JOINT RESOLUTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000400500018-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 1999
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: August 15, 1963
• Content Type: REGULATION

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88TH CONCxRESS
1ST SESSION
H. J. RES. 653
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AuausT 15,1963
Mr. LINDSAY introduced the following joint resolution; which ~s?~s referred
to the Committee on Rules
JOINT RESOLUTION
To establish a Joint Committee on Foreign Information and
Intelligence.
1 Resolved by the Senate and .House o f Representatives
2 o f the United States o f America in Congress assembled,
3 That (a) there is hereby established a joint congressional
4 committee to be known as the Joint Committee on Foreign
5 Information and Intelligence (referred to in this joint res-
6 olution as the "joint committee") , to be composed of seven
7 Members of the Senate appointed by the President of 'the
8 Senate, and seven Members of the Rouse of Representatives
9 appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
10 In each instance not more than four members shall be ap-
11 pointed from the same political party.
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(b) Vacancies in the membership of the joint com-
mittee shall not affect bhe power of the remauung members
to execute the functions of the .joint committee, and .shall be
filled in the same manner as ur the case of the original
selection.
(c} 2'he joint committee shall select a chairman and
a vice chairman from among its members at the beginning of
each. Congress. The vice chairman shall act in bhe place
and stead of the chairman in bhe absence of the chairman.
The chairmanship shall alternate between the Senate and
the House of Representatives with each Congress, and the
chairman shall be selected by the members of the joint
committee from the House entitled to bhe chairmanship.
The vice chairman shall. be selected in the same manner as
the cha-irman, except that the vice chairman shall be selected
by the members of the joint committee from the House not
entitled to the ohairmanship.
(d) The joint committee may appoint and fix the com-
pensation of such experts, consultants, technicians, and cleri-
cal and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary and
advisable.
(e) The joint .committee is authorized to utilize the
services, information, facilities, and personnel of the execu-
tive departments and establishments of the United States.
(f) The joint committee is authorized to classify infar-
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motion originating within the joint committee in accordance
z with standards used generally by the executive branch of the
3 Federal Ci-overnment for classifying restricted data or defense
4 information.
5 (g) The joint committee shall keep a complete record
6 of all committee actions, including a record of the votes on
7 any question on which a record vote is demanded. All
8 committee records, data, charts, and files shall be the prop-
9 erty of the joint committee and shall be kept in the offices of
10 the joint committee, or such other places as the joint com-
11 mittee may direct, under such security safeguards as the joint
12 committee shall determine to be in the interest of national
13 security.
14 (h) The joint committee may make such rules respeet-
15 ing its organization and procedures as it deems advisable,
16 but no measure or recommendation shall- be reported- from
17 the joint committee unless a majority of the members thereof
18 assent.
19 Ste. 2. (a) The joint committee shall make continuing
20 studies of-
21 (1) the activities of each information and intell-
22 genes agency of the United States,
23 (2) the problems relating to the foreign information
~ and intelligence programs, and
25 (3) the problems relating to the gathering of infor-
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1 mation and intelligence affecting the national security,
2 and its coordination and utilization by the various .depart-
3 menu, agencies, and instrumentalities of the United
4 States.
5 (b) Each information and intelligence agency of the
6 United States shall give to the joint committee -such in-
7 formation regarding its activities as the committee nay
8 require.
9 (c) As used in this joint resolution, the team "in-
10 formation and intelligence agency of the United States"
11 means the United States Information Agency, the Central
12 Intelligence Agency, and any unit within any of the execu-
13 tive departments or agencies of the United States conduct-
14 ing foreign information or intelligence activities (including
15 any unit within the Departments of State, Defense, Army,
16 Navy, and Air Force, but not incl~iding the domestic opera-
17 tion of the Federal Bureau of Investigation) .
18 .S~c. 3. A.11 bills, resolutions, and other matters in the
19 Senate and- House of Representatives relating primarily to
20 any information and intelligence agency of the United States
21 ar its activities shall be referred to the joint committee. The
22 members of the joint committee who are Members of the
23 Senate shall, -from time to time, report to the Senate, and
24 the members of the joint committee who are Members of the
25 House of Representatives shall, from time to time, report to
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the House, by bill or otherwise, their recommendations with
respect to matters within. the jurisdiction of their respective
Houses which are-
(1) referred to the joint committee, or
(2) otherwise within the jurisdiction of the joint
committee.
(b) In carrying out its duties under this joint resolu-
tion, the joint committee, or any duly authorized subcom-
mittee thereof, is authorized to hold such heari .zgs, to sit
and act at such times and places, to require, by subpena
or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the pro-
duction of such books, papers, and documents, to administer
such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such print-
ing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deems
advisable. Subpenas may be issued over the signature of
the chairman of the joint committee, or by any member
designated by him, or by the joint committee, and may be
served by any person deslb-nated by such chairman or
19 member.
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Sic. 4. The expenses of the joint committee shall be
paid from the contingent fund of the Senate from funds ap-
22 propriated for the joint committee upon vouchers approved
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by the chairman. The cost of stenographic services in re:
porting such hearings as the joint committee may hold shall
be paid in accordance with the established rules of the Sen-
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1 ate. 'Members of the joint committee, and its employees and
2 consultants, while traveling on official business for the joint
3 committee, may receive either the per diem allowance au=
4 thorized to be paid to Members of Congress or its employees,
5 or their actual and necessary expenses if an itemized state-
6 ment of such. expenses is attached to the voucher.
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anticaflztot be adequate as long as it
gt 'tWtctn4,; to be organised as it is at
A" t ago I referred to the Cen
teal enoe Agency as one of the
fterei Illtpaortant agencies of our Govern metlt' WJlat Is true of CIA is, of course,
even 'at the intelligence commu
nity'as :whole. Yet from time to time
t os&e `ttutintsin that Intelligence op-
ersti eat fell exclusively within the execu-
tive sphere-those, in other words, who
are Appasad to the establishment of a
joint`'. o tgreaional committee-try to
peirsnade us, despite all we have heard
crud seen dnring the past few years. that
nevertheless CIA is a purely advisory
body. that that it in not directly con-
cerned with the making of national pol-
icy, Mr. Allen Dulles himself remarked
several years ago:
CIA is not a policymaking Agency: we
furnlab Intelligence to islet in the focimrla-
ttom ofpolicy.
