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Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 3, 2005
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Publication Date: 
June 1, 1963
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PDF icon CIA-RDP75-00149R000700400010-3.pdf71.69 KB
NEW YOATC' JUN 1 1963 TERALD TRIBUlproved For Release 2005/01/04: CIA-RDP75-0' Letters to the Editor We Had the Facts on Cuba . I o the Herald Tribune: As a naval reserve intelligence officer?I cannot, let Mr. Roscoe Drummond's analysis of the Stennis. Subcommittee Report on our intelligence in the Cuban crisis go unchallenged. Mr. Drumlpsays "something needs to be done" becaulae of the inability of Mr. John A. McCone and our other intelligence chiefSta convince" the sub. committee that all. ..Soviet long-range missiles :have been removed from Cuba. Well, this report is a wondrous document: you can prove either side of the question by it. I suppose this comes from a desire for unanimity. But there is a grave question, when as fundamental an issue as the integrity and competence of our nation's in- telligence}services are concerned, whether the public interest is really served by an inquiry that stops short. of a clear-cut verdict just to keep everybody happy. In any event, one thing is clear: all of the report's, conclusions which refute charges against our intelli, gence services are based on facts, while those which give aid and comfort to the critics are either self-, contradicto,ry or rest on nothing more substantial than theoretical skepticism. Take the matter of strategic missiles. The in- telligence chiefs "to a man" conclude these missiles have.-been removed. To oppose,this impressive prp fessional judgment the committee offers only "abso- lutes" and philosophical skepticism. Theoretically,, to be sure, anything is possible. But is this really anyi way to run a railroad-or a country? Likewise, the "substantial errors" the commit- tee says resulted from a belief by some intelligence fficials that the Soviets would never put missiles An Cuba vanish in the face of facts appearing else- where in the same document. For example, from; July 1962, on all rumors about such missiles-whether contrary to "subjective" beliefs or not-were "scru- pulously" checked out, we are told, with uniformly negative results. Until the pictures came in from that Oct. 14 U-2 flight nobody-either in the Senate or out-had any confirmation of any long-range mis- sile rumors. So what "substantial errors" were there? What more could intelligence have done, even had they believed otherwise? Should' they have represented as confirmed fact rumors for which no confirmation could be found? Or was the subcommittee perhaps indulging some of the Administration's more vocal .critics in its midst by taking the intelligence com- Washington, D. C. House of Representatives. Whatever the ate "answer to our trouble- some problems in qh it can only be complicated by an unwillingness on the part of those in possession o;. the . facts to ' repudiate unequivocally unfounded charges -against an' intelligence community' that ac- tually turned in a magnificent and highly successful performance. last October. Approve,4cF -eP,glmap,49 "irni e. i e 'a s 9R000700400010-3 munity to task f r ' , powers prior to Oc IF,