FOUR STARS AT PRESIDENT'S ELBOW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000700470031-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: July 6, 1961
• Content Type: NSPR

C13:1uSTlAIN
vioNITOR jUL 6 1961 ' __ t, ; -, 1
Approved For Release 2004/12/15 : CIA-RDP75-0046R60700470031-3
tiief of- e rasl iryl "to'tzIPews xc a ." :a ft ce Monitor
As Preside reedy pon- ran < of the P dent's desk n Tr urrrpet he espl,uses . a
tiered weeks ego the Cuban , n s first;m#i rite Ma ' allocation,, of service roles
landings for ensiles ribs, Mr. Ke eciy sougi. b strategic and li(nited war
Were clamorg lie, as this counsel fro~_ the Joii grces, for Instance; instead of'
pondered la1 if r Chiefs of Staff axed from Sec- clay, Navy, and Air Force
showdown dl :. rotary of Defense' Robert .; s >concepts could strongly
may well hat .Q. wry McNamara. But Secr'et'ary Mc-- influence the presidential"
ary advice right at r s el could Narnara, rvee$lcivilianof advice thinking.
t g however, the
This suggests why he caec If4it-,Iy And,yt advice of then esideUelreyos he is mak-
in Gen. Maxwell D, Ta.4 i' gt,Chiefs proved faulty and g, ii or ,j motive his contacts
former United States Air # ciently perceptive on it 1,
the Pentagon sthe
Chief of Staff, to serve `a't~ .., a,,? ent; nee Agency.
White House with the tittc x ~. `aylor', a of ' 1T wou agree to this'.
President. ,,,'. d4us-in-Cdf ibat veteran different approach, here, as in
In his book '`The Ultimate
Decision: The President as
lieved Gen. Douglas Mac-
Arthur in . Kor'ea and later
when. ..resident 'Eisenhower
a e aving authorized
f,72 ob ervation? flights over
o vret UnioAmericans
of quite diffeLedl olitical
faiths XbtSiclcie ciousty if
the commander in chief had
not, become too great, too
complex; and too terrible a
job for any one man."
In his copcl.usion Mr. May,
associate professor of history
at Harvard, points out that a
President has a wider view of
national tcrest than any
m( ret y commander
could haeconcludes that
the issue I ``not only whether
one man can stand the double
strain of the presidency and
the commander in chief but
also whether the nation can
stand to have any man except
one, the President and the
commander in, chief, deter-
mine what its fate shall be."
inent, from that employed by
President Eisenhower.
President Eisenhower pre-
ferred an orderly chain of
nels of inforniation. President ,
Kennedy seerriFto prefer'spe-
cially selecfed task forces, and
a scattered' proliferation of
-advice and advisers:' lime
magazine critically calls the
Taylor . appointment ' "one
rni, 0iceadd d to the'clam-
oring chorus of advisers Whb'
fight, fqr John Kennedy's ear.''
t. __ -- ---: 4 a.
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor S';as and using trusted men.
What counts in each case is
States commander at' Berlin whether "the system" Works.-
1949-51 ),_ 1W-, r_s?watch In the Cuba fiasco, the system
gi1; llixary planning for. the lnahteaty did not work; the
big crises and keep,. rack of advice was one-sided and
A P Q P n #ligency. faces Berlin; and he has added
derstandably produced mixed EliT e military side which he
emotions at the Pentagon. believes will,,serve to,increase
General Taylor's four-star the range o' choices and the
rank, his brilliance in espous- Pu'cisron ?of, . t lligence a ~-
and his rayed before him when the
ing his own ideas
,
President kennedy, did not 'closeness t6 President Ken- great moments oTd vision ar-
bring m'" in the'way of stra- nedy threaten to downgrade rive.'-
tegic y experience `to the Joint Chiefs in their role. In the last analysis, the
the WilIte' grsc,.as did t1 of top military advisers to safety of,the nation, will de-
.
Eislhower. Consequent the President. . pond in a degree on how effec-
ly,, as with, President Truman Mo. cover, General Taylor tively the President, who
and his,e, of Admiral Wil- has favored ' unorthodox must also by the Constitution.
Liam D1111
y,, there is an ideas: for instance replacing be the commander 'in chief,
arguable' for having an the corporate-body Joint uses his 'owii preferred sys-
active, wide-ratrging military Chiefs with a single chief of tong .``
c ?was the first United other departments of govern- i
Approved For Release 2004/12/15 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000700470031-3