Senator Ruesau. during a debate In
the other body was even more blunt:
SOmi Senators who addressed themselves
to 1b gsso}utteo on Monday last, seemed' to
hold the opinion that the CIA was a policy-
making agency. That theme ran all through
the fesi-rtis which were made in advocacy
of the Adoption of the resolution.
Mr. President, the Central Intelligence
Agency Is far from being a policymaking
agency. It MAX" no policy.
The distinguished Senator went on to
say that CIA was merely a coordinating
and information-gathering body whose
function was simply to present Its find-
Was to the actual policymaking body, the
National Security Council.
Senator Roses6 said all this in 1058.
In my view it was scarcely plausible even
then. Now In 1963, after our expert-
eaees In Cuba, Laos and elsewhere, to
lair that MA U In no sense a policymak-
ing body Is to say something that is pal-
pably untrue. The National Security
Act, under which CIA operates, does not,
of course; formally assign it policymak-
ing functions. But CIA Is a policymak-,
lug body, and we all know It. The rea-
sons have been well put by Prof. Harm
Howe Ransom, our leading lay student
of Intelligence affairs. In his study
"Central Intelligence and National Se-
curity.'" published as early as 1858. he
hoe this to may:
Oartainly the CIA has no policymaking
responsibility. Yet policy making is not a
simple static action. Rather it is a dynamic
proem. A key element in this process Is the
information available to poilcymekers. The
man. or group. controlling the Information
available to poltcynrakers does in fact play
a major if Indirect role In policymaking.
A few pages later Professor Ransom
adds:
11 would be unrealistic to suggest that the
bright young men of CIA. by training. talent,
and personality. do not hold strong views on
controversial Issues of national security
ppoolicy. If it Is granted that knowledge Is
Indeed power. it will be recognised that in
reality the WA. through an Increasing of-
eclenar--and eons quently rising credit with
resrooelble decision come to
Play a ..~~m~s.,jjog rear In creating national seals-
ny .1.--1.
Surely those statements can no longer
be regarded-as Anything but the simple
truth. -In fact san Senator Russsm
appears to have cosec lowed. _- Last year.
during"tie h rhnss On the confirmation
of W. Johni MoCons tA be Director ad
central . Intelligence, Senator .Rvsegim
remarbed: -
`In this pitied'tbtculel which we are paw
leg, this cus Is perhaps ncond only to the
Presidency to its inumvismo.
A few moments later be repeated the
point. I Ian. iimfned to agree with Sen-
ator Rvasa1.L. And I submit to you that
one does not describe a man as holding
an once "wooed only to the Presidency
in Its Importance" If the agency of which
he is the head Is not itself a policymak-
leg agency' of the very first order of
lm'othis point, Mr. Speaker, I have
been mainly concerned to clear the
ground. as it . were--to state as clearly
as I could my objections to the argu-
ments most commonly used by opponents
of the proposal I am supporting. Only
by Implication have I suggested positive
reasons why I think a Joint Committee
an Foreign Inform stton and Intelligence
should be established. I want now to ad-
dross myself to the contrail questions:
why do I think- such a Joint committee
Is treoesearf4 and, equally importanth
what wont do I think It might usefully
undertake?
But first I lave to make one further
point. The (entrai intelligence Agency.
and Indeed the entirb? Intelligence oom-
munity, Is hiahly---and necessarily--ee-
cretive fn its mode of operations. For
this Maori outsiders like myself have no
alternative but to rely for their informs-
tioon on ioe!waapw reports, on the oc-
cadonal published hearings' on House
and Senate eomdnllttees, on the work of
scholars hie Professor Ransom, and on
a misoellaneci s variety of other sources.
In the very bat re of things our com-
ments and critiolsltts'cannot be authorl-
tastiYe. We are wdddnfr in the dark, or
at least in the semitwlligbt.' Nevetthe-
tees, i think we do know enough to have
reasonable grander 'for supposing that
all is not well within the Intelligence
community. Even more Important, I
think we know enough to be certain that
we need to know more-and by "we,"
of cou se, I mean not vecessarlly the
general public nor even every member
of Congress, but those Members who
would serve at the kind of committee I
have In mind.
Why, then, do I think such a com-
mittee should be established?
I have two general reasons. The first
concerns the extraordinary number of
specific criticisms that. have been leveled
over the years against the Central In-
telligence Amer and. by implication.
against the intelligence community as
a whole. Admittedly. as Mr. Allen
Dulles recently pointed out.,
You oannt tell of operations that go
along well. Those that go badly generally
speak for themselves.
And I would not want for a moment
to deny than the Coal Intelligence
Agency has scored a number of quite
spectacular successes---the 13-2 over-
flights, for example, and the overthrow
of the Mossadegh regime in. Irsm on
balance it is almost eertaialr true to say
that the intelligence community has
served the. Nations well. But the fact
don remain that on occasion the com-
munity has blundered seriously, and that
for Its blunder the cttlale{ta of the 'United'
States have paid a heavy price.
Let me' refer to lust a few Instances.
Back In 1950, as Mr. Dulles himself has
tacitly admitted, the intelligence com-
munity failed to anticipate the Chinese
Communist Intervention in sores. We
are still awing with the consequences of
that particular failure. A few` years
later an Incident Involving the ' QA
owned us serious embarrassment in tie
Middle East and may have contributed
Indirectly .to the Sues affair. in July
1954 President Nasser of Egypt claimed
In a speech at Alsx&ndria that be had
been advised by a U.S. too rvern
ment egficial'to Ignore an Important ales-
sage that he was about to receive from
the State Departinent, it was subse-
quently o6nMmed that the ofmcial In-
question had been the regional repre
sentative of CRd.
More recently, of course, wed the
fiasco of the Bay of Pigs. Chief respon-
s!btlity for that lamentable affair must
rest with the President of the United
States. However, there can be no slues-
Lion but that the Central Intelligence
Agesno was deeply Involved In the whoj6?
affair, and that its actions afid advice
had a decisive effect on , the eventual
outcome. Surely most Members of the
House will agree that It would be in the
national Interest to know whether such
incidents were merely particular aber-
rations or whether, in fact they form a
h iter nn th t Is likely to be repeated In
My second general reason for pressing
for the establishment of this committee
I can state quite briefly, It Is this. I
abhor government by secrecy. I regard
It as Inimical to the effective function-
ing of our institutions. I regard it as
alien to our American way of life. Above
all. I regard It as a threat to our funds--
mental liberties. I fully realize, of.
course, It should be clear from what I
have said already that a bigb degree of
secrecy Is essential to the workings of
the intelligence community.
