SOVIET EXPERT THINKS 'PENKOVSKY PAPERS' ARE A FORGERY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000600250037-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2000
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: November 15, 1965
• Content Type: NSPR

WASHINGTON POST
Approved For Release 2001107W. CTA f fI4YR000600250037-2
NOV 15 1965
Soviet ,Expert Thinks
`Penkovsk
y
First of Two Articles that they might eventually be
By Victor Zorza published "to clarify his mo-
Manchester Guardian
LONDON-"Their authen-
yonel ? it is ettri
icity," says the introduction that a work with so noble a
.o the Penkovsky.Papers, the
nemoirg of the Anglo-Ameri-
.an spy. in Russia, "is beyond
xuestion." It is not.
Indeed, the book itself con-
.ains the evidence showing cer-
rther sections
)f the book
a r e evidently
made up of in-
telligence in-
rormation pro-
vided by Pen-
sovsky before
,is arrest. Zorza
But the book
foes not, in fact, claim to be
nade up of Penkovsky's intel-
igence reports to the West.
Do the contrary, it is said to
)e quite distinct from them, and
.o consist of "notes, sketches
and comments accumu-
.ated by him during his spying
,areer in 1961-62 and "smug-
gled out of the Soviet Union"
.only in the'autumn of 1962, at
the time of his arrest. It is
re a FOrgery
CPYRGHT
much purely military and po-i just as Soviet Intelligence Iwhich warded off.the Soviet;
litical intelligence. 1 would be interested in their
The `Low-down'
Much of the book seems
calculated to show the Soviet
system in the worst possible
light, but this would be con-
sistent with Penkovsky's at-
tempt to justify his defection.
It is even possible to stretch
this interpretation to explain
the "low-down"-and it really
is low-on the sexual mores,
the drunkenness and cupidity
of some of the people he knew
in the higher ranks of the po-
licital, military and intelli-
gence quarters. "I have abso-
lutely no intention of defam-
ing the marshals and gener-
als," says, after giving some
particularly choice details.
He adds that he had "in-
tentionally omitted the sub-
ject of moral degradation and
drunkenness"-which he had
not. "I know one thing for
sure, though: all our generals
sure?
Papers'
For I abled the western leaders to
It is conceivable that west-
ern intelligence organisations
might have been interested in
the peccadilipe y of members
western opposite numbers,
and that Penkovsky thought
it right to supply this infor-
mation. But he would bar~.y
write It all. down for posterity.
"Intelligence Feat"
The Introduction says that
the extent and ingenuity of
Penkovsky's work add up'per-
haps to the most extraordi-
nary intelligence 'feat of this
century. If there is no o.viet
spy now working at an 'even
higher level in the West, then
this, claim may well be valid,
Much of the intelligence in-
formation reproduced in the
book is obviously genuine.
Western government ex-
perts revealed their knowl-
edge of it some time ago in
the course of discussion about
Soviet affairs. Penkovsky's in-
formation about the ignomin-
ious failure of Khrushchev's
"secret weapon," which blew
up on the launching pad, en-
treat Soviet threats and boasts (;
with rnm nsnrp Pcnirm-1 v's I
information about Khrtish-
chev's plans during the Ger-)
man crisis of 1961 enabled the,
West to make the dispositions j
threat to Berlin.
Penkovsky sent reports on
the bickering over the build-
ing up of the Soviet missile
force, -favored by Khrushchev,
and the maintenance of ade-
quate conventional forces, fa-
vored by the marshals.
Dispute in Kremlin
This gave western intelli-
gence analysts the clues that
helped them to.study between
the"lines of the Soviet press
the. most important political
dispute that raged in the So.
viet leadership in recent years
-on the allocation of re-
sources between civilian and.
military needs, within' the
military field itself.
This contributed greatly to
the western governments' un-
derstanding of the factors
that caused the fall of Khrush-
chev, even though this oc
curred some two years after
Penkovsky's arrest.
For some months before the
Cuban missile crisis, Penkov-
sky and his western masters
k n e w that he was being
watched by Soviet counter-in-
telligence. He could therefore
neither acquire nor send any
intelligence on what was to
prove the most fateful con
frontation between East and
West, and suggestions that lie:
was asked to report on Soviet;
operations in Cuba just be-
fore the, crisis would appear:
to be without foundation. Yet,
paradoxically, his contribution
was probably decisive.
