GEN. TAYLOR'S NOVEL TASK: TO BE MILITARY STATEMAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000700470024-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: July 12, 1961
• Content Type: NSPR

iT'"do 11a 1
elease 2004/12/1J.-dI~4-Rb~75-00149R000700470024-1
By David Lawrence
novel hasr added to the executive system of the United
States i ~y stateman in the White House alongside a
civilian?
Thr l ttt military cirgies, here and abroad, there is
widespr c i-losity, if not, some concern, as to how the new
arrange will work out, Will it eventually mean a single
military for the Uni*ec. States reporting directly to the
President? Will it mean a agew supervisor of the whole defense
operation, both civilian an'f military?
any
than
Co
that
will
him
the
These questions have arisen
because President Xennedy has
selected Gen. Maxwell D. T,y-
lor, formerly Chief?of Staff of
the United State$ Army, to
serve in a special post at the
White Douse covering duties'
which 4ve never before been
entrusted to any single military
man.
Naturally, in the armed serv-
ices themselves there is a bit of
worry", as to what ohapges will
come, Assurances have been
giveiy,oicially by the President
e-
partrn Q state can express
its vie vg' on what ought or
ought not to be foreign policy
from .a diplomatic standpoint,
all too often, the finaf decision
rests upon whit military forces
are available to back-up,.e'leci-
sion and -what military prob-
lems may be introduces If a
certain decision is made
General Taylor Is an
standing military man a has
the respect of .his r~pcs
He also is thoroughly fait; iliar
with the work of the. J4oint
Chiefs 'of Staff, became, he
served on it and met
certain
frustrations there.
oint Chiefs of Staff
meetings will not be in
& ,jlracttcal point
asp
Fdr
(of v
Rivalries 1,etween the armed
services are due to a variety of
causes, but the principal one is
the amount of financial jeeQg-
nition given to each service
through Congressional appro-
priations, The fear that one
service will be given more
money, and hence will be per-
mitted to do more things, is
usually held by each service
chief. The functioning of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff has not
been as satisfactory as the
sponsors of the legislation had
hoped when this system was
officially created by Congress
just after World War II.
But, even during the last
war, the Joint Chiefs, though
not an official body, participat-
ed informally in conferences
with the President, who as
Commander-in-chief made the
final decisions. 'Problems aris-
ing in a "cold War" are very
different from those in a hot
war. The strategy that must be
followed in order to avoid a
"shooting war" is often more
complex than the military
=j opera ions involved in defend-
ft,, r;ainst attack.
~ 0(3 m
,6prprived FW?e i
rare who .
t.llational, policy.
y -while the D
phasis on nuclear war has re-
SU ted in neglect of ground,
n V . and air forces which are
c "conventional" and which
would be used in the event that
nuclear warfare were ' ever
banned by international agree-
President Kennedy, however,
decided to appoint Gen. Taylor
pririarily because he needed at
his. Awe some one with a miii
se wer didn't need such a
r as he himself had had
this experience in World War
II and throughout his lifetime
in the military service. B II& Mg
K discovered in connec
tron, wit I the c y s nni" .
that 4t was dif ;c_u o..poj ne
trat_on an operation its irrt-
po tant as this proved t9 'be and
Yet }ry on thenqffal, busi-
npss tIfthe government.
`Taylor's task
in seining
,
thy,, President, is likely t4, be
on ',o . examination of ttie re-
ports, that come i from all
sources , in the government as
they affect the military. He
probably' will have little or
nothing to do with arms pro-
duction or the Defense Depart-
ment as such. But he undoubt-
ed , h1i act as the', principal
viser of the President-all de-
polrcy_ andF_n.jlp a sense,
wi be somewhere in between
te Secret' df nse and
tte President wht " comes
to . broad questions of policy-
making. This is much to be
preferred. over the system
whereby the Secretary of De-
fense enters into a constant
with the Secretary of
should not be defense policy,
with nobody to decide differ-
ences-that arise between them.
Co-owd1natjou ] a ip. Job
en. Ayr,-
will basically
will ix to co-ordinate the views
of all those concerned with the
military services as well as with
the diplomatic side, but the
final decision upon the recom-
mendations he makes will, of
course, be up to the President
himself. Mr. Kennedy, on the
other hand, will feel better off
with an expert analysis of all
the information on a contro-
versial subject than he would
if he tried to make the deci-
sion after listening himself to
the contending parties.
Fears and suspicions that all
this will make a change in the
functions of the Joint Chiefs
will continue for a while, and
much will depend on the exact
manner in which Gen. Taylor
performs his duties. It will be
up to him to win the confidence
of the Joint Chiefs, as well as
of the Secretary of Defense and
Secretary of State, in his job.
as Liaison man between all of
these services and the chief
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