THE 'MODERN SPY' EXTENDS HIS ARENA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000600290017-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 1999
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: June 9, 1963
• Content Type: NSPR

y, O d For Release 2 6%4/14 IA-R
STATINTL
Although a wave of spy stories has raised questions about the effectiveness of .
secret agents, classic espionage is being practiced on, a greatly increased scale.
By. CHRISTOPHER FELIX
To judge from the number of spy
stories, spy trials and espio-
nage mishaps which since 1960
have colored the pages of our news-
papers, a major "challenge of the
sixties" lies in the field of espionage.
The recent reverberations of the Vas-
sall case in London had scarcely died
away before Moscow was filling the
headlines with the Penkovsky-Wynne
trial. And in the background drum-
med the steady obbligato of arrests
and trials in East and West Germany,
where special spy tribunals run like
traffic courts; of Israeli agents ar-
rested in Switzerland for the attempted
assassination of German scientists
working for the United Arab Republic,
and, in America, of the C.I.A.'s recur-
ring troubles in running secret opera-
tions with Cuban exiles.
CHRISTOPHER FELIX is the pseudonym of
a former agent of the U. S. Government who
has participated in a number of secret service
operations abroad. He is the author of the,
recent "A Short Course in the Secret War."
Traditionally, publicized espionage
is a contradiction in terms. It is thus
fair to ask whether all this publicity
does not indicate that defenses against
traditional espionage methods have
now become so effective as to call
for new spying tactics. Will science
develop new "spies in the sky" and
other electronic miracles to answer
the need for intelligence-gathering in
the interests of national security, and
gradually eliminate the classic but
vulnerable-and so often embarrassing
-secret agent?
ONE answer-certainly for the six-
ties and, I'would say, for a very long
time to come-can be found in the
needs of intelligence itself. Only half
the job is done when we know . all
about Khrushchev's missiles and troop
dispositions. The other and usually
more important half is finding out
what he intends to do with them.
Intelligence is preoccupied with both
capabilities and intentions.
The U-2 flights brought back in-
valuable information on Soviet capabil-
ities-but they could tell the American
Government nothing of what the So-
viets intended to do with the arsenals
and bombers photographed. The Samos
and Midas "spy satellites" and future
refinements of them will be similarly
gifted as to capabilities and limited
as to the human factor of evaluating
intentions. The last-minute warning
of attack they might provide by detect-
ing missile firings cannot compare
to the value of a secret agent in the
Soviet Defense Ministry who would
be privy days or even weeks before
to the Soviet Ieaders' intent to attack.
(A constant danger to peace is the.
military habit of extrapolating inten-
tions from capabilities. Both world
wars revealed the failures of respon-
sible national leaders to supplement
their generals' peacetime estimates of
intentions with sound political intel-
ligence.)
A further answer lies . in the op-
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP75-00149R000600290017-0