But I fear that with respect to the
Intelligence community we are often the
victims of secrecy for secrecy's sake.
Things are done to us and In our name,
which we know nothing of. I do not
wish to aee the legitimate secrets. of the
Intelligence community reported in the
prose and on the air. Of course I do not.
But It does seem to me of enormous im-
portance that a few selected representa-
tives of -the people, chosen by the two
Houses of Congress, should be continu-
ously aware of what the intelligence
community Is doing and of the way in
which It Is going about doing It. The
American people have at stake, not
merely their liberties but their lives.
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 August 15
14268 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE ,
Oft was Ottly
Despite all I have pd?f,aed1 fe0 dlb. [i1f t~ 9 . publicized
would, of course, be little point in estab-
committee unless we believed he was telling the 'truth. But of CIA's apedo#n 1gon , and the fob
the &anicn _
liahing this faint s
had some fairly clear idea Of what we what:he, pas saying was in fact not tries,
CU,
we thought of what subjects and natumlly the sitoshouid, study. I propose. by this apparent Bevil evidence of American re Iiie ~u tessla also appears
e
therefore, to continue by discussing four duplicity. What was the upshot of this to tsars had a in -the East main and
questions, an of high importance. which episode? The American Ambascdor re- in > thrum
I think might usefully be investigated: signed, the 118. Government was deeply Hui?litafii, -ODei'atbnsanof this d controlled unless
by a*
]&a& the relations between the central embarrassed, and the Government of carefully super'1 1
Intelligence Agency and the State De- Burma threatened for a time to break off re reWOODA e l Goes States inns the partnent, especially overseas; second, diplomatic relations.
the relations between intelligence-gath- Admittedly, this incident was particu- major international crisis. possibly In
Bring on the one hand and so-called larly ludicrous. But It is not without war. If this was, not clear before the
special operations on the other; third. parallel. Our policy in the early stages Bay of Pin. It ought to be clear now.
tae selection and training of intelligence of the Laotian crisis appears to have The Institutional danger here Is read
personnel: and fourth, the whole ques- been constantly bedeviled by a lack of fly apparent and has often been stated.
Lion of intelligence evaluation. I pro- effective coordination between the CIA As Professor Ransom Puts it:
pose to deal briefly with the first three of and the State Department. Similarly - 'To mil tau two functions.-
in-
these questions and to say rather more wvialon. Mr. Tad ith Cuba prior to the Band DargKarl That Is. of Information gathering and
about the fourth.
First, the relations between CIA and Meyer , In their able account of that. special operations-
volviaga foot the s and w7ir that u at the foreign the gams agents coitame
the State Department. aiiair, describe how, on its own initiative, lrtIed d
The problem here has been posed gain- CIA established close working relations to bolster t cause the overthrow of a foreign
apparent interest
isinotlY by Henry Howe Ransom in the with exiled supporters of the former die- o'+m'a~f In Atnee'ic overthrow
book I have already cited. on page 916 tator Batt". They add: MAY d , a sass Wan objective sense for
This decision marked the Inauguration of dig batwan} fact and aspiration. writes: he what, In effect. became its independent for-
s. Government of o1 toward Cuba, In cavalier dine- Messrs. t3s111c and Meyer make the
'faring s operation secret aby the t for Intelligence
action could have gord of the thinking In the White Souse game point liprolros of GSrba:
a tarr
in
exempt
widespread diplomatic ramifications. There and the State Department. effTes'hte, t IAu n ~n~ , *1 were
from ma be a basic Incompatibility between the Note that all this occurred despite the any meaningful outside checks on their ac-
alo ntenance of accredited diplomatic miff- efforts of an earlier Secretary of State, tivitlei. Indeed. they were in the enviable'
Mr. Christian Herter, to regularize rels- position of both organiOna a clandestine op-
steal In some 78 foreign Pi's (as of robe)--
The number would be considerably tions between the State Department and eration and preparing the intelligencs data
greater now- CIA. Since then the Herter-Allen Dulles through which the validity of the venture
could be judged.
sa4 the existence of American secret agents agreement on the relations between
solution to this problem
l in the field
in moat of these some foreign areas. Great- bassadora and CIA p~erso The obtlous
eat care must be exercised to keeping V. has been reaffirmed by Mr. Rusk and Mr. would, of course, be:to deprive CIA en-
diplomacy separated from spying and back McCone. And by now we have reason tirely of Its special operations function.
stage p01 tttaai maneuvering, at least on the to hope that the responsible foreign Unfortunately the people In the most fa
the probably should Volleymakers--il-Q President and the vorabit puddon to collect clandestine
surtaoe, yet the diplomats
s of A eer in the et a an to the National Security Council-have reas information are often also the- people
not be
activities of /-mrican secret agents. sorted their authority over the Central beat placed to'ertgkge In subversive polit?
The possibly disruptive effect of hay Intelligence Agency. I agree that to a *Aa scq IUei. In addition, a total dl-
lAg, .on the premises of American em- considerable extent this Is a problem Of, oa+oe between the two functions might
bassles abroad or in the field, agents particular persons and particular situa- lead. in R*naotti's words, to "co>sapett
who owe allegiance to someone other tiong, But it is also the case that, as Lion, duplication. and even outright con-
than the ambassador and to an organi- long as both state Department and CIA filet."
zation other than the State Department personnel am working In the field, as For a time the Maxwell Taylor Corn-.
and who may be engaging in activities long as both agencies are responsible for mjytee, appointed by the president to in-
running counter to expressed State De- the collection of Information, and-per- = into the Hay of Pigs affair, ap-
perlment policy, scarcely needs spelling hops most lmporte~r-tr-ae long as CIA to have toyed, at least, with an
out In detail. continues to be responsible for special alternative idea-the idea of transfer-
Nor are these dangers merely specu- operations, the problem of integrating ring the bulk of CIA's special operations
lathe. It seems, for example, that to- the Central Intelligence Agency into our to the Defense Department. But this
ward the end of the Chinese civil war general foreign policy apparatus will re- solution would have had the equally ob-
remnants of Chiang Rai-shek's Na- main difficult and will remain worthy of vious disadvantage of ensuring that the
tionalist Army moved into parts of close and continuous examination. The uniformed military--and hence the
northern Burma. These troops claimed exercise of surveillance. in this field I credit and prestige of the US. Govern-
to be eager to harass the Communists ooneelve to be one possible function of cent-would become Involved as soon as
across the border, and CIA accordingly a Joint Congressional Committee on For- any paramilitary operation became a
supplied them with large quantities of eign Information and Intelligence. matter of public knowledge.
