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November 11, 2016
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December 17, 1998
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February 5, 1968
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Sanitized -Approved FOr Release ; CIA-RDP75-0014 R0 040: ' 0 0-2 506 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks February 5, 1968 sales have been running at about $98 million During the Dominican Republic civil war annually, although congressional action will in 1985, School of the Americas graduates reduce this year's total. turned up in leadership spots on both sides. As the program's backers point out, mili- When the Argentine army took over the gov- tary aid is only 7 per cent of all U.S. aid to ernment in 1966, the colonel acting as spokes- Latin America. It also accounts for only 7 man for the coup leaders greeted American per cent of Latin America's total annual ex- correspondents by remarking how much he penditures for defense purposes. had enjoyed his "year in Panama." acquiring arms and equipment. This is sub- ject The image Of glamor-and lightning rod gs ttssn The e ceiling statutory recently ceiling In foreign-aid was seign cut - by of controversy-in the military assistance Congress from $85 ce million to o $75 maillion, aid program is another organization at Fort Gu- Transfers of military hardware come lick. A neat row of barracks is headquarters it sales and nd grants. for the 8th Special Forces-Special Action The through grant cash prograandm credit covers is red transport vehicles Force for Latin America, a unit of 800 Green v, helicopters, spare parts and communications Beret specialists in the art of guerrilla equipment, but no tanks, fighter planes, ar- warfare. tillery or combat vessels. The unit consists of 17 training teams that The remaining aid funds are used for travel through Latin America at the request training and miscellaneous functions. A small of Latin governments, supplementing the portion (about $4 million a year) provides work of resident U.S. missions by offering support for Civic Action-the highly pub- special instruction in counterinsurgency. licized program of military participation in Since the unit was established in 1962, the such national development projects as build- Green Berets have operated in all 17 coun- ing roads and rural schools. tries where the U.S. has advisory groups. EMPHASIS ON SECURITY It was one of these teams-its 16 members making it the largest force ever sent into the The overwhelming emphasis in equipment field in Latin America-that trained the grants and training is on internal security. Bolivian troops who bagged the master guer- Less than a decade ago the Defense Depart- rilla, Ernesto Che Guevara. In Venezuela, meat.insisted that the greatest danger came Colombia and Guatemala, Green Beret ad- from "submarine action in the Caribbean visers are given much of the credit for help- Sea and along. the coast of Latin America." ing local military forces crush guerrilla Since 1961, however, U.S. strategic thinking movements. about Latin America has focused on guer- Despite the successes attributed to the rills warfare. Special Forces, many U.S. diplomats view The nerve center of U.S. military activity their presence in Latin America as a mixed in Latin America is Gen. Porter's Southern blessing. They believe that the increasing Command, headquartered in the Panama Ca- publicity they get draws too much attention nal Zone, to U.S. relations with the Latin military and Its functions include supervising the 43 hardens the image of the U.S. as a partner military advisory groups scattered through of repressive forces. 17 Latin countries (all but Mexico and Haiti). COMPARED TO VIETNAM These missions, separate from the military attaches on each embassy staff. have a total Anti-American propaganda increasingly 100 in Brazil, and they train soldiers in-every- behind-the-scenes domination of Latin thing from driver education to riot control. America. Even in the U.S., there are people They are extremely well-heeled in compari- who recall that the Vietnam war started out son with their sister civilian agencies. In with Special Forces troops in an advisory Brazil the military mission's representation role, and who are uneasy about their prom- allowance for entertaining is $17,900 a year. inence on the Latin scene. The Agency for International Development During the Bolivian guerrilla campaign people in Brazil, who administer the largest last summer, the air was filled with vague single U.S. aid program in Latin America, reports of "thousands of Green Berets" flood- have a total representation allowance of ing into the Andes. Actually, in the past $7000. The U.S. Ambassador's similar allow- year the number of U.S. troops in Bolivia ante is about $6000. has never exceeded 150, and these men never The Southern Command also oversees a got anywhere near the fighting. Their activ- :more advanced training program. Each year sties were carefully confined to training and it enrolls more than 2000 Latin officers in U.S. helping the Bolivians unsnarl their supply, :military courses at levels going all the way communications and intelligence problems. up to the Command and General Staff School Similar roles hold in all the other Latin at Fort Leavenworth and the Inter-American countries where the Special Forces