Approved For Release 2001/07/26 CIA-RDP75-00149R000600250037-2
C"nnt1 ruu d
D
 He had ` Penkovskyy passed a paper) order and none at lit.erar. able minute to milk him of any
sent -out, earlier, de-I
rmation or rot Tht,have.
tails of tlA r tpp 62 W6 1b 6A jr,
tern` of Sovie missiles. This ,Embassy a I i ial in 5cb Unlikely Answers
enabled U.S. air reconnais- together with an offer of his ot, explain why the book's
sance experts to identify the' services, but this was not should ? contain several ac- In the extremely unlikely
missile sites at an early stagetaken up because it. was counts 71217, hlirushchc v's ill-l event that he had learned
of construction. The early thought that he had been put about the Berlin Wall while
ytended strategy for:the 13crltp? Still in I ondon would he
warning made it possible for,up to it by Soviet counter ,
all more or
confrontation
have gone, back to IV7osccrw
th
i
,
x mon
s
Only s
President Kennedy to make intelligence.
less the same, and two . Of re orted later to his tna-
when he made another and:' p
later
ti
,
ons
secret the prepara
in a roach to the British, was them separated by only one tern, that he had known about
that played so major a part ~; is it a e-a curious` waste of time the
in his later management o his offer accepted. p g Wall four days in wri-
the crisis, and in compelling, But even the autobiographyand space by one so short of vanc'e.! Why woul.d'he do that
Khrushchev to withdraw. is not wholly genuine. The de-I both -to. show them after the
ascription of Pcnlfovsky's own( Nor can these be the writ- evejlt hQ*;ivellinformed he
Lack of Time war service is woven into al ten reports 'sent out by Pen Iwas?'
edited
re-
f"kovsky at the time
tr;tf~ool: is
iuine
,
,
a, , r
ge potted history o
The most important part of three-pa
the information he sent out i,the' war in Russia. A man of and 'put ,together in a book. ! collection of notes he' kept
consisted of some 5000 photo i Penkovsky's i n I. e 1 1 i g e n'e e; He was clearly much too in in Moscow, would lie simply,
graphs of doduments, sketches, would 'not. have thought it I telligent and efficient a spy
etc., taken with a miniature necessary to waste hisztiu1 on to waste his, efforts on writ- have made a bald statement
camera. Yet we are asked to supplying this kind of "back-? ing down laboriously, `in mi- of fact like that, almost con
believe that this highly pro- ground." ' x. nute detail, and repetitively, versat ovally, and then gone
fessional and valuable spy A western compllhr` "Al .the the views, impressions and on with his discussion of
added to the great risks he"Pcnkovsky papers, ?trtr 'the facts which would have suf-
yyy o t h e r hand, m i?g 11. t is d? ficed in much shorter outline, Khrushchev's -tactic's on Ber-
was already running by ltoep lin?' Neither e x p l a h a t i o n
ing a detailed account of his I thought if, useful to pixi4ltl Yetimetinies the book
activities and views, virtually, the wide readership of the arouses the reader's curiosity, seems credible, and no other 11 every page of which contained book with a historical Jc k'h only to; frustrate it with lack offers itself: The only logical
enough secret information to that waukct havf+Mi~RtiSR,dcn of detail. The introduction answer is that the 'wor'ds at-
kovsky the tributed to Penkottsky were
send him straight to the firingkovsky's wa gareer hive makes for .,Pen
squad. meaningful. ,claim that among the "thou
In the foreword we are told sands of pieces of information" written by someone else-un
that "throughout the period Khrushchev in Ukraine swept up by him was "the ex- less this was a remark he
during which Pcnkovsky was , However, it is not salfe to act planned dimensions of the made in one of his subsequent
turning. over information to sketch in the baelcground Berlin Wall." conversations with a member
the West, he sat up night without being familiar- with Response to Wall of the Anglo-Amerid 'team,
after night composing a jour- who took it down, filed it, and
nal." Yet in a passage that the details of which it is tom- If,trn.e this Is very import- it was then seen and used by
posed, Pcnkovsky spent the ant, for it may cause trouble the `compiler of the "Papers."
has the ring of truth Pen last two years before the war k between Washington and Lon- Indeed; the style of the
kovsky himself makes it clear in a military school and then'
that this is: just what he could , don on the one hand, and meifyoirs is often discursive,
not do. H h to write hur in an artillery unit in the Berlin on the other-some- verbose, almost conversation.