money and arms. But according to A moment ago I alluded to the con- in the event, it seems that routine
available reports the Chinese had long duct by the CIA of so-called special op- covert operations have been left In the
since tired of fighting. Instead of at- erations; that is, the fomenting of oppo- hands of CIA. control to left txarrs-
tacking the Communists, they proceeded sltion against hostile. governments, the few to the .with conly If a be rac-
to settle down, to occupy much of the arming of Insurgents, the provocation of fer project becomes Pentagon On as to waricu-
best agricultural land in northern enemy action. and so on. The question
Burma, and to cultivate opium-all with of housing these special operations--0r open military participation. Mr. Hanson
the assistance of U.B. funds. additional services or other functions or Baldwin in the New York limes summed
This would have been a melancholy whatever you want to call them-under up the matter thus:
episode in any case. But what made it the same roof as the CIA's purely Intel- The general rule of thumb for the future
worse was the fact that our Ambassador ligence-gathering operations has, of is that the CIA will not harulle any 1 -
in Rangoon apparently had not the course, long been a matter of controversy, maruy military operations. or anes of such
How-
faintest idea of what CIA was doing. and it is this question that I. suggest size that they cannot kept l
When the Burmese Government formally. might usefully be the second of the new oam, each n mertas~: van app n~otlea u-~
complained to the United States, the joint committee's areas eed Study. be re- on it. that will eat one ohhard-on under
Ambassador issued a categorical denial; I do not suppose we the CIA and another ender pthe er ~ "
he said the United States had nothing minded of the importance of this ques-
... mw. 6,iG f7".,~w. ... ....,xeVl.+*?..+nrN.7r+~=:Y,im..,wr .. ?:,.... ,'.w..,..,._...
Approved For Release .: CIA-RDP75-00149.R00040050001 8-7
 Annrnvarf WpR' wiaim -1?T1157! HztQR August 15
n
g
R
es
e
Intelligenuo y diplomatic relations. wittingly involve
pert went. especially . overseas; second.
intelligence-gath- Admittedly, this incident was particu- major international eribis. Possibly in
them an relations
the one between
hand and so-called early ludicrous. But It is not without war. If this was not clear before the Mal operations on the other: third, parallel. Our policy in the early stages Bay of Pigs. it ought, to be clear now.
selection and training of intelligence of the Laotian crisis appears to have The Institutional danger here Is read-
personnel; and fourth, the whole ques- been constantly bedeviled by a lack of By apparent and has often been stated:
tiosnof intelligence evaluation. I pro- effective coordination between the CIA As Professor Ransom puts It.
pose to deal briefly with the first three of and the State Department Similarly To mix the two functions--
thesei questions and to say rather more with Cuba prior to the Bay of Pigs in-
about the fourth. vasion. Mr. Tad Szulc and Mr. Karl nal Is. of Info--
First. the relations between CIA and Meyer. In their 'able account of that- special
the danger that forei~n agents ca-
the State Department. ? affair, describe how, on its own initiative, Involy facts and t at o tin same
Problem here has been posed sue- CIA established close working relations le bolster or cause try ng overthrow -& of a e rim
oip~ly .by Henry Howe Ransom in the with exiled supporters of the former die- government in America's apparent Interest
book I have already cited. On page 216 tator Batista. They add: may develop a less than objective soon for
he writes: This deotalon marked the Inauguration of distinguishing between fact and aspiration.
The operation by the U.S. Cloveinment of what. in effect, became Its Independent for- Messrs. Szlile and Meyer make the
a fsrliung secret apparatus for intelligence elgn policy toward Cuba, in cavalier diere-
gathering and political action could have Card of the thinking in the White House same. point apropos of Cuba:
widespread diplomatic ramifications. Thera and the State Department. The CIA men were not only shaping, in
dmr~aayy be a basic Incompatibility between the Note that all this occurred despite the elect. foreign policy. but were exempt tram
2ilainterisaice of accredited diplomatic mU- any meaningful Outside checks on their ac-
fforts of an earlier Secretary of State. tivities. Indeed, they were in the enviable
e
dons in some 78 foreign posts (as of 1968)- Mr. Christian Herter. to regularize rela- position of both organizing a clandestine op-
The number would be considerably tions between the State Department and eration and preparing the Intelligence data'
greater now- CIA. Since then the Herter-Allen Dulles through which the validity of the venture
and the existence of American secret agents agreement on the relations between Am- could be judged,
in"moat of these same foreign areas. Great- bassadors and CIA personnel in the field The obvious solution to this problem'
eat care must be exercised in keeping 'U.S. bas been reefi.nned by Mr. Rusk and Mr. would, of course. be to deprive CIA en-
diplomacy ~yarated from spying and back- MCCorre. And by now we have reason tirely of Its special operations function.
stage political maneuvering, at least on the to hope that the responsible foreign Unfortunately the people in the most fa-
surface , cyst let diplomats probably should pouoymakers---the President and the vorable position to collect clandestine t In slot be ovo A eer a the at .. as to the National Security Council-have real- Information are often also the people
activities of mricn secret agents, ~ their authority over the Central best plate to engage in subversive polit
to continue by diacuemnt four flop
osii, - in Eastern Eurolse. in ERA Berlin and
all of high importance. which episode? The American Ambassador re
might usefully be investigated: signed, the U.B.'Oovernment was deeply Hungary. Operations of this sort, unless-
illiisk
first, ,the relations between the Central embarrasaM, and the Government of carefully supervised and controlled by
enc and the State De- Burma threateMd for a time to break off responsible political II~t
i
A
d I
t
a
i
r
e
a
y
t, It should do, of what suWe ors mud "A"U ti it should study. I propose. by this apparent evidence of American regime in Guatemala. CIA also appears
iiaiq- - What was the upshot of this to have had a hand in the main risings
':'"Despite all I have said so far. there vouu warn aa,c ?.,...........- -.- ---
rrfiiild, of course, be little point In estab- alist Chinese. Our Ambassador of course' the moat spectacular and beet publicized
- this joint, committee unless we believed he was telling the truth. But of CIA's special operations. There was
d some' fairly clear Idea of what we what be was laying was in fact not true, the Iranian affair in 1953. and the for
mose were shocked lowing year the overthrow of the Arberiz
l
19
ll
th
The possibly disruptive effect of hav-
1Ag. on the premises of American em-
brsdes abroad or in the field, agents
who owe allegiance to someone other
than the ambassador and to an organi-
sation other than the State Department
and who may be engaging in activities
running counter to expressed State De-
partment policy, scarcely needs spelling
out in detail.
