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November 11, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 15, 1998
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Publication Date: 
August 15, 1965
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PDF icon CIA-RDP75-00149R000600040140-0.pdf125.48 KB
.____._Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA- Front Edit Other Pago Page FOIAb3b pHZLADIML-7iIA, PA. 13ULLETIN E. 718,167 S. 702,577 AU G 151965 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT CPYRGHT Between the Lines CPYRGHT Bottleneck in U. S. Intelligence Communism's Takeover in Cuba an Example of Fail r-e igence is as objective a. task for professionals as is newspaper reporting. The in telligence man cannot be par .of a policy. s e tting or- g a n ization with o u t be- ing influenc- ed in what h e reports, anymore t h a n a re- porter c a n be a news- paper ad- v e r t i.sing Miss Roosevel man at the same time. % Unfortunately, the intelli- gence man does not have the independence of the report- er. Policymakers in the State Department have the last say over his information. They can pass it along or spike it. The State Department, of course, is divided into geographical desks. Each has authority over everything concerning its area. The Central Intelli- gence Agency is subordinate to this mechanism. The tremendous danger is that it is not the trival, ordi- nary "government informa- tion" that is being held hack from the key committees of the Congress and top policy- makers in the Executive Branch, including the Presi- dent himself. The informa- tion that is blocked almost in- variably concerns something of "extraordinary impor- tance," which if objectively icecognized would require a fundamental change in the course of foreign and military policy. Here is the gap. Human attitudes create..a sit- uation which facilitates the conspiratorial element. BY pal lieutenants. The com,nit-I EDITFT f(ERMIT ROOSEVELT tee was unable in dncturient aj About-Face Aspect Take, for example, the head ,of a geographical desk in the, State Department who has ,spent. the last few years devel- oping a policy on some Afri- ,can, South American or Mid- dle Eastern country. How does he react when an iterl of intelligence comes acros ; his desk which refutes every- thing that he has been saving and doing ever the years? Such an item would require, if recognircrl and ,properly evaluated, that a new apprn>ch be made,. Such ;Tn ahnnt-tare might reflect badly on fhr Of- ficial's judgment, Under such circumstances, it, is not silr--~ prising that data which con lids with "policy" becomes lost or buried in State Depart- ent files, somehow failing tot each the men at the top. Actually, this could have, een the case with Cuba and. astrn: It, has to be this, or Ise the.only alternatives are Cupidity or subversion. In 11 these instances, the results' re the same. 'carilabe-an Desk here also lies the true sig-' liticaner, for example, of the ;enale interns Security sub- rnnmiltt e's "f ndings concern-' n.g William A, Wieland, head! f the stale Department's Of-' ice of Caribbean Affairs when, astro grabbed power in uba. The senators said: "To Mr. Wieland's desk .ame, over a period of years, rrat quantities of solid inf, eJligenco respecting the Cnm' tmist nature and connection,, f, the Castro, movement,, gel single instance in which Mr.;, Wieland passed any of 5this' material up to his superiors or mentioned it as credible in any report or policy' paper." Since well-rounded, factual; Information is the basis for a! wise and effective foreign pol- icy, we have here the perfect formula for diversion and peral_;vsis of policy, Gets Top Post The prnteciion which fnirign service Officer's; who operate within this framework gi"e to etc r'n'I.rr explains Wie- hand':.'' rrr' . pgoaltair:; as top r.nn~,i:l.," ?iffir?r in lin. Il al;-~, Captains lie repka, the ~;tate Departnlrnt. act tn?ity chief. who exposed this svsfcm which has led to iur blunders in China and Isewhere in the world. A careful reading of the fall ext of the many reports on Cuba prepared by the State epartnient's Bureau of In- clligence and Research (I&R) eveale the extraordinary con istency with which intelli- rnce was ignored, block- (I or Suppressed. Obviously, Ore than one official would CPYRGHT Reports on Cuba For the first time, this draft report contained the informa tion that in late 1957 anc/ early 1958 the Communist party of Cuba had captured he 26th of :July Movement, iting August, 1758, reports rom within the Cuban Corn- 'uunist Party, the I & R re-' ort revealed that. the patty nd the rebels had reached a ecret agreement guarantee-; g Communist labor leaders' ositions in any post-revolu onary labor organization.. The I & R report admitted' 1so that the rebels and the ommunists had agreed to lace Reds in key positions', t irnughout - the government, rough the assistance of I au! C'aslro. "Chr" Guevara, and others among Fi6el Cis-' fan's principal advisers.' ('b'irnisly,. this trot, liiird i t^Ili, once conflicted wi+h l olict? sn it was only sent Lip, t the top after the damage, as done and Castro was in over. .*-Bomb Decision This bottleneck in intellli- nce is no new situation, at t e State Departmert. At the , ose of World War 11, the l Department failed to forward It the White House the infor- ation that the tremendous J panese Army in Kwantung ovince, Manchuria, was no 1 nger in existence. The belief that this great force was close to Japan, r ady to strike at our invad i g forces, led President Tru- an to decide upon droppin? Llie atom bomb and made Our hole post-war policy at 'the d unrealistic in relation to e actual strength of Japan. This failure to transmi! in- lligence data is being prac- i ed in the Viet Nam citrra- i n, too, and it will continue occur until the gatherer of formation for the govern- tea-e to be involved in this recess. I & R received a continous low of factual material doc- umenting the Communist con- ections of Castro and his ommunist supporters from he FBI, entral Intelli.~_ ence Agency and our a as- ts" merican coun- ries. This is proved by the A roved For Relea ? d? Rt)P75-0014 0a OO(4044'o o-.#y 11 not prevent vital infnrrna- n from reaching the top.