ONE-UPMANSHIP IN SOVIET-US SPY GAME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000600270027-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 27
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2000/08/03 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600 -1
~e-Upm~nship in: Soviet-US
spy game
"LIAV LLSl1'LJ 0.11U 0.L.LLVIIJ va
friends and acquaintances in
some of the most influential
posts in Moscow.
why_,has.. the CIAO-which only
as a half .? share, soto speak, in
hi-s-
he PenI oysky. papers-he w a s
orkin.g Jointly for the, British
lid '. the Americans-agreed to
is that some of the " secret
facts now appearing in the
" Papers " are known to me to
' In repeated messages,
"The Penkovsky Papers," when they are published in book form a monthu from - Penkovsky kept telling the ;011.
now, will be found to reveal much of the inner workings of Soviet intelligence, which tical leadership of the West that
employed him in a high post. They will show how much he was able.to report Jo the Khrushchev's bark was worse
West of Russia's military and ~~u, Ala ry for the authenticity of the Pen- than his biter that Russia did
political plans, and of the kovsky ii ipers, and the i r ward not have the military: force,
r.?ea.ovo. :i.vaU ,,1 L_ ? All T ., 11.. -------t......i..l
The releas . ^lly,_the._.Central Intelligence Agency of the reports it received during
1661-Zft''orri one+ of its most successful Russsian spies, Oleg Penkovsky, who was sen-
tenced to death in 196 is an event unprecedented in the history of espionaLye.
release them for, publication?
The answer as probably to be
ound in the context of the papers
themselves, and of the time when
they are being published.
Whether the papers have been
doctored by"the; CIA or not it is
impr;:gSlble to say, though it is
indisputable that they have been
cut. What remains provides so
nucit'evidence of the rivalry and
atred between the various parts
f the Soviet intelligence organi-
ation, of the "moral degrada-
tion," as Penkovsky describes it,
YRGH f high personages in the intel-
ligence, military, and political
community, that if true it can
hardly fail to affect their stand-
ing and careers in the S o v i e t
pion. To that extent, there-
ore, the Penkovsky papers are a
straightforward piece of psycho-
logical warfare.
Many of the people he names
have already been demoted,
some publicly and some quietly,
as a result of the investigations
made by the Russians themselves
after Penkovsky's arrest. Some,
however, are still in positions of
influence, and others have been
slowly climbing back..
Tt, ,, ,,, ,,,,,, ,.,mvlnrTi:n4n rn?nann
puLul:c1 U1L lal Ll;L 'V1lIJ W1:G11 VL " '"^`^^h R. C.y,: '- ALLL:JJ W 1Y I:JL YG "l!. Y
book by Gordon Lonsdade, the to make a present of it to Mr German troops would man the
y Last year, Lons- Khrushchev, for the October, first line of defence, and it would.
Russian spy. Oleg Penkovsky in his Revolution anniversary later that
dale, after serving three of the colonel's uniform year, and arranged a test firing, be up the Western forces to
25 years to which he was son- fight their way through. The East
tenced, was evelianged for the which was attended by some of
TT airung the most important men do the German forces, poorly equipped
British business man Greville and trained, and with question-
Wynne, i mp r i s o n e d by the. military missile programme.
po morale, would cave es would
The publ cation of the Pen- able
to The nou went according upon the Western forces would
Russians as Penkovsky's contact. kovsky papers would appear to
Lonsdale's book is a psychological he a direct reply to the Soviet plan-btdown but the new missile find themselves facing the
warfare operation in the reverse Initiative, and a warning that the forded to leave the ground. The "second echelon" of well-armed
direction. It is designed to satisfy West is prepared to play the observers waited for some 20 Soviet forces.
the curiosity of the Western game-only Parch more devastat_ minutes, t this out of the
point the missile ^ ~' cue d'
public about the Russian spy's ingly than the Russians. At least shelter.
exploded, At thi killing 300 CU~...y~
adventures from his own mouth some of those concerned in this g people,
and, in the process, to cause aspect of East-West warfare among them the Commander in
what dissension it can between would seem anxious to get their Chief of the Soviet missile forces,
Western na o v Marshal Medellin. Th onl
good deal-~ Fei~I~~i P7~L~0?4>o6~Opo27o027-1
times skilful and sometimes circle of British and American ovre press was the report on the
untimcl dead f M h N
THE COMMUNIST WORLD : BY VICTOR ZORZA
have been discussed by Western
Government experts on Russia
two or three years ago. Many
of the passages are consistent
with what has been slowly seep-
ing through the official grape-
` in the line of duty."