Nor are these dangers merely specu-
lative. it seems, for example, that to-
ward the end of the Chinese civil war
mnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Na-
r
e
tionalist Army moved into parts of close and continuous examination. The uniformed military-and hence the
northern Burma. These troops claimed exercise of surveillance in this field I credit and prestige of the U.B. Govern-
to be eager to harass the Communists
across the border, and CIA accordingly
supplied them with large quantities of
money and arms. but according to
available reports the Chinese had long
since tired of fighting. Instead of at-
tacking the Communists, they proceeded
to settle down, to occupy much of the
best agricultural land in northern
Burma, and to cultivate opium-all with
~~_ ---,..a........ ..I IT n fur.A.
Tills Would nave oeeil a utcuu,, Ian r
episode In any case. But what made it the same roof as the CIA's purely Intel- The general rule of thumb for the future
worse was the fact that our Ambassador ligence-gathering operations has, of is that the CIA will not handle any pri-
in Rangoon apparently had not the course, long been a matter of controversy. marily military operations, or ones of such
faintest Idea of what CIA was doing. and It is this question that I suggest size that they cannot be kept secret. How-
When the Burmese Government formally might usefully be the second of the new over, each case will apparently be judged
complained to the United States. the joint committees areas of study. on its merits; there to no hard-and-feet
Ambassador issued a categorical denial; I do not suppose we need to be re- formula that will put one operation under
he said the United States had nothing minded of the importance of this ques- the CIA and another under the ?sntagoa,_
ASrtid'rrase=1'7 O,U1491?0~oos
intelligence Agency. I agree that to a teal sotlvitles. In addition, a total di-
considerable extent this Is a problem of vorce between the two functions might
particular persons and particular situs- lead, in Ransom's words, to "competi-
tions. But It Is also the case that, as tion, duplication, and even outright con-
long as both State Department and CIA filet."
personnel are working in the field, as - For a time the Maxwell Taylor Com-
long as both agencies are responsible for mittee, appointed by the President to in-
the collection of information, and-per- quire into the Bay of Pigs affair, ap-
hope most important-as long as CIA pears to have toyed, at least, with an
continues to be responsible for special alternative ideas-the idea of transfer-
operations, the problem of integrating ring. the bulk of CIA's special operations
the Central Intelligence Agency into our to the Defense Department. But this
general foreign policy apparatus will re- solution would have had the equally ob-
main difficult, and will remain worthy of vious disadvantage of ensuring that the
a joint Congressional Committee on For- Ate; -paramilitary operation became a
eign information and Intelligence. matter of public knowledge.
A moment ago I alluded to the con- In the event, it seems that routine
duct by the CIA of so-called special op- covert operations have been left in the
erations; that is, the fomenting of oppo- hands of CIA, with control to be trans-
armn against Ins
ing urgents, hostile governments, the ferred to the Pentagon only if a particu-
i, the e provocation of far project becomes so big as to warrant
The Question
enemy emy action, , and so on.
of housing these special operations--or open military participation. Mr. Hanson
 1vss ? Apprdr" 1 i I RdP_ 49R0OQ 005440 & 7 '
All Of us, I think Will agree that this lift pia, for example, to rely to the with` the top level : ,, rshte ilhgon
- . - - ? C. -_.- ._ A- ?+s.. i..a A.~artl and 1t~ ~~ 1es .
-
t
ed
0` 114 .,....-.--, - 1-
ir
mules aril not gpproprraui ant In'wt< cir, .x re
111 the nature;fefthirngs, organisettional BUD. ie that .retired. scrubs OfilCera. hO'1/.. etltleaa sg : Otg41
ginlmlc s,.cancriit solve' the major diM- tiiot"h almostitlwsn men of gross sell-, thtee
cultles. Al in the can of relations be- ity, would have, an InstioWve teadeUoy aoeritrale, b I;iteelligsnoe
tween CIA and the State Department. to takes rathersnarrow. strictly "spars- Agex~ re used- to pr'ovde m o with au.
much depends. on particular people and tional" view of the problems confronting thgdtative Info mation sa.I have had .to
particular situations. But largely be- them Slenderer. J& . It. wise to rely too rely os data from published sources.
cause the problem Is of this sort, because heavily on the services of political exiles By the phrase "intelligence earn
it is a problem which can never finally and refugees? It qe reasonable. for munllty" I mean the nit Tom menalei
tiinuin gc coni feet gressional rosurrveillthat con- anceis ~ato suppose that an exile from within thA ancutive branch Concerned
be
especially a who has with Intelligence ocllectlon and syslue-
urgently required. If a joint committee passionate convictions about what course tlon: the CIA, the now Defense tntehl
had been in existence in the early stages events 132 his homeland ought to take, gene Agency. the State Departueitlt.:
of the first Cuban crisis. and If It had may not be the beet person to assess RAND, and so on. The oommpnity se a
. the
had cognizance of this matter. would the what course events In his homeland actu- whole Is responsible for nrodUC
Bay of Pigs fiasco have occurred? I ally are taking, especially N what is actu- national b7- '
think it is at least possible that it would ally happening Is not to his taste. sor Ransom ras .''~ vital budding
not. Please do riot misunderstand me. I blocks of national lOCUrltyub With
Discussion of the Bay of Pigs leads me do not mean to Impugn the enormous nthe exception by AD" l-
nd b
y ems- ~~ ~
think a joint committee might rnvesti- retired service v&wuora a
gate: the whole Question of recruitment refugees 1n t e IA. Without their help. + r IIed etii o -
For within the Intelligence the QMUASMIOVLsimply could not the Central Int teelli- ational _Epklaha so -es . .
a personnel
ly clear that one of the things that went gene Agency undoubtedly commands of Board consists of ~a small hllnlber
wrong with the abortive Cuban inva- some of the ablest minds in the U.S. Gov- of . intelligence etxerto -aoldlers. dam-
sion--not the only thing. but one of the erpuzent. And of course I do not mean int., and scholars--who, to duo" Ryan-
things-awes that much of the CIA per- for a moment to suggest that CIA should sold bgatll. ass liked of WiannIft,
sonnel responsible for the operation con- be. staffed with "soft-liners" or people 6e M .* th
silted of the sort of People who could not who have had no personal experience of manlty." The Board can~l~te the:
t
distinguish between the reactionary and the countries in question. That would be Upreparation sually does of an kttl t"oque" the It
the democratic elements in the anti- absurd. so only hoin
Castro camp. between the opponents of But what X 4o think Is that we have President, the Director of Central Llts-
Castro who were acceptable to the Cuban to be sure that what we are getting are agenee. or some other MeMber of the'Ni?.