operate. Defense College in Washington. Because U.S. officials suspect the guerrillas The focal point. of this program is the want to force the U.S. into combat by kill- School of the Americas at Fort Gulick in ing some American advisers, U.S. troops are the Canal Zone. (The school's location appar- forbidden to accompany Latin army units on ently contradicts the 1903 treaty with Pana- patrol in countries with insurgency prob- ma, which says U.S. troops should be sta- lems. tioned in the Zone solely to defend the In Guatemala city recently, Communist Canal.) guerrillas did kill two U.S. officers in an evi- FORTY-WEEK COURSES dent attempt to stir up political trouble. Although the school's stress is on counter The U.S. scrupulously avoided any direct re- insurgency, its curriculum includes 23 differ- sponse to the provocation, ent courses, some running for 40 weeks. All IS SUPPRESSION ENCOURAGED? are taught in Spanish or Portuguese by U.S. Critics on both sides of the U.S. border military instructors. The faculty is heavily argue that military assistance cannot avoid weighted with Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Amer- the danger of encouraging Latin armed scans and Cuban exiles. forces to suppress all dissent in the name of More than 20,000 Latin military men have internal security. studied at the school, and a graduate nos- Nor are they reassured by the official molly commands respect among his fellow Washington doctrine that everyone is on the officers back home. The school counts sa same team and working toward the same many important Latin officers as alumni goals. They point out that many military (including the current Defense Ministers of advisers view the U.S, role In Latin America Colombia and_ Bolivia) that it is known in the simple terms expressed by one high- throughout Latin America as the "escuela de ranking officer: "Our job down here is to golpes" or coup school see that the Commies don't take over." From there, it is but a short step to the idea, long dominant in right-wing Latin cir- cles, that Latin America is not yet ready for democracy and needs guiding by a strong hand like the armed forces. Anyone who has much contact with U.S. military personnel-In Latin America becomes accustomed to remarks about how "Wash- ington is awfully naive if it thinks it can make the Latins over in our image." YOUNG OFFICERS But the assistance program also includes a fair sprinkling of younger officers who recog- nize that the day is passed when the U.S. could maintain Latin America as a sphere of influence through its friendship with re- gional military chieftains. Unlike those liberals who regard Latin military as an institution to be destroyed, these officers think the armed forces can make a real contribution to the region's future progress. They support Civic Action and other plans to rechannel the military's power from poli- tics to national development. By greatly ex- panding and accelerating this side of the assistance program, they think, the Latin armed forces gradually can be brought to accept the idea of civilian dominance. GENERATION GAP "There's no denying that the top layer of the Latin officer corps is set in its ways;" says an officer with long Civic Action experience. "But that's less an institutional problem than the result of the generation gap. "What must be done is to become much more selective in deciding who we're going to make an effort with-who we pick for the openings in our schools. We've got to con- centrate on the younger, idealistic men who haven't had their thinking cast in concrete. And if we do, we could revolutionize the Latin military in a single generation." There are signs that this sort of thinking may eventually bring about big changes in - the military assistance program. The pro- gram's supporters talk less about the dan- gers of communism now and more about the democratizing influence of U.S. advisers on their Latin counterparts. But emphasis on internal security contin- ues to be a very real and conspicuous first principle of U.S. Latin American policy. As long as it does, Washington's close ties with the Latin military will continue to strike most Latins as looking suspiciously like the tail that wags the dog of U.S. devotion to the Alliance for Progress. Marketing Committee Serves Public Interest HON. JOHN D. DINGELL OF MICHIGAN IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, February 5, 1968 Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, last year Secretary of Commerce Alexander B. Trowbridge established a National Mar- keting Advisory Committee. _One objec- tive was to help bring to bear upon the Nation's social and economic problems the best thinking and the full resources of this important private sector of na- tional life. The first meeting of the Com- mittee was held in Washington last month, and it is already apparent that we stand at the threshold of a new and productive era in Government-business- academic relations. This type of partner- ship approach is constantly stressed by President Johnson. Sanitized - Approved, For Release , CIA-RDP7?5-OO 49R000400Q20020-2 Sanitized = AISprowjd For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400520020-2 February 5, 1968 ? CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-Extensions of Remarks But while the armed forces are increas- ingly willing to take part in the moderniza- tion