THE TESTIMONY OF ROMEYN TAYLOR AND RODNEY C. LOEHR FOLLOWS:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000400520008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 9, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

VI/
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD FOIAb3
19 May 1966
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-0
Hearings Field in Minneapolis on War in and proceeded to Implement the other ap- therefore, has real solutions for real prob-
pronch, namely the application, or misnppll- tern. Whether the price paid In the form of
Vietnam--ii cation, of the methods employed success- state control of much social and Intellectual
fully In Europe. This was expressed in activity Is really worth the gains Is hardly
resume to answer for
h
ld
i
on we s
ou
p
EXTENSION OF REMARKS SEATO, the South East Asia Treaty Orgnnl- a quest
nation, which was created In the same year. other peoples. In terms of their cultural tra-
ith the ' which are very different from our
dltlone
tibl
,
e w
ally Incompa
or SEATO was logic
Geneva approach since it Implied a Western own, the cost may not be as high as It would
NALD M FRASGR
. alignment, instead of neutrality, of the seem to us.
Southeast Asian members. In the fact of these adverse factors, our
Thursday, May 19, 1966 fair Vtrial. Our course In this regard can nam and perhaps elsewhere amounts to the
force
ilit
t
ith
ary
o w
m
only be justified if it can be shown to have exercise of a U.B. ve
c Mr. ERASER. Mr. Speaker, u- t ing the presentation of the Views iews Cx- been highly successful. For n number of over certain real and not wholly unreasonable
reasons It has, on the contrary, worked political tendencies In some of the economl-
pressed at the Minneapolis hearings on poorly. The weakness of the Southeast cally underdeveloped countries. One effect of
Vietnam, I have the pleasure of present- Asian members has resulted in they having this Is to place leadership of anti-western
ing the testimony of Romeyn Taylor, as, to permit the establishment of U.S. military. nationallsm In the hands of the left, and,
socintc professor of history at the Uni- bases on their territory, In some cases close under certain conditions, no In Vietnam, this ?
vel'sit,y of Minnesota, and Rodney C. to the Chinese frontier. This has furnished may help them greatly. In passing, it should
Loehr, professor of history at the Unl-' China with a strong reason to apply pressure be noted that the arguments sometime
ad- `' by taking advantage of their extreme vulner- vanced In support of our present policy that
ability to organized Internal opposition from the NLF's resort to violence creates a moral ?
These hearings were an attempt to look the left. Other states, such an Cambodia obligation for outside powers to Intervene
beyond the day-to-day events of the and Durma have avoided alignment with the against It is absurd. If this principle were
st for this reason and have remained out- generalized, all nations would be obliged to'
and to analyze its Implications for W
'R' a
y
e
the people of Vietnam and its lessons side of SEATO. thereby greatly weakening keep the democratic practices of their neigh-
bore under critical review and intervene when
h
d
t
van
ages
e a
t
for the United States. The testimony the organization. Moreover, llluMrates the excellent' Insights of the of alignment with the U S. seem uncertain at they found force being used Improperly.
I expert witnesses Into the problems. The, beet. Our enormous investment In defense Moreover, It would he difficult In Vietnam to
wisdom presented here will be Important of the various Saigon regimes has not only say whether Ngo Dien Diem or Ho Chi-Minh
failed to nullify the effectiveness of the - was the more responsible for the non-exist-
I- into the future. . mllltant left, but has escalated the Internal enco of political democracy In their country,
le to a degree that threatens the devas- since both appear to have been opposed to
'rho testimony of Romeyn Taylor ahd stru
gg
Rodney C. Loehr follows: tatfon of the entire state. Far from encour- It from the start, To define the revolutionary
Y Romeyn Taylor: "This statement pro- aging other Southeast Asian states to as- war in Vietnam as an Instance of interna-
pared by me for Representative DONALD soclato themsolvve with us in this manner, it tional aggression Is a transparent effort to
th
t
bl
f
a
pro
ems
FnAssn's hearings In Minneapolis, December In more likely in the long run to persuade force it into the category o
7, 1005 represents my own views only and them that this to the most dangerous of all our policy of containment was Intended to
iF not that of any organization." possible policies. cope with.
