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November 11, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 15, 1998
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Publication Date: 
August 15, 1965
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PDF icon CIA-RDP75-00149R000600040141-9.pdf127.14 KB
Sanotoze - pproved For Releas b & Front Eel t Outer I Pago Page PHILADI1,1,1IA, PA. BULLETIN E. 718,167 CPYRGHT S. 702,577 AUG151965 rC PYRG HT CPYRGHT CPYRGHT Between the Lines Bottlenec in U. S. Intelligence Communism's Takeover in. Cuba an Example of Failure 01 i ence is as objecti a task' for professionals as telligence man cannot be pa of a policy. ~ s e tting or. with o u t be- ing influenc- ed in what h e reports, any m o r e than a re- ?"1 porter c a n be a news aper ad- v e r t i sing Miss Roosevel an at the same time. Unfortunately, the intelli- ence man does not have the ndepehdence of the report- r. Policymalcers in the State epartmcnt have the last say ver his information. They can ass it alpng or spike it. The tate Department, of course, divided ,into geographical esks. Each has authority ver everything concerning s area. The Central ntelli- ence Ag(21 is subordinate _thi5J11 hanism._ The tremendous danger is t at it is not the trival, ordi- n ry "government informa- ton" that is being held hack ;f om the key committees of le Congress and top policy- ; akers in the Executive anch, including the Presi- ~d nt himself. The informa- it in that is blocked almost in- !v riably concerns something o "extraordinary impor. t ce," which if objectively IN ognized would require ~a fundamental change in the Q curse of foreign and military ip licy, Here is the gap. iH man attitudes create_a sit-, c apiratorial element:. By EDITH KERMIT ROOSEVELT About-Face Aspect Take, for example, the head of a geographical desk in thu ,pent the last tew years Bevel, oping a policy on some Af i r - can, South American or Mid. It does lie react when an item, of intelligence comes across his desk which refutes every. and doing over the years?n Such an item would require , if recognized "and ,prnpcrly evaluated, that a new nppro;!ch he made. Stich an about-face; might reflect badly on thr nf-, ficial's judgment. Under such circumstances, it is not sur- risi h p ng t at data which con- i flirts }vit:h "policy" becomes lost or harried in State Depart-~ mot. files, somehow failing tot h th eac e men at the top. Actually, this could have been the case with Cuba and,; Ise the,only alternatives are f upidity or subversion. In it II th i ese nstances thl ,e resuts'i re the same. aribbean Desk ' Here also lies the true sig-''? si ficanre, for example, of the enale Token security sub- ommiitee's.'7indings concern P; f the State Department's Of-rya ce of Caribbean Affairs when P'll astrn ...._LL_ (ton una. the senators said: sat' M "T W ' ~''~ r o ieland dsk r ma .se me, over a. period of years , teat quantities of solid 1. 0r Hpprovea i-or Kele CPYRGHT Reports on Cuba 1=or the first time, this draft . report contained the in orma -' Lion that in late 1957 and., earl 058h i y , e Communist ; J Party of Cuba had captured icy, we have here the perfect. hang August, 1358, reports pp formula for diversion and, tom within the Cuban Com-? baralvsis of olic _ p y eL;s To ort revealed that the party; p Post nd the rebels had reached al The protection which foreign ecret agreement guarantee-j ervice officers who operate ng Communist labor leaders nthin this framework give to ositions in anq post-revolu or another explains Wie- ionary labor organization. 11P md's recent app lirs ni as The I & R report admitted ] f^wi,ted tote; of Ott,. lace Reds in key positionS'j ;('P1;, 1, State Department ir'nughout -the government em'it' chief. who exposed trough the assistance of is system which has led to I aul Castro. "Che Guevara, A careful reading of the full xt of the many reports on ha prepared by the State partrhent's Bureau of In- igence and Research (I&R) eal,- the extraordinary con. or Suppressed. Obviously his bottleneck in 3ntplli , re than one official would g nee is no new situation, atl cess. c se of World War 11, the & R received a continous 1 partment failed to forward w of factual material doe- t the White House the infor- 1 eons of c astro and his a anese Army in Kwantung~ Imunist supporters from P vince, Manchuria, was no FBI, the Central Intelli- i to ger in existence. ceAgency and our embas- he belief that this great, in Latin'9tmerican coup- fo ce was close to Japan , s. This .is proved by the re dy to strike at our invad-.1 tents of a draft report pre- 'I in forces, led President Tru. it of~19G0 th atom bomb and made-our en unrealistic in refat on to -s miable to doctin 'it th actual strength of Japan. in ranee in which Mr.~ is failure to transmit. in- d passed any of this, tel genre data is being prat- l up to his superiors; tic d in the Viet Nam stns- ntioned it as credible .. do , too, and it will continueccur until the gatherer of' Inr rmation for the govern. ,1 well-roundg~ me t is i e t f the iG~hplabiaafi4 QQ` e ift'l~f ilit- ~- L -t--.. ,ICaI pxftediency or 'ideology swil not prevent vital iriforma- ii tin frnm n a e e i tclli,;ence conflicted with licy so it was only, sent upf the top after the damage, . as done and Castro was in; wer. a A-Bomb Decision