people and those who. as former sup- actually the, taste. and not what we ~tional al of Security Council; In all ales, the
them. porters of Batista, were anathema to would like to In the fao . TiW Is not a ~ of r~sre~ r* Weah rt es
matter of personal p rerence qne way aeidg
let me quote again from Szulc and or the other. It Is a Matter of finding up into feasible oginp ts. And.
aollAgencAgencies,
Meyer. In their book. "The Cuban In- out what Is actually taking place--and aw oprisks s taslb at[ to at tthhe e various
bP
vision " they write: personal preferences enter only as they small t resulting s a of diepare Sums tb
Thus the CIA established contacts in W- may color one's Judgment. I suspect the th00108 en of drafts sheaf a lea r
snit with pro-Batista organisations and with that the Judgment of the CIA 1s some- The Board Board the : ht
exile groups whoa, entire political philosophy times colored by the preference of its ~ s for hat 0010 Wbkh ti _ tloels or io
was dedicated to the return to the pre-Castro employees. I suspect that' CIA ought to assess tam s a o with ht ae laeora or as
status quo In Ouba. ' ' ' These factions take special care to recruit and employ Policies so
were placing themselves not only against Ors- men and women of widely differing back- to future U.S. poi cy-nor a. general edt-
tro but against history: whether or not the grounds. tompemmento. and opinions. I mate.--that is. one involving stated as-
VIA operatives were avenue that taint re"_ tlOns Conoernlna possible changeee In
aion is impossible, the contacts with the suspect that in these kinds of situations After r the draft aft estimatee s has
rightist tactiona ran counter to omciai U.S. one gets at the truth-only when a wide U.S. policy. Afft edr a timg h s
been returned
policy, aimed at encouraging social reform variety of Inclinations is brought to bear.
for their to the ps and eerting ms,
in f.,atia America." But remember that these are my feelings' des comments with c dissents. is to a
A few pages later they rem ark that only. I have little data at my hunch Is submitted. which possibly
ch used to bo known as the
ted Ali I am saying is that I have e a a hunc Intelligence ch used AAvbckry Committee but Is
the activities of the CIA agents reflec that CIA recruitment policy has had as
now named the U.B. Intelligence Board.
a desire to promote astro groups effect on CIA's performance. I may be
which they could manipulate. They con- wrong. but I submit that the only way 1f the Board of Estimates Is the plan
onus: we in Congress can find out is by our- ning board for the intelligence oom-
It also reflected an attitude of hostility to selves conducting an Inquiry into the munity, the Intelligence Board is- Its
left-of-center a:ue groups by second-rata board of directors. As Ransom puts it, It
sell operatives. This in turn affected the subject. the "final forum for the professional
top level of the agency and resulted its a lack The whole question of personnel and is the fin Dommunity it resolves
of understanding at the top. It is not clear recruitment is, then, the third of the
to what extent the CIA attitude was ideolog- areas I would like to see a joint com- jurisdictional iion _finally responsible the for-
based motivated or was simply a response mittee study. I would only add that of munity
on the agent's view of what was pr5C- course no investigation need Inquire Into warding the national estimates to the
heal or realistic. the names and histories of particular National Security Council. invariably
This tendency on the part of the CIA individuals Involved; there need be no the attempt Is made to produce Agreed
to seek out and support the most anti- breaches of security or secrecy. The estimates, and usually the attempt Is sue-
Communist groups in the field, regard- matter we are concerned with is the of oesatul: but on occasion dissenting opin-
lees of whether or not such groups Are general policy. Ions will be submitted. The Intelligence
politically viable, has of course been Penally. I went to turn to what is Board meets usually once &.weekk:. It
manifested on a number of other coca- perhaps the most dtmeult of the four consists of the leading Inteillgetnee'offt-
sions--in Laos as well as in Cuba, and questions I referred to earlier: the goes- outs of the community and 1$ Chahsd by
apparently In Algeria and the Congo as tion of how best to organize the evalu- the D rectOt of Central La.ntre shoe.
Well. It is a persistent tendency, and ation of the enormous Amount of ma- Two aspects of this plorees in pnrucu-
ovo that on occasion has had a damage terlal collected every day by the various lar are worth noting. The first b the
We eVoct on our policy. I suspect It has agencies off.ttrs community. central role of the Central Intelliffelice
something to, do with the kinds of people Obviously, evaluation eft some sort,takes Agetnecy. A high proportion of the Intel-
the Central Intelligence Agency gets to place at every eclisi n within the coin- ligemeale oosnm}nnkttt'e fact gethesmrx".iii
work for It. munity, but. I am particularly concerned. done by CIA. The Board of National
 Approved ACli%j S--OQbM000400500018-7i 1 ,g,,.,t
Estimates functions as a part of CIA.
The chairman of the U.B. Intelligence
BoaN Is Director of CIA. And, of course,
the intelligence community's spokesman
oil the National Security Council itself
is also the CIA Director. The second
thing worth noting, however, is the
duality of CIA's role. Under the Na-
tional `Security Act the agency is not
only one of the participants in the in-
telligence community, it is also the chief
agency responsible for coordinating it,
In; Other words, at many points in the
process of evaluation, CIA Is both player
and umpire, both witness and Judge.
This ambiguity is Implicit in the title
of the Director who is formally not the
"Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency" but simply "Director of Central
Intelligence."
. Now the danger here is clear. It Is
Wait the Central Intelligence Agency will
become-perhaps It has already be-
come-not merely the chief Intelligence
agency but the dominant intelligence
agency, and that It will develop persistent
institutional tendencies, biases, and even
policies. This type of problem is, of
course, not peculiar to the American in-
telligence community but is character-
istic of any complex administrative ap-
paratus, That is the reason it has con-
stantly to be guarded against.
. Sherman Kent, a Yale professor and
a World War II intelligence officer, put
the point this way:
Almost any man or group of men con-
fronted with the duty of getting something
planned or getting something done will
sooner or later hit upon what they consider
a single most desirable course of action.
