THE ROLE OF OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES DURING THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP: WHAT ARE THE REAL FACTS, AND WHAT CAN WE PROPERLY CONCLUDE?
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CIA-RDP75-00149R000700380018-8
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December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 8, 2004
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$286 CO
Approved For Re-Fe]
In 1949.. after much legal: haggling. Los
Alamos became a county, and Its citizens be-
came legal residents of New Mexico with vot-
ing privileges in local, State and national
elections. In 1987;' the gates came down, and
anybody who wanted to could come and go
in the town.
Today, except for its rugged mountain act-
ting, the community of bright green lawns
and brilliant gardens looks just about like
any., suburban town, Its more than 13,000
residents enjoy an outstanding school sys-
tem, a fast-growing shopping facility and
plenty of recreation. The housing has never
Caught up with the demand and often seems
to be losing ground, but the big hope for im-
provement lies In two burgeoning subdi-
vlalons, where land and hom.ee are being
bought and built by private Individuals for
the first time in the history of tho Federal
project.
,. But. it Los Alatnos is still not quite a
"normal" cr,>7lmunity. it soon will b.i Last
fall, President 1?Iennedy signed a bill snaking
possible the shift of cun.lrlerclal and residetX-
tlal property of the (till from ?crewi to
private uwnr,rship Although the Wng pro-
cess of platting, planning mud appraisal has
begun, actual mica are not exp ci.e l Xo be'
girl oe!?.,rc ii id-l9G4 Men'whiir? toe AF (C
is planning rime than Vi lii/111Un .l,,rch of
conatruvtl,rt and nlatritei,una, t,o pit, Iii uni, -
Ipal faclite, in good, sul:.hle nt,.ipc, and
the busy mcu,hers of the Lr d Alnniot Cowt-
ty Conunissionl are tisckliug he ruuuuine',i i]
job of preparing the cornrurlnity for selt-
g,)4eI]nl:r,Xi:
nfany chasiges flare trtker> pi-ice on P:elartl,
Plateau during the pasm, two deea.ien
Changes which have ali'ect.eci riot Oldy tile
community itself, but chuilger, which have iii -
toted rrlankiliu's vi-
aton; practical systeemie for ohtaluang power
from controlled fusion. test breading fission
reactors; explorations in the fluid of inuolecu.
lar biology. QuiLe unpredlct.abte, however,
are scientific and technological break-
throughs. There were plenty of tit,%e dtr-
1ng the Laboratory's first 20 years--there are
Certain to be many more in the future
E ROLE OF OUR INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES DURING TILT; CUBAN
MILITARY BUILDUP: WHAT APE
THE REAL FAC"I'S, AND WHAT CAN
WE PROPERLY CONCLUDE?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
previous Order of the House, the' i,;entle-
man from New York I Mr Sian 1'roN i is
recognized for 45 minutes.
(Mr. S'T'RATTON asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
,
marks.
Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, as is
member of the Armed Services Con]mit-
tee and as a former intelligellc,? olflcer
in the Navy I have been gravely con-
cerned since last January with the
sweeping and. serious ch;>r>;r's that, have
been made aearrrst our es,ablislied Oov-
ernrnent Intelligence arsenclcs lit corulcc-
tiotl with their perfornranet' an the Cu-
ban crisis, For this reason I have await-
ed with great interest the release of the
committee of the other body, stlmutarla- that It to '!heir- opinion that', Ail s la p'
' trers !taw
iht3 Its findings ip Its recent investigation missiles and., tiom
Mr. Speaker, now that this report has
been released I feel constrained to tray
that I find myself baffled, mystified, and
disappointed by It. Last January and
February we found ourselves with a vio-
lent. almost hysterical attack being tliade
upon both the Integrity and the compe-
tence of our Nation's intelligence agen-
cies. Either they cannot find out the
real facts about Cuba, we were being
told, or else they are deliberately cover-
ing up. This attack became so severe
and so potentially damaging that ' on
February 6 to quiet it, the Secretary of
Defense went on nationwide television
for 2 hours with material that only a
few hours earlier had been classified as
secret or top secret-a truly unprece-
dented undertaking, which, incidentally.
was only partially succt:Sstul.
It was against this backyruund. Mr
+`'3peakei. that the sul)cornlll:'. t?f't lnovc'd
?r,tir?
to try to litid the real Arab. w' i' to
grave and very divturbir'; rr,lcsuon.s,
Wcae the intelligence peerplr' rii;itt, -or
,Acre they not? The C oiI try; uil,!lit to
know, and the people ou>;ht to kiuuun', too
This was the task to wh,rh the (i.ruin
gur.he'd sulx'olnunrttce st-i :,.e:f
Now the ve11'rii(:t Ls S. r,-tilt'' 611(1
I must, say I atn rlabbr ?r-,a,-L'-d ,.r, d?f? it -
All charges have bu'ert fnciually dis-
proved, but sornehou the ':ir'rundnu.nt has
still not been acquitted. ;ri,earl he re-
nluins under suspicion, if he it, not in-
deed actually found itulltv at least on
some counts.