It is not possible in a com-
)aratively brief article like this
o do more than scratch the sur-
ace of the mine of information
-ontained in t h e Penkovsky
apers. On the diplomatic side,'
erhaps the most important ser-
ice rendered by Penkovsky was
o warn the West of The exact
ature of Soviet intentions dur-
ng the Berlin crisis of 1961, so
hnf if wac nnccihIn to f1 mu
ood time the measures neces-
ary to compel a Russian climb
mvn
threats, and that Khrushchev
made use of every opportunity
to blackmail the West by the
appearance of greater strength.
However, 'in his messages on
the Berlin crisis, Penkovsky made
it clear that the Kremlin meant
to go ahead with the signing of
the peace treaty with East Ger-
to his Western intelligence many, even if it led to hostilities,
masters. and he described the nature of
It may be that, in terms of these hostilities as envisaged in
military intelligence, the most Moscow.
important piece of information The unquiet summer of 1961
conveyed by him to the West con- i progressed towards the German
corned the " secret weapon " ' climax, with the suspension of
about which Air Khrushchev Soviet arms cuts, increased midi-
boasted in 1960. There need be Lary expenditure, and military
nu doubt that Western intelli- movements disguised as training
,once services were ordered to nranoeuvres but designed to
make every possible effort to bring the troops 'arid weag'ons
break AIr Khrushchev's secret, into Germany by D-day, he
for failure to do so might have ; reported that the final decision
put the West at a great, possibly would be made by the Soviet
decisive, disadvantage. leaders at the time of the party
This new weapon on wcongress in October, after consul-+
tation with their allies who would
Soviet scientists s were on which hic
,
Mr Khr~uslichev said, was " even fraternal abtding the congress as
However,
more perfect, more terrible" mK hchev However,
nst
than the most powerful existing mined, others seemed
were against
Weapons-it was, he said, " un. , many advand
helieveable." The marshals, Pen- the Bet~1!in adventure," and
kovsky reported to the West, Va entsov, the o Commander-In-
were oangry with Ihrushchev for chief of tactical missile forces,
his bombastic talk. who was to be demoted later for
The weapon from which is close connections with the
Khrushchev hoped so much was ,py, told Penkovsky : "We are
a missile powered by a nuclear .aking a risk, a big risk."
propellant. Having announced it The plan was to sign the peace
prcniatureily at the beginning of reaty with East Germany, and
1960, Alr Khrushchev. was Press-
t
l
ts, :
Ti
th
t h.....,, f
th
o
e
l
est
a
or
e
I crude, for Soviet policies. Intelligence experts could vouch Y i o ors al ed-
nCT r_ annr eliin and several other officers
 Approved For Release 2000/08/03 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600270027-1
The Ministry of Defence pass which Penkovsky used to gain access to the classified library. He
i
s arrest.
sent a photograph of it to the west before .h
The alarums and excursions of l
Soviet plan that summer may be forgotten
now, but it was a' close thing.
The Soviet plan was designed The headlines, even in the
"to win without a fight, but to " Guardian," spoke of The
be ready to fight if It comes to Brink of War" over Berlin
that." The Soviet General Staff procla med, Mr -, -or
overh a sstory )from
had planned a number of moves
to feel out Western intentions. Washington : ' , Russians made to
could mean
a
One tank brigade was to stand asee German crisis by for, an attack. If it was have been Macmillan lan who cannot
knocked out, another brigade was e bereading Penkovsky'n
to be sent in, and then the reports, a at first eond ae ce
second echelon, brought to wimpromptu hile playing press s conference
while golf at Gleneagles readliness on the borders of the that the Berlin crisis was "got
Soviet Union, and in Poland, and up by the press,". but soon he,
Czechoslovakia, was to be brought too, changed his tune. And in
into action. October, at the party congress,
Some of the details are much Mr - K h r s h c h e v himself
like what was suspected publicly announced ' that there was no
at the time. But, with this pre- longer any hurry about the
cise knowledge of Soviet inten- German peace treaty-and
tions, the US was able to display suddenly all was sweetness and
to the Soviet Union both by dip- light again. My guess is that the
lomatic means and by the dis- West was able to stare the
position of its forces in Europe, Russians down because it knew,
its determination to fight if need from Penkovsky, what was in Mr
be. Khrushchev's mind.
No doubt this, as many other
Penkovsky reports, would have
been accepted only after confirm-
ation ' from other intelligence
sources. But his papers leave
little doubt that he had access to
some of the most detailed and
most desirable secrets in the
annals of espionage. It can be
said with no exaggeration that
when they are presented in full
the book, which is being rushed
through the press by Doubleday
in the United States and by
Collins in Britain, will make
publishing history. .
[Copyright reserved)
CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 2000/08/03 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600270027-1
OCT 1 5 1965