IY7kraine to which he wasp thin ,that the compilers of al-the, very
opposite of what
riedlyy' `lie says, "for. the sim-posted as a, political officer.' plc lack of time and space.' On one occasion the unit) the book can hardly h a v e' one would expect from ,a man
When he writes at night in' was visited 'by a number of intended,... writing in Penkovsky's diffi-
his,two-room flat-he disturbs) It has ,always been assumed cult circumstances., At one
his family's sleep: "Typing Is Soviet military leaders- whom
, that he slow and fumbling point, when discussing Soviet
Penkovsky recogniz*d, but
very noisy." During the day there was one person- "whom nature' of the western re- military maneuvers, he' is
he is "-always busy," "running I had never seen before." He sponse to 'the wall was due made to ask, "What is the
like a madman,",in a typically was told later that this was in large measure,to the lack Point of these exercises"..
Russian phrase, bet een the ?a certain N. S. Khru'Shclie'v." of any Warning. 1,,ycn , o, the and then proceeds t give a
~r
offices of his two employers, Yet for the past two years West Ge an government has detailed reply.
the Committee-for the +yoordi Khrushchev had been the not ~ 01 fo ivenct~s allies'' Would he really write like
nation of ScienLifir Research, first .,secretary of the uI rain= for . St hey dis that, whether in an inteIli-
yec ti t~
and the Military intelligence tan ''arty; carrying out' a ,
s Bence re ort cr in his mcni-
Headquarters. His evenings ruthless and bloody purge, pl But hadt'I'cnkpvsl,~ iTrl p
tare generally occupied, nor feared and }dated by all ~+the them? In the Lc xt'lie is made airs? Or was it perhaps, a
can he write while visiting his virtital master of the Ukraine, to say that "1 learned about question put to Pcnkovsky by
friends in the country:- the "Little Stalin." with Ills the Berlin Wall four days be- one of his interi'oeators, ir,cl
"Somone may always, ask picture frequently displayed
I fore the Soviet government then, inadvertent iy, allowed
what ~I am doing." At home,,in public places and in the in v ill I the edited" trari-
?,?. ?. ,,., , ,.,,,,,, actually closed it off.' Yet the then, w
showin he is.`,hardly likely toan aspiring political officer.
bqo, and the record of
g, in the
have produced in these cir-J No doubt the account of the. his trial, makes it clear' that
cumstances the manuscript of incident was inserted into the' "four days before" that date
what is iota a,, Sizeable hook. "papers" to make them ap-
Autobigg v Questioned pear more authentic. but the Penkovsky was' still in ' Lon-
j don on One of those extended
,, the de eipt.ion of his do-'result, as happens so often
l iduty trip's On which he took
jwhen enthusiasm outrunsi
mestte" cn stances ~cornes; ,
f r o m' PO ot>sk's autohio.l good judgment, is the oppo- time off 'from shepherding So-
viet delegations-th
fficial
d
, o
site of what was inten
ed.
graphical outline, 'of a kind There ismuch tedious repe- reasons for 'this, visits to the
that any intelligence ce- seivice',tition which is hardly ac-,i West.-,,_sgeri`d long hours
would require front aprosper-
tivelspy, so that it could check counted for by the ex}Tana- cairn the .p a , Anglo.Apier
, , .
his credentials before employ- lion that he papers, are ar- !can team,61r'fou'r intelligence
ing him. , ranged "with little attempt atlIofficers who used every avail-
that might have formed the
basis of this passage in the
hook?
"d'he "Prnt'ter?sutieital origin
of a. number of pa`ksages? is be-
trayed in similar` ways, thus
giving the lie to the claim that
the'book is made up of Pen-
k0i+sky's written "notes." This.
however," does not mean that
the bodk acs-tr" whole may. be re-
;arded as 'a genuine edited
transcript of Penkovsky's con-
versations with western intelli-
gence officers. There are many
other passagds, and sometimes
whole sections;j, which betray
NOV 1 5 ~p `hc+ al en Ytand -or tongue.
AA roved For Release 2001/07/26 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600250037-'2 5 1,, victor Zorza