I realize that the legislative procr, s
involves compromise, but ,,urely when rt
conies to a (Ines ,iotr as gr" i.('ly ticr'iuui
as the one that originally lu-d let thesub-
committee's inquiry, do not we deserve a
afore specific answer than that. If the
facts at till warrant Sueli l,.'1 ittlawel'?
Yet here i5 a jury verdict with sonic-
thing for everybody, a el large ainalgam
of both fact and fancy winch comes out
clearly and posltlvc-ly exactly nowhere.
Surely if the facts point one way, Mr.
Speaker, then we have a right, do we
riot, to expect that, the corichrslons will
follow them In the same direction?
Surely when the integrity t,.nd the coal-
petenee of our top intelligence services
have been so viciously attacked, the
American people have a rleht. to expect
a more specific and forthriu;lit answer
from this great subcommittee.
Let its look at this report. As I see
it, every single one of the grave charges
made against out, lntelligerice services
last February----botli on and off of the
floors of Congress--have been r ftciflc,t!-
ly and conclusively dlaprovedi b'y the
subcommittee's report.
Lit roc Just run dmvu :a,lne of :heir
findings, mostly in their turn yr 1-,1;:
The sut>comntittee hors lturo'rtII to evi..
dente to till t>stmntlat i ct,a>ge!e it ii ylecula-
trtat abr,ut ri photography nap lrtvrt 'x ittect
from September 5 to October 14 Ile " u .-
fence before the enhrnti,nu le'scI c thr^
rnndluislou that such chl,rges are it i!?nir. li?d
'f he news reports of an a,,Ice"d ((10 13, t lie.
twcer, the CIA sod BAG %K1, X nut )}.,lu , to
the operation of U 2 high :it1u't1. tr nn_
naimailnee flights prior r> fN ? t r ? .,,,^e
aIHO closely inquired into :'?i c t'ot' I , be
without merit.
The hyte1118epee cainrrc itj/ ,prttig-t-ted a;
that s oximately 5,400 vie, pers4tinel
were 'withdrawn from Otlbey , following the
Octotter,eonfroi}taLion. .'' A r11ot 'ot 4,000 to
L000 ad4itioxii -Have been .WIthdrawti slzltje
the prat of the year, our. iiitetllgenoa people
That, Mr. Speaker, is a direct quote; "
as
are the others, from. the subo9flir`a
own report, and that-94
ds tl 9uo$a p}at
10,000 Soviet personnel Tie epgl d6es
not mention a single word >!tt t eyi .
dente" to support the chpeF-,ill
some .quarters, that a compiabC cif
ber of Soviet personnel wht?thelr'Ca ed,
troops or i,ochilicians-have newly
rived in Cuba.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, will'.: the
gentlenliun yield? '
Mr. STRA'I"f'ON. .1 yield to the gen-
tie roan troll, l',4a:,sac h,LVetts,
Tel Rl '~}?:?1? Ho'' marry Soviet
tt'uopr', ::t" or ding to the estimates of
our uut:'lilgetice `sources. now remain in
Cuba?
Mr. S'rliATi'(iN If the gentleman
will perlu;t tie(' to (Ievelup my point of
view ft't I l'u"u- ti; r?11fiu ?.i it. I think that
we can t-1011 a.:,r us., i.ua, rutrju'ct a little
later.
Mr MIMI-SE, Mi Speaker, if the gen-
tleman will yield further, will the gen-
tleman untie that I lie presence of Soviet
troops rather than the number of Soviet
troops is the critical factor?
hir S'I RAT'I'ON. Well. I would say to
my good frieeud train Massachusetts that
I certainly agree with him that the pres-
eiice of Sovir'r troops is a matter of con-
cern, but what I and directing myself to,
however, is a specific item with respect
to the quality of our intelligence and
with respu":f to ceiuii.n suggestions that
have been niade in certain quarters that
certain. individuals have a different kind
of Intelligence from that available to our
Lop intelligence agencies. Such a sug-
gestion was made, for example, to the
effect that as many troops or techni-
cians, or whatever you want to call them,
had moved back into Cuba In recent
months as had been withdrawn earlier.
and I am simply calling to the atten
tion of the House the fact that the re-
port of the subcommittee says that a
total of 9,000 to 10,000 troops were with-
drawn from Cuba since October.
And that there is not a shred of evi-
dence in the report---I am not quoting-
but there is nothing In the report to sug-
gest that any number of troops 'or tech
'Yricians or Soviet personnel ever went
back into Cuba.
Mr. MORSE. If the gentleman will
yield fun nisi, would the gentleman agree
Lhat there arc still thousands of Soviet
troops on tilt' island of Cuba today?
Mr. STRATTON. Yes; and the re-
ports substailtlate that.
Mr. MOI3:31?: Would the gentleman
restate' lliS quotation with reference to
tiit' '.iiliotogr:rphv gap' it
Mr. STRATTON, Well, I do not mind
debating itittt the gentleman, and I am
always happy to talk with him, but my
lame Is 5:01Ie' hat 11wItt-'d.
M,'. MORSE. [ Just missed the dates.
Approved For Release 2004/12/15 : CIA-RDP751-00149R000700380018-8