process, they see their role primarily in physical development-the building of roads and dams. In the more basic area of social reform, the military seems haunted by the fear that any radical change will lead to com- munism, as it did in Cuba. In fact, many observers think the militar- ism that parallels the Alliance for Progress is largely a reaction to Fidel Castro. Latin military leaders recall how Castro lined Cuba's senior officers up against the execu- tioner's wall. They recall also that Castro began as a moderate reformer and as a result they view all reform movements as a poten- tial threat to their lives and Institutions. During the early 1960s, the military in most Latin countries forced hesitant or re- luctant civilian governments to make the diplomatic break with Cuba. In all nine countries where a civilian government was recently ousted by coup, the armed forces gave the need to save the countries from communism as one of their main justifica- tions. The military does not seem in any hurry to relax this attitude. In only five countries- Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Pan- ama--do armed forces have a tradition of submitting to civilian authority. Colombia, which a decade ago suffered under an op- pressive military regime, also has shown signs of moving in the direction of constitutional- ism. Eight countries are ruled by outright mili- tary dictatorships. These range from such tiny political backwaters as Paraguay, Nic- aragua, El Salvador, Honduras and Haiti to the two largest countries of South America, Brazil and Argentina. In the smaller countries, where there is little or no democratic tradition, the mili- tary rules pretty much in the "banana re- public" style of past generations. In Argentina and Brazil, and to a lesser extent in Bolovia, the armed forces have de- cided that civilian leadership is corrupt and Incompetent and that the military is the only institution capable of prodding the country toward industrial modernity. The result has been a combination of capitalism and social conservationism reminiscent of pre-World War II Germany, Japan and Italy. As Prof. Lieuwen points out, these armed forces are "attempting revolutions from above" with the emphasis on economic change. . In Argentina and Brazil, they favor the business and landholding interests and put the burden of sacrifice on such low-income groups as trade unions and small farmers. The justification is that if the economic re- forms are successful, the entire country ulti- mately will benefit. While it will be a long time before the final returns are in, all three countries have shown some tentative success in combating deep-seated economic maladies. Although these experiments, particularly in Brazil and Bolivia, have enjoyed the en- thusiastic backing of Washington, the mili- tary leaders of all three countries have made only token efforts to implement the social reforms envisioned by the Alliance for Prog- reis. They have been increasingly dictatorial, with political activity and dissent either sup- pressed outright, as in Argentina, or kept. under tight control; as in Brazil and Bolivia. Finally, there are five countries-Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic-where a civilian sits in the president's chair but where the military IS the power to pull it out from under him. Here, the collisions between military atti- tudes and Alliance ideals are not as obvious, but they exist. TFrg, MODEL OF PERU At first glance, there seems to be much to emulate. The Peruvian army is a lean, tough force that fought and won the last war on the South American continent (a 1942 dustup in which Peru decisively whipped Ecuador). More recently, the Peruvian armed forces have faced a challenge from Castroite guer- rillas and wiped it out with a speed and precision unmatched by any of the other countries with an insurgent problem. At the same time, the armed forces here have participated in an extensive and so- phisticated nation-building, program. Until recently, the army was the only active road- building agency in Peru. Its vocational train- ing schools offer many young Peruvians their only chance to learn such trades as brick- laying or shoemaking. It runs literacy cam- paigns for the peasants. In the jungles of Peru's Amazon Interior, a squadron of gunboats (facetiously called "the Atlantic fleet") cruises the river tribu- taries bringing medical and dental care to remote outposts. The air force operates an airlift whose pontoon planes swoop down on the rivers to transport the sick. The Peruvian military takes justifiable pride in these services. The result of this pride, however, is to bolster the military's image of itself as a sort of supreme court with the duty to act as arbiter between civil- ian politicians and, if necessary, to cast them aside and take over. Twice within the last 20 years (from 1948 to 1956 and from 1962 to 1963), it has done so. The memory of those times causes every politician in Peru from President Fernando Belaunde Terry on down to regard the good will of the generals as their first rule of survival. Thus, when the air force decided recently that it wanted to acquire a squadron of French supersonic Mirage jets, neither the vehement objections of the United States nor the shaky state of Peru's finances were able to prevent it from having its way. Not a single voice was raised publicly