HOW PENKOVSKY WAS SEIZED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000600260013-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 1998
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: November 11, 1965
• Content Type: NSPR

wAS111Nc, t-ON 1
HERALD
Sanitized - Approvertase : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600260013-7
NOV 11 1965
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
Our Man in the Kremlin
CPYRGHT
How Penkovsky Was Seized
Aided in Flight of English Associate
By Frank Gibney
Eleventh - in a Series
Early in the morning of
July 6, 1962, Col. Penkovsky
drove to Sheremetevo air-
port and met Greville
Wynne in the passenger
waiting room. "'
Using his Party card to
overawe customs and securi-
ty personnel, Penkovsky
changed Wynne's tickets,
rushed him through the de-
parture formalities, and saw
him aboard the first west-
bound plane, an S.A.S.
flight headed for Copenha-
gen.
Coming on the heels of
their surveillance at the
Peking Restaurant the night
before, the hasty departure
must inevitably have deep-
ened the suspicions of the
State Security, Police. But
Penkovsky knew that
Wynne was in some danger.
Heedless of his own risk,
111 wanted at all costs to as-
re Wynne's safety.
Over the next --.three
onths the Colonel d~cgeed-
di getting several. ack-
s of information out_ _his
estern contacts, fitly
rough the use of ".dead
ops" and prearranged mes-
ges.
On Sept. 5, he brought
me film to an American
lnbRssy reception, bute.
On Oct. 22, according to
official Soviet record, Col.
Oleg Penkovsky was arrest-
ed by representatives of
the State Security, in Mos-
cow, and taken to Lubianka
Prison. On Nov. 2, Greville
Wynne was kidnaped by
State Security Police in Bu-
dapest, where he had gone
to make preliminary ar-
rangements for a mobile
trade exhibition in Eastern
Europe. He was flown to
Moscow in an aircraft com-
manded by a State Security
general and thrown, into Lu-
hianka for interrogation.
The "interrogation" of
Penkovsky and Wynne was
to last fully six months.
What finally betrayed
Penkovssy?It was certainly
not the result of a long cat-
uld find no safe opp u and mouse game ph
fty T to transfer fi ayed by
T an all-seeing State Security.
he.nexxt t day s he e tried to Penkovsky's high rank and one this Brit sht sources. That ecess to the Kremlin's se-
fort,: too. proved fruitless. erets made ,the far too dan
he net had tightened. gerous an enemy for the So-
viet high command to tem-
porize with, in an effort to
learn more about his con-
tacts, sources, etc.
The minute his spying
was discovered, it would
have to be stopped. So the
discovery must have been
made just before his arrest.
The State Security's orig-
inal discovery that Penkov-
sky's father was a White
Russian officer-a damag-
ing item in any Soviet file-
undoubtedly started an In-
vestigatlQn. In the course of
the investigation, the State
Security Police noticed Pen' -
kovsky's frequent meetings
with foreigners.
Even though Penkovsky's
position in Intelligence per-
mitted such associations,
there must have been a
great many dangerous
foreign contact reports in
his security file.
The expensive gifts he
brought back from the
West, for high army and
arty officials, also aroused
ome suspicion. Wynne still
elieves that Penkovsky was
first suspected of black
arketeering-not an unw
ual crime among Soviet of-
ficials.
pring and summer of 1962,
as tension with the West
as built up by Khru-
shchev, the State Security
had been ordered to tighten
its surveillance on all for-
eigners--and Russians who
associated with them.
Ironically, the same "colli-
sion course for war" which
Penkovsky warned about
was responsible for the in-
tensified surveillance that
brought on his arrest.
At some point the State
Security searched Penkov-
sky's apartment. Once the
searchers found the secret
drawer with Penkovsky's
esplo n a g e appartus-cam-
eras, radio and instructions
for Western contacts-the
Colonel's doom was sealed.
Could Penkovsky have
saved himself before that
time? Probably yes. In July,
for Instance, after Wynne's
return to London, Penkov-
sky could have sent a mes-
sage to London announcing
that he was breaking off
ommunication, temporarily
cut his Western contacts
and, above all, destroyed-
the incriminating materials
in his desk drawer.
He did not do this pre-
cisely because he thought it
necessary, to the very last,
to continue his warnings
about Khrushchev's political
"adventurism" and its dan-
ger to the world.
In the following excerpt
from the Papers, one of the
last he wrote, he discusses
the Soviet nuclear menace
-and Khrushchev's disre-
Continued
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600260013-7
 CPYRGH-ganitized -Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600260013-7
and of any test ban In 1961
nd 1962.
(We must remember that
hrushchev agreed to a test
an in 1963, only after the
S. faced him down in
uba.)
By Oleg Perakovsky
Many of our nuclear ex-
losions (tests) have been
onducted in the central
art of the U.S.S.R., mostly
Kazakhstan. Some of the
.smaller tests were not no-
ced at all and were not
ecorded by the Western
ales.
The large nuclear explo-
ons are reported by Tass
nd the Soviet press, but
othing is ever said about
e smaller ones. At the
eneral Staff we sometimes
now of tests being con-
ucted on a certain type of
uclear weapon, and we
alt to see what Tass will
ay about this. If Tass keeps
ilent, then we keep silent,
o.
