the OAS send inspection teams into Car-
ribbea to determine if missiles, bombers, and
submarines have been removed following the
ultimatum." -
Take Case to American People
"Because I want to capture the eyes and
ears (119:42) of the people and to enlist
their support (119:43), at 10 p.m. I want
to make, a brief 10- to 15-minute TV and
radio report to the American people explain-
ing the urgent necessity of my action
(12:35) stating that for the implementation
of my decisions, as announced in my U.N. and
OAS speeches, I am declaring a national
emergency and, under previously enacted
congressional authority, am preparing for
mobilization of all Ready Reservists and Na-
tional Guardsmen. The greatest importance
of this, for the time being, .is to remove any
lingering doubt in KhrushcheV's mind about
our credibility."
Psychological Moves
"And on this psychological score of credi-
bility-again to get the message across to
Khrushchev loud and clear that we mean
business-even nuclear war, if necessary-I
want two other steps to, be taken. First,
I want all families and civilians evacuated
from the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba
and Ramey Air Force Base and all of our
military and naval facilities in Puerto Rico.
"`Second, I want low level photo-reconnais-
sance flights (53:A12) to be made at noon
sharp on D-day right over the main streets
of Port au Prince and Santo Domingo-close
enough for the people in the streets to see
clearly the United States markings of our
planes and even our cameras, if possible."
Diplomatic Notices
"Three hours preceding my U.N. address,
I want our Ambassador to the NATO organi-
zation to inform that organization of the
contents of my address-and simultaneously
our Ambassadors to each nation with which
we have a security pact. While this is an
'American decision made unilaterally, I want
to touch all bases (101:A21) with our key
allies as well as the U.N. and OAS (11:48).
Russia and her satellite countries, includ-
ing Carribbea, shall not be notified by our
Embassies until 1 hour before (103:9) the
very beginning of my U.N. address."
Congressional Briefing
"Tomorrow at 3 p.m., I want to hold a
meeting here with the Speaker of the House,
the majority and minority leaders of the
Senate and the House, the Senate and House
chairmen and ranking minority members of
the Appropriations, Armed Services, and
Foreign Relations Committees (61:54)-to-
gether with the Vice President, the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-to
brief them on my decisions, and reasons
therefor, prior to my U.N. address-and to
request that they make preparations for a
possible call of a special session to take
appropriate legislative action-even declara-
tion of war, if necessary."
NSC Meeting To Formalize Decisions
"Now I want the Vice President, the Sec-
retary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and
my Special Adviser for National Security
Affairs to remain for a routine meeting of the
National Security Council to formalize my
decisions. Jack, get Emergency Planning
Director Tom Kelly over here immediately-
he's the only NSC member who is not a
member of this Executive Committee and
not here now."
Decision-A Collective Process
"That's it, gentlemen. Only God knows
if we have decided right-yes, perhaps even
more accurately, if we have guessed right-
made the wise choises. I could not have
asked more from you. Collectively you have
really guided (53:A12) (54:A-10) (118:A-6)
and formed my decisions even though only I
could make the final decisions-and even
though probably none of you agree com-
pletely with all facets of my decisions. I
could not have had a better team."
Divine Decision
"And in closing this meeting, I ask that
you bow your heads and join me in a prayer
to Almighty God, who is really the one who
will make the final decision in this matter:
'Almighty God, we pray that we may do
your will-that our decisions are in reality
your decisions-and that in these decisions-
and our actions we will, bring and preserve
peace to everyone, regardless of nation, in
this world. Amen'."
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Department of State Publication 7225, Sep-
tember 1961, pages 33-37, "Listening Post
of the Human Race," In WCNP, volume II,
chapter 17, pages 71-72.
116. "U.S.. Foreign Policy: The Formula-
tion and Administration of U.S. Foreign
Policy," a study prepared at the request of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
by the Brookings Institution, 86th Congress,
2d session, January 13, 1960, study No. 9,
pages 92-96. In WCNP, volume II, chapter
10, pages 25--28.
117. "United States Had Five Divisions Set
to Invade Cuba," the Washington Evening
Star, November 29, 1962, pages A-1 and A-5,
Washington, D.C.
