BRITAIN'S GREAT SPY SCANDAL

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP75-00149R000600330053-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 21, 2000
Sequence Number: 
53
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 9, 1967
Content Type: 
NSPR
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP75-00149R000600330053-5.pdf140.57 KB
Body: 
$f 3eciai Correspondence to The Times-Dispatch 13 ),.N, Anthony T.ejeune i, that the head. of the British secre service was a Soviet agent? Well would you believe that the man wh almost became head of the Britis secret service, and did in fact lea the counterespionage section, was Soviet agent?. You'd better believe It because it'$- true. There n'r}v seems little doubt tha Kim Philby, the "Third Man" in th Burgess and Maclean affair and fo many years a senior officer at th heart of M16, Britain's intelligent organization', was recruited by th Soviets a few months after leavin the university in 1933, and, from the on, passed information regularly t then Communists. These startling revelations abou Philby, far more explicit than an thing which was publicly known b fore, have appeared simultaneous) in two British newspapers.. They an authenticated by Philby's son, wh has just visited him in Moscow. The r : government tried t get then:,uppressed. The Russians on the other hand, "proud of. wha was indeed ? a remarkable achieve ment and, ready enough to embar rass the British authorities, probabl helped them along a little -. whit doesn't make them any less true. . Just to rub a bit more salt in th wound, they were preceded a coups of days earlier by the first picture of. that other master spy for th Communists, George Blake, who es taped from prison last year, no apparently happy and well in Mos cow. * i,* * THE DAMAGE those two men did i incalculable. Blake betrayed who) 'sts of British agents to the Ru slans. Philby was at one time hea of MI6's Washington office, respon SW e for laisioh with the CIA and th FBI. What conclusions can we dra from these terrible cases? It is fai to say that the most blatant weak nesses in thh system were correcte after a searching investigation i 1960. It might also be argued tha the damage would have been mor restricted If the links between the British and American intelligence communities had been less close. This may be true, but the price, in terms of "over-all usefulness, would be too high to pay. And this argu- ment cuts the other way too; the most valuable spy-catching has been achieved through information passed on from one Western Intelligence network to another. In any protracted war, cold or hot, there will be disasters. These things happen. They happen to the Russians too, if we are to believe the Pen- kovsky story. But two sentences from one news- paper account of the Philby affair are worth pondering. He got away with it, The Observer says, because the system of personal contacts and trust which formed the traditional structure of the British secret serv- ice failed to take account of the fact that "the events of the thirties had eroded the loyalties 'of the younger. intelligentsia." * * * BOTH BLAKE AND PHILBY were ideological traitors - as, from the' opposite point of view, was Pen- kovsky. What matters Is the practical con- sequence, which some people have still not understood. Espionage, in the great struggle?? which divides the modern world, is not a question of sinister foreigners. peering through the long grass and sketching gun emplacements. Its vital battles, Its - fatal subversions, take place in the mind. What we are defending are not just hunks of real estate labelled Britain and America but a set of ideas, of political prior- ities, which are the conditions of freedom. The traitors and enemies against whom we must try to protect our- selves are not simply national oppo- nents but men and women, whether inside or outside our own frontiers,. who attack, betray and erode those ideas. Not to recognize this danger -- to blur it, for example, in a woolly cloud of liberal anti-anti-communism has become the gravest weakness in any security system.,,-, Approved For Release 2001/07/27: CIA-RDP75-00149R000600330053-5 Approved For Relea 8~'YR 2001GHT/27 CIA-RDP75-0dif Ob600 CPYRGHT`