Tests of various new
pes of nuclear weapons
re conducted daily. Nu-
lear test explosions take
lace more often than re-
orted by Tass or the So-
1
When Lumumba was tem- j and phase type. Almost a ; powel dicebreaker Lenin is
porarily in power in the Con-
got `,the Soviets sent 23
plc iloads of officers (in-
cluding, generals) there via
Egypt and Sudan. The air-
craft were of the IL-14 and the agreement forbidding 1 1962, Col. Penkovsky added
IL-18 types; heavier types nuclear weapons tests? Be- , the following personal note
could not la 4 pr the Su- cause most of our missiles to the Papers. It was one
danese airfle , and other, have not even passed the of the few entries with a
countries w not give necessary tests, let alone of " date affixed. It was the last
permission for the Soviet missile production, as re- 1 thing ever received from
aircraft to land for refuel- gards quality and there bid
ing. have been many instances - I have already grown
A good friend of mine, of missiles and satellites ex- used to the fact that I note
j Maj. Aleksey Guryev, was ploding fn the air or disap- periodically some degree of
the first one to fly to the pearing completely.
Congo with the Soviet gen- But Khruschev persist-
erals. The primary task of ently does, everyth*ng possi
this mission was to establish ble`oo jmprove mis a weap-
of them are conducted with a floating deathtrap because
missiles. of its, badly designed valves
Why is Khrushchev push- which a'll o w radioactive
big these nuclear tests? leakage.
Why is he unwilling to sign E.D. NOTE: On Aug. 25,
Soviet control over the ura- ons. He wants to seize the son for this,.KGB activity. I
nium ore in the Congo. initi i e < and to show the confuse and !We myself in
t 8 1961 there was ~ViI~ tat};is ahead in the guesses anositions. I
On Se
p
a regular experimental atom- field of missile -production, am very far 4941 exaggerat-
is explosion of a 16-megaton as regards quality as well as -1 ing the dangers. Still, I as
quantity. an optimist and I try to eval
surveillance and control
over my movements. The
"neighbors" continue to study
me. There is some rea-
test explosion of a bomb of scientists are still quite far tively
such force in the- Soviet
missile was from being able to prove I am not disappointed i
Unionused. tAnhis R-12 test. The mis- such a superiority; but they my- life or my work. Th
launched a from the are working hard to Im- most important thing is tha
site
ched frYar. prove all types of missile I remain full of strengt
base was at
Kapustin
Varentsov was present weapons. and desire to continue thi
when the missile was Gen. Kupin says there are insufficient work. To tell the trut
launched. defense facill- about the Soviet system-!
Later when a 50-megatop ties in case of war, particu- is the goal of my life. An
lld df
ary as regarseense if I succeed in contributin
bomb was tested, to every- against radioactive sub-
little bricks to thin Brea
m
let press. All this talk
bout the Soviet Union ad-
ocating the prohibition of
uclear tests is nothing but
es.
Khrushchev will fire any-
ne who mentions complete
uspension of nuclear tests.
le is not 'ready for It.
He will sign an agreement
rohibiting nuclear tests
my after he becomes con-
inced that the U.S.S.R. is
head of the United States
the use of nuclear energy
or military purposes. The
egotiations could last an-
ther ten years without any
esults.
There is a shortage of
tomie raw materials need-
d for the atom bombs and {
issiies with nuclear war-
Bads. Almost all, the ore 9
ontaining uranium comes
o the Soviet Union from
zechoslovakia.
Recently some uranium
re deposits have been
ound in China, but they are
ery insignificant. Soviet
onazite sands and ore de-
osits are not particularly
ich either in elements nec-
ssary for atomic energy.
In view of this shortage
f atomic raw materials, it
s small wonder that our
overnment is so interested
body s surprise the explo- stances,
sion's actual force equaled, Although we tell our
that of 80 megatons. Such
fo
,.
, i people working In defense
rce was no
x
great
cu.
It was. believed that some
unforeseen chemical changes
In the charge must have
taken place after it was pre-.
pared. It Is now thought
that such a bomb with a cal-
culated force of 100 mega"
tons may actually produce
an explosion equaling that
of 150 or 160 megatons.
Why did Khrushchev un=
expectedly begin to conduct
new nuclear tests?
(The Soviets resumed nu-
clear testing on Sept. 1,
1961. They continued the
practice until the nuclear
test-ban treaty of 1963.)
All nuclear tests have had
and some still have two
phases. The first phase
deals, With the explosive
force in{TNT equivalents.
Ini3e tests the bombs
were d.p$d? from aircraft
or from special masts. The
second ph esto nuclear
payl'o"ads lily missiles.
The preient tests are al-
most exclusively on the see-
y
cause, there can be
greater satisfaction.
Condensed from the forhtcoming boo'
"The Penkovsk9 PePers." C~a 1965.
no danger -of contamination, FRIDAY: The arrest an
they are still afraid, trial of Col. Penkovsky an
Many become 41, . after Greville Wynne, after si
working for six months`. ar months' interrogation in Vu
a year. Even our nuclear- Lubianka cellars.
L n establishing Soviet con-
rol in the Copgo. l9lar
st uranium' s- Approved For Release CIA-RDP75-001498000600260013-7
'
NUV 11 1965