Usually it is sooner; sometimes, under du-
ress, it Is a snap judgment of the top of the
head. I cannot escape the belief that under
the circumstances outlined, intelligence will
and Itself right In the middle of policy, and
that upon occasions it will be the unabashed
apologist for a given policy rather than its
impartial and objective analyst.
Saulc and Meyer, writing of the Bay
of Pigs, conclude;
Yet CIA was not behaving Idiotically: it
was In many senses responding to the insu-
lated rationalism that infects a sheltered
bureaucracy. Indeed, If there is an Institu-
tional villain, it to bureaucracy Itself-that
hulking, stubborn giant that seemingly can
only look where it has been and not whither
it Is tending.
Professor Ransom calls it simply the
problem of "feedback."
Naturally in the early months of 1961
the administration addressed Itself to
this problem. After the Bay of Pigs it
could scarcely do otherwise. In pal-ticu-
lar It reactivated a watchdog group set
up by President Eisenhower In 1986,
originally called the President's Board of
Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Ac-
tivities and now named the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
This Board, under the chairmanship of
D:r. James R. Killian, Jr., of the Massa-
cuhette Institute of Technology, studied
the question of evaluation and appar-
ently forwarded one or more reports to
the President in the course of the year.
These reports have not been made pub-
lic, but I think it is possible to piece to-
gether from newspaper reports roughly
what happened. It seems that the KiI-
Tian committee, or at least some of its
members, were unhappy about the dual
role being played by CIA. They proposed
that In future the Director of CIA should
be more of a technician, and that a new
post should be created, probably at-
tached to the White Houses, with some
suoh title as "Coordinator of Intel-
ligence,". the new coordinator would be
in a position to analyse and assess the
results achieved by the Intelligence com-
munity without having any bias In favor
of CIA. Reports to this effect appeared
frequently in the press In June and July
1961. In August Mr. Cabell Phillips of
the New York Times stated that the new
post had actually been offered to Mr.
Fowler Hamilton.
Either these reports were inaccurate,
of the administration changed its mind,
or they could not find anyone to occupy
the new post, because in September 1961
the President announced that Mr. John
A. McCone had been named Director of
Central Intelligence without any major
change being made in the structure of
the intelligence community. Subse-
quently, however, in January 1962 one
such change was announced. Hence-
forth the Director of Central Intelligence
was not to function both as Chairman of
the U.S. Intelligence Board and also as
CIA member of the Board. Instead, al-
though the Director was to remain Chair-
man of the Board, his deputy was to act
as representative of the CIA. In a letter-
to Mr. McCone, the President noted this
change with approval. He added:
As head of the Oentrai Intelligence Agency.
while you will oonttnue to have overall re-
sponsibility for the Agency. I shall expect
you to delegate to your principal deputy,
as you may deem necessary, so much of the
direction of the detailed operation of the
Agency as you may be required to permit you
to carry out your primary task as Director
of Central Intelligence.
Clearly there was a dilemma here. On
the one hand, it was evident that CIA's
intelligence gathering and operational
functions could conflict with Its coordi-
nating function-and, of course, what
was true of the Agency was also true of
its Director. On the other hand, the
President and his advisers were almost
certainly aware that an Independent co-
ordinator, who was not himself the head
of a major agency, might find himself
weak, even powerless, in tire face of the
vast intelligence bureaucracies, Inde-
pendence in theory might mean im-
potence in practice. So a compromise
was struck, and the duties of the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence merely
redefined.
How successful this compromise has
been it is probably too early to say. But
from all that I have said, it. ought to be
obvious that the problem of evaluation,
like the other problems I have already
mentioned, is a continuing one, and not
one that can be spirited out. of existence
by merely Institutional gimmickry, it
is also obvious that the problem of evalu-
ation Is an enormously important prob-
lem, probably the most important con-
fronting the Intelligence community,
For these reasons. I think that it, too,
should be a continuing subject of scru-
tiny by a well-qualified and 'well-staffed
committee of Congress.
Mr. Speaker, I do not wish to detain
the House further. I have spoken at
considerable length, yet I am only too
well aware that I have only skimmed the
surface of this extraordinarily compli-
cated and 'difficult subject. There are
any number of further questions that 1
might have'posed-for example, concern-
ing the apparently increasing concentra-
tion of authority within the intelligence
community, or about the role of the
U.S. Information Agency. And, of
course, I must repeat that this has
been essentially an outsider's analysis.
I have been trying merely to suggest
what kinds of inquiry a joint committee
might undertake, not to anticipate what
the results of those inquiries would be.
Nor as I remarked at the outset, do
I wish to insist that the resolution I am
introducing today provides the only pos-
sible way of proceeding. Perhaps the
joint committee should be given rather
different terms of reference. Or perhaps
a body should be established comprising
private citizens as well as Members of
Congress. I do not want to be dogmatic
about this. My purpose in speaking to-
day has been to reopen public discussion
of an issue that has too long been dor-
mant, and moreover to reopen It at a
time of relative tranquillity, when the
intelligence community Is not In the
public spotlight, at a time therefore when
these matters can be considered soberly
and dispassionately.
But we In Congress should not be too
timid about putting ourselves forward.
I wonder how many Members of this
House are aware of the enormous body
of opinion in favor of the creation of a
congressional joint committee. Both
the Hoover Commission and its special
intelligence task force favored congres-
sional Intervention. The New York
'l'imes has consistently supported the
idea in its editorial columns. Two years
ago the' distinguished military analyst.
Mr. Hanson Baldwin, stated that one of
the lessons to be drawn from the Bay of
Pigs was "the necessity of keeping all
secret intelligence activities and opera-
tions under constant top-echelon sur-
veillance and review." He noted that
the machinery for achieving this would
be greatly strengthened by the creation
of a joint congressional watchdog com-
mittee.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, I should like to
quote just once more from the writings
of Professor Harry Howe Ransom who,
as I have already said, is our country's
leading lay student of intelligence affairs.
I think his comment deserves all the
greater consideration because It comes
from a member of the political science
profession-a profession which, as we all
know, has always had a strong bias in
favor of the executive branch of sov-
erninent. On page 206 of "Central In-
telligence and National Security" Pro-
fessor hansom remarks:
It is common experience for security
policymakers, military and civilian. to find
their fear of congressional Interference
changed Into gratitude for congressional
support, frequently more effective support
than has been accorded on the executive side
of Government. No executive agency today
reveals everything to congressional com
mittees with jurisdiction over its operations.