U.B. Foreign policy in the Far East since Another defect of the containment rip- Our failure In Vietnam does not mean
WW II appears to have been focused, an in preach is that Its economic phase necessarily that we should cease to support democratic
other parts of the world on the containment produces results very different than In Europe leaders against their authoritarian rivals on
of Communism. The practical definition of and may sometimes work against our polio- the left and right, but It does menn, that we
t containment, however, cannot be the name Cal objectives. In Europe, we were under., must distinguish between those cases where
{ In different time and different areas. In writing the restoration of developed Indus- such support has a reasonable chance of
Europe, the policy of containment was gen- ' trial societies, In Southeast Abia, we hope achieving its Intended result and those entice
orally successful. Isere, military assistance, to foster the industrlalIvatiou of predoml- where our Intervention is simply destruc-
I the NATO system of collective security and. nantly non-industrial societies. This do- tive. We must also recognize that we cnn-
the programs of economic aid got good re- mends a profound change In their cultures not substitute for or create Indigenous lend-
suits. The states we supported In central and their institutions. Such change in turn ership no we have tried to do In Leos and
and western Europe were already com- ? results in sharp Internal conflicts that may Vietnam with uniformly disastrous results.
of gov- take political or even military form. Since This necessary condition of democratic do-
ni
t tradition
tt
C
t
o non-
ommu
s
s
ml
eel
crnment and representative institutions, internal order is necessary for economic de- velopment Is one that must be provided by
Moreover, they possessed, at least collec- velopment, this creates n presumption in the people In question, Where It in lacking,
tively, the skills And natural resources nee- favor of authoritarian governmental forms we must try to live with the result and not
essary to create and maintain military power- as against the kind of open and representa- try inappropriately by military means to
ton a very large scale. Little more than an tive forms that we would favor on Ideological ' force upon them governmental forma that
Infusion of U.S. capital and a certain amount grounds. Moreover, the authoritarian loft have no relation to their culture and experi-
of enlightened cooperation among the nn- has a distinct advantage over the right. ence. What are the Implications of such a
tions concerned were needed to create a firm While there hnvc been some durable nu change In policy toward SEAsln? In a gen-
obstacle to Russian expansion westward. At thoritarian regimes of the right, these have oral sense, this points to a return to the
the same time, economic recovery prevented generally occurred In Europe, where there Geneva approach of protected neutrality for
the massive social disturbances without was a relatively secure conservative middle- those states that desire It and the acceptance
which Communist revolution could hardly class base, an In Spain or Portugal. Such a of leftist control where It Is already an no-
have been attempted. The definition of the social base to largely absent In Southeast complished fact. It also calls for the gradual
problem of containment and the means used + Asia, and where it exists. It is likely to be replacement of the Western oriented system
to implement it in Europe, however, cannot partly Chinese, and therefore to this extent, of collective security In SEATO by joint
easily be transfered to Southeast Asia. This by attraction of the home country, inclined guarantees by the major Communist and
Is not more speculation: we have tried it to the left. Moreover, rightist dlstatorshlpe non-Communist powers. China's adherence
and on the whole, It has worked poorly. have not generally had a good record In coo-. should become it major goal of our policy
In Southeast Asia, several economically nomlo development. Nationalist China and to secure It, we should show our readl-
f weak and politically unstable states are ar- might be cited on Taiwan as a small example ness to discuss all major Issues now dividing
the two countries.
ranged on or near the southern periphery to the contrary, but hero there are the pocu-
of China, a nation that outnumbers all the liar circumstances of rule by cohesive and We must also face the fact that to hope
Southeast Asian states together by about powerfulrefugeo elite and Investment of U.S,. for neutralization of Vietnam at this very
four to one In population and is relatively capital on a scale which It might be lmpos- . Into date may be unrealistic. Our war there
stable politically, The problem here was to nlble to repent for other states. The political can probably be ended only if we make it
I prevent these peripheral states from align- left, on the other hand, by involving great clear to the Saigon Military that we will not
Ing themselves with China to our own etra- numbers of the population in revolutionary win their war for them and they will either
teglc advantage. Two general approaches to- political or even military action, achieves have to win It themselves with limited no-
this problem have been, one: the neutralize- strong psychological Identification with many sistance or, which Is more likely, make their
tlon of the area under collective guarantee or most of the population. This It turn own arrangements with the NFL and Hanoi , \, I
.by the leading states on both sides of the ? makes the party or governmental organiza. In a reconvened Genova Conference. If, as
cold war. This approach to represented by tion strong enough to carry out the costly Is likely, this results in a leftist or even Corn-
the Geneva Conference of 1054 and was and difficult tasks of capitalizing Industrial naunlst government in the south under.'
strongly advocated at that time by India, and agricultural development. On this score, Hanoi's political control, we should then un-
Itself a neutralist state. While the United the Asian Communist states of China, North 'dertake to encourage Vietnamese Indepen-
States participated in this conference, it ap- Korel 'end North Vietnam appear to have donee of Peking as we- have encouraged
'
S'hlr
peen to have done so with some reluctance done fairly well. The /autl-oritarlan left, . YugOsiavla's Independence of Moscow,
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