118. Voss, Earl H., "United States Has Little
Hope of Soviet Policy Shift," the Washing-
ton Evening Star, December 18, 1962, pages
A-1. and A-6, Washington, D.C.
119. Warren, Sidney, "New Dimensions in
the Presidency," Saturday Review, XLII, No.
34 (Aug. 20, 1960), pages 11-13, 40, In
WCNP, volume If, chapter 4, pages 41-45.
120. "Who Really Gained in the Cuba
Showdown?" U.S. News & World Report,
November 12, 1962, pages 42-46.
121. "Your Department of State," Depart-
ment of State Publication 7168, released May
1961 (revised), pages 4-7, 10-13. In WCNP,
volume II, chapter 5, pages 5-7.
TH: Mr. President, in plac-
in is study in the RECORD, I am not
including the preface and the table of
contents in the study. However, I do
wish to mention that part of the preface
which states:
In this connection, A,disclalmer,is. made
that,. while there are marked similarities in
this fictio.d study to contemporary events
and persons, and while such contemporary
factors are used for citation purposes in the
text, n X Jp person is depicted in th '
study.
TRANSSHIPMENT OF WHEAT BY
POLAND AND YUGOSLAVIA TO
OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, some
weeks ago I received a letter in which
the writer stated that he had informa-
tion that wheat shipped to Poland in
large tankers Is transloaded to other
ships in the Baltic and suggesting that
this wheat which comes from the United
States under Public Law 480 goes behind
the Iron Curtain. I have received similar
reports about our Public Law 480 pro-
gram in Yugoslavia,
1. asked the staff of the Committee on
For`:eign Relations to check this matter
with the Department of State and I hold
in .n y hand a letter to Mr. Marcy of the-
Forejgn Relations Committee staff from
Assisant Secretary of State Dutton.
This letter is dated April 19 aild I ask
unaninous consent that it be inserted in
the RupORD at this point.
There being no objection, the letter was
ordered, to be printed in the RECORD, as
Washington, D.C? April 19, 1963.
Mr. CARL WARCY,
Chief of Stff,
Committee n Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senaty,
DEAR MR:? MARCY: Thank you for your
letter of Ap it 11, 1963, requesting a report
on the alleg transshipment of Public Law
480 wheat by Oland and Yugoslavia to other
Communist c untries.
The Depart ent has received in recent
months severa inquiries about alleged trans-
shipments by Oland and Yugoslavia of the
Public Law 4 agricultural commodities
they had re el d from the United States.
On each of thes occasions the Department
made a separate heck but no substantiating
evidence was un vered. Upon the receipt
of your inquiry the Department again
checked all avails a sources of information,
including intellig ce sources, but again
there were only ne tive reports. It should
be noted in this Bard that Poland and
Yugoslavia failed to roduce enough wheat
last year to meet th it domestic needs and
were obliged to turn o foreign suppliers.
As you know, our ublic Law 480 sales
programs are carefull reviewed to assure
that the commodities s old are well within
the consumption requi ` ments of the receiv-
ing country, will not d place normal com-
mercial marketings of s h commodities and
will not result in the inc ased availability of
those or like commoditle for export to other
countries. Under the te' s of our Public
Law 480 agreements, Pola d and Yugoslavia
agreed not to resell or ansship to third
countries Public Law 480 c modities unless
specifically approved by a U.S. Govern-
The Department, which aintains careful
surveillance to insure com lance with the
Public Law 480 agreements, uld, of course,
be seriously concerned abou any violation
of these agreements. The recd shows, how-
ever, that Yugoslavia and P and have al-
ways lived up to their Public aw 480 com-
If I can be of further asst ance to you
in this matter, please do not h sitate to let
me know.
Sincerely yours,
FREDERICK G. D Tom,
Assistant cretary.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. Preside t, I must
say that the letter is a model f ambi-
guity. In short, it states that ,the De-
partment has had a number of inquires
about alleged transshipments Public
Law 480 commodities but that A0 sub-
stantiating evidence was unc vered,
The letter also states that there sti con-
tinue to be only negative reports, hen
my specific inquiry was checked agf,inst
all available sources of informationk,
After these statements the letter con-
tains some disarming comments about
the general nature of our sales to Poland
and Yugoslavia and that Poland and
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400490010-7