Oftlcials of central Intelligence may be ez-
- p.. c red-F, -ke4ease= ',CFA-R.DFx7 1 8 O ,4Q4 AAA 7-.-.
 r, rn
Approved For 1
^ y
pecte4 49 reveal even ices. But more ad-
vantages are to be gained thFn lost from
estebltsbtog a mark tnStitutlenalr:e4 sys-
tern fcc to anal surveillance.
I spree with that. Mr. Speaker. said I
hope that what I have said today Will be
given earnest and thoughtful attention
bymy, coileagu" on both sides of the
I+c r NQR ,AD. Mr, speaker, will the
gentlemen yield?
Mr. LINDSAY. I yield to the gentle-
man from Oregon.
Mr. NOR$IAL). Mr. Speaker, I want
to associate myself with the gentleman's
remarks. I think we should have had
a joint committee to monitor the CIA
when it min ?Heat established. I have haft
a little experience in the i latter as a
member of the Committee on Armed
services. As you may know, we have a
subcommittee on the CIA. I was a mein-
bar of that committee for either 9 or A
years. We Diet annually-one time a
year. for a period of 2 hours in which
we aco( pushed virtually nothing. I
think a proposal such as you have made
is the ar)swer to it because a part-time
. of the Armed Services
t say. which meets for lust
2 houF474 ay a year, accomplishes
nothing whatsoever. I want to COmplt-
mentt the gentleman on his proposal.
Mr. LINDSAY. I thank the gentleman
from Oregon and appreciate the con-
tribuUon he has made. He knows where-
in he talks. He is an expert on the
subject and is a member of the Commit-
tee on Armed Services and was a member
of the' subcommittee supervising the
CIA--iii theory--and what he says dove-
tails,entirely and agrees with the experi-
euce, and'the statements made in the
other body as well.
(Mr. LINDSAY asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.) ,
(Mr. MORSE (at the request of Mr.
LmDSAT) WAS given permission to extend
his remarks at this point in the RscoRO.)
Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to
commend my distinguished colleague,
the gentleman from New York (Mr.
LneDssyl, on the step he has taken In
introducing his resolution. The gentle-
man from New York (Mr. LrxosAT) has
taken the initiative in remedying a seri-
ous inadequacy in our foreign policy
making process. His efforts merit our
thOU*hj.ful attention and solid support.
I have joined the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Luressy] in filing a com-
paniou resolution which, by establishing
it joint Committee on Foreign Informa-
tion and intelligence. would flll what is
now a gaping hole in the congressional
mechanism for the formulation of for-
eign policy. At present, Intelligence
matters are handled simultaneously by
several committees on both sides of Cap-
itol Hill. Not only confusion but omis-
sion as well result from this decentral-
ization of supervision. Our proposals,
which would apply to any intelligence or
informiatioai agency, not only the CIA,
would remedy. this situation.
- ff lrst? A he pitopoaed joint committee
auteld glue.C ngre@sthe machinery It
Must bavee,bo exercise: its responsibility
for the oversight of the Nations intellt-
gence activities. The present lack of
cor-Rreaelonal sgpervisto*i in this area is
Itself a serious 'atiartnn, In view of the
wgrkjwluirod of ;tile a f sign policy corn-
both ousel.. A rsriepf_os
teulgeastoe.a`os fl deains rane+ of In-
the its, . YC"Ifective coordina-
l eon of oongre oira rupsevls10U is icm
pos ble..
The Proposed committeelwould have a
ooauprehea)sive view of the intalligoraoe
and informatlan aassppppaqttas of foreign of
fairs., A single oommittee of this natum
Would provide the existing foreign policy
ocmmltts with more: dti~ect and eO-
clent service.. The agencies under its
supervision would beset t as well. A
prime target of the joint committee's
efforts would be the improvement of
their operations and policies. Studies
of the agencies' problems and programs
would. of cqurse, be considerably more
extensive and complete when conducted
by a committee with single responsibility
of intelligence oversight.
Ultdfaatoly. I believe, both Houaea of
CongyeM. yrould.lenefit from the estab-,
b'lu ant of ills, proposed joint oosnetstt.
The Senate and ousts puld,.,bq for
fur considara of hd
and Intelligence matters. - The agencies
involved would similarly benefit from
the committee's studies and reoom-
mendatlons.
- Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I hope the
House may act promptly on our proposal.
it Would #11l a, vital gap in out foreign
poll Proem. .15 would stream-
line,existlag,efforts `ttie areas of for-
eign information a Intelligence. This
Is-an area in which congressional re-
sponsibility is long overdue.
EBTA WSHINa MINIMUM STAND-
ARDS FOR OPEftATl1)Z OP CIVII.
SUPERSONIC. AtRCR.aPT
. The SOZAXJkt~ pro tempore. ' (Mr.
RoyMz.). W4er previous order of the
House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr.
Pucnrsaal is recognised for 30 minutes.
Mr. PUCZNSKI. Mr. speaker, I have
today introduced legislation designed to
deal with a most serious problem which
will confront our Nation In the very bear
future. Specifically. Mr. Speaker, my
legislation would. establish oertain hibIts
of tolerance associated with the advent
of the supersonic civil. transport plane
now being developed by aircraft manu-
factarrers in France and Ungiand and
being purchased by several American
airlines. Elmilar efforts to develop a
supersonic transport ate now underway
in the United States.
'This is a problem which we no longer
can ignore. I have Introduced this leg-
islation At this particular time, In order
to gtve.ni*plane manufactuiers both In
our own country and abroad simple op-
portunity to make sufiloient changes In
the design of their powerplanta to ,avoid
future distress to millions of Americans.
The -supersonic jet powerplont of the
future -must be developed end'de ne
. s apilil I el it iaor zso s
longer''lgziore ifs s piobleii : Trio Un led !.
States the entire world failed to pro-
rig liter 'the development of
our P ens subsonic Jet. traTlsports anti,"
the world have eves
changed by the ble noiaiedny t
today's Jet tr rt produce at 1r-
Would be literally Impossible for me to
fully, describe the ening noise which
thousands . of , constituents suer;
everyday from conventional subsonic fats
either arriving. or dap ruing O'Hare
Field. It -orur not be said ~thatythese peo:
I believe: it Is , tragic that
manufacturers ocf tale w 1d did 0 e
these conaetiusnei law oasid
when, they 41000-W th
tr d tXe e.
f igt- a m C ongroix in
Wow daYS. but t; ,eel `#a ot: only my
'
of
dui: bit?