to question the wisdom of the move or point out the problems, It would create for Be- launde's efforts to bolster the sagging econ- omy, even though the jet purchase probably will cost Peru a badly needed U.S. loan. Instead, Belaunde, who is regarded as one of the region's most articulate advocates of reform, led the bipartisan chorus ap- plauding the purchase of the jets. The planes were needed, he explained with a straight face, to help further the armed forces' de- velopment work. No one familiar with Latin American af- fairs is under any illusions about what hap- pened in Peru. There are those who argue that this is the price that must be paid to protect Latin America from Castroism and give the Alliance for Progress time to work. But others wonder how much protection of this sort the Alliance can stand. LATINS BLAME THE UNITED STATES FOR MILI- TARY COUPS-AID Is SUSPECT (Second In a series) (By John M. Goshko) LIMA.-Brig. Gen. Vernon D. Walters is an affable, urbane man whose many tal- ents include a remarkable facility with lan- guages. At one time, he was well-known in Washington as President Eisenhower's fav- orite interpreter. More recently, "Dick" Walters has had a reputation of a different sort. In Brazil, where he served as U.S. military attache, political circles still whisper about how he allegedly prodded his old World War II com- rade, the late Marshal Humberto Castello Branco, into leading the 1964 coup that brought Brazil under military rule. A typical example is offered by Peru, whose Half a continent away, in the Bolivian armed forces are frequently cited by U.S. capital of La Paz, similar stories are told E 505 Force Col. Ed Fox. A flying instructor and drinking companion of Gen. Rene Barrien- toe Ortuno, he was regarded as one of the Air Force leader's intimates in the days be- fore the coup that catapulted him into the Bolivian presidency. The victim of that coup, exiled former President Victor Paz Estenssoro, still in- sists that Fox was behind his ouster. Among Bolivians with an awareness of politics, it is hard to find anyone who disagrees. These stories are now part of Latin polit- ical folklore. Spokesmen for the U.S. Em- bassies in La Paz and Rio de Janeiro have grown hoarse in their denials. Washington, while conceding that it was not unhappy to be rid of Brazil's leftist Pres- ident Joao Goulart, insists that it gave no comfort to the forces that toppled him. Lin- coln Gordon, U.S. Ambassador in Rio at the time, later told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "Neither I nor other officials of the U.S. Government nor the Government in any way, shape or manner was involved ... 11 Still, U.S. officials admit that Walters did drop around to have breakfast with Castello Branco the morning after the coup and urged him to assume the presidency. During the ensuing three years, Walters, with his links to the Brazilian military leadership, was known to be one of the most Important be- hind-the-scenes figures in the Embassy. BOLIVIAN SITUATION Denials of U.S. involvement in the Bolivian coup follow the same pattern-with the ad- ditional point that U.S. policy in 1964 aimed at keeping Paz Estenssoro in office. Yet there are former members of the U.S. mission in Bolivia, who, in private, hint at "contra- dictions" among the Embassy personnel at the time of the coup. Both Walters and Fox are gone from the Latin scene. Argument about what they did or didn't do would now be academic-except for one thing. To most Latin Americans, the stories of their alleged extracurricular ac- tivities have the ring of truth.. So do the rumor-clouded reports of other U.S. military activities in such places as the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Hon- duras. More than six years of U.S. investment in the Alliance for Progress have been un- able to rid Latins of their conviction that U.S. policy is made In the Pentagon. For they are aware of the close collabora- tion between the U.S. and the powerful Latin armed forces, including those in most of the eight countries that live under military dic- tatonships. Why is there such collaboration? SEE FEAR OF CASTRO Latins believe the answer is fear of Fidel Castro. They feel U.S. policy is aimed less at furthering the Alliance than at keeping the Latin military establishment pro-U.S. anti- Communist. U.S. officials insist that military and civil- ian goals are really two chips from the same block. A recent State Department pronounce- ment puts it this way: "Basically we support the Alliance for Progress. But you can't separate the military from the far-larger area of economic and social change and improvement. The econ- omy of a nation and the welfare of the people cannot progress in a climate of civil disturbance." Gen. Robert W. Porter, head of the U.S. Southern Command, praises the Latin armed forces as an instrument for "change through evolutionary rather than revolutionary means." In a recent Washington speech, Porter said Latin America threatens to become another Vietnam unless the U.S. helps armed forces there provide a shield against insurgency. while the governments build a stable society. This is the rationale on which officials base the equipment sales and training programs that make the U.S. the chief outside influ- ence on the Latin armed forces. Grants and Sanitized Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R0004O0520020-2