BOTTLENECK IN U. S. INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000600040140-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 1998
• Sequence Number: 140
• Publication Date: August 15, 1965
• Content Type: NSPR

.____._Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-
Front Edit Other
Pago Page FOIAb3b
pHZLADIML-7iIA, PA.
13ULLETIN
E. 718,167
S. 702,577
AU G 151965
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
Between the Lines
CPYRGHT Bottleneck in U. S. Intelligence
Communism's Takeover in Cuba an Example of Fail r-e
igence is as objective
a. task for professionals as is
newspaper reporting. The in
telligence man cannot be par
.of a policy.
s e tting or-
g a n ization
with o u t be-
ing influenc-
ed in what
h e reports,
anymore
t h a n a re-
porter c a n
be a news-
paper ad-
v e r t i.sing Miss Roosevel
man at the same time. %
Unfortunately, the intelli-
gence man does not have the
independence of the report-
er. Policymakers in the State
Department have the last say
over his information. They can
pass it along or spike it. The
State Department, of course,
is divided into geographical
desks. Each has authority
over everything concerning
its area. The Central Intelli-
gence Agency is subordinate
to this mechanism.
The tremendous danger is
that it is not the trival, ordi-
nary "government informa-
tion" that is being held hack
from the key committees of
the Congress and top policy-
makers in the Executive
Branch, including the Presi-
dent himself. The informa-
tion that is blocked almost in-
variably concerns something
of "extraordinary impor-
tance," which if objectively
icecognized would require
a fundamental change in the
course of foreign and military
policy. Here is the gap.
Human attitudes create..a sit-
uation which facilitates the
conspiratorial element.
BY pal lieutenants. The com,nit-I
EDITFT f(ERMIT ROOSEVELT tee was unable in dncturient aj
About-Face Aspect
Take, for example, the head
,of a geographical desk in the,
State Department who has
,spent. the last few years devel-
oping a policy on some Afri-
,can, South American or Mid-
dle Eastern country. How
does he react when an iterl
of intelligence comes acros ;
his desk which refutes every-
thing that he has been saving
and doing ever the years?
Such an item would require,
if recognircrl and ,properly
evaluated, that a new apprn>ch
be made,. Such ;Tn ahnnt-tare
might reflect badly on fhr Of-
ficial's judgment, Under such
circumstances, it, is not silr--~
prising that data which con
lids with "policy" becomes
lost or buried in State Depart-
ent files, somehow failing tot
each the men at the top.
Actually, this could have,
een the case with Cuba and.
astrn: It, has to be this, or
Ise the.only alternatives are
Cupidity or subversion. In
11 these instances, the results'
re the same.
'carilabe-an Desk
here also lies the true sig-'
liticaner, for example, of the
;enale interns Security sub-
rnnmiltt e's "f ndings concern-'
n.g William A, Wieland, head!
f the stale Department's Of-'
ice of Caribbean Affairs when,
astro grabbed power in
uba. The senators said:
"To Mr. Wieland's desk
.ame, over a period of years,
rrat quantities of solid inf,
eJligenco respecting the Cnm'
tmist nature and connection,,
f, the Castro, movement,, gel
single instance in which Mr.;,
Wieland passed any of 5this'
material up to his superiors
or mentioned it as credible
in any report or policy'
paper."
Since well-rounded, factual;
Information is the basis for a!
wise and effective foreign pol-
icy, we have here the perfect
formula for diversion and
peral_;vsis of policy,
Gets Top Post
The prnteciion which fnirign
service Officer's; who operate
within this framework gi"e to
etc r'n'I.rr explains Wie-
hand':.'' rrr' . pgoaltair:; as
top r.nn~,i:l.," ?iffir?r in
lin. Il al;-~, Captains lie
repka, the ~;tate Departnlrnt.
act tn?ity chief. who exposed
this svsfcm which has led to
iur blunders in China and
Isewhere in the world.
A careful reading of the fall
ext of the many reports on
Cuba prepared by the State
epartnient's Bureau of In-
clligence and Research (I&R)
eveale the extraordinary con
istency with which intelli-
rnce was ignored, block-
(I or Suppressed. Obviously,
Ore than one official would
CPYRGHT
Reports on Cuba
For the first time, this draft
report contained the informa
tion that in late 1957 anc/
early 1958 the Communist
party of Cuba had captured
he 26th of :July Movement,
iting August, 1758, reports
rom within the Cuban Corn-
'uunist Party, the I & R re-'
ort revealed that. the patty
nd the rebels had reached a
ecret agreement guarantee-;
g Communist labor leaders'
ositions in any post-revolu
onary labor organization..
The I & R report admitted'
1so that the rebels and the
ommunists had agreed to
lace Reds in key positions',
t irnughout - the government,
rough the assistance of
I au! C'aslro. "Chr" Guevara,
and others among Fi6el Cis-'
fan's principal advisers.'
('b'irnisly,. this trot, liiird
i t^Ili, once conflicted wi+h
l olict? sn it was only sent Lip,
t the top after the damage,
as done and Castro was in
over.
.*-Bomb Decision
This bottleneck in intellli-
nce is no new situation, at
t e State Departmert. At the ,
ose of World War 11, the l
Department failed to forward
It the White House the infor-
ation that the tremendous
J panese Army in Kwantung
ovince, Manchuria, was no
1 nger in existence.
The belief that this great
force was close to Japan,
r ady to strike at our invad
i g forces, led President Tru-
an to decide upon droppin?
Llie atom bomb and made Our
hole post-war policy at 'the
d unrealistic in relation to
e actual strength of Japan.
This failure to transmi! in-
lligence data is being prac-
i ed in the Viet Nam citrra-
i n, too, and it will continue
occur until the gatherer of
formation for the govern-
tea-e to be involved in this
recess.
I & R received a continous
low of factual material doc-
umenting the Communist con-
ections of Castro and his
ommunist supporters from
he FBI, entral Intelli.~_
ence Agency and our a as-
ts" merican coun-
ries. This is proved by the
A roved For Relea ? d? Rt)P75-0014 0a OO(4044'o o-.#y
11 not prevent vital infnrrna-
n from reaching the top.