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Document Creation Date: 
November 11, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 15, 1998
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Publication Date: 
August 15, 1965
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PDF icon CIA-RDP75-00149R000600040142-8.pdf126.03 KB
Gd--- Front Ed;+ t Pcg* page PHILAD-vL;';[IA, PA. 13ULLETIN' E. 718,167 S. 702,577 AUG 15 195 pproved For Release ~Gqk- I CPYRGHT CPYRGHT CPYRGHT CPYROHT Between the Lines Uottleneci ' in U. S. Intelligence Com.m.unisrn's Takeover in. Cuba an Example of Failure Washin -ton-? The gathering o intelligence is as objective By a. task for professionals as is EDITH KERMIT ROOSEVELT newspaper reporting. The in telligence man cannot be par 0 of a policy- s e tting or- g a n ization with o u t be- ' ing influenc- ed in what h e' reports, any m o r e t h a n a re- pa pe rad- v e r t i.sing Miss Roosevelt man at the same time. Unfortunately, the intelli- gence man does not have the independence of the report- er. Policymakers in the State Department have the last say over his information, They can pass it along or spike it. The State Department, of course, is divided into geographical desks. Each has authority .over everything concerning its area. The Central Intelli- gence Agency is subordinate to this mechanism. The tremendous danger is that it is not the trival, ordi- nary "government informa- tion" that is being held hack from the key committees of the Congress and top policy- makers in the Executive Branch, including the Presi- dent himself. The informa- jtion that is blocked almost in- variably concerns something ,of "extraordinary impor- tance," which if objectively recognized would require a fundamental change in the course of foreign and military policy. Here is the gap. Human attitudes create-a sit- uation which facilitates the conspiratorial element. Sanitized nut-ace Aspect Take, for example, the head of a geographical desk in the, State Deparlmer.t who has spent the last few years devel- oping a policy. on some Afri- can, South American or Mid- dle Eastern country. ' How does he- react when an item of intelligence comes across his desk which refutes every- thing that he has been saying and doing over the years? Such an item would require, f recognized and properly` valuated, that a new npprorch, he made. Such ;m ahmit-face-% might reflect badly on the of-1 ficial's judgment. Under such a circumstances, it is not stir-;l prising that data which con-?i lids jvith "policy" becomes ost or huried in State Depart ent files, somehow failing to each the men at the top. Actually, this could haves een the case with Cuba and, astro: It has to be this, or~ ,.Ise the ,only alternatives are t.upidity or subversion. In CPYRGHT Reports on Cuba ; For the first time, this draft,' tion that in late 1957 and' I 'early 1958 the Communist iCactio rmself and his 7 inei e 26th of July Movement. pal lieutenants. The coinntil- ~.jC l ing August, 1'58, reports! tee was unahhd to dnct'n-ent f tom within the Cuban Com single iitst.ance in which Mr , unist Party, the I & R re-' eland passed any. of \thi p rt revealed that the pally m Lerial up to his superior. 'a d the rebels had reached a or mentioned it as credihl ; reem nt uarantee ret s c g ag e >in any retort or ? polic i g Communist labor leaders` 'p er." positions in any post-revolu-., ince well-rounded, factual ti nary labor organization.; in ormation is the basis for The I & R report admitted: wife and effective foreign pol- pa alysis of policy. C .ts Top Post la d'' rec nt appnintme;~r as tto eonsula:' nfficcr in At,sira-- lia I 1 also ' explains the cis where in the world. careful reading of the fall te. t of the many reports on Cu a' prepared by the State 11 these instances, the results`; tell rgence and Research (I&R) h re t e same, K'aribbcan Desk ret ale the extraordinary con- sis ncy with which intelli- Here also lies .the true sig-l' ilicance, for example, of the:' ,enate Tntrrn;.ySecurity sub-. .ommittee.'s?-findings concern-i' ng William A. Wieland, head: f the State Department's Of-f ice of Caribbean Affairs when, astro grabbed power in; uba. The senators said: "To Mr. WieIand's desk"; ame, over a period of years, ,eat, quantities of solid inx eeligence respecting the Cond.. unist.nature and connection: f; : th'e Castrg; _movernep.k,, 't7 ge cc was ignored, block- m e than one official would hate to be involved in this pr cess. um[iiting the Communist con- th FBI, LIHL entral Intelli ei ce,Agency and our a as- s m 'tin rnerican coun- tri i s, This -is proved by the co eats of a draft report pre-, pa d by I &, R Itself in, Aug- proved For Release' : YA- 7P7'6--6 645R also that the rebels and the C nimunists had agreed toy p ace Reds in key positions , ti roughout the government, ti rough the. assistance of; d others among Fidel Ca,,;-; 's principal advisers )hvinlisiy, : this , true, ha rd{ IrlliFence conflicted with lice so it was only sent upy the top after the damage is done and Castro was in wer. -Bo'nib Decision his bottleneck in intellii-1 nee is no new situation at' s State Department At the .. se of World War 11, the partment failed to forward the White House the infor- tion that the tremendous panese Army in Kwantung ovince, Manchuria, was no The belief that this great cc was close to Japan, dy to strike at. our invad-.11 forces, led President Tru- ? _ n to decide upon dropping' atom bomb and made.our w ole post-war policy at, the ell unrealistic in relation to I th actual strength of Japan. tic tic to in rill St ed in the Viet Nam cit,r.-- n, too, and it will continue' nt is independent of the to Department. Then polit- V p' 'nf Vita1 utformnfornia. ' n from - reaching the to?. J